We re-examine the links between changes in housing wealth, financial wealth, and consumer spending. We extend a panel of U.S. states observed quarterly during the seventeen-year period, 1982 through 1999, to the thirty-seven year period, 1975 through 2012Q2. Using techniques reported previously, we impute the aggregate value of owner-occupied housing, the value of financial assets, and measures of aggregate consumption for each of the geographic units over time. We estimate regression models in levels, first differences and in error-correction form, relating per capita consumption to per capita income and wealth. We find a statistically significant and rather large effect of housing wealth upon household consumption. This effect is consistently larger than the effect of stock market wealth upon consumption.
In our earlier version of this paper we found that households increase their spending when house prices rise, but we found no significant decrease in consumption when house prices fall. The results presented here with the extended data now show that declines in house prices stimulate large and significant decreases in household spending.
The elasticities implied by this work are large. An increase in real housing wealth comparable to the rise between 2001 and 2005 would, over the four years, push up household spending by a total of about 4.3%. A decrease in real housing wealth comparable to the crash which took place between 2005 and 2009 would lead to a drop of about 3.5%.
Questionnaire surveys undertaken in 1988 and annually from 2003 through 2014 of recent homebuyers in each of four U.S. metropolitan areas shed light on their expectations and reasons for buying during the recent housing boom and subsequent collapse. They also provide insight into the reasons for the housing crisis that initiated the current financial malaise. We find that homebuyers were generally well informed, and that their short-run expectations if anything underreacted to the year-to-year change in actual home prices. More of the root causes of the housing bubble can be seen in their long-term (10-year) home price expectations, which reached abnormally high levels relative to mortgage rates at the peak of the boom and have declined sharply since. The downward turning point, around 2005, of the long boom that preceded the crisis was associated with changing public understanding of speculative bubbles.
Questionnaire surveys we have undertaken in 1988 and annually 2003–2012 of recent homebuyers in each of four U.S. cities shed light on their expectations and reasons for buying and selling during the recent housing boom and subsequent collapse, and on the reasons for the housing crisis that initiated the current financial malaise. We find that homebuyers were generally well informed, and that their short-run expectations if anything underreacted to the year-to-year change in actual home prices. More of the root causes of the bubble can be seen in their long-term, ten-year, home price expectations, which reached abnormal levels relative to the mortgage rate at the peak of the boom and declined sharply since. The downward turning point around 2005 of the long boom that preceded the crisis was associated with changing public understanding of speculative bubbles.
We re-examine the link between changes in housing wealth, financial wealth, and consumer spending. We extend a panel of U.S. states observed quarterly during the seventeen-year period, 1982 through 1999, to the thirty-one year period, 1978 through 2009. Using techniques reported previously, we impute the aggregate value of owner-occupied housing, the value of financial assets, and measures of aggregate consumption for each of the geographic units over time. We estimate regression models in levels, first differences and in error-correction form, relating per capita consumption to per capita income and wealth. We find a statistically significant and rather large effect of housing wealth upon household consumption. This effect is consistently larger than the effect of stock market wealth upon consumption. This reinforces the conclusions reported in our previous analysis.
In contrast to our previous analysis, however, we do find — based on data which include the recent volatility in asset markets — that the effects of declines in housing wealth in reducing consumption are at least as large as the effects of increases in housing wealth in increasing the course of household consumption.
Most institutional and individual portfolios are very undiversified in real estate: many hold no real estate at all, many have holdings highly concentrated in certain regions or types of real estate. The risk of these concentrated holdings is not hedged. We propose here that cash-settled futures and options markets be opened on real estate to better allow diversification and hedging, and show that these markets solve problems that have hampered other real estate hedging media in the past. Related institutions, such as home equity insurance, might develop around the futures and options markets. The establishment of these markets is likely to increase the quantity of reproducible real estate, and lower rents on real estate. It may also reduce the amplitude of speculative real estate price movements and dampen the business cycle.
This paper uses data on nearly a million homes sold in four metropolitan areas — Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and San Francisco — to construct quarterly indexes of existing home prices between 1970 and 1986. We propose and apply a new method of constructing such indexes which we call the method of constructing such indexes which we call the weighted repeat sales method (WRS). We believe the results give an accurate picture of the actual rate of appreciation in home prices in the four cities. The paper explains the construction of the index, discusses the results and compares them with the National Association of Realtors data on the median price of existing single family homes for the period 1981-1986.
JEL Classification: 026, 012
Keywords: Noncooperative games, agreements, repeated games