Eduardo Dávila Publications

This paper develops probability pricing, extending cash flow pricing to quantify the willingness-to-pay for changes in probabilities. We show that the value of any marginal change in probabilities can be expressed as a standard asset-pricing formula with hypothetical cash flows derived from changes in the survival function. This equivalence between probability and cash flow valuation allows us to construct hedging strategies and systematically decompose individual and aggregate willingness-to-pay. Four applications examine the valuation of changes in the distribution of aggregate consumption, the efficiency effects of varying performance precision in principal-agent problems, and the welfare implications of public and private information.

This paper introduces a decomposition of welfare assessments for general dynamic stochastic economies with heterogeneous individuals. The decomposition is based on constructing individual, dynamic, and stochastic weights that characterize how welfarist planners make trade-offs across individuals, dates, and histories. Guided by the compensation principle, it initially decomposes a welfare assessment into an efficiency and a redistribution component, while the efficiency component is further decomposed into (1) aggregate efficiency, (2) risk sharing, and (3) intertemporal sharing components. Five minimal examples and three applications illustrate the properties of the decomposition and how it can be used to draw normative conclusions in specific scenarios.

The classic tariff formula states that the optimal unilateral tariff equals the inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity. We generalize this result and show that an intertemporal tariff formula characterizes the efficient tariff in a large class of dynamic heterogeneous agent (HA) economies with multiple goods. Intertemporal export supply elasticities and relative tariff revenue weights are sufficient statistics for the optimal tariff that decentralizes the efficient allocation. We also develop a general theory of second-best optimal tariffs. In dynamic HA incomplete markets economies, Ramsey optimal tariffs trade off intertemporal terms of trade manipulation against production efficiency, risk-sharing, and redistribution. Intertemporal export supply elasticities and relative tariff revenue weights remain sufficient statistics for the intertemporal terms of trade manipulation motive of second-best optimal tariffs. We apply our results to a quantitative heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) model with trade.

This paper studies welfare assessments in economies with rich demographic structures. First, we show that perpetual consumption is the only unit that enables interpersonal comparisons in demographically disconnected economies, in which there is no date in which all individuals are concurrently alive. Second, we show that there exist feasible perturbations of Pareto efficient allocations in demographically disconnected economies that feature positive Kaldor-Hicks efficiency gains. Third, we show how welfare gains from reallocating consumption can be separately attributed to an incomplete markets and a demographic component. We use our results to derive new insights in three workhorse intergenerational models: i) Samuelson (1958) two-date-life model, exploring the desirability of young-to-old transfers; ii) Diamond (1965) growth model with capital, exploring capital taxation and the question of over-/under-accumulation of capital, and iii) Samuelson (1958) three-date-life model, decomposing the efficiency gains from intergenerational transfers into markets and demographic components.

This paper develops a welfare accounting decomposition that identifies and quantifies the origins of welfare gains and losses in general economies with heterogeneous individuals and disaggregated production. The decomposition — exclusively based on preferences and technologies — first separates efficiency from redistribution considerations. Efficiency comprises i) exchange efficiency, which captures allocative efficiency gains due to reallocating consumption and factor supply across individuals, and ii) production efficiency, which captures allocative efficiency gains due to adjusting intermediate inputs and factors, as well as technical efficiency gains from primitive changes in technologies, good endowments, and factor endowments. Leveraging the decomposition, we provide a new characterization of efficiency conditions in disaggregated production economies with heterogeneous individuals that carefully accounts for non-interior solutions, extending classic efficiency results in Lange (1942) or Mas-Colell et al. (1995). In competitive economies, prices (and wedges) are directly informative about the welfare-relevant statistics that shape the welfare accounting decomposition, which allows us to characterize a generalized Hulten’s theorem and a new converse Hulten’s theorem. We present several minimal examples and four applications to workhorse models in macroeconomics: i) the Armington model, ii) the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, iii) the Hsieh-Klenow model, and iv) the New Keynesian model.

This paper shows that it is possible to define an unambiguous notion of the direct effect of a parameter perturbation on the value of an optimization problem’s objective away from an optimum for problems with linearly homogeneous constraints. This notion of the direct effect relies on reformulating the optimization problem using shares as choice variables, and has the interpretation of holding choice variables — when formulated as shares — fixed. This short paper contains one formal “non-envelope” theorem and four applications to i) consumer demand, ii) cost minimization, iii) planning in exchange economies, and iv) planning in production economies.

This paper studies the optimal determination of deposit insurance when bank runs are possible. We show that the welfare impact of changes in the level of deposit insurance coverage can be generally expressed in terms of a small number of sufficient statistics, which include the level of losses in specific scenarios and the probability of bank failure. We characterize the wedges that determine the optimal ex ante regulation, which map to asset- and liability-side regulation. We demonstrate how to employ our framework in an application to the most recent change in coverage in the United States, which took place in 2008.

This article studies the optimal design of corporate taxes when firms have private information about future investment opportunities and face financial constraints. A government whose goal is to efficiently raise a given amount of revenue from its corporate sector should attempt to tax unconstrained firms, which value resources inside the firm less than financially constrained firms. We show that a corporate payout tax (a tax on dividends and share repurchases) can both separate constrained and unconstrained firms and raise revenue and is therefore optimal. Our quantitative analysis implies that a revenue-neutral switch from profit taxation to payout taxation would increase the overall value of existing firms and new entrants by 7%⁠. This switch could be implemented in the current US tax system by making retained earnings fully deductible.

This paper studies leverage regulation when equity investors and/or creditors have

distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal regulation

responds to arbitrary changes in investors’/creditors’ beliefs, relating our results

to practical scenarios. We show that the optimal regulation depends on the type

and magnitude of such changes. Optimism by investors calls for looser leverage

regulation, while optimism by creditors, or jointly by both investors/creditors, calls for

tighter leverage regulation. Our results apply to environments with i) planners with

imperfect knowledge of investors’/creditors’ beliefs, ii) monetary policy, iii) bailouts

and pecuniary externalities, and iv) endogenous beliefs.

This paper studies the social value of closing price differentials in financial markets. We show that arbitrage gaps (price differentials between markets) exactly correspond to the marginal social value of executing an arbitrage trade. We further show that arbitrage gaps and measures of price impact are sufficient to compute the total social value from closing an arbitrage gap. Theoretically, we show that, for a given arbitrage gap, the total social value of arbitrage is higher in more liquid markets. We apply our framework to compute the welfare gains from closing arbitrage gaps in the context of covered interest parity violations and several duallisted companies. The estimates of the value of closing arbitrage gaps vary substantially across applications.

This paper studies the optimal design of second-best corrective regulation, when some agents or activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large class of environments. We show that the optimal second-best policy is determined by a subset of policy elasticities: leakage elasticities, and characterize the marginal value of relaxing regulatory constraints. We apply our results to scenarios with unregulated agents/activities and with uniform regulation across agents/activities. We illustrate our results in applications to shadow banking, scale-invariant regulation, asset substitution, and fire sales.