The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,” i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,” i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-concave preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,” i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
We present a (hopefully) fresh interpretation of the Hangman’s Paradox and Newcomb’s Paradox by casting the puzzles in the language of modern game theory, instead of in the realm of epistemology. Game theory moves the analysis away from the formal logic of the puzzles toward more practical problems, such as: On what day would the executioner hang the prisoner if he wanted to surprise him as much as possible? How should a surprise test be administered? We argue that both the Hangman’s Paradox and Newcomb’s Paradox are analogous to a well-known phenomenon in game theory, that giving a player an additional attractive (even dominant) strategy may make him worse off.
In the Hangman’s Paradox, the executioner is determined to surprise the prisoner as much as possible, yet he cannot surprise him at all because he cannot commit in advance to a random schedule. The possibility of changing his mind (i.e., the presence of alternative strategies) superficially would seem to help the executioner, but because it changes the expectations of the prisoner, in the end it works dramatically to his disadvantage. In Newcomb’s Paradox, a man given an extra dominant choice is worse off because it changes God’s expectations about what he will do.
Our analysis cannot be couched in terms of the standard Nash framework of games, but must instead be put in a recent extension called psychological games, where payoffs may depend on beliefs as well as on actions.
Arrow’s original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrow’s proof.
My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third (and shortest) proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).
The first proof shows that Arrow’s axioms guarantee neutrality: every social choice must be made in exactly the same way, which quickly leads to dictatorship. The second proof clarifies the last step, and also confirms the intimate connection between Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the Condorcet triple. The second proof shows that a doubly pivotal agent must be a dictator; the Condorcet triple guarantees the existence of a doubly pivotal agent. Neutrality guarantees the existence of a (symmetrically) doubly pivotal agent.
Arrow’s original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrow’s proof.
My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third (and shortest) proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).
Arrow’s original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrow’s proof. My first proof uses almost no notation, while the second uses May’s notation and is extremely brief. The third proof is perhaps the most interesting, because along the way to proving the existence of an extremely pivotal voter, it shows that the Arrow axioms guarantee issue neutrality, that is, that every choice must be made by exactly the same process.
This paper surveys the implications of “common knowledge” in interactive epistemology and game theory, with special emphasis on speculation, betting, agreeing to disagree, and coordination. The implications of approximate common knowledge are also analyzed. Approximate common knowledge is defined three ways: as knowledge of knowledge … of knowledge, iterated N times; as p-common knowledge; and as weak p-common knowledge. Finally the implications of common knowledge are examined when agents are boundedly rational.
This paper surveys the implications of “common knowledge” in interactive epistemology and game theory, with special emphasis on speculation, betting, agreeing to disagree, and coordination. The implications of approximate common knowledge are also analyzed. Approximate common knowledge is defined three ways: as knowledge of knowledge … of knowledge, iterated N times; as p-common knowledge; and as weak p-common knowledge. Finally the implications of common knowledge are examined when agents are boundedly rational.
Gold and tobacco have both been used as money. One difference between the two is that gold yields utility, on account of its beauty, without diminishing its quantity. Tobacco yields utility when it is consumed. If this were the only difference, which would be the better money?