It is suggested that the appropriate structure for the reconciliation of micro and macroeconomics is an infinite horizon overlapping generations (OLG) model with many finitely lived natural persons and one infinitely lived strategic player without preferences whose choice rule is determined by the periodic political choice of the finitely lived players who are alive and politically strategically active at the time of choice. This player may be interpreted as government. In the steps from the finite horizon general equilibrium (GE) model to the overlapping generations model (GGOLG) it is suggested that even without exogenous uncertainty, if economic efficiency is to be attained it is logically and technologically necessary to introduce government, government money, credit, bankruptcy and inheritance conditions.
It is suggested that the appropriate structure for the reconciliation of micro and macroeconomics is an infinite horizon overlapping generations (OLG) model with many finitely lived natural persons and one infinitely lived strategic player without preferences whose choice rule is determined by the periodic political choice of the finitely lived players who are alive and politically strategically active at the time of choice. This player may be interpreted as government. In the steps from the finite horizon general equilibrium (GE) model to the overlapping generations model (GGOLG) it is suggested that even without exogenous uncertainty, if economic efficiency is to be attained it is logically and technologically necessary to introduce government, government money, credit, bankruptcy and inheritance conditions.
We recast the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the broader context of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI). In this setting we give proofs of three properties of CAPM equilibria: they are efficient, asset prices lie on a “security market line,” and all agents hold the same two mutual funds. The first property requires a riskless asset, the latter two do not. We show that across all GEI only one of these three properties of equilibrium is generally valid: asset prices depend on covariances, not variances. We extend CAPM to many consumption goods in such a way that all three properties hold. But now the definition of a riskless asset depends on preferences and endowments, and so cannot be specified a priori.
In a previous paper (Shubik and Yao, 1988) we examined a multistage exchange economy with m perishable goods and one infinitely durable gold used as money. we considered an economy without credit and one with one hundred percent secured loans. In this paper we consider an economy with m(1) goods which have finite lives and m(2) goods which are of infinite durability. Historically the two durables which have been prominent in economic activity have been gold and land, although one might wish to include platinum and some other items.
In a previous paper (Shubik and Yao, 1988) we examined a multistage exchange economy with m perishable goods and one infinitely durable gold used as money. we considered an economy without credit and one with one hundred percent secured loans. In this paper we consider an economy with m(1) goods which have finite lives and m(2) goods which are of infinite durability. Historically the two durables which have been prominent in economic activity have been gold and land, although one might wish to include platinum and some other items.
The payments system of a modern economy is a peculiar mix of technological and institutional factors. Trade takes time and involves some form of money or credit. Going to the bank or arranging credits is expensive. Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) address the costs of transactions. However both the Baumol and the Tobin analysis was carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Here we address the task of considering the costs of banking in a closed strategic market game.
The payments system of a modern economy is a peculiar mix of technological and institutional factors. Trade takes time and involves some form of money or credit. Going to the bank or arranging credits is expensive. Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) address the costs of transactions. However both the Baumol and the Tobin analysis was carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Here we address the task of considering the costs of banking in a closed strategic market game.
There are two sources of inefficiency of strategic equilibria (SE) in market mechanisms. The first is the oligopolistic effect, which occurs when an agent can single-handedly influence prices. With a continuum of agents we get “perfect competition” and this effect is, of course, wiped out. But the inefficiency of SE’s may nevertheless persist because agents are not “perfectly liquid,” i.e., the constraints of the mechanism are such that they cannot carry out arbitrary trades at the market prices. Our main result is that, if enough repeated rounds of trade are permitted within a single utility period, then the liquidity problem is overcome: SE outcomes turn out to be not only efficient but, in fact, Walrasian.
This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.
This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.
JEL Classification: 215, 026
Keywords: Experimental economics, Game theory, Experimental methods
A multiperiod exchange economy with gold used both as money and as jewelry is examined in this paper. The existence of Nash equilibria is proved for the market games with finitely many traders as well as the games with a continuum of traders. For market games with a continuum of traders at infinite horizon, the existence of stationary Nash equilibria has been proved under the assumption that gold is properly distributed at the beginning or a secured loan between traders is available.
A multiperiod exchange economy with gold used both as money and as jewelry is examined in this paper. The existence of Nash equilibria is proved for the market games with finitely many traders as well as the games with a continuum of traders. For market games with a continuum of traders at infinite horizon, the existence of stationary Nash equilibria has been proved under the assumption that gold is properly distributed at the beginning or a secured loan between traders is available.