Marius Ring Publications

Whether imposing higher taxes on business owners adversely affects business activity by constraining investment and inducing capitalist flight is a central question in the ongoing debate on how to tax the ultra wealthy. To shed new light, I exploit a series of related Norwegian reforms during 2021–2024 that increased dividend tax rates, removed migration-related capital gains tax loopholes, and nearly doubled the effective marginal tax rate on business wealth. These reforms spurred international debate and, allegedly, an “exodus” of Norwegian billionaires (Financial Times, 2023). While I document clear effects on migration, these responses are concentrated among the top 0.1% of the wealth distribution and mostly confined to 2022 and 2023. My results indicate that at most 100 individuals left due to the reforms. I find no evidence of significant outmigration or reduced inflows of startup founders or inventors. I estimate that absent any outmigration, wealth tax revenues would have increased by 75% from 2021 to 2024. Reform-driven outmigration lowers the revenue gain to 71.5%. My findings further show that outmigrating owners’ firms remain economically active and do not reduce investment. In a broader set of analyses, I examine whether business outcomes are affected, regardless of whether owners outmigrate, since firms may reduce investment both due to liquidity constraints or distortions to owners’ savings decisions. I compare firms owned by Norwegian individuals subject to the wealth tax with firms owned by foreigners and other tax-exempt entities. By merging historical ownership data from Orbis with the Norwegian shareholder register, I perform these analyses on both Norwegian and foreign-domiciled firms. Across settings, I find no evidence that Norwegian-owned firms pay out more dividends or invest less after the reforms, nor is there any evidence that the reform induced more bankruptcies. These findings indicate that the short-run economic costs of wealth taxation, in terms of migration and firm investment, are more limited than the public debate implies.

Using administrative panel data on Norwegian investors’ portfolios, we document strong but slow portfolio allocation responses to a persistent wealth-tax-induced shock to the equity premium. Short-run responses resemble the modest sensitivity documented using surveys. The longer-run responses are much larger and can be rationalized by moderate risk aversion. We document that equity premium shocks affect stock market entry but not exits, suggesting that entry costs dominate participation costs. Our finding of slow responses supports the asset-pricing literature that uses adjustment frictions to explain important asset-pricing puzzles, and has implications for optimal capital taxation when tax rates differ across assets.

Neither theory nor existing empirical evidence support the notion that wealth taxation reduces saving. Theoretically, the effect is ambiguous due to opposing income and substitution effects. Empirically, the effect may be masked by misreporting responses. Using geographic discontinuities in the Norwegian annual net-wealth tax and third-party-reported data on savings, I find that wealth taxation causes households to save more. Each additional NOK of wealth tax increases annual net financial saving by 3.76, implying that households increase saving enough to offset both current and future wealth taxes. This positive effect on saving is primarily financed by increases in labour earnings. These responses are the combination of small negative effects of increasing the marginal tax rates and larger positive effects of increasing average rates. My findings imply that income effects may dominate substitution effects in household responses to rate-of-return shocks, which has implications for both optimal taxation and macroeconomic modelling.