The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce the refined bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that simultaneously provides answers to both of the fundamental questions.
In this paper we introduce the concept of a strictly fair allocation and investigate the set of strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies. We prove that when agents’ utility functions are differentiable, the set of strictly fair allocations coincides with the set of equal-income Walrasian equilibria. This is shown using both the “limit theorem” approach the “limit economy” approach. We also extend the analysis to economies that have both atoms and an atomless sector. These results substantially improve upon the existing characterizations of equal-income Walrasian equilibria in terms of both economic efficiency and economic equity.