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Amanda E. Kowalski Publications

Publish Date
Discussion Paper
Abstract

We uncover political dynamics that reward and reinforce increases in US health spending by studying the passage of the 2003 Medicare Modernization (MMA). We focus on a provision added to the MMA, which allowed hospitals to apply for temporary Medicare payment increases. Hospitals represented by members of Congress who voted ‘Yea’ to the MMA were more likely to receive payment increases. The payment increases raised local health spending and led to suggestive increases in health sector employment. Members of Congress representing hospitals that got a payment increase received large increases in campaign contributions before and after the program was extended.

Abstract

Young people with private health insurance sometimes transition to the public health insurance safety net after they get sick, but popular sources of cross-sectional data obscure how frequently these transitions occur. We use longitudinal data on almost all hospital visits in New York from 1995 to 2011. We show that young privately insured individuals with diagnoses that require more hospital visits in subsequent years are more likely to transition to public insurance. If we ignore the longitudinal transitions in our data, we obscure over 80% of the value of public health insurance to the young and privately insured.

Abstract

I examine the impact of state policy decisions on the early impact of the ACA using data through the first half of 2014. I focus on the individual health insurance market, which includes plans purchased through exchanges as well as plans purchased directly from insurers. In this market, at least 13.2 million people were covered in the second quarter of 2014, representing an increase of at least 4.2 million beyond pre-ACA state-level trends. I use data on coverage, premiums, and costs and a model developed by Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2013) to calculate changes in selection and markups, which allow me to estimate the welfare impact of the ACA on participants in the individual health insurance market in each state. I then focus on comparisons across groups of states. The estimates from my model imply that market participants in the five “direct enforcement” states that ceded all enforcement of the ACA to the federal government are experiencing welfare losses of approximately $245 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in all other states. They also imply that the impact of setting up a state exchange depends meaningfully on how well it functions. Market participants in the six states that had severe exchange glitches are experiencing welfare losses of approximately $750 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in other states with their own exchanges. Although the national impact of the ACA is likely to change over the course of 2014 as coverage, costs, and premiums evolve, I expect that the differential impacts that we observe across states will persist through the rest of 2014.