Andreas Kleiner Publications

Many seemingly different economic problems share a common mathematical structure: they involve the maximization of a functional over sets of monotonic functions that are either majorized by, or majorize, a given function. This paper presents new, simpler proofs for the main characterization results of the extreme points of sets defined by monotonicity and majorization constraints obtained by Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021). It demonstrates how these characterizations can be applied to a broad range of economic applications, including auction and information design, contest design, optimal delegation, optimal stopping, and decision problems under risk. The paper concludes with an overview of recent related work extending these characterizations to settings with additional constraints, multidimensional state spaces, and alternative stochastic orders.

In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular action, such as making a purchase. The sender’s objective is to maximize her utility derived from the receiver’s action, and she achieves this by careful selection of the information policy. Building on the work of Kleiner et al., our focus lies specifically on information policies that are associated with power diagram partitions of the underlying domain. To address this problem, we employ entropy-regularized optimal transport, which enables us to develop an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal solution. We present experimental numerical results that highlight the qualitative properties of the optimal configurations, providing valuable insights into their structure. Furthermore, we extend our numerical investigation to derive optimal information policies for monopolists dealing with multiple products, where the sender discloses information about product qualities.