Publication Date: June 2008
Cognitive dissonance is one of the most influential theories in psychology, and its oldest experiential realization is choice-induced dissonance. In contrast to the economic approach of assuming a person’s choices reveal their preferences, psychologists have claimed since 1956 that people alter their preferences to rationalize past choices by devaluing rejected alternatives and upgrading chosen ones. Here, I show that every study which has tested this preference-spreading eﬀect has overlooked the potential that choices may reflect individual preferences. Speciﬁcally, these studies have implicitly assumed that subject’s preferences can be measured perfectly, i.e., with inﬁnite precision. Absent this, their methods, even with control groups, will mistakenly identify cognitive dissonance when there is none. Correctly interpreted, several prominent studies actually reject the presence of choice-induced dissonance. This suggests that mere choice may not always induce rationalization, a reversal that may signiﬁcantly change the way we think about cognitive dissonance as a whole.
Cognitive dissonance, Revealed preference
JEL Classification Codes: A12, C91, D01