This paper discusses some macro links that are missing from trade models. A multicountry macroeconometric model is used to analyze the effects on the United States of increased import competition from China, an experiment that is common in the recent trade literature. In the macro story a fall in Chinese export prices is stimulative. Domestic prices fall, which increases real wage rates and real wealth, which increases household expenditures. Trade models do not have these channels, and they likely overestimate the negative effects or underestimate the positive effects on total output and employment from increased Chinese import competition. They lack some important aggregate demand channels.
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender’s and the Receiver’s equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the lie detection technology because the Sender simply compensates by lying more. When the lie detection probability is sufficiently high, the Sender’s (Receiver’s) equilibrium payoff decreases (increases) with the lie detection probability.
We build an equilibrium model of a small open economy with labor market frictions and imperfectly enforced regulations. Heterogeneous firms sort into the formal or informal sector. We estimate the model using data from Brazil, and use counterfactual simulations to understand how trade affects economic outcomes in the presence of informality. We show that: (1) Trade openness unambiguously decreases informality in the tradable sector, but has ambiguous effects on aggregate informality. (2) The productivity gains from trade are understated when the informal sector is omitted. (3) Trade openness results in large welfare gains even when informality is repressed. (4) Repressing informality increases productivity, but at the expense of employment and welfare. (5) The effects of trade on wage inequality are reversed when the informal sector is incorporated in the analysis. (6) The informal sector works as an “unemployment,” but not a “welfare buffer” in the event of negative economic shocks.
This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive mixed bundling with an arbitrary number of firms. We examine both a firm’s incentive to introduce mixed bundling and equilibrium tariffs when all firms adopt the mixed-bundling strategy. In the duopoly case, relative to separate sales, mixed bundling has ambiguous impacts on prices, profit and consumer surplus; with many firms, however, mixed bundling typically lowers all prices, harms firms and benefits consumers.
This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures which induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures which are optimal for firms and those which are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less-preferred product. Our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly.
I investigate the optimal timing and length of breaks in a model with fatigue. A break’s length determines the worker’s productivity once work is resumed. I show that all breaks should be identical, equally spaced and long enough to fully recover productivity. When taking breaks is costless, the higher the number of breaks the better. Otherwise, the optimal number is finite and those workers whose productivity falls more at the beginning of the day should take more breaks. Workaholics take their breaks too early and make them too short, from the employers’ viewpoint. The opposite is true for leisure-oriented workers.