Publication Date: November 2009
We characterize belief-free equilibria in inﬁnitely repeated games with incomplete information with N > 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoﬀs across players. The characterization is tight: we deﬁne a set of payoﬀs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoﬀ vector when players are suﬀiciently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and suﬀicient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoﬀs, and for arbitrary payoﬀs.
Supplemental Material: Supplemental material
Repeated games with incomplete information, Harsanyi doctrine, Belief-free equilibria
JEL Classification Codes: C72, C73
Published in Journal of Economic Theory (September 2011), 146(5): 1770-1795 [DOI]