Deposit Insurance is the most significant explicit government guarantee to the financial sector. In the wake of the Silicon Valley, Signature, and First Republic Bank failures and the Systemic Risk Exception invoked by regulators, there have been multiple proposals to reform the deposit insurance system in the United States. To further our understanding of the trade-offs and considerations that shape the design of deposit insurance schemes, the Tobin Center for Economic Policy at Yale and the Wharton Initiative on Financial Policy and Regulation are convening a research conference titled “Rethinking Optimal Deposit Insurance.”
The conference will be organized by Eduardo Davila (Yale University) and Itay Goldstein (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School), with support from the Tobin Center for Economic Policy, the Wharton Initiative on Financial Policy and Regulation, and the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics.
The organizers welcome submissions of both empirical and theoretical research. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:
- The trade-offs and considerations that affect the optimal design of deposit insurance schemes
- The effects of deposit insurance on banks' funding and investment decisions
- The effects of deposit insurance on the behavior of insured and uninsured depositors
- The interaction between deposit insurance and regulation/supervision
- Broader consequences of deposit insurance for the banking and financial system
The conference will include a panel discussion.
The deadline for submissions is January 15th, 2024. Notification of acceptance will be provided by January 22th, 2024.
Submit a Paper