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Zhuoran Yang Publications

Discussion Paper
Abstract

We study quantile-optimal policy learning where the goal is to find a policy whose reward distribution has the largest α-quantile for some α P p0, 1q. We focus on the offline setting whose generating process involves unobserved confounders. Such a problem suffers from three main challenges: (i) nonlinearity of the quantile objective as a functional of the reward distribution, (ii) unobserved confounding issue, and (iii) insufficient coverage of the offline dataset. To address these challenges, we propose a suite of causal-assisted policy learning methods that provably enjoy strong theoretical guarantees under mild conditions. In particular, to address (i) and (ii), using causal inference tools such as instrumental variables and negative controls, we propose to estimate the quantile objectives by solving nonlinear functional integral equations. Then we adopt a minimax estimation approach with nonparametric models to solve these integral equations, and propose to construct conservative policy estimates that address (iii). The final policy is the one that maximizes these pessimistic estimates. In addition, we propose a novel regularized policy learning method that is more amenable to computation. Finally, we prove that the policies learned by these methods are Õ(n-1/2) quantile-optimal under a mild coverage assumption on the offline dataset. Here, Õ(·) omits poly-logarithmic factors. To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first sample-efficient policy learning algorithms for estimating the quantile-optimal policy when there exist unmeasured confounding.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 have revolutionized natural language processing, showing remarkable linguistic proficiency and reasoning capabilities. However, their application in strategic multi-agent decision-making environments is hampered by significant limitations including poor mathematical reasoning, difficulty in following instructions, and a tendency to generate incorrect information. These deficiencies hinder their performance in strategic and interactive tasks that demand adherence to nuanced game rules, long-term planning, exploration in unknown environments, and anticipation of opponents’ moves. To overcome these obstacles, this paper presents a novel LLM agent framework equipped with memory and specialized tools to enhance their strategic decision-making capabilities. We deploy the tools in a number of economically important environments, in particular bilateral bargaining and multi-agent and dynamic mechanism design. We employ quantitative metrics to assess the framework’s performance in various strategic decision-making problems. Our findings establish that our enhanced framework significantly improves the strategic decision-making capability of LLMs. While we highlight the inherent limitations of current LLM models, we demonstrate the improvements through targeted enhancements, suggesting a promising direction for future developments in LLM applications for interactive environments.