Publication Date: September 2009
Revision Date: March 2013
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives for the agent, giving the principal an incentive to reduce the continuation value of the project. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. We also ﬁnd that there are non-Markov equilibria that make the principal better oﬀ than the recursive Markov equilibrium, and that may make both agents better oﬀ. Eﬀicient equilibria front-load the agent’s eﬀort, inducing as much experimentation as possible over an initial period, until making a switch to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial phase concentrates the agent’s eﬀort near the beginning of the project, where it is most valuable, while the eventual switch to the worst continuation equilibrium attenuates the dynamic agency cost.
Experimentation, Learning, Agency, Dynamic agency, Venture Capital, Repeated principal-agent problem
JEL Classification Codes: D8, L2