Publication Date: August 2007
We study a class of continuous-time reputation games between a large player and a population of small players in which the actions of the large player are imperfectly observable. The large player is either a normal type, who behaves strategically, or a behavioral type, who is committed to playing a certain strategy. We provide a complete characterization of the set of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player using an ordinary diﬀerential equation. In addition, we identify a suﬀicient condition for the sequential equilibrium to be unique and Markovian in the small players’ posterior belief. An implication of our characterization is that when the small players are certain that they are facing the normal type, intertemporal incentives are trivial: the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player coincides with the convex hull of the set of static Nash equilibrium payoﬀs.
Repeated games, Reputation, Continuous time
JEL Classification Codes: C73
See CFP: 1326