The demand for air quality depends on health impacts and defensive investments, but little research assesses the empirical importance of defenses. A rich quasi-experiment suggests that the Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Budget Program (NBP), a cap-and-trade market, decreased NOx emissions, ambient ozone concentrations, pharmaceutical expenditures, and mortality rates. The annual reductions in pharmaceutical purchases, a key defensive investment, and mortality are valued at about $800 million and $1.1 billion, respectively, suggesting that defenses are over one-third of willingness-to-pay for reductions in NOx emissions. Further, estimates indicate that the NBP’s benefits easily exceed its costs and that NOx reductions have substantial benefits.
In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to maximize own compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative outcomes due to private information — ex-ante customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post customer moral hazard after acquisition. This paper investigates potential positive and negative responses of a salesforce to managerial levers — multidimensional incentives for acquisition and retention performance and job transfers that affect the level of private information.
Salespeople are responsible for managing customer relationships and compensated through multidimensional performance incentives for customer acquisition and maintenance at many firms. This paper investigates how a salesperson’s private information on customers affect their response to multiple dimensions of incentives. Using unique matched panel data that links individual salesperson performance metrics with customer level loans and repayments from a microfinance bank, we find that sales people indeed possess private information that is not available to the firm. Salespeople use the private information to engage in adverse selection of customers in response to acquisition incentives. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual purpose; they not only reduce loan defaults, but also moderate adverse selection in customer acquisition. Transfers that eliminate private information reduces the adverse selection effects of acquisition incentives, but increase loan defaults — customer moral hazard. Despite the potential negative adverse selection effects due to private information, the effort increasing effect of each of the three dimensions of sales management we investigate — acquisition incentive, maintenance incentive and transfers all have a net positive effect on firm value. Methodologically, the paper introduces an identification strategy to separate customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (loan repayment), by leveraging the multidimensional incentives of an intermediary (salesperson) responsible for both customer selection and repayment with private information about customers.
This article studies the structural transformation of Russia in 1885–1940 from an agrarian to an industrial economy through the lens of a two-sector neoclassical growth model. We construct a data set that covers Tsarist Russia during 1885–1913 and Soviet Union during 1928–1940. We develop a methodology that allows us to identify the types of frictions and economic mechanisms that had the largest quantitative impact on Russian economic development. We find that entry barriers and monopoly power in the nonagricultural sector were the most important reason for Tsarist Russia’s failure to industrialize before World War I. Soviet industrial transformation after 1928 was achieved primarily by reducing such frictions, albeit coinciding with a significantly lower performance of productivity in both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. We find no evidence that Tsarist agricultural institutions were a significant barrier to labour reallocation to manufacturing, or that “Big Push” mechanisms were a major driver of Soviet growth.
How sensitive is Earth’s climate to a given increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations? This long-standing and fundamental question in climate science was recently analyzed by dynamic panel data methods using extensive spatiotemporal data of global surface temperatures, solar radiation, and GHG concentrations over the last half century to 2010 (Storelvmo et al, 2016). These methods revealed that atmospheric aerosol effects masked approximately one-third of the continental warming due to increasing GHG concentrations over this period, thereby implying greater climate sensitivity to GHGs than previously thought. The present study provides asymptotic theory justifying the use of these methods when there are stochastic process trends in both the global forcing variables, such as GHGs, and station-level trend effects from such sources as local aerosol pollutants. These asymptotics validate con dence interval construction for econometric measures of Earth’s transient climate sensitivity. The methods are applied to observational data and to data generated from three leading global climate models (GCMs) that are sampled spatio-temporally in the same way as the empirical observations. The fi ndings indicate that estimates of transient climate sensitivity produced by these GCMs lie within empirically determined con dence limits but that the GCMs uniformly underestimate the effects of aerosol induced dimming. The analysis shows the potential of econometric methods to calibrate GCM performance against observational data and to reveal the respective sensitivity parameters (GHG and non-GHG related) governing GCM temperature trends.