We study a dynamic contribution game where investors seek private benefits that are offered in exchange for contributions and a single, publicly-minded donor values project success. We show that donor contributions serve as costly signals that encourage socially-productive contributions by investors who face a coordination problem. Investors and the donor prefer different equilibria but all benefit in expectation from the donor’s ability to dynamically signal his valuation. We explore various contexts in which our model can be applied and delve empirically into the case of Kickstarter. We calibrate our model and quantify the coordination benefits of dynamic signaling in counterfactuals.
We analyze the welfare impact of a monopolist able to segment a multiproduct market and offer differentiated price menus within each segment. We characterize a family of extremal distributions such that all achievable welfare outcomes can be reached by selecting segments from within these distributions. This family of distributions arises as the solution to the consumer maximizing distribution of values for multigood markets. With these results, we analyze the effect of segmentation on consumer surplus and prices in both interior and extremal markets, including conditions under which there exists a segmentation benefiting all consumers. Finally, we present an efficient algorithm for computing segmentations.
We characterize the bidders' surplus maximizing information structure in an optimal auction for a single unit good and related extensions to multi-unit and multi-good problems. The bidders seeks to find a balance between participation (and the avoidance of exclusion) and efficiency. The information structure that maximizes the bidders surplus is given by a generalized Pareto distribution at the center of demand distribution, and displays complete information disclosure at either end of the Pareto distribution.
We analyze sorting in a frictional labor market when workers and jobs have multidimensional characteristics. We say that matching is positive assortative in dimension (j, k) if workers with higher endowment in skill k are matched to a job distribution with higher values of attribute j in the first-order stochastic dominance sense. Crucial for sorting is a single-crossing property of technology. Sorting is positive between worker-job attributes with strong complementarities but negative in other dimensions. Finally, sorting is based on comparative advantage: workers sort into jobs that suit their skill mix rather than their overall skill level.
Which information structures are more effective at eliminating first- and higher-order uncertainty and hence at facilitating efficient play in coordination games? We consider a learning setting where players observe many private signals about the state. First, we characterize multiagent learning efficiency, that is, the rate at which players approximate common knowledge. We find that this coincides with the rate at which first-order uncertainty disappears, as higher-order uncertainty vanishes faster than first-order uncertainty. Second, we show that with enough signal draws, information structures with higher learning efficiency induce higher equilibrium welfare. We highlight information design implications for games in data-rich environments.
Why do the prices of some products change little during business cycles while the prices of others vary wildly and tend to rise during economic booms and fall during recessions? In particular, why do the prices of some products not fall or fall only a little when the demand for them declines dramatically. It is not surprising that in highly competitive industries prices fluctuate with shifts in demand and supply, but what explains the stability of prices in markets where firms have more direct control of prices? These questions are central to an understanding of business cycles, and good answers would also help us predict how prices will behave.
Commitment to the behaviorist approach to utility theory, to the usefulness of mathematics in economic analysis, and to equalization of the marginal utility of income as a principle of just taxation brought Irving Fisher and Ragnar Frisch to attempt to measure the marginal utility of income and led them to collaborate in forming the Econometric Society and sponsoring the establishment of the Cowles Commission, institutions advancing economic theory in connection to mathematics and statistics, and led Frisch to pioneer an axiomatic approach to utility and microeconomic theory.
A number of producers of heterogeneous goods with heterogeneous costs compete in prices. When producers know their own production costs and consumers know their values, consumer surplus and total surplus are aligned: the information structure and equilibrium that maximize consumer surplus also maximize total surplus. We report when alignment extends to the case where either consumers are uncertain about their own values or producers are uncertain about their own costs, and we also give examples showing when it does not. Less information for either producers or consumers may intensify competition in a way that benefits consumers but results in inefficient production.
This study provides new mechanisms for identifying and estimating explosive bubbles in mixed-root panel autoregressions with a latent group structure. A postclustering approach is employed that combines k-means clustering with right-tailed panel-data testing. Uniform consistency of the k-means algorithm is established. Pivotal null limit distributions of the tests are introduced. A new method is proposed to consistently estimate the number of groups. Monte Carlo simulations show that the proposed methods perform well in finite samples; and empirical applications of the proposed methods identify bubbles in the U.S. and Chinese housing markets and the U.S. stock market.
This paper uses world records by age in running, swimming, and rowing to estimate a biological frontier of decline rates for both men and women. Decline rates are assumed to be linear in percent terms up to a certain age and then quadratic after that, where the transition age is estimated. For both men and women decline rates are smallest for rowing, followed by swimming and then running.
Decline rates for women are roughly the same as those for men for the short swimming events. They are slightly larger for the longer swimming events and for the rowing events. They are largest for running, more so for the longer events than the shorter ones. The age at which there is a 50 percent decline from age 40 ranges from 70 to 90, an optimistic result for humans. The estimated decline rates can be used by non physically elite people under the assumption that their decline rates in percentage terms are similar to those of the elite athletes.