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Alex Smolin Publications

Publish Date
In Proceedings of the 17th Int. Conf. on Web and Internet Economics
Abstract

We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing—a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach exploits duality methods to identify conditions on the distribution of consumer types under which (a)each product is purchased by the same set of buyers as under separate monopoly pricing (though the transfers can be different), and (b) these sets are nested.

We exhibit two distinct sets of sufficient conditions. The first set of conditions weakens the monotonicity requirement of types and virtual values but maintains a regularity assumption, i.e., that the product-by-product revenue curves are single-peaked. The second set of conditions establishes the optimality of upgrade pricing for type spaces with monotone marginal rates of substitution (MRS)—the relative preference ratios for any two products are monotone across types. The monotone MRS condition allows us to relax the earlier regularity assumption.

Under both sets of conditions, we fully characterize the product bundles and prices that form the optimal upgrade pricing menu. Finally, we show that, if the consumer’s types are monotone, the seller can equivalently post a vector of single-item prices: upgrade pricing and separate pricing are equivalent.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing—a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach exploits duality methods to identify conditions on the distribution of consumer types under which (a) each product is purchased by the same set of buyers as under separate monopoly pricing (though the transfers can be different), and (b) these sets are nested.

 

We exhibit two distinct sets of sufficient conditions. The first set of conditions is given by a weak version of monotonicity of types and virtual values, while maintaining a regularity assumption, i.e., that the product-by-product revenue curves are singlepeaked. The second set of conditions establishes the optimality of upgrade pricing for type spaces with monotone marginal rates of substitution (MRS)—the relative preference ratios for any two products are monotone across types. The monotone MRS condition allows us to relax the earlier regularity assumption. 

 

Under both sets of conditions, we fully characterize the product bundles and prices that form the optimal upgrade pricing menu. Finally, we show that, if the consumer’s types are monotone, the seller can equivalently post a vector of single-item prices: upgrade pricing and separate pricing are equivalent.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the trade of information between a data buyer and a data seller. The data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty and seeks to augment his initial private information with supplemental data. The data seller is uncertain about the willingness-to-pay of the data buyer due to this private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of (Blackwell) experiments as statistical tests to the data buyer. The seller exploits differences in the beliefs of the buyer’s types to reduce information rents while limiting the surplus that must be sacrificed to provide incentives.

Abstract

A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers. Buyers differ in their prior information, and hence in their willingness to pay for additional signals. The monopolist can profitably offer a menu of experiments. We show that, even under costless information acquisition and free degrading of information, the optimal menu is quite coarse. The seller offers at most two experiments, and we derive conditions under which at vs. discriminatory pricing is optimal.