Skip to main content

Industrial Organization

Industrial Organization at Yale is a strong and distinctive group. Many of the central ideas of the field were developed at Yale, and many of the field’s top scholars were trained here.

There is a large and diverse “IO” faculty at Yale, distributed across the Economics Department, the Yale School of Management, the Yale School of the Environment, and the Yale School of Public Health. Their research—and that of Yale PhD students in IO—spans a broad range of substantive questions concerning the functioning of imperfectly competitive markets, the exercise of market power, and competition policy. Yale also has a strong tradition in the development of empirical methods for the study of such questions. Harmonious relations across fields within Economics have made Yale a particularly attractive place for faculty and students whose research interests combine insights and analytical tools from IO with questions traditionally viewed as within the realms of other fields—e.g., the economics of education, health care, taxation, development, or the environment.

The Cowles Research Program in Industrial Organization provides direct research support to students and faculty, support for postdoc positions, and support for short term and long term academic visitors.

Seminars and Conferences

A central element of the Yale research environment in IO is the weekly Industrial Organization Seminar, organized jointly between the Economics Department and the School of Management. Preceding the seminar is an IO Faculty Lunch, in which visiting scholars meet with IO faculty from around Yale to discuss current topics in the field. The Department also runs a weekly Industrial Organization Prospectus Workshop. This workshop is primarily for graduate students presenting thesis work at various stages of development. For third-year students, the goal is a finished thesis prospectus. Interested faculty and outside visitors may also present early work in progress.

Every year, the Industrial Organization Program hosts a "Models and Measurement" summer conference. This conference brings together scholars across fields of applied microeconomics whose research uses economic models as a foundation for empirical work. Recent conference presentations have included topics such as collusion among generic prescription drug makers, the role of firm buyer power in distorting technology adoption, the design of defined contribution plans, and the use of model-based estimation in applied microeconomics. Recent research at these conferences has also focused on tools for improved estimation of demand models, a building block for most applied work in this space.

For more information about the Models and Measurement summer conferences, see the Cowles Conferences and Workshops page.

Graduate Teaching and Research

We offer a two-semester sequence (Econ 600 and 601) that covers a broad range of topics. Students in this sequence are given a firm grounding in the tools of frontier research in IO and the wide range of challenging research questions studied by IO economists and others concerned with the nuances that determine market outcomes under imperfect competition.

The first semester covers a mix of methodological and substantive topics such as demand estimation, differentiated products oligopoly, horizontal and vertical mergers, entry models, estimation of production functions, and dynamic oligopoly.  In the spring term, the focus shifts toward applications and the increasingly broad range of substantive questions studied by IO economists in frontier research.

For detailed field descriptions, please see the Department’s PhD Program Page.

Latest Publications

Discussion Paper
Abstract

We develop a framework for the optimal pricing and product design of LLMs in which a provider sells menus of token budgets to users who differ in their valuations across a continuum of tasks. Under a homogeneous production technology, we show that users’ high-dimensional type profiles are summarized by a scalar index, reducing the seller’s problem to one-dimensional screening. The optimal mechanism takes the form of committed-spend contracts: buyers pay for a budget that they allocate across token classes priced at marginal cost. We extend the analysis to environments with multiple differentiated models and to competition between a proprietary leader and an open-source fringe, showing that competitive pressure reshapes both the intensive and extensive margins of compute provision. Each element of our theory (token-budget menus, maximum- and minimum-spend plans, multi-model versioning, and linear API pricing) has a direct counterpart in the observed pricing practices of providers such as Anthropic, OpenAI, and GitHub.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

Economists often use variation in consumers’ distance from services as a source of demand variation. This approach typically treats consumer-supplier distance as exogenous, despite suppliers strategically choosing locations. We develop a novel class of instruments to address this endogeneity. These instruments exploit the spatial distribution of consumer demographics and can be constructed from standard cross-sectional data, making them useful in a variety of spatial applications. Our preferred instruments use the income composition of concentric discs centered on the Central Business District. Applying these instruments to smartphone geolocation data for millions of devices across 18 metropolitan areas, we estimate consumer preferences for general merchandise chains across income groups. We show that accounting for distance endogeneity significantly alters willingness-to-travel estimates, distorting welfare conclusions. Contrary to a prevailing “retail apocalypse” narrative, consumer surplus per trip remained stable from 2010 to 2019. Ignoring endogeneity falsely suggests substantial welfare declines for lower-income households.