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This paper provides the first nationwide U.S. evidence on the effects of electric vehicle (EV) adoption on air quality and child health. Using county-level data from 2010–2021, we link EV registrations to air pollution, birth outcomes, and emergency department visits. Endogenous adoption is addressed using two-way fixed effects and an instrumental variables strategy exploiting the rollout of federally designated Alternative Fuel Corridors. Greater EV adoption significantly lowers nitrogen dioxide and improves infant and child health, reducing very low birth weight, prematurity, and asthma-related emergency visits. The largest health gains occur in high-pollution areas and exceed $1.2–$4.0 billion annually.

Human capital is central to efforts to promote growth, convergence, and the elimination of poverty. Drawing on seminal macroeconomic frameworks by Nelson-Phelps, Lucas, and subsequent developments, alongside macro and microeconomic evidence, the chapter examines the role of human capital in driving innovation and growth, emphasizing how different types of human capital matter at different stages of development, and discussing obstacles to accumulation and evidence from policy interventions.

This chapter, prepared for the Handbook of Development Economics (Vol. 6), reviews recent microeconomic evidence on the causes of resource misallocation in developing countries. It distinguishes between “technological” and “distortionary” wedges, develops a unified theoretical framework linking market power, taxes, financial frictions, and firm dynamics, and summarizes empirical findings from the “direct approach” to misallocation. The authors emphasize how wedges vary by firm size and discuss policy implications for improving allocative efficiency.

We study mechanism design for a sophisticated agent with non-expected utility (EU)
preferences. We show that the revelation principle holds if and only if all types are EU
maximizers: if at least one type is a non-EU maximizer, randomizing over dynamic
mechanisms generates a strictly larger set of implementable allocations than using static
mechanisms. Moreover, dynamic stochastic mechanisms can fully extract the private
information of any type who doesn’t have uniformly quasi-concave preferences without
providing that type any rent. Full-surplus extraction is possible in a broad variety of
non-EU environments, but impossible for types with concave preferences.

We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient allocations. We address this limitation by proposing data-driven mechanisms that condition transfers on additional post-allocation information, modeled as an estimator of the payoff-relevant state. Our mechanisms extend the classic Vickrey–Clarke–Groves framework. We show they achieve exact implementation in posterior equilibrium when the state is fully revealed or utilities are affine in an unbiased estimator. With a consistent estimator, they achieve approximate implementation that converges to exact implementation as the estimator converges, and we provide bounds on the convergence rate. We demonstrate applications to digital advertising auctions and AI shopping assistants, where user engagement naturally reveals relevant information, and to procurement auctions with consumer spot markets, where additional information arises from a pricing game played by the same agents.

We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a “completeness” statistical condition, any “identifiable” equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate’s information. In canonical specifications, politicians may “anti-pander” (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result.

Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters’ interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents’ performance and decide whether to replace them. Politicians may be “good” types who always exert effort or opportunists who may shirk. We find that good long-run outcomes are always attainable, though the mechanism and its robustness depend on economic conditions. In environments conducive to incentive provision, some equilibria feature sustained effort, yet others exhibit some long-run shirking. In the complementary case, opportunists are never fully disciplined, but selection dominates: every equilibrium eventually settles on a good politician, yielding permanent effort.

How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers’ costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that notably simple mechanisms—those that share a constant fraction of the buyer utility with the seller—allow the buyer to realize a guaranteed positive fraction of the efficient social surplus across all possible costs. Moreover, a judicious choice of the share based on the known demand maximizes the surplus ratio guarantee that can be attained across all possible (arbitrarily complex and nonlinear) mechanisms and cost functions. Results apply to related nonlinear pricing and optimal regulation problems.