Evidence is shown, using US foreclosure data by state 1975-93, that periods of high default rates on home mortgages strongly tend to follow real estate price declines or interruptions in real estate price increase. The relation between price decline and foreclosure rates is modelled using a distributed lag. Using this model, holders of residential mortgage portfolios could hedge some of the risk of default by taking positions in futures or options markets for residential real estate prices, were such markets to be established.
We provide a method for decomposing the variance of world national income (present values) into components in such a way as to indicate the most important risk-sharing opportunities among nations of the world. We identify risk-sharing opportunities in terms of eigenvectors of a variance matrix of deviations of the present value of country incomes from their respective shares (adjusted for population and risk aversion) of world income.
The method is applied to data on national incomes of six large countries 1870-1992 (Maddison [1995]): Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and United States. The method reveals that, assuming symmetric risk aversions, the most important risk sharing contract to devise for these countries would be essentially a national income swap between the United States, and together on the other side, France, Germany and Italy, i.e., approximately a US-Europe national income swap. A contract that is essentially a France-Germany swap is the second most important risk-sharing contract.
Experimental evidence shows that an important reason why people tend to imitate others, to exhibit “herd behavior” is that they assume that the others have information that justifies their actions. The information cascade models of Banerjee [1992] and Bikhchandani et al. [1992] are significant developments in showing some general equilibrium and welfare effects of such rational imitative behavior. But these models as specified may be of limited applicability since they assert that differences across groups in herd behavior can be attributed to the random decisions of first movers. Differences across groups in herd behavior might be explained more often in terms of different modes of interpersonal information transmission. Patterns of human conversation imply great selectivity to the kinds of information transmitted within groups.
Home equity insurance policies, policies insuring homeowners against declines in the price of their homes, would bear some resemblance both to ordinary insurance and to financial hedging vehicles. A menu of choices for the design of such policies is presented here, and conceptual issues are discussed. Choices include pass-through futures and options, in which the insurance company in effect serves as a retailer to homeowners of short positions in real estate futures markets or of put options on real estate. Another choice is a life-event-triggered insurance policy, in which the homeowner pays regular fixed insurance premia and is entitled to a claim if both there is a sufficient decline in the real estate price index and a specified life event (such as a move beyond a certain geographical distance) occurs. Pricing of the premia to cover loss experience is derived, and tables of break-even policy premia are shown, based on estimated models of Los Angeles housing prices 1971-91.
Estimates are made, from time series data on real gross domestic products, of the standard deviations of returns in markets for perpetual claims on countries’ incomes. The results indicate that the variability of returns is of a magnitude comparable to that of returns in stock markets. Evidence is shown that there may be only minimal possibility of cross hedging these returns in existing capital markets.
Methods of establishing markets for perpetual claims on aggregate incomes are examined. Such markets, by allowing hedging of these aggregate income risks, might make for dramatically more effective international macroeconomic risk sharing than is possible today. Retail institutions are described that might develop around such markets and help the public with their risk management. However, the establishment of such markets would also incur the risk of major financial bubbles and panics.
Two proposals are made that may facilitate the creation of derivative market instruments, such as futures contracts, cash-settled based on economic indices. The first proposal concerns index number construction: indices based on infrequent measurements of nonstandardized items may control for quality change by using a hedonic repeated measures method, an index number construction method that follows individual assets or subjects through time and also takes account of measured quality variables. The second proposal is to establish markets for perpetual claims on cash flows matching indices of dividends or rents. Such markets may help us to measure the prices of the assets generating these dividends or rents even when the underlying asset prices are difficult or impossible to observe directly. A perpetual futures contract is proposed that would cash settle every day in terms of both the change in the futures price and the dividend or rent index for that day.
A pilot effort was undertaken to experiment with a method of collecting parallel time series data for expectations and popular models and theories of institutional stock market participants in the United States and Japan 1989-91, covering the period before and after the dramatic and sudden halving of Japanese stock prices. Substantial variability within countries through time in the responses and dramatic differences across countries in expectations (even expectations for the same country) were found. There are significant research opportunities in expanded data collection along these lines.
JEL Classification: C22, C82
Keywords: Expectations, stock markets, data collection
Repeat sales price estimators are designed to infer price indexes of infrequently sold and unstandardized assets, such as houses, based only on changes in prices of those individual assets that are observed to be sold twice. Repeat sales price estimators are proposed here that are arithmetic, and either value-weighted or equally-weighted. Moreover, variants are proposed that are interval-weighted, i.e., that correct for a form of heteroskedasticity, and that include additional regressors representing changes in hedonic variables. Some of these methods are applied to data on house prices in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and San Francisco 1970–1986.
Real stock prices seem to overreact to changes in long-term interest rates. That is, real stock prices drop when long-term interest rates rise (and rise when they fall) more than would be implied by a rational expectations present value model where expectations are based on a vector autoregression. This overreaction is not associated with any overreaction to changes in the short-run inflation rate. Over the last century real stock prices have shown little reaction to changes in inflation rates, and according to the model they should show little reaction. These conclusions were reached from an analysis of annual data in the United States 1871 to 1989 and the United Kingdom 1918 to 1989.
Random samples of the Moscow and New York populations were compared in their attitudes towards free markets by administering identical telephone interviews in the two countries in May, 1990. Although the Soviet respondents were somewhat less likely to accept exchange of money as a solution to personal problems, and their attitudes towards business were less warm, we found that the Soviet and American respondents were basically similar in most dimensions. Soviets showed no difference from Americans in their feelings that price increases may be unfair. There appears to be little difference between the Soviets and Americans in their concern with income inequality, in their belief in the importance of providing material incentives for hard work, and in their understanding of the workings of markets.
Keywords: Market prices, market clearing, rents, behavior, fairness, income distirbution, inheritance, wealth, rich, speculation, profiteering, savings, government interference, incentives, envy, perestroika, public, perceptions, attitudes, survey, poll, USA, USSR, communism, socialism, capitalism, national character, values
Questionnaires were sent out at the time of the October 19, 1987 stock market crash to both individual and institutional investors inquiring about their behavior during the crash. Nearly 1000 responses were received.
The survey results show that: 1. No news story or rumor appearing on the 19th or over the preceding weekend was responsible for investor behavior, 2. Investors’ importance rating of news appearing over the preceding week showed only a slight relation to decisions to buy or sell, 3. There was a great deal of investor talk and anxiety around October 19, much more than suggested by the volume of trade, 4. Many investors thought that they could predict the market, 5. Both buyers and sellers generally thought before the crash that the market was overvalued, 6. Most investors interpreted the crash as due to the psychology of other investors, 7. Many investors were influenced by technical analysis considerations, 8. Portfolio insurance is only a small part of predetermined stop-loss behavior, and 9. Some investors changed their investment strategy before the crash.
This paper consolidates and interprets the literature on the term structure, as it stands today. Definitions of rates of return, forward rates and holding returns for all time intervals are treated here in a uniform manner and their interrelations, exact or approximate, delineated. The concept of duration is used throughout to simplify mathematical expressions. Continuous compounding is used where possible, to avoid arbitrary distinctions based on compounding assumptions. Both the theoretical and the empirical literature are treated.
The attached tables by J. Huston McCulloch give term structure data for U.S. government securities 1946-1987. The tables give discount bond yields, forward rates and par bond yields as defined in the paper. The data relate to the concepts in the paper more precisely than does any previously published data series.
JEL Classification: 311, 313
Keywords: Term structure, Interest rates, Government securities, Rates of return, Forward rates, Bond yields
What, ultimately, is different from quarter to quarter or year to year that accounts for the fact that macroeconomic variables change over these intervals? That is, which are the biggest ultimate sources, in terms we may say of tastes, technology, endowments, government policy, industrial organization, labor-management relations, speculative behavior, or the like, that change to cause this variability? There are a bewildering variety of claims in the literature for such ultimate sources. Far fewer efforts have been made to give a breakdown of the variance of macroeconomic aggregates by Pigou (1929) and Fair (1987). The nature of the evidence for such breakdowns is discussed here, and the possibility that a partial breakdown may be well-determined is put forward. An unsuccessful attempt is made to detect a component of macroeconomic fluctuations that is due to the weather.
Contagion or epidemic models of financial markets are proposed in which interest in or attention to individual stocks is spread by word of mouth. The models give alternative interpretations of the random walk character of stock prices. A questionnaire survey of institutional investors was undertaken to ascertain the relevance of such models. Questions elicited what fraction of these investors were unsystematic and allowed themselves to be influenced by word-of-mouth communications or other salient stimuli. Rough indications of the infection rate and removal rate were produced. Investors in stocks whose price had recently increased dramatically to a high P/E ratio were contrasted with a control group of investors.