We assess the capacity of gerrymandering to undermine the will of the people in a representative democracy. Citizens have political positions represented on a spectrum, and electoral maps separate people into districts. We show that unrestrained gerrymandering can severely distort the composition of a legislature, potentially leading half the population to lose all representation of their views. This means that, under majority rule in the congress, gerrymandering enables politicians to enact any legislation of their choice as long as it falls within the interquartile range of the political spectrum. Just as worrisome, gerrymandering can rig any legislation to pass instead of the median policy, which would otherwise prevail in a referendum against any other choice.
We propose framing human action in physics before reaching to biology and social sciences, rearranging the order of their usual deployment. As an example, consider efforts to model altruism that start in a frame of psychological or social attributes such as reciprocity, empathy, and identity. Evolutionary roots might also be used by appeal to survival of the species from biology. Only then the modeler abstracts to work on notations, and to establish relationships using mathematical apparatus from physics. This top-down deployment of principles from various scientific disciplines has generated a body of coherent models, partially generalizable theories, and disagreements. In this paper we present a definition of action as a movement between two points in the relevant space, and explore reversing the direction of deploying scientific theories, starting with the principle of least action in physics to frame observed human action. Used as an organizing principle of the whole universe, optimization element in human behavior does not have to be presumed to arise from animate aspects of adaptive and cognitive faculties; emergence of social phenomena, when optimal, can be disconnected from methodological individualism. Our three-tier framework makes room for physical, biological and social science principles, proposing a new perspective on human behavior, sans reductionism.
We use data from marriage records in Murcia, Spain, in the eighteenth century to study the role of women in social mobility in the pre-modern era. Our measure of social standing is identification as a don or doña, an honorific denoting high, though not necessarily noble, status. We show that this measure, which is acquired over the lifecycle, shows gendered transmission patterns. In particular, same-sex transmission is stronger than opposite-sex, for both sons and daughters. The relative transmission from fathers versus mothers varies over the lifecycle, and grandparents may affect the status of their grandchildren.
The author of this article describes the content of her course titled “Economics of Artificial Intelligence and Innovation.” The course is offered by the Department of Economics of Yale University at a senior undergraduate level. The author also teaches this course at the MBA program of the Yale School of Management in another format.
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with stochastic click-through rates and known valuations per click. The auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the clickthrough auction, namely the generalized second-price auction. Yet, the auctioneer can design the information flow regarding the clickthrough rates among the bidders. We require that the information structure to be calibrated in the learning sense. With this constraint, the auction needs to rank the ads by a product of the value and a calibrated prediction of the click-through rates. The task of designing an optimal information structure is thus reduced to the task of designing an optimal calibrated prediction.
We show that in a symmetric setting with uncertainty about the click-through rates, the optimal information structure attains both social efficiency and surplus extraction. The optimal information structure requires private (rather than public) signals to the bidders. It also requires correlated (rather than independent) signals, even when the underlying uncertainty regarding the click-through rates is independent. Beyond symmetric settings, we show that the optimal information structure requires partial information disclosure, and achieves only partial surplus extraction.
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turn-out and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.
Marketers routinely use timing as a segmentation device through sequential product releases. While there has been much theoretical research on the optimal introduction strategy of sequential releases, there is little empirical research on this problem. This paper develops an econometric model to empirically solve the inter-release timing problem: it involves (1) developing and estimating a structural model of consumers’ choice for sequentially released products and (2) using the estimates of the structural model to solve for the optimal inter-release time. The empirical application focuses on the movie industry, where we specifically address the issue of the inter-release time between a theatrical movie and its DVD version. We find that consumers are indeed forward looking; a shrinking movie-DVD release window does negatively impact box office revenues, but there is a tradeoff in that there is greater residual buzz from the movie marketing that supports the sales of DVD due to the shorter time window. This leads to an inverted U shaped relationship between movie-DVD release window and revenues, and the theater-DVD window that maximizes industry revenue for the average movie during the data period is 2.5 months.