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This chapter, prepared for the Handbook of Development Economics (Vol. 6), reviews recent microeconomic evidence on the causes of resource misallocation in developing countries. It distinguishes between “technological” and “distortionary” wedges, develops a unified theoretical framework linking market power, taxes, financial frictions, and firm dynamics, and summarizes empirical findings from the “direct approach” to misallocation. The authors emphasize how wedges vary by firm size and discuss policy implications for improving allocative efficiency.

We study mechanism design for a sophisticated agent with non-expected utility (EU)
preferences. We show that the revelation principle holds if and only if all types are EU
maximizers: if at least one type is a non-EU maximizer, randomizing over dynamic
mechanisms generates a strictly larger set of implementable allocations than using static
mechanisms. Moreover, dynamic stochastic mechanisms can fully extract the private
information of any type who doesn’t have uniformly quasi-concave preferences without
providing that type any rent. Full-surplus extraction is possible in a broad variety of
non-EU environments, but impossible for types with concave preferences.

We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient allocations. We address this limitation by proposing data-driven mechanisms that condition transfers on additional post-allocation information, modeled as an estimator of the payoff-relevant state. Our mechanisms extend the classic Vickrey–Clarke–Groves framework. We show they achieve exact implementation in posterior equilibrium when the state is fully revealed or utilities are affine in an unbiased estimator. With a consistent estimator, they achieve approximate implementation that converges to exact implementation as the estimator converges, and we provide bounds on the convergence rate. We demonstrate applications to digital advertising auctions and AI shopping assistants, where user engagement naturally reveals relevant information, and to procurement auctions with consumer spot markets, where additional information arises from a pricing game played by the same agents.

We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a “completeness” statistical condition, any “identifiable” equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate’s information. In canonical specifications, politicians may “anti-pander” (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result.

Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters’ interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents’ performance and decide whether to replace them. Politicians may be “good” types who always exert effort or opportunists who may shirk. We find that good long-run outcomes are always attainable, though the mechanism and its robustness depend on economic conditions. In environments conducive to incentive provision, some equilibria feature sustained effort, yet others exhibit some long-run shirking. In the complementary case, opportunists are never fully disciplined, but selection dominates: every equilibrium eventually settles on a good politician, yielding permanent effort.

How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers’ costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that notably simple mechanisms—those that share a constant fraction of the buyer utility with the seller—allow the buyer to realize a guaranteed positive fraction of the efficient social surplus across all possible costs. Moreover, a judicious choice of the share based on the known demand maximizes the surplus ratio guarantee that can be attained across all possible (arbitrarily complex and nonlinear) mechanisms and cost functions. Results apply to related nonlinear pricing and optimal regulation problems.

We develop a methodology for modeling household income processes when subjective probabilistic assessments of future income are available. This allows us to flexibly estimate conditional cdf s directly using elicited individual subjective probabilities, and to obtain empirical measurements of subjective risk and subjective persistence. We then use two longitudinal surveys collected in rural India and rural Colombia to explore the nature of perceived income dynamics in those contexts. Our results suggest linear income processes are rejected in favor of more flexible versions in both cases; subjective income distributions feature heteroskedasticity, conditional skewness and nonlinear persistence.

We propose a new formulation of the maximum score estimator that uses compositions of rectified linear unit (ReLU) functions, instead of indicator functions as in Manski (1975, 1985), to encode the sign alignment restrictions. Since the ReLU function is Lipschitz, our new ReLU-based maximum score criterion function is substantially easier to optimize using standard gradient-based optimization pacakges. We also show that our ReLU-based maximum score (RMS) estimator can be generalized to an umbrella framework defined by multi-index single-crossing (MISC) conditions, while the original maximum score estimator cannot be applied. We establish the n −s/(2s+1) convergence rate and asymptotic normality for the RMS estimator under order-s Holder smoothness. In addition, we propose an alternative estimator using a further reformulation of RMS as a special layer in a deep neural network (DNN) architecture, which allows the estimation procedure to be implemented via state-of-the-art software and hardware for DNN.