We analyze the long-term workforce composition when the quality of mentoring available to majority and minority juniors depends on their representation in the workforce. A workforce with at least 50 percent majority workers invariably converges to one where the majority is overrepresented relative to the population. To maximize welfare, persistent interventions, such as group-specific fellowships, are often needed, and the optimal workforce may include minority workers of lower innate talent than the marginal majority worker. We discuss the role of mentorship determinants, talent dispersion, the scope of short-term interventions, various policy instruments and contrast our results to the classic fairness narrative.
We analyze the long-term workforce composition when the quality of mentoring available to majority and minority juniors depends on their representation in the workforce. A workforce with ≥ 50% majority workers invariably converges to one where the majority is overrepresented relative to the population. To maximize welfare, persistent interventions, such as group-specific fellowships, are often needed, and the optimal workforce may include minority workers of lower innate talent than the marginal majority worker. We discuss the role of mentorship determinants, talent dispersion, the scope of short-term interventions, various policy instruments and contrast our results to the classic fairness narrative.
We study the evolution of labor force composition when mentoring is more effective within members of the same socio-demographic type. Typically, multiple steady states exist. Some completely exclude juniors of one type. Even a mixed steady state tends to over-represent the type that is dominant in the population. In contrast, the efficient labor force balances talent recruitment against mentoring frictions. It may even underrepresent the dominant type and typically calls for persistent government intervention. This contrasts with the public discourse around temporary affirmative action. We consider specific policy instruments and show that hiring quotas can induce equilibrium employment insecurity.