

THE OPTIMAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME REVISITED

By

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# The Optimal Distribution of Income Revisited

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## Abstract

This paper revisits the optimal distribution of income model in Fair (1971). This model is the same as in Mirrlees (1971) except that education is also a decision variable and tax rates are restricted to lie on a tax function. In the current paper the tax-rate restriction is relaxed. As in Fair (1971), a numerical method is used. The current method uses the DFP algorithm with numeric derivatives. Because no analytic derivatives have to be taken, it is easy to change assumptions and functional forms and run alternative experiments. Gini coefficients are computed, which provides a metric for comparing the redistributive effects under different assumptions. Ten optimal marginal tax rates are computed per experiment corresponding to ten tax brackets.

The sensitivity of the results to the four main assumptions of the model are examined: 1) the form of the social welfare function that the government maximizes, 2) the form of the utility function that each individual maximizes, 3) the distribution of ability across individuals, and 4) the rate of return to education.

The changes in the Gini coefficient from before-tax income to after-tax income for the experiments are compared to actual changes from various countries. Experiments using a lognormal distribution of ability match the

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data better than those using a lognormal distribution with a Pareto tail—there is less actual redistribution than a Pareto tail implies.

The numerical approach in this paper has advantages over the use of analytic expressions. When functional forms are changed, it may be easier to run a new numerical experiment than use an analytic expression, which can be complicated. Also, although not done in this paper, individual heterogeneity is straightforward to handle. The coding can have a different utility function for each individual. And different assumptions about education can be easily incorporated. The approach also shows the problematic nature of assuming a quasi-linear utility function—a utility function with no income effects.

## 1 Introduction

Mirrlees' (1971) classic paper analyzes optimal marginal tax rates and lump sum redistribution in a setting in which the government maximizes a social welfare function in the face of individual optimization behavior. An individual chooses his or her labor supply to maximize utility, taking as given his or her wage rate, the tax rates, and the lump sum transfer payment. Assumptions need to be made about the distribution of wage rates, the form of the utility functions, and the form of the social welfare function. The key question for Mirrlees and the large literature that followed is how the optimal rates vary with income. In the original simulations, Mirrlees came to two somewhat surprising conclusions: optimal tax rates may decline at high income levels, and a constant tax rate for all incomes may be close to optimal. But as Mirrlees himself concluded, these conclusions are sensitive to the underlying assumptions.

In the literature since Mirrlees there is still no agreement on his first proposition. Diamond (1998) found optimal marginal tax rates were U-shaped, but Dahan and Strawczynski (2000) showed that this result is sensitive to replacing linear by logarithmic utility of consumption. Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) argue that optimal marginal tax rates are likely to decline with income, whereas Diamond and Saez (2011) argue the opposite.

The basic setup in Fair (1971) is the same as in Mirrlees (1971) except that education is a decision variable and a single parameter of a tax-rate function with rising marginal tax rates is computed (plus the lump sum transfer) rather than many unrestricted tax rates. In Mirrlees (1971) the distribution of wage rates is exogenous, whereas in Fair (1971) the distribution of ability is exogenous and an individual's wage rate depends on his or her ability and hours of education. A central focus in Fair (1971) was on how the optimal government tax policy changes the income distribution—Gini coefficients. The literature following Mirrlees was mostly concerned with optimal tax rates, but it is straightforward after the optimization to compute Gini coefficients or other income-distribution parameters.

In the current paper I return to this basic setup with education as a decision variable, but relax the assumption of a tax-rate function, allowing flexibility in the number of marginal tax rates chosen. I also use a flexible solution method—the DFP algorithm with numeric derivatives. This requires that no analytic derivatives be taken—unlike many papers in this literature, this paper is not filled with first-order conditions and Lagrangians! This allows one to consider alternative cases with only a few coding changes. One can easily examine the sensitivity of the optimal marginal tax rates to alternative assumptions about the the social welfare function, the individual utility functions, the ability distribution, and the returns to education.

Regarding education, I know of no paper following Mirrlees (1971) that takes education hours as a decision variable on a par with hours worked. The closest to this is Chapter 7 in Tuomala (1990), but in the models in that chapter there are no foregone earnings from education. The only cost to education is that it enters negatively in the utility function. In Bovenberg and Jacobs (2008) education is an investment cost but does not subtract from hours worked. Also, the government observes education in their model. Best and Kleven (2013) examine career effects in a two-period model in which future wages depend on current hours worked. There is no formal education. In Fair (1971) and in the analysis below educa-

tion hours are not observed by the government and they subtract from total hours available for work.

The main conclusions are as follows. Lognormal distributions of ability lead to declining marginal tax rates at the top. Adding a Pareto tail leads to a higher tax rate in the top bracket relative to the other brackets. As the social welfare function weights low income individuals more, tax rates increase. There is huge redistribution if the social welfare function is Rawlsian. Eliminating education as a decision variable leads to higher tax rates since there are then no negative tax-rate effects on education. As the risk aversion parameter increases in the utility functions, which means faster declining marginal utility with income, the tax rates increase and there is more redistribution. OECD results match best for a risk aversion parameter between 0.75 and 1.00. Quasi-linear utility functions, as in Diamond (1998), are too extreme to analyze unless one assumes that utility functions of low ability individuals have a lower weight on leisure than utility functions of high ability individuals.

## **2 The Model**

### **Overview**

The model is timeless. I prefer to set it up as a lifetime model rather than a model for one year, but this is simply a matter of interpretation. There is no wealth and no saving. An individual's utility function is a function of after-tax income and leisure, where leisure is total hours minus hours worked minus education hours. Individuals choose hours of work and education hours to maximize lifetime utility, given ability, the tax system, and the rate of return to education. The wage rate depends on ability and education.

The government has a social welfare function (SWF) in the individual utilities and chooses the tax system to maximize this SWF. The tax system consists of tax

rates by income categories. The budget constraint implies that all taxes are returned to the individuals as lump sum transfers—each individual gets  $1/n$  of total taxes, where  $n$  is the number of individuals. For the numerical results below  $n$  is taken to be 999. The tax system is used only for redistribution, although one could add government expenditure to be financed by taxes.

### General Equations

The lifetime utility function for each individual is

$$u_i = f_i(y_i, T - h_i - e_i), \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (1)$$

where  $u_i$  is utility,  $y_i$  is after-tax income,  $h_i$  is the number of hours worked,  $e_i$  is the number of hours spent in education, and  $T$  is the total number of hours in an individual's working or education life. The wage rate for each individual is determined by the earnings function:

$$w_i = g(a_i, e_i), \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (2)$$

where  $w_i$  is the wage rate and  $a_i$  is ability. Before-tax income,  $y_i^*$ , is

$$y_i^* = w_i h_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (3)$$

After-tax income is

$$y_i = y_i^* - t(y_i^*) + k, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (4)$$

where  $t(y_i^*)$  is the tax schedule—the amount of tax collected from an individual with before-tax income  $y_i^*$ —and  $k$  is the lump sum amount transferred to each individual by the government. The tax schedule consists of marginal tax rates by income category.

The social welfare function of the government is

$$SWF = z(u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n) \quad (5)$$

The budget constraint of the government is

$$n \cdot k = \sum_{i=1}^n t(y_i^*) \quad (6)$$

The decision of the government is to choose the tax schedule to maximize  $SWF$  subject to the budget constraint and to the fact that individuals maximize utility. Individuals take the tax schedule and  $k$  as given and choose  $h_i$  and  $e_i$  to maximize utility subject to equations (2), (3), and (4).

### **Solution Method**

It is possible to use an algorithm like Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP)—Davidon (1959) and Fletcher and Powell (1963)—and numeric derivatives to solve many nonlinear optimization problems. I have used it in Fair (1974) to solve large optimal control problems, of up to 239 control variables. This procedure—DFP with numeric derivatives—is used in this paper. The advantage of using numeric derivatives is that no analytic derivatives have to be taken, which makes it trivial to change functional forms and reoptimize. Given the sensitivity of results to functional forms, this feature of the method is very useful.

The overall solution is as follows. There are two decision variables per individual— $h_i$  and  $e_i$ —and  $n$  optimization problems in total, one per individual. This is  $n$  uses of the DFP algorithm. Call this the “level 1” solution. The decision variables of the government are the marginal tax rates in the tax schedule, say 10 of them. The DFP algorithm is also used to find the optimal marginal tax rates, subject to the budget constraint (6). Call this the “level 2” solution.

The use of the DFP algorithm with numeric derivatives simply requires that a program (subroutine) be written that computes the value of the objective function for given set of values of the decision variables. For the level 1 solution for a given individual  $i$ , the subroutine computes  $u_i$  for given values of  $h_i$  and  $e_i$ , conditional on the tax schedule and  $k$ . This is all the DFP algorithm needs to find the optimal

values of  $h_i$  and  $e_i$ , given  $a_i$  and the utility functions. Function evaluations are used in computing the numeric derivatives and in the search process.

The function evaluation for the level 2 solution is a little more involved. It computes  $SWF$  for a given tax schedule. Embedded in this evaluation is the level 1 solution, which requires  $n$  uses of the DFP algorithm. The complication for the level 2 solution is that for a given tax schedule, the lump sum transfer  $k$  requires the  $n$  values of  $h_i$  and  $e_i$ , but the optimal values of the  $h_i$ 's and  $e_i$ 's depend on  $k$ . An iterative technique was used to solve this problem. Initial values of  $h_i$  and  $e_i$  were used to compute  $k$  (given a tax schedule); the  $n$  uses of the DFP algorithm were used to compute the level 1 solution;  $k$  was recomputed using the computed values of  $h_i$  and  $e_i$ ; the level 1 solution was computed again; etc. The process was stopped when the difference between successive values of  $k$  was within a prescribed tolerance level. At the stopping point optimal values of  $h_i$  and  $e_i$  have been computed for the given tax schedule (within the tolerance level of the budget constraint), from which the values of  $u_i$  can be computed and thus  $SWF$ . This is one function evaluation for the level 2 solution, which is all the DFP algorithm needs. The level 2 solution yields optimal values of the marginal tax rates (and  $k$ ).

### **Specific Equations for the Base Case**

Given the above setup, it should be clear that it is easy to use alternative functional forms. Each change just requires a different line of code. The following is the base-line specification.

Working or education years are assumed to be between the ages of 18 and 70 (53 years). Sleep requirements are assumed to be 8 hours per day, so the total number of non-sleep hours ( $T$ ) is  $53 \times 365.25 \times 16 = 309,732.$ , which is rounded to 300 thousand hours. A year of education is assumed to take 8 hours per day times 20 days per month times 12 months = 1,920 hours, which is rounded to 2 thousand hours.

In the base case, ability  $a_i$  is assumed to be log normally distributed with mean



$\log(25)$  and standard deviation 0.5. The wage function is

$$\log w_i = \log a_i + \rho \log\left(\frac{e_i}{2} + 1\right) \quad (7)$$

If  $e_i = 0$ , then the wage rate is just equal to the ability value. The wage rate is in units of dollars per hour. The rate of return to education,  $\rho$ , is taken to be 0.12. A year of education (2 thousand hours) increases  $w_i$  by 12 percent.

If an individual works 8 hours a day, 20 days a month, 12 months a year for 53 years, this is 101.760 thousand hours, which is rounded to 100 thousand hours. At a wage rate of \$25 per hour, this is lifetime before-tax income of \$2.5 million dollars, or an average of about \$47 thousand per year. The parameter  $\beta$  in the utility function presented next was chosen to have the optimal values of  $h_i$  be in the ball park of 100 thousand hours.

The base-case utility function is taken to be logarithmic in after-tax income and leisure:

$$u_i = \log y_i + \beta \log(T - h_i - e_i) \quad (8)$$

where  $\beta$  is taken to be 2.0. This is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function, with risk aversion parameter of 1.0. It will be denoted CRRA (1.00).

The social welfare function is postulated to be:

$$SWF = \sum_{i=1}^n \log u_i \quad (9)$$

If the government could chose utility for each individual with no constraints, the optimum would be complete equality of utility.

If taxes were proportional, the tax function would be:

$$t(y_i^*) = t_1 y_i^*, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (10)$$

where  $t_1$  is the proportional tax rate. If instead, say, 10 tax rates were chosen, there would be 10 brackets:  $b_1 - 0, b_2 - b_1, \dots, b_{10} - b_9$ , where  $b_{10}$  is larger than the income of any individual. The choice of brackets is discussed below.

## Robustness Options

As noted above, it is easy to change assumptions and reoptimize. Some of the options are as follows.

- Different utility functions can be used, including having the parameters of the function differ by individual. Four other CRRA functions are considered below, with risk aversion parameters of 0.50, 0.75, 1.25, and 1.50 respectively. These are CRRA (0.50), CRRA (0.75), CRRA (1.25), and CRRA (1.50) respectively.
- Different distributions of  $a_i$  can be used. Two other distributions are considered below: a lognormal distribution with a standard deviation of 0.6 rather than 0.5, and a Pareto tail with parameter 1.5 spliced to the lognormal distribution with standard deviation 0.5 at the 95th percentile.
- For education, different values of  $\rho$  can be used. Also, a different wage function can be used, and education can be dropped from the model. The case of no education is considered below.
- Different tax brackets can be used, including more or fewer than 10. For each set of the other assumptions, two cases are considered below: 1) one proportional tax and 2) 10 tax brackets. The choice of the brackets is explained below.
- A different SWF can be used, for example the sum of utilities instead of the sum of the log of utilities and a Rawlsian utility function. Both of these functions are considered below. Also considered is a SWF that excludes the top 10 percent of income earners.

## **Gini Coefficients**

Although the literature following Mirrlees (1971) has not focused on the optimal income distribution, it is straightforward to compute Gini coefficients once a solution has been obtained. The two Gini coefficients of interest are the one corresponding to before-tax income,  $y_i^*$ , and the one corresponding to after-tax income,  $y_i$ . These will be denoted  $g^*$  and  $g$  respectively. It is of interest to see how much the Gini coefficient is lowered by the government's tax policy. Note that the Gini coefficients as is usual are in income, not utility. As a result,  $g$  is not a decision variable of the government but a result of its policy.

## **Returns to Education**

As noted above, the return to a year of education has been taken to be 12 percent. This number can, of course, be changed for the calculations. From Table 5 in Card's (1999) survey article, a return of 10 percent seems roughly consistent with the literature. Since the present analysis pertains to lifetime variables, I have chosen to use a slightly higher return of 12 percent.

In Fair (1971) nine earnings functions were postulated, given data at the time, where an individual's productivity depended on his or her ability and education. These functions were then approximated by a polynomial function to get an earnings function. In this work the effect of education on an individual's productivity depended positively on his or her ability. In the present paper the earnings function is simpler, and the return to education in percent terms does not vary with ability.

Note that no cost to education has been built into the model except foregone earnings. Such costs could be added, but it is unlikely that this would make much difference to the analysis.

## The Utility Functions

The log function in (8) has the feature that if income is all wage income, an uncompensated change in the wage rate has no effect on hours worked. If, however, part of income is nonwage income, the number of hours worked does depend on the wage rate. Consider (8) where there is no  $e_i$  and  $y_i = (1 - t_1)w_i h_i + k$ , where  $t_1$  is the proportional tax rate and  $k$  is a lump sum transfer (exogenous to the individual). Then taking the derivative of  $u_i$  with respect to  $h_i$  and setting it equal to zero yields optimal hours,  $h_i^*$ :

$$h_i^* = \frac{T}{1 + \beta} - \frac{k}{(1 + \beta)(1 - t_1)w_i} \quad (11)$$

The derivative of  $h_i^*$  with respect to  $t_1$  is  $-\frac{k}{(1 + \beta)(1 - t_1)^2 w_i}$ , which is negative. So an increase in the tax rate lowers hours worked. The derivative of  $h_i^*$  with respect to  $k$  is  $-\frac{1}{(1 + \beta)(1 - t_1)w_i}$ , which is also negative. So an increase in the lump sum transfer also lowers hours worked.

The other two utility functions have the form:

$$u_i = \frac{y_i^{1-\theta}}{1 - \theta} + \beta \frac{(T - h_i - e_i)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \quad (12)$$

where  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  are coefficients of relative risk aversion. This equation reduces to (8) when  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  are one. For CRRA (0.50),  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  are 0.50; for CRRA (0.75), they are 0.75; for CRRA (1.25), they are 1.25; and for CRRA (1.50), they are 1.50. The larger is  $\theta$ , the faster does marginal utility decrease with income. The values of  $\beta$  chosen for these four functions are 7.071, 3.76, 1.0636, and 0.566, respectively. These values were chosen to have the optimal values of  $h_i$  for the median ability individual ( $i = 500$ ) be in the ball park of 100.

When there are no taxes (and no lump sum) and the utility function is CRRA (1.00), everyone works the same amount and has the same amount of education. As  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  deviate from 1.00 in either direction, the range of hours worked and education across ability gets wider. When they are less than one, higher ability

individuals work more and get more education, and vice versa when they are greater than one. A wide range of hours worked and education is problematic for the numerical procedure used in this paper, and 0.50 and 1.50 are about the limits of what can be computed. For example, for CRRA (0.50), lognormal (0.5), SWF the sum of the log of utilities, education in, and no taxes, the bottom ability person works 31 hours and the top ability person works 198 hours. The education hours are 1.7 versus 27.2. The ratio of income for the top to the bottom is 182. This compares to 21.98 for CRRA (1.00). Smaller differences in behavior could be achieved by having the utility functions differ by ability, although it is somewhat arbitrary as to how this is specified. For purposes of this paper, the same utility function has been used for all, with risk aversion parameters outside the range of 0.50 and 1.50 not used. Comments about quasi-linear utility functions are made at the end of Section 3.

### **The Social Welfare Functions**

Maximizing the SWF in (9) is equivalent to maximizing the product of utilities. Another option is simply to maximize the sum:

$$SWF = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i \quad (13)$$

Another option is the Rawls case, where the utility of the lowest ability individual is maximized:

$$SWF = u_1 \quad (14)$$

A fourth SWF was also used, which is (9) except that the top 10 percent of the individuals are not counted. The summation is from 1 to  $.9n$ .

### **The Tax Brackets**

The tax brackets were chosen to correspond to roughly 10 percent of the population in each bracket. For each set of assumptions (each table below), the optimal

proportional tax rate was first computed ( $t_1$ ), i.e., just one tax rate. For this run the 999 individuals were ranked by before-tax income, and the 10 brackets were chosen by picking the income of individual 100 to end the first bracket, the income of individual 200 to end the second, up to the income of individual 900 to end the ninth. The top income for the tenth bracket was taken to be in effect infinite. The marginal tax rates are thus roughly for the first decile, the second decile, and so on.

### **A Note on the DFP Algorithms**

The fact that the overall DFP algorithm requires the use of another DFP algorithm to compute the objective function leads to some accuracy issues when numeric derivatives are used. In some cases, especially when 10 tax rates are computed, the objective function is fairly flat, and some of the results were sensitive to starting points. The general pattern of the optimal marginal tax rates by income was not sensitive, but the accuracy to three, and sometimes two, decimal points was. For each run I tried a number of starting points and chose the one that led to the largest value of the objective function. I don't think any of the main points below are affected by these accuracy issues. Remember, however, that the numerical procedure is limited to considering values of the risk aversion parameter between about 0.50 and 1.50.

### **Top and Bottom Tax Rates**

The question of whether the optimal marginal tax rate is zero for the lowest and highest income individuals is not an issue in this paper because of the use of brackets. There is no one tax rate for the highest income individual, nor for the lowest income individual. Also, for some of the experiments the lowest income individual does not work.

### 3 The Results

There are a large number of options that can be run. With say 3 utility functions, 3 distributions of  $a_i$ , education or no education, 2 tax schedules, and 4 social welfare functions, there are 72 runs. There is also considerable output per run. For each run there are 999 values for each variable pertaining to an individual plus the tax-rate values and the Gini coefficients.

Before considering the results in detail, it will be useful to present a summary of the sensitivity of the optimal marginal tax rates to the various assumptions. This is done in Table 1.  $t_1$  is the tax rate when there is only one tax parameter, and  $t_{10}/t_5$  is the ratio of the 90th percentile marginal tax rate to the 50th percent marginal tax rate when 10 tax rates are computed. Part I of the table shows that as the risk aversion parameter increases, the overall tax rate increases, as does the ratio of the top rate to the 50th percentile rate. As the risk aversion parameter increases, marginal utility decreases faster with income, which encourages redistribution.

Part II of Table 1 shows that as the ability distribution becomes more skewed to the right, the higher is the overall tax rate and the ratio of the top rate to the 50th percentile rate. For the lognormal distributions the ratio is less than one, but for the Pareto tail the ratio is considerably above one. This result is consistent with the results in Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009). For all the runs in this study, the top rate was lower than the other rates when a lognormal distribution was used and higher when the Pareto tail was used.

Part III of Table 1 shows that as the SWF weights low income individuals more, the overall tax rate rises, as does the ratio. As expected, when the top 10 percent are excluded from the SWF, they are taxed more. The Rawls case leads to a very high tax rate. Although not shown in the table, for the Rawls case 130 individuals do not work, and 223 individuals do not take any education.

**Table 1**  
**Overview of Results**

<b>Part I</b>		
<b>lognormal (0.5), SWF is Sum of Logs, Education yes</b>		
Risk Aversion Parameter	$t_1$	$t_{10}/t_5$
CRRA (0.50)	0.210	NA
CRRA (0.75)	0.227	0.730
CRRA (1.00)	0.248	0.761
CRRA (1.25)	0.317	0.834
CRRA (1.50)	0.323	NA
<b>Part II</b>		
<b>CRRA (1.00), SWF is Sum of Logs, Education yes</b>		
Ability Distribution		
lognormal (0.5)	0.248	0.761
lognormal (0.6)	0.312	0.752
Pareto tail	0.316	2.049
<b>Part III</b>		
<b>CRRA (1.00), lognormal (0.5), Education yes</b>		
SWF		
Sum	0.241	0.725
Sum of Logs	0.248	0.761
Exclude top 10 percent	0.295	0.947
Rawls	0.542	NA
<b>Part IV</b>		
<b>CRRA (1.00), lognormal (0.5), SWF is Sum of Logs</b>		
Education		
yes	0.248	0.761
no	0.255	0.763

$t_1$  = one overall tax rate

$t_{10}/t_5$  = ratio of 90th percentile tax rate to 50th percentile tax rate

NA = no solution

When the top 10 percent are excluded, the SWF is the sum of logs



Finally, Part IV of Table 1 shows the effects of education. When education is not a decision variable, the overall tax rate is higher, as is the ratio. This is as expected, since with no education possibilities there is one less way for individuals to respond to tax changes—one less disincentive.

I now turn to a more detailed examination of the results. Twelve runs are discussed, the first six using tables. The results reported in the tables for each run are the two Gini coefficients,  $g$  and  $g^*$ ; the 10 marginal tax values,  $t_1, \dots, t_{10}$ ; the ratio of the lump sum transfer to median before-tax income,  $k/y_{500}^*$ ; the first individual for whom  $h$  is not zero,  $\#h$ ;  $h$  for individuals 25, 500, and 975,  $h_{25}$ ,  $h_{500}$ , and  $h_{975}$ ; the same four variables for  $e$ ,  $\#e$ ,  $e_{25}$ ,  $e_{500}$ , and  $e_{975}$ ; the ratio of the ability of the top individual to that of the bottom individual,  $a_{999}/a_1$ ; and the same for after-tax income and utility,  $y_{999}/y_1$  and  $u_{999}/u_1$ .

For ease of discussion, individuals in the bottom 10 percent of the ability distribution will be called “poor,” and those in the top 10 percent will be called “rich”.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00)**

Table 2 contains the results for the base case: lognormal distribution with standard deviation of 0.5, CRRA (1.00), and SWF as the sum of the log of the utilities. Column (1) is the run with no taxes and transfers; column (2) is the column for one tax rate; and column (3) is for 10 marginal tax rates.

In column (1), with no taxes, everyone works the same number of hours and has the same number of hours of education— $h = 96.8$  and  $e = 9.6$ . The ratio of the ability of the top individual to the bottom is 21.98. In column (2), with one tax rate, the rate is 0.248 and the ratio of the lump sum transfer to median before-tax income is 0.289. Hours worked increases with ability, as does education. The bottom 2 individuals do not work, and the bottom 6 do not choose any education.

**Table 2**  
**Solution Results**  
**Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00)**

	Number of tax brackets		
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$g$	0.275	0.258	0.270
$g^*$	0.275	0.342	0.357
$g - g^*$	0	-0.084	-0.087
$t_1$	0	0.248	0.268
$t_2$	0		0.268
$t_3$	0		0.269
$t_4$	0		0.267
$t_5$	0		0.264
$t_6$	0		0.260
$t_7$	0		0.256
$t_8$	0		0.248
$t_9$	0		0.237
$t_{10}$	0		0.201
$k/y_{500}^*$	0	0.289	0.308
$\#h$	1	3	4
$h_{25}$	96.8	42.0	36.8
$h_{500}$	96.8	77.7	76.5
$h_{975}$	96.8	89.7	92.6
$\#e$	1	7	10
$e_{25}$	9.6	3.0	2.4
$e_{500}$	9.6	7.3	7.2
$e_{975}$	9.6	8.8	9.1
$a_{999}/a_1$	21.98	21.98	21.98
$y_{999}/y_1$	21.98	15.90	16.01
$u_{999}/u_1$	1.182	1.108	1.107

$g$  = Gini coefficient

$t$  = marginal tax rate

$k$  = lump sum transfer

$h$  = number of hours worked

$e$  = number of education hours

$a$  = ability

$y^*$  = before-tax income

$y$  = after-tax income

$u$  = utility

In column (3), with 10 tax rates, the tax rates are higher than 0.248 for the bottom 70 percent and lower for the top 20 percent. The lump sum transfer is slightly higher than in column (2). Compared to column (2), the poor work less because of the higher tax rates and higher transfer, and the rich work more because of the lower tax rate. The poor educate themselves less, and the rich educate themselves more. In column (3) the Gini coefficient falls by 0.087, from 0.357 for before-tax income to 0.270 for after-tax income.

### **Pareto Tail, CRRA (1.00)**

Table 3 is the same as Table 2 except the Pareto tail is used. As noted above, the Pareto distribution with a parameter of 1.5 was spliced to the lognormal distribution with a standard deviation of 0.5 at the 95th percentile level. This distribution is much different at the top than the lognormal. The ability ratio is 144.73 compared to 21.98 for the lognormal. With one tax rate in column (2), the tax rate is 0.316 compared to 0.248 in Table 2, and the lump sum ratio is 0.434 compared to 0.289. There is more redistribution—the Gini coefficient falls by 0.147.

With 10 tax rates, the tax rates are lower than 0.316 except for the top 10 percent, where the tax rate is 0.539. Compared to column (2), the high tax rate of 0.539 cuts the hours worked and education of the rich, but the very rich have high enough before-tax incomes for this to be optimal. Everyone else works more and gets more education because of the lower tax rates. The lump sum ratio is smaller—0.385 versus 0.434 in column (2). Comparing Tables 2 and 3, the lower tax rate for the rich in the lognormal case and the higher tax rate in the Pareto case is consistent, as noted above, with the results in Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009), Figure 3. It will be seen next that this result holds even for a lognormal distribution with a larger standard deviation.

**Table 3**  
**Solution Results**  
**Pareto Tail, CRRA (1.00)**

	Number of tax brackets		
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$g$	0.346	0.320	0.273
$g^*$	0.346	0.467	0.421
$g - g^*$	0	-0.147	-0.148
$t_1$	0	0.316	0.257
$t_2$	0		0.265
$t_3$	0		0.266
$t_4$	0		0.266
$t_5$	0		0.263
$t_6$	0		0.261
$t_7$	0		0.257
$t_8$	0		0.251
$t_9$	0		0.242
$t_{10}$	0		0.539
$k/y_{500}^*$	0	0.434	0.385
$\#h$	1	17	9
$h_{25}$	96.8	8.2	23.1
$h_{500}$	96.8	68.8	72.7
$h_{975}$	96.8	89.3	68.5
$\#e$	1	40	21
$e_{25}$	9.6	0.0	0.8
$e_{500}$	9.6	6.3	6.7
$e_{975}$	9.6	8.7	6.2
$a_{999}/a_1$	144.73	144.73	144.73
$y_{999}/y_1$	144.73	71.59	51.74
$u_{999}/u_1$	1.293	1.187	1.171

See notes to Table 2

### **Lognormal (0.6), CRRA (1.00)**

Table 4 is the same as Table 2 except the standard deviation of the lognormal distribution is 0.6 rather than 0.5. The ability ratio is 40.78 versus 21.98 for 0.5. This is still, however, much lower than the ratio of 144.73 for the Pareto case. The tax rates are higher in Table 4 versus Table 2, as are the lump sum transfers. However, it is still the case that the tax rates fall for the upper part of the distribution. The general story is the same in Table 4 as in Table 2, but with more redistribution.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (0.75)**

Table 5 is the same as Table 2 except that the utility function is CRRA (0.75). For this utility function compared to CRRA (1.00), marginal utility decreases less with income. With no taxes and transfers in column (1), hours worked and education increase with ability. Higher ability individuals work more than they do in Table 2 because their marginal utility does not decrease as much as they earn more income. Because of this, in column (1) the ratio of the top and bottom income is 45.90 compared to 21.98 in Table 2 where everyone works and educates themselves the same. As in Table 2, the tax rates are lower in column (3) at the higher incomes relative to the lower incomes. Overall, the tax rates are lower in Table 5 than in Table 2. Because marginal utility declines less with income than in Table 2, the optimum is for there to be less redistribution from the top incomes to the bottom.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.25)**

Table 6 is the same as Table 2 except that the utility function is CRRA (1.25). In this case marginal utility decreases more with income. With no taxes and transfers in column (1) hours worked and education decrease with ability. The ratio of the top and bottom income is 14.12 compared to 21.98 in Table 2. The tax rates are higher in Table 6 versus Table 2. The optimum is now for there to be more redistribution from the top incomes to the bottom. However, the tax rate at the

**Table 4**  
**Solution Results**  
**Lognormal (0.6), CRRA (1.00)**

	Number of tax brackets		
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$g$	0.327	0.302	0.317
$g^*$	0.327	0.438	0.456
$g - g^*$	0	-0.136	-0.139
$t_1$	0	0.312	0.321
$t_2$	0		0.328
$t_3$	0		0.329
$t_4$	0		0.329
$t_5$	0		0.327
$t_6$	0		0.329
$t_7$	0		0.325
$t_8$	0		0.317
$t_9$	0		0.303
$t_{10}$	0		0.246
$k/y_{500}^*$	0	0.397	0.414
$\#h$	1	30	37
$h_{25}$	96.8	0.0	0.0
$h_{500}$	96.8	70.7	69.4
$h_{975}$	96.8	89.0	93.0
$\#e$	1	58	65
$e_{25}$	9.6	0.0	0.0
$e_{500}$	9.6	6.5	6.3
$e_{975}$	9.6	8.7	9.2
$a_{999}/a_1$	40.78	40.78	40.78
$y_{999}/y_1$	40.78	16.03	17.02
$u_{999}/u_1$	1.222	1.107	1.109

See notes to Table 2

**Table 5**  
**Solution Results**  
**Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (0.75)**

	Number of tax brackets		
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$g$	0.335	0.326	0.339
$g^*$	0.335	0.422	0.438
$g - g^*$	0.000	-0.096	-0.099
$t_1$	0	0.227	0.223
$t_2$	0		0.240
$t_3$	0		0.244
$t_4$	0		0.246
$t_5$	0		0.248
$t_6$	0		0.249
$t_7$	0		0.243
$t_8$	0		0.233
$t_9$	0		0.222
$t_{10}$	0		0.181
$k/y_{500}^*$	0.000	0.286	0.302
$\#h$	1	19	20
$h_{25}$	81.1	6.2	5.3
$h_{500}$	101.3	76.9	74.6
$h_{975}$	123.2	111.4	115.7
$\#e$	1	43	45
$e_{25}$	7.7	0.0	0.0
$e_{500}$	10.2	7.2	7.0
$e_{975}$	12.8	11.4	11.9
$a_{999}/a_1$	21.98	21.98	21.98
$y_{999}/y_1$	45.90	23.24	24.18
$u_{999}/u_1$	1.313	1.182	1.186

**Table 6**  
**Solution Results**  
**Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.25)**

	Number of tax brackets		
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$g$	0.236	0.212	0.222
$g^*$	0.236	0.310	0.325
$g - g^*$	0	-0.098	-0.103
$t_1$	0	0.317	0.341
$t_2$	0		0.340
$t_3$	0		0.339
$t_4$	0		0.336
$t_5$	0		0.332
$t_6$	0		0.328
$t_7$	0		0.325
$t_8$	0		0.313
$t_9$	0		0.296
$t_{10}$	0		0.277
$k/y_{500}^*$	0	0.358	0.378
$\#h$	1	1	2
$h_{25}$	106.4	48.7	43.5
$h_{500}$	94.2	74.6	73.8
$h_{975}$	82.8	77.4	79.3
$\#e$	1	4	6
$e_{25}$	10.8	3.8	3.2
$e_{500}$	9.3	7.0	6.9
$e_{975}$	7.9	7.3	7.5
$a_{999}/a_1$	21.98	21.98	21.98
$y_{999}/y_1$	14.12	9.97	9.99
$u_{999}/u_1$	7.246	2.085	2.026



top income bracket in column (3) is still lower compared to the other tax rates in column (3).

So, as expected, the results in Table 2 are in between those in Table 5 and 6.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), No Education**

Table 7 is the same as Table 2 except there is no education. Except for  $t_1$  in column (3), the tax rates are higher in Table 7 than in Table 2, and the lump sum transfers are slightly higher. There is a little more redistribution. This is as expected, since, as noted above, with no education possibilities there is one less way for individuals to respond to tax changes.

Some other runs that were computed are as follows. Tables are not presented to save space.

### **Pareto Tail, CRRA (0.75)**

Comparing this run with Table 3 is similar to comparing Table 5 with Table 2. The tax rates are generally lower and there is more redistribution. The change in the Gini is -0.196 versus -0.148 in Table 3. The tax rate for the top 10 percent is higher than all the other tax rates, as in Table 3—0.542 versus a range of 0.203 to 0.271 for the others.<sup>1</sup> As in Table 3, the rich work more than the poor, and when there are no taxes and transfers the ratio of the top income to the bottom is 393.72! The bottom 76 (out of 999) do not work, and the bottom 135 do not choose any education.

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<sup>1</sup>For this case only 9 tax rates were computed, with the first bracket beginning with the income of the 20th percentile individual. There are too few working in the bottom 10 percent to get meaningful results.

**Table 7**  
**Solution Results**  
**Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00)**  
**No Education**

	Number of tax brackets		
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$g$	0.275	0.251	0.261
$g^*$	0.275	0.337	0.350
$g - g^*$	0	-0.086	-0.089
$t_1$	0	0.255	0.264
$t_2$	0		0.271
$t_3$	0		0.273
$t_4$	0		0.274
$t_5$	0		0.274
$t_6$	0		0.273
$t_7$	0		0.270
$t_8$	0		0.262
$t_9$	0		0.247
$t_{10}$	0		0.209
$k/y_{500}^*$	0	0.297	0.313
$\#h$	1	1	2
$h_{25}$	100.0	44.0	41.4
$h_{500}$	100.0	79.0	77.4
$h_{975}$	100.0	92.1	95.3
$\#e$	-	-	-
$e_{25}$	0.0	0.0	0.0
$e_{500}$	0.0	0.0	0.0
$e_{975}$	0.0	0.0	0.0
$a_{999}/a_1$	21.98	21.98	21.98
$y_{999}/y_1$	21.98	15.06	15.48
$u_{999}/u_1$	1.183	1.110	1.110

### **Pareto Tail, CRRA (1.25)**

Comparing this run with Table 3 is similar to comparing Table 6 with Table 2. The tax rates are generally higher and there is less redistribution. The change in the Gini is -0.126. The tax rate for the top 10 percent is higher than all the other tax rates, as in Table 3. In this case the rich work less than the poor, and with no taxes and transfers the ratio of the top income to the bottom is 68.07.

So again as expected, the results in Table 3 are in between those in these latter two runs. And for all the Pareto cases the tax rate for the top 10 percent is always higher than the others.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), SWF is the Sum of Utilities**

This case is the same as Table 2 except SWF is the sum of utilities instead of the sum of the log of utilities. This change makes only a small difference. For 10 tax rates  $g$  is slightly larger—0.272 versus 0.270 in Table 2, and  $u_{999}/u_1$  is slightly larger—1.108 versus 1.107. There is slightly more redistribution.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), SWF is (9) Excluding the Top 10 percent**

This case is the same as Table 2 except that in the SWF the government does not care about the top 10 percent. In this case, as expected, the tax rates are higher than those in Table 2 and there is more redistribution. With 10 tax rates,  $g$  is 0.256 versus 0.270 in Table 2. The ratio of after-tax income of the top individual to the bottom is 13.03 versus 16.01 in Table 2. It is still the case, however, that the tax rate for the top 10 percent is lower than the tax rate for the rest of the distribution—0.287 versus about 0.310 for the rest. Even though the government does not care about the rich, it is still optimal to tax them less when the distribution is lognormal.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), SWF is Rawls**

This case is the same as Table 2 except that the SWF is just  $u_1$ . This change does make a large difference. With only one tax rate, the tax rate is 0.542 versus 0.248 in Table 2 and the lump sum ratio is 0.705 versus 0.289 in Table 2. The bottom 129 individuals do not work, and the bottom 223 do not choose any education. The Gini coefficient falls from 0.511 for before-tax income to 0.234 for after-tax income.  $y_{999}/y_1$  is 6.85 and  $u_{999}/u_1$  is 1.063. Plato in *The Laws* thought that the former should be no larger than 4, so we are getting close. Trying to solve this case for several tax rates gave erratic results, but the main point using just one tax rate is clear.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (0.50)**

This case is the same as Table 2 and Table 5 except that the utility function is CRRA (0.50). The one tax rate is 0.210, lower than in Tables 2 and 5. The results are more extreme than in Table 5. 116 individuals do not work, compared to 19 in column (2) in Table 5, and 191 do not take any education, compared to 43 in Table 5.  $h_{975}$  is 159.7 versus 111.4 in Table 5. The rich work more since their marginal utility decreases more slowly with income, and the optimum is for them to be taxed less (than in Table 5, where the utility function is CRRA (0.75)).

It was not possible in this case to compute 10 tax rates using the numerical procedure.

### **Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.50)**

This case is the same as Table 2 and Table 6 except that the utility function is CRRA (1.50). In this case marginal utility decreases faster with income. The one tax rate is 0.323, higher than in Tables 2 and 6. In this case  $h_{975}$  is 71.1 versus 77.4 in Table 6. The rich work less since their marginal utility of income decreases faster with income, and the optimum is for them to be taxed more.

It was also not possible in this case to compute 10 tax rates.

### Quasi-Linear Utility Functions

Diamond (1998) and a number of papers that followed have examined the case of a quasi-linear utility function. Assuming no education, in the present notation this function is

$$u_i = y_i + \nu(T - h_i) \quad (15)$$

where  $\nu$  is strictly concave. Assume, for example, that the function is

$$u_i = y_i + \beta \log(T - h_i) \quad (16)$$

As discussed in Section 2, in dealing with utility functions in the numerical work,  $\beta$  was chosen so that the optimal values of  $h_i$  for the median ability individual ( $i = 500$ ) were in the ball park of 100. All individuals were assumed to have the same  $\beta$ . This is not possible for the function in (16).

Consider the case of no taxes, where  $y_i = w_i h_i$ . Taking the derivative of  $u_i$  with respect to  $h_i$  and setting it equal to zero yields optimal hours,  $h_i^*$ :

$$h_i^* = T - \frac{\beta}{w_i} \quad (17)$$

In the numerical work  $T = 300$  and  $w_{500} = 25$ . (With no education  $w_i = a_i$ .) For  $h_{500}^* = 100$ , this is a value of  $\beta$  of 2500. This value of  $\beta$ , however, is not sensible for low and high ability individuals. For the lognormal (0.5) distribution,  $w_{999}$  is 117.2, which implies  $h_{999}^* = 279$ , and  $w_1$  is 5.33, which implies  $h_1^* = -169$ . If  $\beta = 1066$ , then  $h_1^* = 100$ , but  $h_{999}^* = 291$ . The only way for a function like (16) to be used in the numerical work is for  $\beta$  to vary inversely with ability. One needs low ability individuals to have a low weight on leisure relative to high ability individuals. There seems no particular reason that this is true, which casts doubt on the usefulness of the quasi-linear utility function.

## 4 The Gini Coefficients

The OECD has computed for a number of countries Gini coefficients for market income and disposable income, roughly in this paper before-tax income and after-tax income. Table 8 shows results for 23 countries plus the OECD average of 29 countries. The market income Gini ranges from 0.323 for Korea to 0.523 for Chile. The disposable Gini ranges from 0.243 for Denmark to 0.496 for Chile. The changes in the two Ginis range from -0.023 for Korea to -0.152 for Belgium. The OECD averages for 29 countries are 0.304 and 0.407, for a change of -0.103. The average change is similar to the changes in Tables 2, 5, and 6, which pertain to the lognormal (0.5) distribution and the three CRRA utility functions. For column (3) in the three tables the changes are -0.087, -0.099, and -0.109, respectively. Regarding the level of  $g$ , the values in the three tables are 0.270, 0.339, and 0.216. The OECD value of 0.304 is thus in between the values in Tables 2 and 5. Note that the Pareto results in Table 3 [and the Pareto results discussed above for CRRA (0.75) and CRRA (1.25)] have noticeably more redistribution than the OECD average.

## 5 Conclusion

The main conclusions from the results are the following.

- When the lognormal distribution of ability is used, the optimal marginal tax rates are always lower for the top income categories. When the Pareto tail is used, the optimal marginal tax rate for the top income bracket (top 10 percent) is always higher. There is considerably more redistribution for the Pareto than the lognormal.
- Regarding the SWF, it makes only a small difference whether the sum is over utilities or the log of utilities. If the top 10 percent are excluded, there is more redistribution, but the marginal tax rate for the top income bracket

**Table 8**  
**OECD Gini Coefficients**  
**Data between 2006 and 2009**

Country	Disposable Income	Market Income	Difference
Denmark	0.243	0.374	-0.131
Norway	0.256	0.376	-0.120
Belgium	0.256	0.408	-0.152
Finland	0.258	0.403	-0.145
Sweden	0.259	0.368	-0.109
Austria	0.261	0.406	-0.145
Switzerland	0.290	0.338	-0.048
France	0.292	0.431	-0.139
Netherlands	0.297	0.351	-0.054
Germany	0.300	0.420	-0.120
Korea	0.300	0.323	-0.023
Poland	0.310	0.435	-0.125
Spain	0.313	0.405	-0.092
New Zealand	0.323	0.403	-0.080
Japan	0.324	0.392	-0.068
Australia	0.324	0.418	-0.094
Canada	0.328	0.416	-0.088
Italy	0.334	0.465	-0.131
U.K.	0.345	0.456	-0.111
Portugal	0.347	0.458	-0.111
Israel	0.359	0.465	-0.106
U.S.	0.370	0.453	-0.083
Chile	0.496	0.523	-0.027
OECD(29)	0.304	0.407	-0.103

Source: OECD, "Divide We Stand: Why Inequality  
Keeps Rising," 2011

is still lower (for the lognormal distribution). There is huge redistribution when the SWF is Rawlsian, and the ratio of the top after-tax income to the bottom is only 6.85, close to Plato's 4.0.

- The results are as expected for education. The tax rates are higher and there is more redistribution when there is no education since there are then no negative tax-rate effects on education.
- The results are also as expected for the utility functions. The more does marginal utility decline with income, the higher are the tax rates and the more is there redistribution. The OECD results match best for the lognormal (0.5) distribution and a risk aversion parameter between 0.75 and 1.0.
- The quasi-linear utility function is not sensible in the present context unless it is assumed that low ability individuals weight leisure less than do high ability individuals.

Does this analysis have any guidance for public policy? There are, of course, many restrictive assumptions, especially the timeless nature of the analysis. There is no tagging power of the government, as in Akerlof (1978). There are no other taxes and just one government entity. Nevertheless, the results are firm in showing that for a lognormal distribution of ability it is optimal to tax the rich less. This is true across fairly different utility functions. It is also true even when the top 10 percent are excluded from the SWF. For a Pareto tail, the top tax rate is always greater than the others. So an important empirical question is which distribution of ability best approximates reality. The OECD results in Table 8 suggests that if the countries are optimizing, they are not using a Pareto distribution. The redistribution is not as large as a Pareto distribution would imply. Finally, the results suggest that if one could pin down the actual distribution of ability, the optimal marginal tax rates are not likely to be constant across income categories. If the distribution



is close to lognormal, they are likely to decline at the top income brackets, and if the distribution has a Pareto tail, the tax rate at the top is likely to be higher.

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