The growing availability of big data enables firms to predict consumer search outcomes and outside options more accurately than consumers themselves. This paper examines how a firm can utilize such superior information to offer personalized buy-now discounts intended to deter consumer search. However, discounts can also serve as signals of attractive outside options, potentially encouraging rather than discouraging consumer search. We show that, despite the firm’s ability to tailor discounts across a continuum of consumer valuations, the firm-optimal equilibrium features a simple two-tier discount scheme, comprising a uniform positive discount when the consumer outside option is intermediate and no discount when the outside option is low or high. Furthermore, compared to a scenario where the firm lacks superior information, we find that the firm earns lower profits, consumers search more while their welfare remains unchanged, and total welfare declines.
This paper develops and applies new asymptotic theory for estimation and inference in parametric autoregression with function valued cross section curve time series. The study provides a new approach to dynamic panel regression with high dimensional dependent cross section data. Here we deal with the stationary case and provide a full set of results extending those of standard Euclidean space autoregression, showing how function space curve cross section data raises efficiency and reduces bias in estimation and shortens confidence intervals in inference. Methods are developed for high-dimensional covariance kernel estimation that are useful for inference. The findings reveal that function space models with wide-domain and narrow-domain cross section dependence provide insights on the effects of various forms of cross section dependence in discrete dynamic panel models with fixed and interactive fixed effects. The methodology is applicable to panels of high dimensional wide datasets that are now available in many longitudinal studies. An empirical illustration is provided that sheds light on household Engel curves among ageing seniors in Singapore using the Singapore life panel longitudinal dataset.
A soft-floor auction asks bidders to accept an opening price to participate in an ascending auction. If no bidder accepts, lower bids are considered using first-price rules. Soft floors are common despite being irrelevant with standard assumptions. When bidders regret losing, soft-floor auctions are more efficient and profitable than standard optimal auctions. Revenue increases as bidders are inclined to accept the opening price to compete in a regret-free ascending auction. Efficiency is improved since having a soft floor allows for a lower hard reserve price, reducing the frequency of no sale. Theory and experiment confirm these motivations from practice.
We quantify how pollution affects aggregate productivity and welfare in spatial equilibrium. We show that skilled workers in China emigrate away from polluted cities. These patterns are evident under various empirical specifications, such as when instrumenting for pollution using upwind power plants, or thermal inversions. Pollution changes the spatial distribution of skilled and unskilled workers, and wage returns by location. We quantify the loss in aggregate productivity due to this re-sorting by estimating a spatial equilibrium model. Counterfactual simulations show that reducing pollution increases productivity through spatial re-sorting by approximately as much as the direct health benefits of clean air.
We show that the higher-orders and their interactions of the common sparse linear factors can effectively subsume the factor zoo. To this extend, we propose a forward selection Fama-MacBeth procedure as a method to estimate a high-dimensional stochastic discount factor model, isolating the most relevant higher-order factors. Applying this approach to terms derived from six widely used factors (the Fama-French five-factor model and the momentum factor), we show that the resulting higher-order model with only a small number of selected higher-order terms significantly outperforms traditional benchmarks both in-sample and out-of-sample. Moreover, it effectively subsumes a majority of the factors from the extensive factor zoo, suggesting that the pricing power of most zoo factors is attributable to their exposure to higher-order terms of common linear factors.
While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life-years from transplantation (LYFT). We examine the role of choice in increasing LYFT and compare realized assignments to benchmarks that remove choice. Our model combines choices and outcomes in order to study how selection affects LYFT. We show how to identify and estimate the model using instruments derived from the mechanism. The estimates suggest that the design in use selects patients with better post-transplant survival prospects and matches them well, resulting in an average LYFT of 9.29, which is 1.75 years more than a random assignment. However, the maximum aggregate LYFT is 14.08. Realizing the majority of the gains requires transplanting relatively healthy patients, who would have longer life expectancies even without a transplant. Therefore, a policymaker faces a dilemma between transplanting patients who are sicker and those for whom life will be extended the longest.
We develop a theory of sectoral fluctuations driven by the propagation of demand shocks along supply chains with heterogeneous time-to-build production. We solve the model in closed form. Downstream producers respond directly to current demand. Upstream producers, due to time-to-build delays, respond to anticipated future demand. Consequently, hump-shaped demand shocks to downstream goods propagate and amplify along the supply chain, generating pronounced volatility in upstream sectors and creating the bullwhip effect. Empirically and quantitatively, we show that the bullwhip is significant across downstream sectors that are important for final consumption.
To safeguard economic and financial stability policymakers regularly take actions designed to increase resilience to systemic risks and curb speculative market behavior. To assess the effectiveness of such mitigation policies, we introduce a counterfactual approach tailored to accommodate the mildly explosive dynamics that occur during speculative bubbles. We derive asymptotics of the estimated treatment effect under a common factor structure that allows for explosive, I(1), and stationary factors, thereby having applicability to a wide range of prevailing economic conditions. An inferential procedure is proposed for the policy treatment effect that has asymptotic validity and demonstrates satisfactory finite sample performance. An empirical analysis examines the monetary policy of interest rate hikes implemented by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, beginning in October 2021.This policy exerted a statistically significant cooling effect on all regional housing markets in New Zealand. Our findings show that this policy led to 20%-33% reductions in house prices in five out of six regions seven months after the enactment of the interest rate hike.
We study mechanism design when agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. We show that standard message-driven mechanisms cannot implement socially efficient allocations when agents have multidimensional types, even under favorable conditions.
To overcome this limitation, we propose data-driven mechanisms that leverage additional post-allocation information, modeled as an estimator of the payoff-relevant state. Our data-driven mechanisms extend the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves class. We show that they achieve exact implementation in posterior equilibrium when the state is either fully revealed or the utility is affine in an unbiased estimator. We also show that they achieve approximate implementation with a consistent estimator, converging to exact implementation as the estimator converges, and present bounds on the convergence rate.
We demonstrate applications to digital advertising auctions and large language model (LLM)-based mechanisms, where user engagement naturally reveals relevant information.
Cointegrating rank selection is studied in a function space reduced rank regression where the data are time series of cross section curves. A semiparametric approach to rank selection is employed using information criteria suitably modified to take account of the function space context, extending the linear cointegrating model to accommodate cross section data under general forms of dependence. A parametric formulation is employed analogous to recent work on cross section curve autoregression and cointegrating regression. Consistent cointegrating rank estimation is developed by the use of information criteria methods that are extended to the curve time series environment. The asymptotic theory involves two parameter Gaussian processes that generalize the standard limit processes involved in cointegrating regressions with conventional multiple time series. Simulations provide evidence of the effectiveness of consistent rank selection by the BIC criterion and the tendency of AIC to overestimate order as it does in standard lag order selection in autoregression as well as in reduced rank regression with multiple time series.