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Publications

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Discussion Paper
Abstract

Recent literature suggests that both stock returns and economic growth are significantly higher under Democratic presidential administrations. This is a puzzle in that persistent differences in stock returns seem unlikely in efficient markets, and it is not obvious why Democrats should do better. Often these kinds of results go away upon further analysis or more data, and this appears to be true in the present case. In this paper the sample is extended to 28 administrations, fromWilson-1 through Biden. While the mean stock return under the Democrats is higher, none of the differences in means is significant at conventional significance levels. There is considerable variation in the mean return across administrations, which results in lack of significance. Similarly, while the mean output growth rate under the Democrats is larger, the difference is not significant. Again, there is considerable variation in output growth across administrations. Results are also presented with the nine administrations between Hayes and Taft added, a total of 37 administrations. While the added data are likely not as good, the conclusion is the same—no significant differences.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion).

We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and items, even with a continuum of buyer values. The seller optimally pools buyer values and reduces product variety to minimize informational rents.

We show that value pooling is optimal even for finite value distributions if their entropy exceeds a critical threshold. We also provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal menu restricts offering to a single item.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

In digital advertising, the allocation of sponsored search, sponsored product, or display advertisements is mediated by auctions. The generation of bids in these auctions for attention is increasingly supported by auto-bidding algorithms and platform-provided data. We analyze the equilibrium properties of a sequence of increasingly sophisticated auto-bidding algorithms. First, we consider the equilibrium bidding behavior of an individual advertiser who controls the auto-bidding algorithm through the choice of their budget. Second, we examine the interaction when all bidders use budget-controlled bidding algorithms. Finally, we derive the bidding algorithm that maximizes the platform’s revenue while ensuring all advertisers continue to participate.

Journal of Financial Economics
Abstract

We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homogeneous present bias, β, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of 1−β. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.

American Economic Review
Abstract

We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently concluded incentive auction that repurposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the United States. We document significant multilicense ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multilicense owners have an inventive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation and simulation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction increases payouts to TV stations by between 13.5 percent and 42.4 percent.

American Economic Review
Abstract

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing its bond market by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalizes China's strategy as trying to build credibility as a safe issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We use our framework to shed light on China's response to episodes of capital outflows.

American Economic Review: Insights
Abstract

We test whether payments for ecosystem services (PES) can curb the highly polluting practice of crop residue burning in India. Standard PES contracts pay participants after verification that they met a proenvironment condition (clearing fields without burning). We randomize paying a portion of the money up front and unconditionally to address liquidity constraints and farmer distrust, which may undermine the standard contract's effectiveness. Incorporating partial up-front payment into the contract increases compliance by 10 percentage points, which is corroborated by satellite-based burning measurements. The cost per life saved is $3,600–$5,400. The standard PES contract has no effect on burning.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

We characterize the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions from [0,1]^n to [0,1], as well as the extreme points of the set of one-dimensional marginals of these functions. These characterizations lead to new results in various mechanism design and information design problems, including public good provision with interdependent values; interim efficient bilateral trade mechanisms; asymmetric reduced form auctions; and optimal private private information structure. As another application, we also present a mechanism anti-equivalence theorem for two-agent, two-alternative social choice problems: A mechanism is payoff-equivalent to a deterministic DIC mechanism if and only if they are ex-post equivalent.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

We study the intergenerational effect of education policy on crime. We use Swedish administrative data that links outcomes across generations with crime records, and we show that the comprehensive school reform, gradually implemented between 1949 and 1962, reduced conviction rates both for the generation directly affected by the reform and for their sons. The reduction in conviction rates occurred in many types of crime. The key mediators of this reduction in child generation are an increase in education and household income and a decrease in crime among their fathers.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

This paper provides a framework in which a multiproduct ecosystem competes with many single-product firms in both price and innovation. The ecosystem is able to use data collected on one product to improve the quality of its other products. We study the impact of data regulation which either restricts the ecosystem's cross-product data usage, or which requires it to share data with small firms. Each policy induces small firms to innovate more and set higher prices; it also dampens data spillovers within the ecosystem, reduces the ecosystem's incentive to collect data and innovate, and potentially increases its prices. As a result, data regulation has an ambiguous impact on consumers, and is more likely to benefit consumers when small firms are relatively more efficient in innovation. A data cooperative among small firms, which helps them to share data with each other, does not necessarily benefit small firms and can even harm consumers.