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James Dana Publications

Publish Date
Discussion Paper
Abstract

This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible, but only when firms adopt inventory controls (sales limit restrictions) and demand becomes more inelastic over time. Therefore, in addition to being useful to manage demand uncertainty, we show that inventory controls are also a tool to soften price competition. We discuss model extensions, including product differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons.

Discussion Paper
Abstract

This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible, but only when firms adopt inventory controls (sales limit restrictions) and demand becomes more inelastic over time. Therefore, in addition to being useful to manage demand uncertainty, inventory controls are also a tool to soften price competition. We also discuss model extensions, including product differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons.

Abstract

Inventory controls, used most notably by airlines, are sales limits assigned to individual prices. While typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we argue that inventory controls also facilitate intertemporal price discrimination. In our model, competing firms first choose quantity and then choose prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. When demand becomes more inelastic over time, as in the airline and hotel markets, a monopolist can easily price discriminate; however, we show that oligopoly firms generally cannot. Inventory controls let firms set increasing prices regardless of whether or not demand is uncertain.