Mayara Felix Publications

We document employment preferences of workers at the margin of informality using open-ended questions and discrete choice experiments in Brazil’s largest favela complex. Stated preferences emphasize pay and tangible job benefits rather than meaning or purpose, while primary complaints center on poor management, customers, and inflexible schedules. Workers exhibit high valuations for all formal sector amenities on average—unemployment insurance, parental leave, and termination notice—as well as for learning opportunities, but lower for non-formal sector amenities such as shorter commutes. Valuations vary systematically by employment sector in ways consistent with sorting: formal workers value formal amenities most, the self-employed value them least or not at all, and the informally employed exhibit mixed valuations. These patterns are also consistent with learning and endowment effects, for which we find suggestive evidence.

I estimate the effect of trade on local labor market concentration and its implications for wages using employer-employee linked data and tariff shocks from Brazil’s trade liberalization. Trade increased concentration by 7%, an effect driven by firm exit and worker flows to surviving import-competing firms. Increased concentration reduced wage take-home shares—estimated at 50 cents on the dollar pre-shock—enough to offset small wage gains from reallocation, but did not meaningfully reduce wages on net. Most of the wage declines attributed to Brazil’s trade liberalization resulted instead from reductions in the marginal revenue product of labor. Incorporating informality reveals substantial regional heterogeneity.

We evaluate the effects of mandatory disclosures of firm-specific gender wage gaps in Brazil—the first developing country to enact a large-scale pay transparency law. The mandate took effect in 2023, automatically releasing to the public government-curated reports showing firm-specific gender wage gaps, separately by major occupational groups, for formal sector firms with 100 employees or more. Regression discontinuity estimates on outcomes one year after the release show that the mandated disclosures had no effects on the gender wage ratio, average wages for men or women, or the number of occupations within firms. We document that gender wage gaps persist in the formal sector as of year-end 2024, with women earning 10% less than men on average after conditioning on a flexible vector of observables, including hours worked, work experience, years of education, and occupation codes. Gender wage gaps increase with firm size for all occupational groups except production workers, which are male-dominated and have stronger union presence. Two major employer associations and a political party have challenged the legality of the policy at the Supreme Court, arguing that the mandated disclosures violate data protection rules, expose commercially sensitive wage data constituting trade secrets, conflict with existing labor legislation that permits legitimate wage differentials, and impose penalties without due process. We hypothesize two non-mutually-exclusive channels for the null effects: information frictions—workers may not receive, understand, or find actionable the technical reports—and labor market frictions—workers may be unable to act on information given limited outside options and high transition costs in Brazil’s frictional labor market.

We estimate the labor market impacts of Brazil’s 1993 outsourcing legalization using North-South variation in pre-legalization court permissiveness, and comparing security guards to less affected occupations. We find that outsourcing legalization persistently reallocated jobs from older incumbent guards to younger entrants. Total employment of guards and their entry from informality persistently increased, while average demographic-adjusted wages remained constant. Meanwhile, a wave of occupational layoffs displaced some incumbent guards from high-wage firms. The evidence suggests that the rise of non-core activity outsourcing reduced labor market frictions, facilitated by firm-level economies of scale in human resources and spillovers to non-adopting firms.

This paper estimates the wage, employment, and reallocation effects of non-core activity outsourcing using Brazil’s unexpected 1993 court-ordered outsourcing legalization. We leverage North-South variation in pre-legalization court permissiveness and compare security guards to less affected occupations. We find that older incumbent security guards were adversely impacted through occupational layoffs, loss of firm-level wage premia, and exit from the occupation. At the same time, increased numbers of younger workers entered the formal sector and became employed at contract firms. On net, legalization increased guard employment by 5%, led by a 50% increase in employment for guards aged 18-24, and had no effect on demographically-adjusted guard wages. The observed labor reallocation effects are explained by the fact that contract firms persistently employ demographically different workers than direct employers.