THE SCOPE OF SEQUENTIAL SCREENING
WITH EX-POST PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS

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The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

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Abstract

We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of buyers’ ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently do not use up-front fees and instead use transaction-contingent fees.

We establish conditions under which the optimal selling mechanism is static and buyers are not screened with respect to their interim type, or sequential and the buyers are screened with respect to their interim type. In particular, we provide an intuitive necessary and sufficient condition under which the static contract is optimal for general distributions of ex-post values.

Further, we completely characterize the optimal sequential contract with binary interim types and continuum of ex-post values when this condition fails. Importantly, the latter contract randomizes the allocation of the low type buyer while giving a deterministic allocation to the high type.

We also provide partial results for the case of multiple interim types.

Keywords: Sequential screening, ex-post participation constraints, static contract, sequential contract.

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation

Sequential screening models have been used extensively in economics and revenue management to study optimal contract design when buyers learn their valuations over time. In the classic formulation of sequential screening pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), a profit-maximizing seller faces buyers that have initial partial-private information about their valuation, for example the mean, and privately learn their full valuation after some time. In the classic setting, buyers are required to participate from an interim perspective: their expected gains at the time of contracting have to offset their outside option. A salient example discussed by Courty and Li (2000) is the airline industry in which, for example, travelers purchase tickets in advance, but may only realize their actual valuation once the date of the trip approaches.

Even though the optimal contracts that arise may offer partial refunds, the initial advanced price is large enough such that some travelers experience negative ex-post utility while still being willing to participate interim. This situation arises in other industries as well, such as hotels, theaters or even railroads where advanced pricing/refunds type contracts are also offered.

In many new markets, however, sellers are constrained to sell products in such a way that buyers obtain a non-negative net utility once they have realized their valuation, that is from an ex-post perspective. For example, in online shopping buyers may have the chance to return a purchased item after delivery, usually at no or low cost (Krähmer and Strausz (2015)). In the online display advertising market typical business constraints impose that publishers cannot use up-front fees (Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2016)) and instead run auctions, for example second-price. Thus, the seller needs to guarantee participation not only initially – at the interim level – but also after the buyers have completely learned their valuation – at the ex-post level.

Motivated by these new markets, we study the sequential screening problem as described by Courty and Li (2000) and in order to match our previous narrative we incorporate ex-post participation constraints. Ex-post participation constraints rule out the optimal contracts derived by Courty and Li (2000) with up-front fees. As pointed out by Krähmer and Strausz (2015) because different up-front fees cannot be used to price discriminate the different buyers, it may be that a static contract, one that does not screen the buyers interim, becomes optimal under ex-post participation constraints. Building on the work by Krähmer and Strausz (2015), our objective is to understand when in fact the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are not screened interim) or sequential (buyers are screened interim) and obtain a full characterization of such contracts. Our work highlights the significant revenue im-
provements that can be attained by using a sequential contract relative to a static one, even in the presence of ex-post participation constraints.

Our model considers a seller who is selling one unit of an object at zero marginal cost to a buyer who has an outside option of zero. The sequence of events unfolds in two periods. In the first, the buyer privately learns her interim type, for example the mean of her valuation distribution, and the parties contract—important parts of our analysis are done for binary interim types of buyers, low and high. The high type has a distribution of ex-post values that dominates the distribution of the low type in some stochastic order. The contract specifies allocation and payment functions. In the second period, the buyer privately learns her valuation, and allocations and transfers are realized. At this point, the buyer only accepts the contracting terms if her realized net utility is weakly larger than her outside option. This model aligns with our aforementioned examples. In online shopping, the first period corresponds to the purchasing time. At this time the buyer possesses private information about her valuation but can only know her valuation with certainty after inspecting the purchased item. In the second period, the buyer is delivered the item and has the option to return it, at low or no cost. In the case of display advertising, some publishers use a sequence of auctions known as “waterfall auctions” that implicitly impose different priorities over participants. Commonly, higher-priority auctions have higher reserve prices. The first period can be thought of as the time at which the buyer decides in which auction (priority/reserve) to participate in. The second period is when the auctions are actually run.

1.2 Results

One of our main contributions is to characterize when a static contract—that is, a contract that does not sequentially screen buyers—is optimal. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of the aforementioned contract, we refer to it as the average profit-to-rent condition. The characterization we provide is intuitive. At the static contract the seller offers a single price to both low and high type buyers. This price is too large for low types and too low for high types relative to what the seller would set if he were to know the types. To increase his revenue with respect to the static contract, the seller could try to increase the price for high type buyers, however, this would incentivize them to imitate the low types. Another option the seller has is to decrease the price for low type buyers, but this would again incentivize the high types to mimic the low types. In order to increase revenue and to deter high type buyers from imitating the low types, the seller can reduce the price for a portion of low types thus serving more of them and, at the same time, randomize their allocation.

1See, for example, https://adexchanger.com/the-sell-sider/the-programmatic-waterfall-mystery. A similar dynamic occurs when sellers offer “preferred deals” to advertisers (see, for example, Mirrokni and Nazerzadeh (2015)).
so that high types do not take the low types’ contract. The profit-to-rent condition establishes that
this deviation is not profitable for the seller; hence, the profit-to-rent condition is necessary for the
optimality of the static contract. Notably, we also show that it is sufficient. Our characterization is a
weighted average monotonicity condition of the virtual valuations around the optimal static threshold
that in some settings encodes information about the similarity of the interim types. For example, in the
case of exponential valuations, the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the distributions
of the low and high type are appropriately close.

Our second main contribution characterizes the optimal mechanism when the condition mentioned
above does not hold and a static contract is no longer optimal. We prove that the optimal sequential
contract randomizes the low type and gives a deterministic allocation to the high type. Randomization
occurs to prevent the high type buyer from taking the low type’s contract. More specifically, the optimal
contract is characterized by an allocation probability \( x \in (0, 1) \), and three thresholds \( \theta_1, \theta_2, \) and \( \theta_H \)
with \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \leq \theta_2 \). In this contract, the seller allocates the object to a low type buyer with probability
\( x \) whenever her valuation is between \( \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \), and asks for a payment of \( \theta_1 \cdot x \). When the valuation
of this type is above \( \theta_2 \), the object is always allocated to her and the seller demands a payment of
\( \theta_2 - (\theta_2 - \theta_1) \cdot x \). The high type buyer gets the object with certainty and only when her valuation is
above \( \theta_H \), at which point the payment she has to make to the seller is \( \theta_H \). These parameters are set in
such a way that the interim incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied.

A salient feature of this type of contract is that it discriminates the low type in two dimensions.
First, we establish that \( \theta_1 \) is above the optimal threshold a seller would set if she was selling exclusively
to low type buyers. That is, the low type buyer is being allocated the object less often in the presence
of high type buyers. The opposite holds for high type buyers, they are being allocated the object more
often than if they were alone. Second, there is a range of values for which the object is sold to the
low type with some probability strictly below one, which further reduces the chances of a low type to
receive the object compared to a case in which there are no high type buyers. We illustrate these results
with the example of the exponential distribution for which we have explicit solutions. We find that for
exponential valuations the sequential contract can exhibit revenue improvements of up to 16-27% with
respect to the static contract.

Towards the end of the paper, we consider the case of many interim types. We generalize the profit-
to-rent condition to a setting with an arbitrary number of interim types. We also discuss directions on
how to expand our analysis and results to this setting, as well as the challenges that arise.
1.3 Related Work

Our model builds on the sequential screening literature as pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), with an *interim participation constraint*. In contrast, in this paper we impose an *ex-post participation constraint*. The closest paper to ours that studies sequential screening with ex-post participation constraints is Krähmer and Strausz (2015). They establish that the static contract is optimal under a monotonicity condition regarding the cross-hazard rate functions. This condition rules out some common distributions for values such as the exponential distribution. Furthermore, the condition is only sufficient, and therefore, does not provide a complete characterization of the space of primitives for which the static contract is optimal. We close this gap by providing a necessary and sufficient condition under which the static contract is optimal. Our condition leverages the economic intuition that lies behind a potential profitable deviation from the optimal static contract. Further and importantly, when the condition fails we characterize the optimal *sequential* mechanism and show that randomization of one of the interim types is required for optimality.

In terms of approaches, Krähmer and Strausz (2015) relax both the low to high incentive constraint and monotonicity constraint and then show that, under their condition, the contract that maximizes the Lagrangian is deterministic and that as a result the static contract is optimal. In contrast, we also relax the incentive constraint but maintain the monotonicity constraint. For the relaxed problem, we perform a first-principle analysis, in the style of Samuelson (1984) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) that leads us to identify the right structure of the optimal contract. In turn, this permits us to characterize the optimal sequential contract when our condition breaks. In related recent work, Heumann (2016) considers a setting in which a seller can design the screening mechanism as well as the information disclosure mechanism with ex-post participation constraints.

The sequential nature of our model and the presence of ex-post participation constraints is related to the work of Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah (2016) and Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2016). These authors consider a model in which a seller, constrained by ex-post participation (also motivated by the display advertising market), repeatedly sells objects to a buyer whose valuations are independent across periods. Both papers provide characterizations for a nearly optimal mechanism. They are

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2 See Akan, Ata, and Dana (2015) for a recent adaptation of the Courty and Li (2000) formulation to study advanced purchase contracts in revenue management settings.

3 See also Manelli and Vincent (2007) and Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2015) for examples of multi-good environments in which stochastic allocations can improve over deterministic ones. In a related note, Krähmer and Strausz (2016) establish that with multiple, as opposed to a single good, generically, the static contract is not optimal for the sequential screening problem with ex-post participation constraints.
different from ours because we consider a single sale and construct the exactly optimal mechanism in a sequential screening model.

Our optimal mechanism is related to the BIN-TAC auction derived in the context of online display advertising by Celis, Lewis, Mobius, and Nazerzadeh (2014). This is a static auction that offers two options to advertisers: a buy-it-now (BIN) option in which buyers can purchase the impression at a posted high price, and a take-a-chance (TAC) option in which the highest bidders are randomly allocated the impression (if no bidder went for the BIN). This auction is tailored to approximate ironing in the classic static Myerson setting for non-regular distributions that commonly arise in display advertising settings. This mechanism is similar in spirit to ours as it randomizes low valuation buyers to separate them from high valuations ones. However, with one bidder the BIN-TAC auction reduces to a posted price which corresponds to the static contract in our setting. In contrast to their static setting, we study a two-period model in which the buyer is sequentially screened and randomization occurs even with one bidder.

2 Model

2.1 Payoffs and Private Information

We consider a seller (he) who is selling one unit of an object at zero cost to a buyer (she) with an outside option of zero value. Both parties are risk-neutral and have quasilinear utility functions. The sequence of events unfolds in two periods.

In the first period, the buyer privately learns her type and then the parties contract. The type provides information about the distribution of the ex-post values of the buyer, her true willingness-to-pay for the object. The contract specifies allocation and payment functions.

In the second period, the buyer privately learns her valuation, and allocations and transfers are realized. We refer to the type realized in period 1 as the interim type and the valuation realized in period 2 as the ex-post type.

There are finitely many types, denoted \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \), and the prior probability of type \( k \) is given by \( \alpha_k \) with \( \alpha_k > 0 \) and \( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k = 1 \). In the second period, a buyer of type \( k \) privately learns her valuation \( \theta \) which we assume to have a continuously differentiable c.d.f. \( F_k(\cdot) \) and pdf \( f_k(\cdot) \), with full support in \( \Theta \subseteq [0, \theta_{\text{max}}] \). We assume that \( \Theta \) is a connected interval of the form \([0, \theta_{\text{max}}]\). It will be convenient to denote the upper c.d.f. by

\[
F_k(\cdot) \triangleq 1 - F_k(\cdot).
\]
All the distributions are common knowledge. We denote the virtual valuation \( \mu_k(\cdot) \) of interim type \( k \) by

\[
\mu_k(\theta) \triangleq \theta - \frac{1 - F_k(\theta)}{f_k(\theta)}, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}, \forall \theta \in \Theta.
\]

For the rest of the paper we make the standard assumption that:

\[
\frac{1 - F_k(\theta)}{f_k(\theta)}, \text{ is non-increasing in } \theta, \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}. \quad (\text{DHR})
\]

This assumption facilitates our discussions. However, for our formal results we will need a weaker assumption that we introduce later.

The terms of trade are specified in the first period by the seller. For a payment \( t \in \mathbb{R} \) and a probability of receiving the object \( x \in [0, 1] \), a buyer with valuation \( \theta \) receives a utility of \( \theta \cdot x - t \), while the seller gets paid \( t \).

We assume that the buyer agrees to purchase the object only if she is guaranteed a non-negative net utility for any possible valuation of the object she might have. That is, we require \( \theta \cdot x - t \) to be non-negative for all \( \theta \). The seller’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes his expected payment, satisfying the ex-post participation constraint together with incentive compatibility.

### 2.2 Mechanism Design Formulation

By means of the revelation principle (see, e.g., Myerson (1979)) we can focus on incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms, with allocations \( x_k : \Theta \to [0, 1] \) and transfers \( t_k : \Theta \to \mathbb{R} \), that depend on the types \((k, \theta)\) reported to the mechanism. Then, for a buyer reporting an interim type \( k' \) and an ex-post type \( \theta' \) the mechanism allocates the object with probability \( x_{k'}(\theta') \) and charges the buyer \( t_{k'}(\theta') \).

We define the ex-post utility of a buyer who reported \( k \) in the first period and \( \theta' \) in the second period while her true valuation is \( \theta \) as

\[
u_k(\theta; \theta') \triangleq \theta \cdot x_k(\theta') - t_k(\theta'),
\]

with the understanding that \( u_k(\theta) \) equals \( u_k(\theta; \theta) \). Similarly, we define the interim expected utility of a buyer whose true interim type is \( k \) but reported to the mechanism \( k' \) as

\[
U_{kk'} \triangleq \int_{\Theta} \max_{\theta' \in \Theta} \{u_{k'}(z; \theta')\} \cdot f_k(z) dz,
\]

where the maximum is included because double deviations are in principle allowed. Note, however, that with distributions with common support and under ex-post incentive compatibility, the maximum will always be achieved at \( \theta' \) equal to \( z \), and we can restrict attention to single deviations.
There are two kinds of incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied by our mechanism. The first one is the ex-post incentive compatibility or \((IC^{xp})\) constraint which requires that for any report in the first period, truth-telling is optimal in the second period, that is,

\[ u_k(\theta) \geq u_k(\theta; \theta') \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}, \forall \theta \in \Theta. \quad (IC^{xp}) \]

The second one is the interim incentive compatibility or \((IC^{i})\) constraint which requires that truth-telling is optimal in the first period, that is,

\[ U_{kk} \geq U_{kk'} \quad \forall k, k' \in \{1, \ldots, K\}. \quad (IC^{i}) \]

Also, we require the mechanism to satisfy an ex-post individual rationality constraint or \((IR^{xp})\)

\[ u_k(\theta) \geq 0, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}, \quad \forall \theta \in \Theta. \quad (IR^{xp}) \]

Then, the seller’s problem is

\[
\max \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \cdot \int_{\Theta} t_k(z) \cdot f_k(z) dz
\]

\[
\text{s.t } (IC^{i}), (IC^{xp}), (IR^{xp})
\]

\[ 0 \leq x \leq 1, \]

where we use boldfaces to denote vectors. Observe that \((IR^{xp})\) implies interim individual rationality. In fact, if we were to relax \((P)\) by considering only interim individual rationality we would be in the setting of Courty and Li (2000) for discrete interim types.

In general, two types of contract can arise as a solution to the seller’s problem \((P)\) : static and sequential. A static solution to problem \((P)\) corresponds to the case when the allocations and transfers \((x_k, t_k)\) do not depend on the interim type \(k\). In this case we have a unique menu \((x, t)\) that is offered to the buyer and the contract does not screen among interim types. We use \((P^s)\) to denote the constrained version of \((P)\) to static contracts, which we refer to as the static program. In contrast, a sequential solution allows for different menus that depend on the interim type \(k\), and each type of buyer self-selects into one of the menus. The problem \((P)\), referred as the sequential program, allows for such solutions.

The main focus of this paper is two-fold. First, to study when the optimal solutions to the static and sequential programs, \((P^s)\) and \((P)\), coincide. Second, when they do not coincide, we aim to characterize the optimal solution to \((P)\).
3 A Classic Example of Sequential Screening

We use the motivating example of Courty and Li (2000) to illustrate the power of sequential screening in the presence of an ex-post participation constraint. We show that a sequential contract outperforms the static contract.

There are two types of potential buyers, low type and high type. One-third of potential buyers are low type whose valuation is uniformly distributed in $[1, 2]$, two-thirds are high type buyers with valuation uniformly distributed in $[0, 1] \cup [2, 3]$. Courty and Li (2000) think of the low type as a leisure traveler and of the high type as a business traveler with the same mean but larger variability in her valuation. The seller has a production cost equal to 1.

The optimal static contract sets the optimal monopoly price, $\hat{p}$, equal to 2, which yields a profit of 1/3. The static contract only serves the high types with high realized valuations. Courty and Li (2000) in their setting with an interim participation constraint show that the seller can significantly increase its profits with sequential screening by offering a menu of advanced payments/partial refund contracts. They establish that the optimal contract for their setting offers an advanced payment of 1.5 and no refund to the leisure traveler, and an advanced payment of 1.75 and 1 of refund to the business traveler. In this contract a buyer can have a negative realized net utility. For example, the leisure traveler initially pays 1.5 but her actual valuation can be any value within $[1, 2]$ and, therefore, half of the time she will obtain negative net utility after learning her valuation.

Because of the advanced payments these contracts typically will not satisfy an ex-post participation constraint, which we study next.

Let us consider the following sequential contract as a simple deviation from the optimal static contract. The seller offers a menu of two quantities and prices, $(x_L, p_L)$ and $(x_H, p_H)$. The second contract is set equal to the optimal static contract, that is, $(x_H, p_H) = (1, 2)$. Hence, the selling price for the high type is 2 and high types that buy receive the full quantity.

Now, we find the optimal quantity and price for the low type buyer. Given the contract for the high type, the seller’s profit is given by:

$$\frac{1}{3} \times x_L \times (p_L - 1) \times (2 - p_L) + \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{1}{2} \times (2 - 1),$$

where $x_L \in [0, 1]$ and $p_L \in [1, 2]$. We need to ensure that the menus are interim incentive compatible. The low to high incentive constraint is always satisfied ($p_H$ equals 2), and the high to low incentive constraint is given by:

$$\frac{1}{2} \times \left(\frac{5}{2} - 2\right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \times x_L \times \left(\frac{5}{2} - p_L\right).$$
Profit maximization implies that this constraint must be binding, and therefore, the seller’s profit becomes:

\[
\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{(p_L - 1) \times (2 - p_L)}{5 - 2p_L} + \frac{1}{3}.
\]

The first order condition yields an optimal price equal to \((5 - \sqrt{3})/2\) which, in turn, delivers a profit of \(2/3 - 1/(2\sqrt{3})\). The improvement of the sequential contract versus the optimal static contract is then \(1 - \sqrt{3}/2 \approx 13\%\).

From this simple exercise we learn an important lesson: even in a simple setting a sequential contract can have substantial benefits over a static contract. In this paper we study more generally when a sequential contract outperforms a static contract and what drives this revenue improvement.

### 4 Optimality of Static Contract

First, we start by characterizing conditions under which it is optimal not to screen the interim types. In the main theorem of this section we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be optimal. We begin with a reformulation of the problem based on standard techniques that use the envelope theorem, and enables us to solve for the allocation and utilities of the lowest ex-post types instead of both allocations and transfers. Using the reformulation we characterize the optimal static contract. In Section 4.2, we use the optimal static contract together with a simple deviation analysis to obtain an intuitive necessary condition for its optimality. In Section 4.3, we show that this condition is both necessary and sufficient.

#### 4.1 Problem Reformulation and Static Solution

We obtain a more amenable characterization of the constraints by eliminating the transfers from the them as in the classical Myersonian analysis.

**Lemma 1 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Implementation)**

*The mechanism \((x, t)\) satisfies \((IC^i),(IC^{xp})\) and \((IR^{xp})\) if and only if*

1. \(x_k(\cdot)\) is a non-decreasing function for all \(k\) in \(\{1, \ldots, K\}\) and

\[
u_k(\theta) = u_k(0) + \int_0^\theta x_k(z)dz, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}, \forall \theta \in \Theta.
\]  

2. \(u_k(0) \geq 0\) for all \(k\) in \(\{1, \ldots, K\}\).

3. \(u_k(0) + \int_\Theta x_k(z)F_k(z)dz \geq u_{k'}(0) + \int_\Theta x_{k'}(z)F_k(z)dz\) for all \(k, k'\) in \(\{1, \ldots, K\}\).
All proofs are provided in the Appendix. The first condition in the lemma is the standard envelope condition and it comes from the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint. The second condition is derived from the ex-post individual rationality constraint and the fact that \( u_k(\theta) \) is non-decreasing. The third condition is the envelope formula inserted into the interim incentive compatibility constraint.

Lemma 1 enables us to obtain a more compact formulation for the seller’s problem. Specifically, we can use equation (1) and integration by parts to write down the objective of \( (P) \) in terms of the allocation rule \( x \) and the indirect utilities \( \{u_k(0)\}_{k=1}^{K} \) of the lowest ex-post types. To this end, we denote each \( u_k(0) \) as a new variable by \( u_k \). The new formulation is then:

\[
\max_{0 \leq x \leq 1} \left( -\sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k u_k + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{\Theta} x_k(z) \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \right) \quad (P)
\]

s.t \( x_k(\theta) \) non-decreasing, \( \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \)

\( u_k \geq 0, \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \)

\( u_k + \int_{\Theta} x_k(z) F_k(z) dz \geq u_{k'} + \int_{\Theta} x_{k'}(z) F_k(z) dz, \forall k, k' \in \{1, \ldots, K\}, \)

Note that in \( (P) \) the variables are the allocation rule \( x \) and the vector of the indirect utilities of the lowest ex-post types \( u \). Once we solve for these variables the transfers are determined by equation (1).

As we mentioned before, a solution to \( (P) \) that screens the interim types is a sequential contract. In contrast, a static solution to \( (P) \) pools the interim types. Formally, we say that a solution to \( (P) \) or contract is static when \( x_k(\cdot) \equiv x(\cdot) \) and \( u_k \equiv u \) for all \( k \) in \( \{1, \ldots, K\} \).

We earlier defined the virtual valuation \( \mu_k(\cdot) \) of interim type \( k \). Given (DHR) the virtual valuation for each type \( k \) has exactly one zero which we denote by \( \hat{\theta}_k \). Without loss of generality we assume for the remainder of the paper that we can order the interim types:

\( \hat{\theta}_1 \leq \cdots \leq \hat{\theta}_K. \)

It turns out that solving \( (P) \) over the space of static contracts is a simpler problem. The \( (IC^{xa}) \) constraints disappear from the problem because in this case there is effectively only one interim type. Also, it is clear that any optimal solution sets \( u_k = 0 \) for all \( k \) in \( \{1, \ldots, K\} \). So, the static version of the seller’s problem is given by

\[
\max_{0 \leq x \leq 1} \int_{\Theta} x(z) \cdot \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) \right) dz \quad (P^s)
\]

s.t \( x(\theta) \) non-decreasing,
where a simple calculation shows that the term in parenthesis is equal to the virtual value function of the mixture distribution times the density function of the mixture. Hence, this problem corresponds to the classic optimal mechanism design problem applied to the mixture distribution over types.

From this formulation we see that the relevant quantity that shapes the allocation $x(\cdot)$ is $ar{\mu}(\theta) \triangleq \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \mu_k(\theta) f_k(\theta)$. In general, because there is only one buyer, independent of any regularity assumptions imposed over $\bar{\mu}(\theta)$, one can show that an optimal way to choose a non-decreasing allocation $x(\cdot)$ that maximizes

$$\int_{\Theta} x(z) \bar{\mu}(z) dz,$$

is a threshold allocation, that is, a single posted price (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). We summarize this in the following lemma.

**Lemma 2 (Threshold Allocation)**

A solution to $(\mathcal{P}^*)$ is a threshold allocation characterized by $\hat{\theta}$ in $[\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_K]$ that maximizes (2).

### 4.2 A Necessary Condition

In the rest of this Section and the next Section 5 we provide our results for the setting with binary interim types. We denote the low type by $L$ and the high type by $H$. In Section 6 we return to the general setting with finitely many interim types.

The static optimal solution is characterized by a threshold allocation $\hat{\theta}$. In this section, we leverage this characterization to deduce an intuitive necessary condition for the optimality of the static contract. As we will show later in Section 4.3 this condition turns out to be not only necessary but also sufficient.

For ease of exposition, we assume that the high type dominates the low type in the hazard rate order sense:

$$\frac{1 - F_H(\theta)}{f_H(\theta)} \geq \frac{1 - F_L(\theta)}{f_L(\theta)}, \quad \forall \theta \in \Theta. \quad (3)$$

We note that we do not need this assumption for the formal arguments.

Suppose now that a static contract is optimal, that is, setting a single posted price equal to $\hat{\theta}$ for both types solves $(\mathcal{P})$. Consider Figure 1, where we have plotted the virtual value function weighted by the density function for each type.\footnote{We needly represent the virtual valuation weighted by $f_k(\cdot)$. This does not change the signs in the figure but gives a convenient geometric representation.} If the types were public, the seller would optimally set posted prices equal to $\hat{\theta}_L$ and $\hat{\theta}_H$ for types $L$ and $H$, respectively. In this way, the seller would serve buyers if and only if they have positive virtual values. In contrast, when selecting a single posted price $\hat{\theta}$, there is surplus...
that the seller is not extracting; the shaded area shows the regions of the virtual valuations for each type that the static contract is not capturing. For the high type, the static contract serves too many buyers, some of them with negative virtual values; hence, the seller would be better off by offering a higher price. For the low type, the static contract serves too few buyers, leaving positive virtual value buyers unserved; hence, the seller would prefer to choose a lower price. A challenge, though, is that the seller faces incentive compatibility constraints that restrict this type of possible deviations/improvements:

1. Selling to fewer high types implies increasing the price for high types; but then the high types have an incentive to accept the low type contract and such a deviation is not feasible.

2. Selling to more low types amounts to reducing the price from $\hat{\theta}$ to some value $\theta_1$. However, to prevent the high types from taking the low type contract the seller must decrease the quantity offered to the low types (or equivalently, randomize their allocation).

This second improvement is feasible by choosing a quantity (probability) $0 < x_L < 1$ to all low types inside an interval $[\theta_1, \theta_2]$ with $\theta_1 \leq \hat{\theta} \leq \theta_2$, see Figure 2.

Formally these allocations correspond to the following menu:

$$
x_L(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_1, \\
x_L & \text{if } \theta_1 \leq \theta \leq \theta_2, \\
1 & \text{if } \theta_2 < \theta;
\end{cases}
$$

$$
x_H(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \hat{\theta}, \\
1 & \text{if } \hat{\theta} \leq \theta;
\end{cases}
$$

(4)
with $u_L = u_H = 0$. We refer to this deviation as an interior variation or improvement.

The interior improvement is feasible only if it satisfies both incentive compatibility constraints. Inserting the menu (4) into the incentive constraints in $(P)$ we obtain for the low type:

$$x_L \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_L(\theta))d\theta + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} (1 - F_L(\theta))d\theta \geq \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_{max}} (1 - F_L(\theta))d\theta,$$

and for the high type:

$$\int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_{max}} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta \geq x_L \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta,$$

and/or in a more compact form as a bracketing inequality:

$$\frac{\int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_L(\theta))d\theta}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_L(\theta))d\theta} \leq x_L \leq \frac{\int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta},$$

which contains both incentive compatibility constraints. The monotone hazard rate condition (3) guarantees that $x_L$ as in given by (5) always exists. The interior variation is thus feasible and we can select $x_L$ so as to maximize the seller’s revenue.

Indeed, evaluating the interior variation in the seller’s objective yields:

$$x_L \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)d\theta + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} \mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)d\theta.$$

Figure 2: Weighted virtual valuations for low type (dotted line) and high type (dashed line) buyer around $\tilde{\theta}$. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue that the seller leaves on the table when using a static contract with respect to the case in which the interim types are public information. We show deviation from the static contract for the low type (solid line). If $A - B \geq 0$ the deviation is profitable.
and since $\mu_L(\theta) \geq 0$ in $[\theta_1, \theta_2]$ (c.f Figure 2) the right hand side inequality in (5) must be tight.

With the interior variation, the seller serves more low-value buyers in $[\theta_1, \hat{\theta}]$ at the level of $x_L$. This comes at the expense of offering a lower quantity, a loss of $1 - x_L$ to buyers with values in $[\hat{\theta}, \theta_2]$. In Figure 2 the area $A$ corresponds to the additional revenue the seller can make due to the variation because he is serving more low type buyers, and region $B$ is the efficiency loss due to the incentive constraints.

If the static contract is optimal then this variation cannot be profitable. In terms of Figure 2 this means the areas must satisfy $A \leq B$. Hence, if the static contract is optimal then

$$A = x_L \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)d\theta \leq (1 - x_L) \cdot \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)d\theta = B.$$ 

In turn, since the optimal choice of $x_L$ always equals the right hand side of (5), we can insert $x_L$ in terms of the ratio, and after some re-arranging we get

$$\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)d\theta}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta} \leq \frac{\int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)d\theta}{\int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} (1 - F_H(\theta))d\theta}.$$ 

(6)

To better understand this inequality consider a monopolist who faces a consumer with valuation distributed according to $F_k(\cdot)$. Observe that at some price $\theta_b$ the expected profit $\Pi_k(\theta_b)$ the monopolist makes and the expected consumer’s informational rents $I_k(\theta_b)$ are given by

$$\Pi_k(\theta_b) \triangleq \theta_b \cdot (1 - F_k(\theta_b)) = \int_{\theta_b}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu_k(\theta)f_k(\theta)d\theta \quad \text{and} \quad I_k(\theta_b) \triangleq \int_{\theta_b}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} (1 - F_k(\theta))d\theta.$$ 

If the monopolist considers lowering the price from $\theta_b$ to $\theta_a$ then the change in profit is $\Pi_k(\theta_a) - \Pi_k(\theta_b)$. The lower price positively impacts the information rents which increase by $I_k(\theta_a) - I_k(\theta_b)$. The ratio $(\Pi_k(\theta_a) - \Pi_k(\theta_b))/(I_k(\theta_a) - I_k(\theta_b))$ then is a measure of the average impact in profits per unit of consumer rents the seller experiences due to the price variation. In condition (6) we have a cross version of this ratio. In the numerator we take $k = L$ and in the denominator $k = H$. In light of this observation condition (6) suggests the following definition.

**Definition 1 (Average Profit-to-Rent Ratio)**

The average profit-to-rent ratio is defined by:

$$R^{jk}(\theta_a, \theta_b) \triangleq \frac{\Pi_j(\theta_a) - \Pi_j(\theta_b)}{I_k(\theta_a) - I_k(\theta_b)}, \quad \forall j, k \in \{L, H\}, \quad 0 \leq \theta_a \leq \theta_b \leq \theta_{\text{max}}.$$ 

The average profit-to-rent ratios measure changes in the seller’s profit normalized by the information rents he gives away to the consumer due to a price deviation. The ratio $R^{jk}$ compares the impact on
profit for type $j$ with the increase in the information rent for type $k$. This cross ratio arises as the incentive compatibility constraint for type $k$ implies that a modification in the contract for type $j$ affects type $k$ as well. This was clear from our discussion regarding the internal variation above. There, a price $\theta_1$ (smaller than $\hat{\theta}$) for the type $L$ creates a profit improvement for the seller measured by the numerator of $R$. Since the seller has to make sure that type $H$ does not take the type $L$ contract (by reducing quantity), this price decrease generates a loss to the seller quantified by the denominator of $R$.

Back to (6) we notice that the numerator in either ratio refers to the revenue that the seller is making from the low type over some interval, and the denominator refers to the information rent of the high type over the same interval. Now, since the choice of $\theta_1, \theta_2$ was arbitrary, we obtain the following necessary condition by taking minimum and maximum at both sides of the inequality in (6). If the static contract is optimal then

$$\max_{\theta_1 \leq \hat{\theta}} R^{LH}(\theta_1, \hat{\theta}) \leq \min_{\hat{\theta} \leq \theta_2} R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta_2),$$

(7)

The above condition establishes that if the static contract is optimal then any extra revenue the seller can garner from low type buyers is offset by the efficiency loss due to the incentive compatibility constraints: $A - B \leq 0$ for any possible choice of $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$.

4.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition

We now establish that condition (7) is in fact a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal static solution to coincide with the optimal solution to $(\mathcal{P})$. Before we provide the main theorem, we introduce some notation for the quantities of interest that will help us to further refine our intuition. While we maintain the binary type framework here; we note that all definitions naturally extend to finitely many types as we will see in Section 6.

The local version of the average profit-to-rent ratio, when $\theta_a < \hat{\theta} < \theta_b$ are close to $\hat{\theta}$, gives raise to the profit-to-rent ratio.

Definition 2 (Profit-to-Rent Ratio)

The profit-to-rent ratio between type $j$ and $k$ is defined by:

$$r^{jk}(\theta) \triangleq \frac{\mu_j(\theta)f_j(\theta)}{1 - F_k(\theta)}, \quad \forall j, k \in \{L, H\}, \forall \theta \in \Theta.$$
Now, we are ready to state and discuss the main result of this section.

**Theorem 1 (Optimality of Static Contract)**

Suppose \( r^{kk}(\theta) \) is non-decreasing for each \( k \in \{L,H\} \). The static contract is optimal if and only if

\[
\max_{\hat{\theta} \leq \theta} R^{LH}(\theta, \hat{\theta}) \leq \min_{\hat{\theta} \leq \theta} R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta). \tag{APR}
\]

This result completes the necessity condition given in Section 4.2 by showing that it is also sufficient. We showed in Section 4.2 that condition (APR) established that the specific deviation that increases the sales to the lower type with a lower quantity is not profitable relative to the static contract.

Theorem 1 now establishes that in fact this is not only a necessary but in fact a sufficient condition. The sufficiency condition is noteworthy as it arises from “simple” deviations, namely, those that assign the low type an interior allocation in a small interval around the static optimal price. In particular, we do not need to be concerned either with more elaborate deviations which offers the low type several options in his menu, nor do we need to trace simultaneous changes to the offers to the high type. The present theorem confirms that this type of interior improvement for the low type is sufficient to study changes in the seller’s revenue. In fact, we will establish in Section 5 that the family of allocations suggested by the interior variation completely describes the optimal sequential mechanism as well.

To prove the sufficiency in Theorem 1 we rely on a dualization-type of argument. For the necessity, we assume that condition (APR) is not satisfied and show that in that case there is a profitable deviation as given by the following proposition.

**Proposition 1 (Revenue Improvement)**

Suppose \( r^{LL}(\theta) \) is non-decreasing. Assume condition (APR) does not hold. Then there exists \( \theta_1, \theta_2 \) such that \( \theta_1 < \hat{\theta} < \theta_2 \) and \( R^{LH}(\theta_1, \hat{\theta}) > R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta_2) \), for which the allocation in (4) with

\[
x_L = \frac{\int_{\frac{\theta_2}{\hat{\theta}}}^\theta f_H(z)dz}{\int_{\frac{\theta_1}{\hat{\theta}}}^{\theta_2} f_H(z)dz},
\]

yields a strict improvement in (P) over the static contract.

In the proof of Proposition 1 we can see that as soon as condition (APR) breaks two things happen. First, a non-static contract becomes feasible as it does not violate the incentive compatibility constraints. Note that the proposition is similar to the discussion in Section 4.2; however, it is more general because it does not assume hazard rate order to guarantee feasibility. The mere fact that (APR) breaks implies the feasibility of the new allocation. Second, the same contract obtains a larger expected revenue than the static one. So, from this we see that (APR) is preventing both the feasibility and optimality of a sequential contract.
4.4 The Exponential Example

Before we move to the study of the optimal sequential contract it might be helpful to build some more intuition for the results. We shall consider the case of exponentially distributed values. The main result of this section establishes that the static contract is optimal if and only if the mean of the interim types are sufficiently close.

We consider the exponential density functions

\[ f_k(\theta) = \lambda_k e^{-\lambda_k \theta}, \quad k = \{L, H\} \quad \theta \geq 0. \]

We assume \( \lambda_L > \lambda_H \), so \( L \) and \( H \) stand for low and high type respectively. Note that \( H \) has a higher mean \( (1/\lambda_H) \) than \( L \) \((1/\lambda_L)\) and that \( H \) dominates \( L \) in the sense of the hazard rate stochastic order and in first order stochastic dominance. In addition, for the interim probabilities we have \( \alpha_L + \alpha_H = 1 \) with \( \alpha_L, \alpha_H > 0 \).

We begin by studying the optimal solution to the static formulation. The optimal static contract is given by a threshold allocation. Thus, in the exponential case the seller’s expected revenue for any given threshold \( \theta \) is

\[ \Pi^{\text{static}}(\theta) \triangleq \int_\theta^1 (\alpha_L \mu_L(z)f_L(z) + \alpha_H \mu_H(z)f_H(z))dz = \alpha_L \theta e^{-\lambda_L \theta} + \alpha_H \theta e^{-\lambda_H \theta}. \]

In order to find the optimal threshold we just need to maximize the expression above. The first order condition yields

\[ \alpha_L (\theta - \frac{1}{\lambda_L}) \lambda_L e^{-\lambda_L \theta} + \alpha_H (\theta - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}) \lambda_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta} = 0, \quad (8) \]

that is, the optimal threshold is a zero of the mixture virtual valuation. Notice that equation (8) cannot be explicitly solved; however, we can (as we do in the forthcoming results) provide comparative statics. Interestingly, in Proposition 3 below, we show that we can obtain explicit expressions for the thresholds characterizing the optimal sequential contract. The following lemma provides some initial properties of the optimal static contract.

Lemma 3

The optimal solution to \((\mathcal{P}^s)\) is a threshold allocation characterized by \( \hat{\theta} \) in \([\frac{1}{\lambda_L}, \frac{1}{\lambda_H}]\), solving (8). Also, \( \hat{\theta} \) is a non-increasing function of \( \alpha_L \) with \( \hat{\theta}(0) = \frac{1}{\lambda_H} \) and \( \hat{\theta}(1) = \frac{1}{\lambda_L} \).

Next, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be optimal.
**Proposition 2 (Necessity and Sufficiency for the Exponential Model)**

*The static contract is optimal if and only if*

\[
\lambda_L - \lambda_H \leq \frac{1}{\hat{\theta}}
\]  
(9)

The result follows from Theorem 1, but it requires some effort to determine the max and min in (APR) in closed form. We note that in the right hand side, \(\hat{\theta}\), is a solution to equation (8) and, therefore, it also depends on the parameters \(\lambda_L\) and \(\lambda_H\). Subsequent corollaries provide sharper characterizations that only depend on model primitives. We highlight that (9) corresponds to a particular case of condition (APR).

Proposition 2 provides an intuitive characterization for when the seller is better-off screening the interim types than not. In terms of equation (9), when \(\lambda_L\) and \(\lambda_H\) are sufficiently close, then equation (9) should hold, in which case the static contract is optimal. Conversely, when \(\lambda_L\) and \(\lambda_H\) are sufficiently apart from each other, the static contract may not be optimal.

Intuitively, when the interim types are similar any contract that screens the types would be close in terms of expected revenue to the static contract because for each type it could get at most what it would get by setting thresholds \(1/\lambda_L\) and \(1/\lambda_H\) respectively, but \(\hat{\theta} \in \left[\frac{1}{\lambda_L}, \frac{1}{\lambda_H}\right]\). However, when screening, the seller has to pay an extra cost to prevent the types from mimicking each other and, since the contracts’ revenue will be similar, it is likely that this cost offsets the earnings from screening. On the other hand, when interim types are sufficiently apart in their mean valuation then the seller can tailor the contract to each type and in this way extract more from them than in the static contract.

**Corollary 1** Assume \(\lambda_L \in (\lambda_H, 2\lambda_H]\), then for any \(\alpha_L \in [0, 1]\) the static contract is optimal.

This result establishes that when the distributions of the low and high type buyers are sufficiently close to each other then no matter in which proportion the types are, the static contract is always optimal.

**Corollary 2** Assume \(\lambda_L > 2\lambda_H\), then there exists \(\bar{\alpha} \in (0, 1)\) such that for all \(\alpha_L \in (0, \bar{\alpha})\) the sequential contract is strictly optimal and for all \(\alpha_L \in [\bar{\alpha}, 1]\) the static contract is optimal.

Corollary 2 asserts that when the mean of the low and high type buyers are sufficiently different then both contracts can be optimal. If the proportion of low type is low enough (but not zero) then the seller is better-off screening the types. On the other hand, if there is a very large proportion of low type buyers then the static contract is optimal. This follows because as \(\alpha_L\) increases, one can show that \(\hat{\theta}\) decreases, and at some point condition (9) holds. This discussion suggests our final corollary.
Corollary 3 For $\lambda_H$ and $\alpha_H$ fixed, there exists $\tilde{\lambda}_L$ larger than $2\lambda_H$ such that for all $\lambda_L \in [\tilde{\lambda}_L, \infty)$ the sequential contract is strictly optimal.

4.5 Discussion

We introduced earlier the condition (DHR) which establishes that the hazard rates

$$h^{jk}(\theta) = \frac{1 - F_k(\theta)}{f_j(\theta)}$$

are non-increasing when $j$ equals $k$. A related condition is about the cross-hazard rate functions,

$$h^{jk}(\theta) \text{ are non-increasing in } \theta, \quad \forall j, k \in \{L, H\}. \quad (R)$$

To the best of our knowledge condition (R) was first introduced in the context of sequential screening by Krähmer and Strausz (2015). In that paper the authors show that under condition (R) the optimal solution to $(P)$ and to $(P^s)$ coincide, that is, the static contract is optimal. In fact, they show this result for multiple interim types. We discuss our generalization of condition (APR) to multiple types in Section 6. However, condition (R) is rather restrictive and is not satisfied by some common distributions. For example, the condition is not satisfied by any pair of exponential distributions, because in this case the cross-hazard rate is given by:

$$h^{jk}(\theta) = e^{-(\lambda_k - \lambda_j)\theta}, \quad j, k = L, H.$$  

If, without loss of generality, we consider $\lambda_L > \lambda_H$ then $h^{LH}(\theta)$ is an increasing function and, therefore, it violates conditions (R). However, notice (DHR) is satisfied because the simple hazard rate functions are constant and equal to $1/\lambda_k$.

We can also compare Theorem 1 with Lemma 12 in Krähmer and Strausz (2014). In that Lemma they assume $h^{HH}(\theta) > h^{LL}(\theta)$, which implies $\tilde{\theta}_L < \tilde{\theta}_H$, and establish that a necessary condition for the static contract to be optimal is to have the profit-to-rent ratio $r^{LH}(\theta)$ being increasing at $\tilde{\theta}$. Our result also contains this lemma, because if $r^{LH}(\cdot)$ was decreasing at $\tilde{\theta}$ we can always find $\theta_1 < \tilde{\theta}$ and $\theta_2 > \tilde{\theta}$ such that

$$R^{LH}(\theta_1, \tilde{\theta}) > R^{LH}(\tilde{\theta}, \theta_2),$$

so (APR) does not hold and, therefore, the static contract would not be optimal. Figure 3 illustrates how our condition (APR) closes the gap between the ones by Krähmer and Strausz.
We can compare condition (R) and (APR). Note that condition (R) implies the monotonicity of the profit-to-rent ratios, and therefore condition (APR) holds as

\[ R_{LH}(\theta, \hat{\theta}) = \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) r_{LH}(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z)dz} \leq r_{LH}(\hat{\theta}), \quad \forall \theta \leq \hat{\theta}, \]

and

\[ R_{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta) = \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) r_{LH}(z)dz}{\int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta} F_H(z)dz} \geq r_{LH}(\hat{\theta}), \quad \forall \theta \geq \hat{\theta}. \]

Hence, the result by Krähmer and Strausz (2015) that if condition (R) holds then the static contract is optimal follows as a corollary of Theorem 1. We highlight that while condition (R) implies the profit- to-rent ratios are increasing, our condition (APR) only implies a type of monotonicity over an appropriate weighted average of the profit-to-rent ratios. This is sensible as we are dealing with interim expected seller’s revenues and interim incentive compatibility constraints.

In terms of methodology, our approach differs from that of Krähmer and Strausz (2015). Their approach consists of relaxing the low to high interim IC constraint and then – by using their condition (R) – they relax the monotonicity constraint and prove that the solution must be a threshold schedule for each type. From there, they show that the threshold for both types must be equal and, therefore, the static contract is optimal.

In our approach we do not use a relaxation of the general formulation nor do we impose conditions on the primitives besides that \( r_{kk}(\theta) \) are non-decreasing. For the sufficiency we construct a Lagrangian relaxation with multipliers for the incentive compatibility constraints, but we do not relax the monotonicity constraints. The multipliers relate to the profit-to-rent ratios at the static threshold \( \hat{\theta} \); they measure the change in the objective per unit of change in the constraints. Then by leveraging a result from Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) that the optimal contract must involve a threshold allocation we
prove that under (APR) the solution to the relaxation is the static contract.

5 Sequential Contract

We now proceed to provide the complete characterization of the optimal sequential contract when the necessary and sufficient condition associated with the static contract fails. As hinted in Section 4.2 and by Proposition 1 the optimal sequential contract gives a deterministic allocation to the high type and, for mid-range values, it randomizes the low type buyer (or equivalently reduces the quantity allocated).

5.1 The Structure of the Sequential Contract

Our analysis consists in studying the following relaxation to \((P)\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{0 \leq x \leq 1} & \quad - \sum_{k \in \{L, H\}} \alpha_k u_k + \sum_{k \in \{L, H\}} \alpha_k \int_{\Theta} x_k(z) \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \\
\text{s.t} & \quad x_k(\theta) \text{ non-decreasing, } \forall k \in \{L, H\} \\
& \quad u_k \geq 0, \forall k \in \{L, H\} \\
& \quad u_H + \int_{\Theta} x_H(z) F_H(z) dz \geq u_L + \int_{\Theta} x_L(z) F_L(z) dz.
\end{align*}
\]

The difference between \((P_R)\) and the original problem \((P)\) is the omission of the incentive constraint for the low type to report truthfully. Importantly, we do not relax the monotonicity constraint. We obtain a characterization of the optimal solution to \((P_R)\) as stated by the following theorem.

**Theorem 2 (Relaxed Solution)**

Suppose \(r^{kk}(\theta)\) is non-decreasing for each \(k \in \{L, H\}\). Consider problem \((P_R)\), the optimal solution has allocations

\[
\begin{align*}
x^*_L(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_1, \\
x_L & \text{if } \theta_1 \leq \theta \leq \theta_2, \\
1 & \text{if } \theta_2 < \theta;
\end{cases}
\quad x^*_H(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_H, \\
1 & \text{if } \theta_H \leq \theta.
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

The threshold values \(\theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2\) satisfy \(\theta_L \leq \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \leq \theta_2\) and

\[
x_L = \frac{\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz}.
\]

Note that if \(\theta_1 = \theta_H\) we recover the static contract. Importantly, the optimal contract of \((P_R)\) has the same structure as the profitable deviation to the static contract presented in Proposition 1. The only
difference is that in the former the threshold for the high type may not necessarily equal to \( \hat{\theta} \) as in the latter. With this generalization one can show that the proposed profitable deviation is indeed optimal for \((P_R)\). The associated transfers are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
t^*_L(\theta) &= \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_1, \\
\theta_1 \cdot x_L & \text{if } \theta_1 \leq \theta \leq \theta_2, \\
\theta_2 - (\theta_2 - \theta_1) \cdot x_L & \text{if } \theta_2 < \theta;
\end{cases} \\
t^*_H(\theta) &= \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_H, \\
\theta_H & \text{if } \theta_H \leq \theta.
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

Our optimality proof adapts arguments by Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) to our setting. We use an improvement argument to show that the optimal contract of \((P_R)\) only requires a simple threshold allocation without randomization for the high type. Finally, we use another improvement argument to show that the low type allocation only requires a single interval of randomization.

More specifically, consider a low type allocation that randomizes between an interval \([\theta_a, \theta_b]\). Recall the argument in Section 4.3 where we found a revenue improvement while keeping feasibility, in particular, while maintaining the high to low IC constraint. Using a similar reasoning, we can show that feasibly improving upon the random allocation requires the following condition to hold for some \( \hat{\theta} \):

\[
R^{LH}(\theta_a, \hat{\theta}) = \frac{\int_{\theta_a}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) r^{LH}(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_a}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_a}^{\theta_b} F_H(z) r^{LH}(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_a}^{\theta_b} F_H(z) dz} = R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta_b).
\]

In general this condition is not satisfied, because the profit-to-rent ratio \(r^{LH}(\cdot)\) does not need to be a non-decreasing function. Therefore, we cannot find a feasible improvement over the random allocation contract, and hence, we cannot restrict attention to deterministic contracts for the low type. In contrast, a similar argument for the high type yields the expression \(R^{HH}(\theta_a, \hat{\theta}) \leq R^{HH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta_b)\), which always holds when \(r^{HH}(\cdot)\) is non-decreasing. Hence, we can restrict attention to a deterministic threshold contract for the high type.

In addition, the low type allocation only requires a single interval of randomization. To see this, suppose for example that \(x^*_L(\theta)\) equals \(x_a\) in \((\theta_a, \hat{\theta})\) and \(x_b\) in \((\hat{\theta}, \theta_b)\) with \(0 < x_a < x_b < 1\), and also assume (10) does not hold. Then, it is possible to show that we can increase \(x_a\) and decrease \(x_b\) (maintaining feasibility) and obtain an improvement to the objective function. We can do this until \(x_a\) and \(x_b\) collapse into a single value.

The discussion above highlights again the importance of the average profit-to-rent ratios in our analysis, as they quantify revenue improvements while maintaining incentive compatibility. Now, the next result characterizes the optimal sequential contract and it also provides conditions that allow to compute the optimal thresholds.
Theorem 3 (Optimal Sequential Contract)

Suppose \( r^{kk}(\theta) \) is non-decreasing for each \( k \in \{L, H\} \). The optimal sequential contract coincides with the optimal solution of \((P_R)\) as given by Theorem 2.

In Theorem 2 we provided the characterization of the optimal solution to \((P_R)\). In the proof of Theorem 3 we argue that the optimal solution to \((P_R)\) is feasible for \((P)\) and thus optimal. In turn, we obtain a full characterization of the optimal sequential contract up to three parameters.

In terms of solving for the optimal sequential contract, Theorems 2 and 3 imply that we can ignore the IC constraints and do a search over three parameters to maximize seller’s revenues over the proposed contract structure, \( \theta_1, \theta_2 \) and \( \theta_H \). In the proof of Theorem of 3 we show that the optimality conditions for the thresholds \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \leq \theta_2 \) are:

1. \( R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \leq \min_{\theta_2 \leq \theta} R^{LH}(\theta_2, \theta) \);
2. \( \max_{\theta \leq \theta_2} R^{LH}(\theta, \theta_2) \leq R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \);
3. \( \alpha_L \cdot R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) + \alpha_H r^{HH}(\theta_H) = 0 \).

Conditions (1) and (2) put together are similar to (APR) where \( \theta_2 \) plays the role of \( \hat{\theta} \). Similarly to the case of the static contract, one can show that any allocation that randomizes beyond \( \theta_2 \) is never profitable. In turn, randomization should only occur for valuations below \( \theta_2 \). Condition (2) by itself also implies that among all the intervals that can be randomized, the interval \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) is the most profitable.

To see this let us compare the seller’s revenue when it randomizes the low type buyer over some interval \((\theta, \theta_2)\) and \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) (and it gives a deterministic allocation to the high type). Using Theorem 2 the allocation \( x_L \) that satisfies incentive compatibility in each case is:

\[
x_L(\theta) = \frac{\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz} \quad \text{and} \quad x_L(\theta_1) = \frac{\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}.
\]

Hence, doing a revenue comparison, we conclude that randomizing the low type buyer over \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) is better than over \((\theta, \theta_2)\) if and only if

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz} \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz} \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz,
\]

equivalently, \( R^{LH}(\theta, \theta_2) \leq R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \) for arbitrary \( \theta \leq \theta_2 \) which is exactly condition (2). Finally, condition (3) is simple a first order optimality condition on \( \theta_H \).
It is interesting to note that in the optimal solution the low type buyers are allocated the object over a larger interval \((\theta_1 \leq \theta_H)\) but they are randomized. This is done as a way to prevent the buyers from mimicking each other. Specifically, we must have \(\theta_1 \leq \theta_H\); otherwise, the low type buyers would have an incentive to pretend being the high type since that would get them allocated the object more often and at a lower price. Similarly, \(\theta_H \leq \theta_2\) otherwise high type buyers would choose the low type contract for a better allocation and a lower price.

It is worth noting that the sequential contract makes the low type worse-off and the high type better-off with respect to the contract the seller would offer if he could perfectly screen each type. For the low type, that contract would set a threshold equal to \(\hat{\theta}_L\) and would always allocate the object when her value is above the threshold. However, the sequential contract allocates the object to the low type whenever her valuation is above \(\theta_1 \geq \hat{\theta}_L\) with positive probability. So the low type is worse-off in two dimensions, it is allocated the object less often and with less probability. On the other hand, the high type buyer gets allocated the object more often and with certainty since \(\theta_H \leq \hat{\theta}_H\).

5.2 The Exponential Example Continued

In Section 4.4 we studied the properties and structure of the optimal static contract for exponential valuations. In particular, we applied our necessary and sufficient condition to this family of distributions and obtained an intuitive characterization.

Proposition 3

Assume condition (9) does not hold, then the optimal allocation is

\[
x^*_L(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_1, \\
x & \text{if } \theta_1 \leq \theta 
\end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad x^*_H(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_H, \\
1 & \text{if } \theta_H \leq \theta 
\end{cases}
\]

The thresholds are given by:

\[
\theta_1 = \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} \quad \text{and} \quad \theta_H = \frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \frac{\alpha_L}{\alpha_H} \frac{e^{-1}}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H},
\]

with \(\theta_1 \leq \theta_H\). The probability of receiving the object for the low type is:

\[
x = \exp \left( -\lambda_H \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \frac{\alpha_L}{\alpha_H} \frac{e^{-1}}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} - \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} \right] \right).
\]

This result follows from Theorem 3 and the characterization of the three free parameters that follow. We note that in the exponential case we only have two intervals for the low type’s allocation as we can show that \(\theta_2 = \infty\).
We now illustrate our findings with numerical results where we vary the difference in the mean between the low and the high type. Specifically, we fix $\alpha_L$ to be 0.7 and $\lambda_H$ to be 0.5, that is, the high type has mean 2. Since we are assuming $\lambda_L > \lambda_H$, we consider $\lambda_L = \lambda_H + \delta$ with $\delta > 0$. Figure 4 shows how the different thresholds vary as $\delta$ increases or, equivalently, as the mean of the low type decreases to zero. As we can see, there is a value of $\delta$ ($\delta = 0.93$) to the left of which the static contract is optimal and to its right the sequential contract is optimal. This aligns with Proposition 2 because as $\delta$ increases, $(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)$ increases, and therefore, we expect it to be larger than $1/\hat{\theta}$ (see Corollary 2 and Corollary 3). At a more intuitive level as $\delta$ increases both distribution become more and more different from each other with one of them having a larger average value than the other. Thus, there is gain in screening the types.

![Figure 4: Optimal thresholds for static and sequential contracts when setting $\lambda_L = \lambda_H + \delta$, with $\alpha_L = 0.7$ and $\lambda_H = 0.5$.](image-url)

In terms of thresholds, for the static contract we observe that $\hat{\theta}$ is decreasing at the beginning and then it increases getting closer to $1/\lambda_H = 2$. This happens because as we increase $\delta$ we are making $1/\lambda_L$ smaller; however, at some point this value is too small and, therefore, the probability of allocating the object to a low type, $P(\text{value low type} > \hat{\theta}) = e^{-\lambda_L \hat{\theta}}$, is going to be so low that the seller will be better off by choosing a threshold tailored for the high type, that is, close to $1/\lambda_H = 2$. For the sequential thresholds, the one for the low type is decreasing while the one for the high type is increasing. This makes sense because in the sequential case the seller can adjust the threshold for each type; hence, as $\delta$ increases the distributions become more and more different and, therefore, is optimal to set thresholds closer and closer to the threshold a seller would set if he knew the types in advance, that is, $1/\lambda_L$ and $1/\lambda_H$. Also, note that from equation (11) we see that $x$ is a decreasing function of $\delta$ because as the mean
of the low type goes to zero we are less and less constrained to offer a high probability of allocation; however, in the limit \( x(\delta) \approx e^{-1} \), hence even though the low type buyers will have values concentrated at zero we still need to reduce their quantity so that high types do not take their low price contract.

We can also compare the different mechanism in terms of revenue. Note that with the contracts from Proposition 3, the optimal revenue for the sequential contract \( \Pi_{\text{seq}} \) can be shown to be equal to:

\[
\Pi_{\text{seq}} = \alpha_L \cdot x \cdot \theta_1 \cdot e^{-\lambda_L \theta_1} + \alpha_H \cdot \theta_H \cdot e^{-\lambda_H \theta_H}.
\]

Then, we can plot the different revenues as we vary \( \delta \). Figure 5 (left panel and thick line in right panel) depicts the results. For values of \( \delta \) above 0.93 the sequential contract dominates the static. Further the sequential contract can achieve a significant improvement over the static contract, getting as high as 16.5%. Note that when \( \delta \) grows large the improvement of the sequential over the static decreases because both contracts set the thresholds to maximize what they can extract from the high type buyer. Actually, with some abuse of notation, we have that

\[
\lim_{\delta \to \infty} \Pi_{\text{seq}}(\delta) = \lim_{\delta \to \infty} \Pi_{\text{static}}(\delta) = \alpha_H \frac{e^{-1}}{\lambda_H},
\]

which equals the optimal revenue a seller could make if he was only selling to the high type buyer. The right panel in Figure 5 shows the revenue improvement for different instances as we vary \( \alpha_L \). Consistent with Corollary 3, given \( \alpha_H \) and \( \lambda_H \), there exists \( \lambda_L \) large enough such that the sequential contract is strictly better than the static one. The figure also shows that the larger \( \alpha_L \) the larger has to be the difference between the types for the sequential and static contracts to differ. When \( \alpha_L \) is large \( \hat{\theta} \) is tailored for low types and so (9) holds for more values of \( \lambda_L \). However, screening occurs when the mean of the low type is sufficiently small (\( \delta \) large) in which case, due to the low values and high fraction of the low type, the revenue improvement can achieve better percentage performance (e.g., 27% for \( \alpha_L = 0.9 \)).

### 5.3 Menu Implementation

Next, we discuss how the optimal sequential contract can be implemented in practice. By means of the taxation principle we can verify that the following menu of contracts is an indirect implementation of our optimal mechanism:

- **contract \( H \):** there is a single posted price of \( p_H = \theta_H \);

- **contract \( L \):** the buyer can choose between two items:
  
  (a) buy at a price of \( p_L = \theta_1 \cdot x_L \) and be allocated with probability \( x_L \).
Figure 5: Left: Optimal expected revenue for static and sequential. Right: Percentage improvement of the sequential over the static contract. In both figures we set set $\lambda_L = \lambda_H + \delta$ with $\lambda_H = 0.5$. In the left figure we set $\alpha_L = 0.7$ while in the right figure $\alpha_L$ takes values in $\{0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9\}$.

(b) buy at a price of $p_L = \theta_2 - (\theta_2 - \theta_1) \cdot x_L$ and be allocated with probability 1.

The prices in the above menu of contracts are set using the values in Theorems 2 and 3. This implementation offers a posted price to the high type buyer, and gives to the low type buyer two options. In option (a) the low type buyer can pay a low price but it can potentially not acquire the item or equivalently, get a reduced quantity; in (b), the low type buyer pays a high price and always gets the object.

An appealing feature of the implementation is that if we think of allocations as quantities, then we can order the per unit prices. In contract $L$, the per unit prices are $\theta_1$ and $\theta_1 \cdot x_L + \theta_2 \cdot (1 - x_L)$ for (a) and (b), respectively. Hence, the per unit price in (a) is less than or equal to the one in (b). That is, the low type in (a) receives less of the good but at a discounted price compare to the low type in (b). For contract $H$, the per unit price is $\theta_H$ and, since $\theta_1$ is less than or equal to $\theta_H$, the low type in (a) receives less of the good at a discounted price compared to the high type buyer. Comparing the per unit prices of the low type in (b) and the high type is less straightforward. Even-though $\theta_H$ is between $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ we are not able to compare it to $\theta_1 \cdot x_L + \theta_2 \cdot (1 - x_L)$. However, intuitively, even if the high type puts a large mass in values larger than $\theta_2$ we expect the per unit price of the high type to be below the one of the low type in (b) because, otherwise, the high type buyer would have an incentive to take contract $L$. Equivalently, the high type or the low type in (b) have to pay a premium for the additional quantity. We can also refer back to the exponential case of Section 4. From Proposition 3, the premium the high type has to pay is given by $\theta_H - \theta_1 = \log(1/x_L)/\lambda_H$ and, therefore, the larger the quantity
the lower is the premium. Finally, note that this implementation accommodates the case in which the static contract is optimal. In that case, we have \( x_L = 1 \) and \( \theta_1 = \theta_H = \theta_2 \) thus both contracts are the same.

6 Multiple Types

Until now, we have studied the optimality of the static contract and the optimal sequential mechanism for two types of interim buyers. In this section, we consider an arbitrary number of interim types \( \{1, \ldots, K\} \) and investigate some properties of the solution to (\( \mathcal{P} \)). In particular, we provide a generalized version of condition (APR). Then, we provide numerical evidence and highlight the challenges associated with the characterization of the optimal sequential mechanism when \( K > 2 \).

6.1 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition

Our generalized necessary and sufficient condition relies on a characterization of the changes in the objective around the static solution when considering allocation deviations. With this purpose, consider the following set:

\[
\mathcal{A} \triangleq \left\{ (\lambda_{ij})_{i,j \in \{1, \ldots, K\}^2} \geq 0 : \sum_{j \neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot F_j(\hat{\theta}) = \alpha_k \cdot \mu_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot f_k(\hat{\theta}) + F_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot \sum_{j \neq k} \lambda_{kj}, \right. \\
\left. \alpha_k \geq \sum_{j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j \neq k} \lambda_{jk}, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \right\}.
\]

The set \( \mathcal{A} \) contains the multipliers associated with the IC constraints that encode the change in the objective as we deviate from the static allocation. Roughly speaking, when the static contract is optimal, allocation perturbations in the contract of each type should equal the dualized costs associated to such perturbations in the IC constraints. In other words, the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to allocations around the static solution equals zero. This is captured by the set of equalities in the definition of \( \mathcal{A} \). In addition, the set of inequalities ensures that the optimal ex-post utilities of the lowest valuation buyers are zero. Note that multipliers being in the set \( \mathcal{A} \) are necessary for optimality. The next result provides a necessary and sufficient condition.

**Theorem 4 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Finitely Many Types)**

*The set \( \mathcal{A} \) is non-empty. Furthermore, if there exists a feasible solution to (\( \mathcal{P} \)) which strictly satisfies all the IC constraints then the static contract is optimal if and only if there exist \( (\lambda_{ij})_{i,j \in \{1, \ldots, K\}^2} \in \mathcal{A} \)
such that
\[
\max_{\theta \leq \bar{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_k \cdot R^{kk}(\theta, \bar{\theta}) - \sum_{j \neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_j(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_k(z) dz} \right\} \leq \min_{\theta \leq \bar{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_k \cdot R^{kk}(\bar{\theta}, \theta) - \sum_{j \neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_j(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_k(z) dz} \right\}, \tag{APR^M}
\]
for all \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \).

The strict feasibility to \((P)\) corresponds to a standard Slater condition. Condition \((APR^M)\) is obtained by studying the Lagrangian when the static contract is optimal and disentangling the key conditions it must satisfy. To obtain a better understanding of this condition it is helpful to see how it generalizes the necessary and sufficient condition provided in Theorem 1 for two types. The general condition of Theorem 4 in the binary case becomes
\[
\max_{\theta \leq \bar{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_1 \cdot R^{11}(\theta, \bar{\theta}) - \lambda_{21} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_2(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_1(z) dz} \right\} \leq \min_{\theta \leq \bar{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_1 \cdot R^{11}(\bar{\theta}, \theta) - \lambda_{21} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_2(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_1(z) dz} \right\},
\]
for the low type, and
\[
\max_{\theta \leq \bar{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_2 \cdot R^{22}(\theta, \bar{\theta}) - \lambda_{12} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_1(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_2(z) dz} \right\} \leq \min_{\theta \leq \bar{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_2 \cdot R^{22}(\bar{\theta}, \theta) - \lambda_{12} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_1(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_2(z) dz} \right\}, \tag{13}
\]
for the high type, where \( \lambda_{12} \) and \( \lambda_{21} \) belong to \( \mathcal{A} \). We next argue that condition \((APR)\) holds if and only if there exist \( \lambda_{12}, \lambda_{21} \in \mathcal{A} \) such that conditions \((12)\) and \((13)\) hold. Suppose \((APR)\) holds. Since we expect the low to high IC constraint not to be binding we take \( \lambda_{12} \) equal to zero. Because \( \lambda \) must belong to \( \mathcal{A} \) this necessarily implies that \( \lambda_{21} \) is equal to \( \alpha_1 r^{12}(\bar{\theta}) \). For this choice of multipliers inequality \((13)\) follows directly from \( r^{kk} \) being increasing. At the same time, the choice of multipliers together with \((APR)\) imply that both the max and the min in \((12)\) are equal to zero. To see this consider the maximum in \((12)\) and take \( \theta = \bar{\theta} \), since \( \lambda_{21} \) equal to \( \alpha_1 r^{12}(\bar{\theta}) \) the expression inside the brackets is zero. Hence, the maximum in \((12)\) is bounded below by zero. It is also bounded above by zero,
\[
\alpha_1 \cdot R^{11}(\theta, \bar{\theta}) - \lambda_{21} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_2(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F_1(z) dz} \leq 0 \Leftrightarrow R^{12}(\theta, \bar{\theta}) \leq r^{12}(\bar{\theta}), \quad \forall \theta \leq \bar{\theta}.
\]
When \((APR)\) holds the right hand side inequality above always holds. A similar argument applies to the min. Therefore, the condition provided in Theorem 1 implies \((APR^M)\) for the binary case. The converse implication follows from a contradiction argument which for the sake of brevity we omit.

The two type case is amenable to this simplification because one can readily solve for the multipliers: \( \lambda_{12} \) equal to zero is a natural choice (the low to high IC constraints can be relaxed c.f Section 5), and \( \lambda_{21} \) equal to \( \alpha_1 r^{12}(\bar{\theta}) \) then follows from the definition of \( \mathcal{A} \). Unfortunately, when \( K > 2 \) the space of
deviations is richer and so is the possible selection of multipliers; in turn this precludes such a clear characterization as in the two type case.

We stress that by judiciously choosing the multipliers it is straightforward to verify that as in the two type case, condition (R) of Krähmer and Strausz (2015) implies our condition \((\text{APR}^M)\) also in the case of multiple types, and thus the optimality of the static contract.

By contrast, a complete characterization of the sequential contract seems substantially more complex with finitely many types. Next, in the context of exponentially distributed ex-post types, we briefly describe partial results and highlight the challenges associated with multiple types that already appear in the numerical analysis.

### 6.2 The Exponential Example Continued

Despite the challenges that we discuss below, we are able to provide the following characterization

**Proposition 4** For exponential valuations the optimal allocations have at most one randomized interval.

Proposition 4 establishes that for exponentially distributed valuation the optimal contract is simple in the sense that each interim type’s allocation is randomized at most in one interval. The proof consists on noticing that the monotonicity constraints form a cone, and then using duality and complementary slackness. It is worth mentioning that the proof method applies more generally but the structure of the contract in general depends on the values of the dual variables values corresponding to the IC constraints. In the exponential case, the argument can be simplified to show that the simple structure in the result arises independent of these variables’ values.

The characterization in Proposition 4 only establishes the structure of the optimal allocations but it does not provide information on the number of contracts that the optimal solutions will ultimately feature. For example, if \(K = 4\) Proposition 4 does not say whether the optimal solution will pool the interim types creating either one, two, three or four different contracts. In general, the full range of contracts from static to fully sequential \((K\) different contracts\) is possible.

To further explore the structure of optimal contracts we provide numerical results. In Figure 6 we show the optimal allocations when \(K = 4\) and all interim types have exponentially distributed valuations. A first observation is that for different proportions \(\alpha_k\) of interim types the optimal contract can feature different levels of separation. Panel (a) in the figure corresponds to an optimal static contract (no separation), and panel (d) in the figure corresponds to an optimal sequential contract that features
Figure 6: Optimal allocations for $K = 4$, types have exponential distribution with means $(2.2, 5.0, 12, 50)$ respectively (for numerical simplicity, we use truncated versions of these distributions in the interval $[0, 60]$). In each panel the vertical axis corresponds to buyers’ valuations and the horizontal axis corresponds to the interim type. Each bar represents the allocation for each type, lighter grey indicates lower probability of allocation while darker grey indicates higher probability of allocation. White represents no allocation and black full allocation. From panel (a) to (d) the fractions, $\alpha_k$, for each type are: $(0.7, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05), (0.4, 0.1, 0.4, 0.1), (0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.1)$ and $(0.25, 0.25, 0.1, 0.4)$, respectively.

a different contract for each interim type (full separation). As a second observation note that out of the four instances depicted in Figure 6 only one, (d), has four contracts in the optimal solution. Finding the minimal number of contracts that give a good approximation to the optimal multiple type sequential contract is a question outside the scope of this paper but that may be of interest to study in the future.

Observe that across the instances in Figure 6 each optimal contract has at most one interval of valuation for which randomization occurs (c.f Proposition 4). This simple structure of the optimal contract appears however not to be robust to other specifications of the value distributions. When we consider the case of normally distributed valuations (using truncated normal random variables), the optimal contract might exhibit several different intervals of randomization for a given type. In general, richer contract features may arise when we combine exponential, normal, uniform or other distributions. As a consequence, generally speaking, it is challenging to analytically characterize the optimal solution. The challenge here is that classic relaxation approaches used in the mechanism design literature do not apply in our setting. For example, relaxing all the upward incentive constraints and leaving only the local downward incentive constraints does not work because in general global downward incentive
constraints bind. Moreover, binding constraints are highly sensitive to model primitives. Improving our understanding of this setting may be an interesting avenue for future research.

7 Conclusion

We considered the scope of sequential screening in the presence of ex-post participation constraints. The ex-post participation constraints limit the ability of the seller to extract surplus. As the buyer has to be willing to participate in the contractual arrangement following every realization of his valuation, the surplus has to be extracted ex-post rather than at the interim level.

Despite these restrictions sequential screening generally allows the seller to increase his revenue beyond the statically optimal revenue. The gains from sequential screening become more pronounced to the extent that the interim types differ in their willingness to pay. A natural implementation of the optimal mechanism simply offers the buyer the choice among different menus in the first stage. The choice of menu in the first period merely restricts the possible choices in the second period. In particular, it is not necessary to ask the buyer for any transfer before the final transaction occurs. Moreover, the buyer only has to make a transfer if she receives the object.

In contrast to the static solution where the optimal policy is always to sell the largest possible quantity, the sequential screening policy offers intermediate quantities. This departure from the bang-bang policy in a linear utility setting arises due to the presence of the ex-post participation constraint in conjunction with the incentive compatibility constraints.

There are several natural directions to extend the present work. Our stronger results were for the case of binary interim types while allowing for a continuum of valuations for each type. We also presented an extension of Theorem 1 to multiple types as well as a characterization and numerical results for exponential valuations. We would like to further explore the characterization of the optimal sequential contract to multiple types and general valuation distributions. An interesting question here concerns the number of randomization intervals per type and whether the number of intermediate allocations increases with the number of interim types. Also, is there a fixed number of intermediate allocations that yield a good approximation to the optimal solution for an arbitrary number of interim types? Similarly, is there a fixed number of contracts that yield a good approximation to the optimal solution for an arbitrary number of interim types?

We might also be interested in analyzing how the number of competing buyers may affect the nature of the optimal mechanism. This has important practical consequences particularly in industries that use market mechanisms like auctions, such as display advertising alluded at the beginning of the paper. We
note that this extension is not direct, because with multiple buyers we lose the threshold structure of the optimal static allocation when the mixture distribution is not regular and ironing may be required. However, we conjecture that in this case an approximately optimal market design would consist of running a series of “waterfall auctions” with different priorities across participants.
References


A Proofs for section 4

Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this result is standard and thus omitted. ■

Proof of Lemma 2. The fact that the optimal solution is a threshold allocation is explained in the main text. Thus, we only need to provide a proof for \( \bar{\theta} \) being in the interval \([\theta_1, \theta_K]\). Note that for all \( \theta \) below \( \theta_1 \), \( \mu_L(\theta) \) is negative for all \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \). Therefore, \( \bar{\mu}(\theta) \) is negative for all \( \theta \) below \( \theta_1 \). Similarly, for all \( \theta \) above \( \theta_K \), \( \bar{\mu}(\theta) \) is positive. Since the allocation is of the threshold type, it is optimal to set \( x(\theta) \) equal to 0 for \( \theta \) below \( \theta_1 \) and to set \( x(\theta) \) equal to 1 for \( \theta \) above \( \theta_K \). This necessarily implies that \( \bar{\theta} \) is in \([\theta_1, \theta_K]\). ■

Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the sufficiency of our condition and then its necessity. We denote by \( \Omega \) the space of non-decreasing allocations, that is,

\[
\Omega \triangleq \{ x : [0, 1] \to [0, 1] : x(\cdot) \text{ is non-decreasing} \}.
\]

Sufficiency. We assume condition (APR) holds, we want to verify the static contract is optimal. In order to do so we dualize the IC constraints. The Lagrangian is

\[
\mathcal{L}(u, x, \lambda, w) = u_L(w_L - \lambda_{HL} - \alpha_L) + u_H(\lambda_{HL} - \alpha_H + w_H) \\
+ \int_0^{\theta_{max}} x_L(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz \\
+ \int_0^{\theta_{max}} x_H(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz,
\]

where \( w_L, w_H \) correspond to the multipliers for the ex-post IR constraints, and \( \lambda \in \{ \lambda_{HL}, \lambda_{LH} \} \) to the multipliers for IC constraints. In the Lagrangian above we have chosen the multipliers as follows

\[
w_L = \alpha_L - \alpha_H r^{HH}(\hat{\theta}), \quad w_H = \alpha_H + \alpha_H r^{HH}(\hat{\theta}), \quad \lambda_{HL} = \alpha_L r^{LH}(\hat{\theta}), \quad \lambda_{LH} = 0,
\]

(A-1)

these multipliers are non-negative because \( r^{HH}(\hat{\theta}) \leq 0, r^{LH}(\hat{\theta}) \geq 0 \) and

\[
w_H = \alpha_H + \alpha_H r^{HH}(\hat{\theta}) \geq 0 \iff r^{HH}(\hat{\theta}) \geq -1 \iff \hat{\theta} - \frac{F_H}{f_H}(\hat{\theta}) \geq -\frac{F_H}{f_H}(\hat{\theta}) \iff \hat{\theta} \geq 0.
\]

Hence, maximizing the Lagrangian over non-decreasing allocation \( x_L \) and \( x_H \) yields an upper bound for the relaxed problem. Note that this choice of multipliers eliminates the \( u_L \) and \( u_H \) terms in the Lagrangian. We next show that under (APR) the solution to the Lagrangian relaxation is the static solution. We first claim that

\[
\max_{x_L \in \Omega} \int_0^{\theta_{max}} x_L(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz = \int_\hat{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz. \quad \text{(A-2)}
\]
To prove this first note that the optimal solution $x_L$ on the left hand side of (A-2) must be of the threshold type, that is, $x_L(\theta) = 1_{\{\theta \geq \theta^*\}}$, because $x_L(\cdot)$ is non-decreasing (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). Hence (A-2) is equivalent to
\[
\int_{\theta_*}^{\theta_{max}} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz \leq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz, \quad \forall \theta^* \in [0, 1].
\]
Replacing the value of $\lambda_{HL}$, this equation can be cast over values $\theta^*_1 \leq \hat{\theta}$ and $\theta^*_2 \geq \hat{\theta}$ as
\[
\frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) dz} \leq \alpha_{L} r^{LH}(\hat{\theta}) \leq \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) dz}, \quad \forall \theta^*_1 \leq \hat{\theta} \leq \theta^*_2 \tag{A-3}
\]
Condition (APR) ensures the equation above always hold. Indeed, condition (APR) implies that for any $\theta^*_1 \leq \hat{\theta}$ and $\epsilon > 0$
\[
\frac{\int_{\theta}^{\theta + \epsilon} \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\theta + \epsilon} F_H(z) dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\theta + \epsilon} \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\theta + \epsilon} F_H(z) dz}.
\]
Taking $\epsilon \downarrow 0$ yields the left hand side inequality in (A-3). The right hand side inequality in (A-3) can be verified using an analogous argument. This shows (A-2), that is, the static contract maximizes the part of the Lagrangian that corresponds to interim type $L$. We now prove the same for type $H$. Note first that the optimality of the static contract implies
\[
\lambda = \alpha_L r^{LH}(\hat{\theta}) = -\alpha_{HH} r^{HH}(\hat{\theta}).
\]
Then
\[
\max_{x_H \in \Omega} \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_H(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_{HH} H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda_{HL} F_H(z) \right] dz
\]
\[
= \max_{x_H \in \Omega} \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_H(z) \cdot \alpha_H \cdot \left[ \mu_H(z) f_H(z) - r^{HH}(\theta_s) F_H(z) \right] dz
\]
\[
= \max_{x_H \in \Omega} \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_H(z) \cdot \alpha_H \cdot \left[ r^{HH}(z) - r^{HH}(\theta_s) \right] F_H(z) dz
\]
\[
= \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} \alpha_H \cdot \left[ r^{HH}(z) - r^{HH}(\theta_s) \right] F_H(z) dz
\]
where in (a) we have used the definition of $r^{HH}(\cdot)$ and in (b) our assumption that $r^{HH}(\cdot)$ is increasing. Thus, we have proved that for this choice of Lagrange multipliers the static contract maximizes the Lagrangian. Since the value of the Lagrangian coincides with the primal objective at the static solution, and this solution is always primal feasible. We conclude that the static contract is optimal.

**Necessity.** We differ this proof to the proof of Proposition 1. In it we show that whenever condition (APR) is not satisfied, there is a contract different from the static one with a strictly larger revenue. ■
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume (APR) does not hold, then by Lemma A-1 (which we state and prove after the current proof) there exist $\theta_1 < \tilde{\theta} < \theta_2$ such that

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\tilde{\theta}} F_H(z)r^{LH}(z)dz}{\int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz} > \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)r^{LH}(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\tilde{\theta}} F_H(z)dz},
\]  

(A-4)

Consider a solution in which we set $u_L = u_H = 0$, and

\[
x_L(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \theta_1 \\
x & \text{if } \theta_1 \leq \theta \leq \theta_2 \\
1 & \text{if } \theta_2 < \theta,
\end{cases}
\]

\[
x_H(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta < \tilde{\theta} \\
1 & \text{if } \tilde{\theta} \leq \theta,
\end{cases}
\]

where $x = \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz / \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz$. We next show that this solution is feasible and that yields an strict revenue improvement over the static contract.

Feasibility. The ex-post participation constraints are clearly satisfied. Also, since $\theta_1 < \tilde{\theta} < \theta_2$ we have $x_L \in (0, 1)$, and both $x_L(\cdot)$ and $x_H(\cdot)$ are non-decreasing allocations. We verify the IC constraints

\[
u_L + \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_L(\theta)F_L(\theta)d\theta \geq u_H + \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_H(\theta)F_L(\theta)d\theta,
\]

\[
u_H + \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_H(\theta)F_H(\theta)d\theta \geq u_L + \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_L(\theta)F_H(\theta)d\theta.
\]

By replacing the allocations and ex-post utilities we obtain that the IC constraints are equivalent to

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz}{\int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz} > \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\tilde{\theta}} F_L(z)dz}.
\]

(A-5)

To see why this is true, rewrite equation (A-4) as

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz}{\int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz} > \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)r^{LH}(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\tilde{\theta}} F_H(z)r^{LH}(z)dz},
\]

(A-6)

note that we are using here that by Lemma A-1 the denominator on the right hand side is strictly
positive. Also note that
\[
\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) r^{LL}(z) dz
\leq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) r^{LL}(z) dz
\]
\[\geq r^{LL}(\hat{\theta}) \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
\[= r^{LL}(\hat{\theta}) \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
\[\geq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
\[= \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) r^{LL}(z) dz\]
\[\geq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
\[= \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
\[\geq r^{LL}(\hat{\theta}) \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
where the inequalities come from the fact that \(r^{LL}(\cdot)\) is an increasing function and \(r^{LL}(\hat{\theta}) \geq 0\). This
gives
\[
\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) r^{LL}(z) dz
\leq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_L(z) dz\]
ote that we are using here that by Lemma A-1 the denominator on the left hand side is strictly positive.
This inequality together with (A-6) yields (A-5) and, therefore, the proposed solution is feasible.

**Revenue improvement.** We need to prove that
\[
\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} [\alpha_L f_L(z) \mu_L(z) + \alpha_H f_H(z) \mu_H(z)] dz < \chi \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_L f_L(z) \mu_L(z) dz + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_L f_L(z) \mu_L(z) dz
\]
\[+ \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} \alpha_H f_H(z) \mu_H(z) dz,\]
this is equivalent to
\[
\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} \alpha_L f_L(z) \mu_L(z) dz < \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz} \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_L f_L(z) \mu_L(z) dz
\]
which is the same as
\[
\frac{\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) r^{LL}(z) dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz} < \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) r^{LL}(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz}
\]
which is exactly the property satisfied by \(\theta_1, \theta_2\) in (A-4).

**Lemma A-1** Suppose
\[
\max_{0 \leq \theta \leq \theta_0} R^{LL}(\theta, \hat{\theta}) > \min_{\hat{\theta} \leq \theta \leq \theta_{\text{max}}} R^{LL}(\hat{\theta}, \theta).
\]
Then, there exist \( \theta_a, \theta_b \in [0, \theta_{\text{max}}] \) with \( \theta_a < \hat{\theta} < \theta_b \) such that \( R^{LH}(\theta_a, \hat{\theta}) > R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta_b) \). Moreover, 
\[
0 < \int_{\theta_a}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) r^{LH}(z) dz = \int_{\theta_a}^{\hat{\theta}} F_L(z) r^{LL}(z) dz, \quad \text{and} \quad 0 < \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_b} F_H(z) r^{LH}(z) dz = \int_{\theta_a}^{\hat{\theta}} F_L(z) r^{LL}(z) dz.
\]

**Proof of Lemma A-1.** Note that both \( r^{LH}(\cdot, \hat{\theta}) \) and \( r^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \cdot) \) are continuous functions. Thus the maximum and the minimum in the statement are achieved by some \( \hat{\theta}_a \in [0, \hat{\theta}] \) and \( \hat{\theta}_b \in [\hat{\theta}, \hat{\theta}] \), respectively. Therefore, by assumption, we have that 
\[
R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}_a, \hat{\theta}) > R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \hat{\theta}_b).
\]

Using the continuity of both function we can find \( \theta_a < \hat{\theta} \) and \( \theta_b > \hat{\theta} \) such that the inequality above is satisfied.

To finalize, we argue why \( 0 < \int_{\theta_a}^{\hat{\theta}} F_2(z) r^{LH}(z) dz \). Note that since \( \theta_b > \hat{\theta} \geq \hat{\theta}_a \) (see Lemma 2) we have \( R^{LH}(\hat{\theta}, \theta_b) > 0 \). Therefore, \( R^{LH}(\theta_a, \hat{\theta}) > 0 \) which imply the desired inequalities. ■

**Proof of Lemma 3.** From Lemma 2 we have that \( \hat{\theta}_L \leq \hat{\theta} \leq \hat{\theta}_H \). For exponential distributions, \( \hat{\theta}_L = 1/\lambda_L \) and \( \hat{\theta}_H = 1/\lambda_H \). Therefore, \( \hat{\theta} \in [1/\lambda_L, 1/\lambda_L] \). Moreover, \( \hat{\theta} \) must satisfy (8), if not we could increase it or decrease and obtain an strict revenue improvement.

We provide a proof for the rest of the properties for general distributions satisfying (DHR). Note first that \( \hat{\theta} \) can be seen as a function of \( \alpha_L \) and \( \alpha_H \) but since \( \alpha_H \) equals \( 1 - \alpha_L \), we can effectively consider \( \hat{\theta} \) just a function of \( \alpha_L \). Then, when \( \alpha_L \) equals 0 is as we only had type H buyers and, therefore, the optimal threshold is \( \hat{\theta}_H \). While when \( \alpha_L \) equals 1 is as we only had type L buyers so the optimal threshold is \( \hat{\theta}_L \). Hence, \( \hat{\theta}(0) \) equals \( \hat{\theta}_H \) and \( \hat{\theta}(1) \) equals \( \hat{\theta}_L \).

Now we prove that \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L) \) is non-increasing. Consider \( \alpha_L^a < \alpha_L^b \) and suppose that \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a) < \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b) \). Define
\[
\ell(\theta, \alpha_L) \triangleq \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \alpha_L f_L(z) \mu_L(z) + (1 - \alpha_L) f_H(z) \mu_H(z) dz,
\]

note that this is a linear function of \( \alpha_L \) and, for fixed \( \alpha_L \), it is maximized at \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L) \). Hence,
\[
\ell(\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a), \alpha_L^a) \leq \ell(\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b), \alpha_L^b)
\]
\[
= \ell(\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a), \alpha_L^b - \alpha_L^a) + \ell(\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b), \alpha_L^b)
\]
\[
\leq \ell(\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a), \alpha_L^b - \alpha_L^a) + \ell(\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b), \alpha_L^b)
\]

therefore
\[
\int_{\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a)}^{\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b)} \alpha_L^b f_L(z) \mu_L(z) + (1 - \alpha_L^b) f_H(z) \mu_H(z) dz 
\leq \int_{\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a)}^{\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b)} \alpha_L^a f_L(z) \mu_L(z) + (1 - \alpha_L^a) f_H(z) \mu_H(z) dz. \hspace{1cm} (A-7)
\]

Recall that \( \hat{\theta} \in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \) and, therefore, \( \theta_L \leq \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a) < \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b) \leq \theta_H \). This in turn implies that
\[
\mu_L(z) > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mu_H(z) < 0, \quad \forall z \in (\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a), \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b)),
\]

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so for \( z \in (\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^a), \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^b)) \) we have
\[
\alpha_L^bf_L(z)\mu_L(z) + (1 - \alpha_L^a)f_H(z)\mu_H(z) < \alpha_L^bf_L(z)\mu_L(z) + (1 - \alpha_L^b)f_H(z)\mu_H(z),
\]
which contradicts (A-7).

**Proof of Proposition 2.** We make use of Theorem 1. Condition (APR) for the exponential distribution is
\[
\max_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \frac{\theta e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}} - \theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta}}{e^{-\lambda_H\theta} - e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}}} \right\} \leq \min_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \frac{\theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta} - \hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}}}{e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}} - e^{-\lambda_H\theta}} \right\}.
\]
(A-8)

Before we begin the proof we need some definitions and observations. Define the following functions
\[
g(\theta) \equiv \frac{\hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}} - \theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta}}{e^{-\lambda_H\theta} - e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}}}
\quad \text{and} \quad
f(\theta) \equiv \frac{\theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta} - \hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}}}{e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}} - e^{-\lambda_H\theta}}.
\]

Note the following
\[
\lim_{\theta \to \theta +} \overline{f}(\theta) = \lim_{\theta \to \theta -} \overline{g}(\theta) = \frac{(\lambda_L\hat{\theta} - 1)}{\lambda_H} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)},
\]
(A-9)

and
\[
\lim_{\theta \to \infty} \overline{g}(\theta) = \hat{\theta} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)}. \quad \text{(A-10)}
\]

Finally note that
\[
\frac{(\lambda_L\hat{\theta} - 1)}{\lambda_H} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \leq \hat{\theta} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \iff \hat{\theta} \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H}. \quad \text{(A-11)}
\]

Now, suppose condition (APR) holds and
\[
\hat{\theta} > \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} \quad \text{(A-12)}
\]

From equations (A-9),(A-10) and (A-11) we see that
\[
\overline{g}(\hat{\theta}) = g(\hat{\theta}) > \lim_{\theta \to \infty} g(\theta),
\]

which implies
\[
\max_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \frac{\theta e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}} - \theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta}}{e^{-\lambda_H\theta} - e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}}} \right\} > \min_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \frac{\theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta} - \hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}}}{e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}} - e^{-\lambda_H\theta}} \right\}
\]
(A-13)

contradicting the fact that condition (APR) holds.

For the other direction, assume equation (9) holds. We first prove that for \( \theta \leq \hat{\theta} \) we have \( g(\theta) \leq g(\hat{\theta}) \), indeed
\[
g(\theta) \leq g(\hat{\theta}) \iff \frac{\hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}} - \theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta}}{e^{-\lambda_H\theta} - e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}}} \leq \frac{(\lambda_L\hat{\theta} - 1)}{\lambda_H} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)}
\]
\[
\iff \lambda_H \cdot (\hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L\hat{\theta}} - \theta e^{-\lambda_L\theta}) \geq (e^{-\lambda_H\hat{\theta}} - e^{-\lambda_H\theta}) \cdot (\lambda_L\hat{\theta} - 1) \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)}
\]
\[
\iff \lambda_H \hat{\theta} \cdot (1 - \frac{\theta}{\hat{\theta}} e^{-\lambda_L(\theta - \hat{\theta})}) - (1 - e^{-\lambda_H(\theta - \hat{\theta})}) \cdot (\lambda_L\hat{\theta} - 1) \geq 0,
\]

so we just need to see that this last inequality holds for \( \theta \leq \hat{\theta} \). For doing so define

\[
H(\theta) \triangleq \lambda_H \hat{\theta} \cdot (1 - \frac{\theta}{\hat{\theta}} e^{-\lambda_L(\theta - \hat{\theta})}) - (1 - e^{-\lambda_H(\theta - \hat{\theta})}) \cdot (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1),
\]

and note that \( H(\hat{\theta}) = 0 \) and

\[
H(0) = \lambda_H \hat{\theta} + (e^{\lambda_H \hat{\theta}} - 1) \cdot (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) = \lambda_H \hat{\theta} + \lambda_H \hat{\theta}(\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) = \lambda_H \hat{\theta} \cdot \lambda_L \hat{\theta} > 0,
\]

where the inequality comes from convexity of the exponential function and the fact that \( \hat{\theta} \geq 1/\lambda_L \). Furthermore the derivative of \( H \) is given by

\[
\frac{dH}{d\theta} = \lambda_H (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) e^{-\lambda_L(\theta - \hat{\theta})} - \lambda_H (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) e^{-\lambda_H(\theta - \hat{\theta})},
\]

and it can be easily verified that for \( \theta \leq \hat{\theta} \) we have \( dH/d\theta \leq 0 \). This together to the facts that \( H(0) > 0 \) and \( H(\hat{\theta}) = 0 \) imply that \( \bar{g}(\theta) \leq \bar{g}(\hat{\theta}) \) for all \( \theta \leq \hat{\theta} \). Which in turn implies

\[
\max_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \frac{\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - \lambda_H \theta}{\lambda_H} \right\} = \frac{(\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1)}{\lambda_H} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)}.
\]

Now we prove that for \( \theta \geq \hat{\theta} \) we have \( \bar{g}(\theta) \geq \bar{g}(\hat{\theta}) \). Note that if we prove this we are done because this and what we have just proven imply condition (APR). As before we do

\[
\bar{g}(\theta) \geq \bar{g}(\hat{\theta}) \iff \frac{\theta e^{-\lambda_L \theta} - \lambda_L \theta}{\lambda_H} \geq \frac{(\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1)}{\lambda_H} \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)}
\]

\[
\iff \lambda_H (\theta e^{-\lambda_L \theta} - \lambda_L \theta) \geq (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) \cdot (e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}} - e^{-\lambda_H \theta}) \cdot e^{-\hat{\theta}(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)}
\]

\[
\iff \lambda_H (\hat{\theta} - \lambda_L (\theta - \hat{\theta})) \geq (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) \cdot (1 - e^{-\lambda_H (\theta - \hat{\theta})}) \geq 0,
\]

note that the LHS of this last inequality is again the function \( H(\cdot) \) but this time defined for \( \theta \geq \hat{\theta} \). We have \( H(\hat{\theta}) = 0 \). It is easy to prove that for \( \hat{\theta} \leq \theta \leq \hat{\theta} \) the function \( H(\theta) \) is increasing, and then for \( \theta > \hat{\theta} \) is decreasing, where \( \hat{\theta} > \hat{\theta} \) and \( dH(\hat{\theta})/d\theta = 0 \). Also,

\[
\lim_{\theta \to \infty} H(\theta) = \lambda_H \hat{\theta} - (\lambda_L \hat{\theta} - 1) \geq 0,
\]

hence for \( \theta \geq \hat{\theta} \) we have \( H(\theta) \geq 0 \) and, therefore, \( \bar{g}(\theta) \geq \bar{g}(\hat{\theta}) \) for all \( \theta \geq \hat{\theta} \), as desired.

**Proof of Corollary 1.** Recall that for any \( \lambda_L > \lambda_H \) from Lemma 3 we have

\[
\frac{1}{\lambda_L} \leq \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L) \leq \hat{\theta}(\alpha_H) \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_H},
\]

and

\[
\lambda_L \leq 2\lambda_H \iff \frac{1}{\lambda_L} \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_H} \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H},
\]

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therefore, for any \( \alpha_L \in [0, 1] \) equation (9) is satisfied. Then by Proposition 2 we conclude that the static contract is optimal for any \( \alpha_L \in [0, 1] \). ■

**Proof of Corollary 2.** First we show \( \hat{\theta}(\cdot) \) is continuous from the right at zero. Let \( \{\alpha_L^n\} \in [0, 1] \) be any sequence such that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \alpha_L^n = 0,
\]

and suppose \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^n) \) does not converge to \( \hat{\theta}(0) = 1/\lambda_H \). That is,

\[
\exists \epsilon > 0, \forall n_0, \exists n \geq n_0, \quad |\frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^n)| > \epsilon,
\]

since \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^n) \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_H} \) we have

\[
|\frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^n)| > \epsilon \iff \frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^n) > \epsilon.
\]

This in turn means that we can create a subsequence \( \{\alpha_L^{\ell_n}\} \subset \{\alpha_L^n\} \) such that

\[
\forall n, \quad \frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \epsilon > \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n}). \tag{A-14}
\]

But since \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n}) \) is a maximizer of \( \Pi^{\text{static}}(\cdot) \) we must have

\[
\alpha_L^{\ell_n} \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})e^{-\lambda_L \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})} + (1 - \alpha_L^{\ell_n}) \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})} \geq \alpha_L^{\ell_n} \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_L \frac{1}{\lambda_H}} + (1 - \alpha_L^{\ell_n}) \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H}},
\]

because \( \lambda_L > \lambda_H \) we can bound the LHS above to obtain

\[
\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})} \geq \alpha_L^{\ell_n} \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_L \frac{1}{\lambda_H}} + (1 - \alpha_L^{\ell_n}) \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H}}. \tag{A-15}
\]

Note that the function \( \theta e^{-\lambda_H \theta} \) has a unique maximum at \( \theta = 1/\lambda_H \) and since \( \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n}) \) satisfies equation (A-14), we can always find \( \delta(\epsilon) > 0 \) such that

\[
\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_H} + \delta(\epsilon) \right) e^{-\lambda_H \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_H} + \delta(\epsilon) \right)} > \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}(\alpha_L^{\ell_n})}, \quad \forall n,
\]

plugging this in equation (A-15) yields

\[
\left( \frac{1}{\lambda_H} + \delta(\epsilon) \right) e^{-\lambda_H \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_H} + \delta(\epsilon) \right)} > \alpha_L^{\ell_n} \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_L \frac{1}{\lambda_H}} + (1 - \alpha_L^{\ell_n}) \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H}}, \quad \forall n,
\]

so taking the limit over \( n \) gives a contradiction. In conclusion we have proved that \( \hat{\theta}(\cdot) \) is continuous from the right at zero. Now, to finalize the proof recall that we are assuming \( \lambda_L > 2\lambda_H \) or equivalently \( \frac{1}{\lambda_H} > \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} \). However, since \( \hat{\theta}(0) = 1/\lambda_H \) and \( \hat{\theta}(\cdot) \) is continuous from the right we can always find \( \hat{\alpha}_L \in (0, 1] \) such that

\[
\frac{1}{\lambda_H} \geq \hat{\theta}(\hat{\alpha}_L) \geq \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H},
\]

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so thanks to Proposition 2, the sequential contract is optimal when we set $\alpha_L > \tilde{\alpha}_L$. Note that the same arguments is valid for $1/\lambda_L$. That is, we can show that $\hat{\theta}(\alpha_L)$ is continuous from the left at 1 and then using the fact that

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} > \frac{1}{\lambda_L},$$

we can find $\tilde{\alpha}_H \in [\tilde{\alpha}_L, 1)$ such that

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} > \hat{\theta}(\tilde{\alpha}_H) \geq \frac{1}{\lambda_L},$$

hence in $[\tilde{\alpha}_H, 1]$ the static contract is optimal. All of this implies that since $\hat{\theta}(\cdot)$ is a non-increasing function we can always find $\tilde{\alpha} \in (0, 1)$ with the desired property. ■

**Proof of Corollary 3.** Fix $\lambda_H$ and $\alpha_L$. Suppose the result is not true, that is,

$$\forall \lambda_L \geq 2\lambda_H, \exists \lambda_L \geq \tilde{\lambda}_L, \quad \hat{\theta}(\lambda_L) \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H}.$$ 

From this we can construct a sequence $\lambda^n_L \geq 2\lambda_H$ such that

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \lambda^n_L = \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L) \leq \frac{1}{\lambda^n_L - \lambda_H}, \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{N},$$

therefore $\hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)$ converges to 0, and we have

$$\Pi^{\text{static}}(\hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)) = \hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)}(\alpha_L e^{-(\lambda^n_L - \lambda_H)\hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)} + \alpha_H) \leq \hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)} \to_\infty 0.$$ 

However, since $\hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)$ maximizes $\Pi^{\text{static}}(\cdot)$ it must be the case that $\Pi^{\text{static}}(1/\lambda_H) \leq \Pi^{\text{static}}(\hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L))$, that is,

$$\alpha_L \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H}} + \alpha_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H}} \leq \Pi^{\text{static}}(\hat{\theta}(\lambda^n_L)).$$

Taking limit over $n$ at both sides of the previous equation yields

$$\alpha_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H} e^{-\lambda_H \frac{1}{\lambda_H}} \leq 0,$$

a contradiction. ■
B Proofs for section 5

Proof of Theorem 2. For ease of exposition we restate the problem’s formulation,

\[
(P_R) \quad \max_{0 \leq x \leq 1} \quad - \sum_{k \in \{L,H\}} \alpha_k u_k + \sum_{k \in \{L,H\}} \alpha_k \int_0^{\theta_{max}} x_k(z) \mu_k(z) f_k(\theta) d\theta
\]

s.t. \(x_k(\theta)\) non-decreasing, \(\forall k \in \{L, H\}\)

\[u_k \geq 0, \forall k \in \{L, H\}\]

\[u_H + \int_0^{\theta_{max}} x_H(z) F_H(z) dz \geq u_L + \int_0^{\theta_{max}} x_L(z) F_H(z) dz.\]

We separate this proof into two parts. In part 1 we show that the optimal solution has the structure in the statement of the theorem. Note that it is enough to provide a proof for the structure of the allocation, the transfers can be readily derived from Lemma 1. In part 2 we derive the properties about the thresholds, \(x_L\) and \(u_H\) and \(u_L\).

Part 1. For any optimal solution to \((P_R)\) two possible situations may arise:

1. The allocation has at least one interval in which is continuously strictly increasing.

2. The allocation does not have an interval in which is continuously strictly increasing, but is a piecewise constant non-decreasing function.

For each interim type, we prove that if we are in case (1), we can modify the allocation in that interval to be constant and obtain at least a weak improvement in the objective. This implies that for any optimal allocation, we can construct another optimal allocation that is a piecewise constant non-decreasing function. Therefore, we can always assume we are in case (2). In this case, we show that for interim type \(L\) there is only one intermediate step, and for interim type \(H\) there is no intermediate step.

We split the proof in interim type \(L\) and \(H\). Let \(x_L^*(\theta)\) and \(x_H^*(\theta)\) denote the optimal allocations. We begin with interim type \(L\).

- **interim type \(L\) case (1)**: Suppose there is an interval \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) in which \(x_L^*(\theta)\) is continuously strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note that if \(\hat{\theta}_L > \theta_1\) then we can set \(x_L^*(\theta)\) to be equal to \(x_L^*(\theta_1)\) for all \(\theta\) in \((\theta_1, \hat{\theta}_L)\). This strictly increases the objective function while maintaining feasibility. So we can assume \(\hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1\), which in turn implies that \(\mu_L(\cdot)\) is non-negative in the interval \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\).
Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217), $x^*_L(\theta)$ must maximize the Lagrangian:\footnote{To use this theorem we need to verify that there is a feasible solution that strictly satisfies all inequalities. We can take $u_L = u_H > 0$, $x_L(\theta) = 1_{\theta \geq \theta_L}$ and $x_H(\theta) = 1_{\theta \geq \theta_H}$ with $\theta_H < \theta_L$.}

$$
L(u, x, \lambda, w) = u_L(w_L - \lambda - \alpha_L) + u_H(\lambda - \alpha_H + w_H)
+ \int_{\theta_{\max}}^{\theta_0} x_L(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_L\mu_L(z)f_L(z) - \lambda \mathcal{F}_H(z) \right] dz
+ \int_{\theta_{\max}}^{\theta_0} x_H(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_H\mu_H(z)f_H(z) + \lambda \mathcal{F}_H(z) \right] dz,
$$

with $\lambda, w_L, w_H \geq 0$. Define $L_L(\cdot)$ by

$$
L_L(\theta) \triangleq \alpha_L\mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta) - \lambda \mathcal{F}_H(\theta),
$$

then it must be the case that $L_L(\theta) = 0$ for all $\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$. Suppose this is not true, then we could have $\hat{\theta} \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$ such that $L_L(\hat{\theta}) > 0$, since $L_L(\cdot)$ is a continuous function this must also be true for all $\theta \in (\hat{\theta} - \epsilon, \hat{\theta} + \epsilon)$ for $\epsilon > 0$ small enough. But then we can obtain a strict improvement by setting $x_1(\theta) = x^*_L(\hat{\theta} + \epsilon)$ for all $\theta \in (\hat{\theta} - \epsilon, \hat{\theta} + \epsilon)$. A similar argument holds when $L_L(\hat{\theta}) < 0$. Therefore, we have just proved that $L_L(\theta) = 0$ for all $\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$. In other words,

$$
\alpha_L \frac{\mu_L(\theta)f_L(\theta)}{\mathcal{F}_H(\theta)} = \lambda \geq 0, \quad \forall \theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2), \quad (B-1)
$$

Also, by the second mean value theorem for integrals there exists $\tilde{\theta} \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$ such that

$$
x^*_L(\tilde{\theta}) = \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x^*_L(z)\mathcal{F}_2(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mathcal{F}_H(z)dz}. \quad (B-2)
$$

Going back to ($\mathcal{P}_R$), we have that the part of objective associated to $x^*_L$ in $(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ is

$$
\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_L x^*_L(z)\mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz = \lambda \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x^*_L(z)\mathcal{F}_H(z)dz, \quad (B-3)
$$

where in the equality we have used (B-1). Now, consider modifying $x^*_L$ to be $\tilde{x}^*_L$ equal to $x^*_L(\tilde{\theta})$ in $(\theta_1, \theta_2)$. Then from (B-1), (B-2) and (B-3) we get

$$
\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x^*_L(z)\alpha_L\mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz = \lambda \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \tilde{x}^*_L(z)\mathcal{F}_H(z)dz
= x^*_L(\tilde{\theta}) \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_L\mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz
= \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \tilde{x}^*_L(z)\alpha_L\mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz,
$$

5To use this theorem we need to verify that there is a feasible solution that strictly satisfies all inequalities. We can take $u_L = u_H > 0$, $x_L(\theta) = 1_{\theta \geq \theta_L}$ and $x_H(\theta) = 1_{\theta \geq \theta_H}$ with $\theta_H < \theta_L$. 47
therefore, the modified $\tilde{x}_L^*$ has the same objective value than the old one. Also, note that we have preserved feasibility because

$$u_L + \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \tilde{x}_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz = u_L + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \tilde{x}_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz + \int_{(\theta_2, \theta_3)} \tilde{x}_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz$$

$$= u_L + x_L^*(\hat{\theta}) \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f_H(z)dz + \int_{(\theta_2, \theta_3)} x_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz$$

$$(a) = u_L + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz + \int_{(\theta_1, \theta_2)} x_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz$$

$$= u_L + \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_L^*(z)f_H(z)dz,$$

where in (a) we used equation (B-2).

- **interim type L case (2):** Suppose for $x_L^*(\cdot)$ there exists $\theta_1 < \theta_2 < \theta_3$ and $0 < x_1 < x_2 < 1$ such that $x_L^*(\theta) = x_1$ in $(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ and $x_L^*(\theta) = x_2$ in $(\theta_2, \theta_3)$. Since type’s $L$ allocation is piecewise constant we must have $x_L^*(\theta_1^-) < x_1$ and $x_2 < x_L^*(\theta_3^+)$. Then, the part of objective associated to interim type $L$ in these intervals is

$$\alpha_L \cdot x_1 \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz + \alpha_L \cdot x_2 \cdot \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz. \quad (B-4)$$

If $\mu_L(\hat{\theta}) \leq 0$ for some $\hat{\theta} \in (\theta_1, \theta_3)$ then because of (DHR), $\mu_L(\theta) \leq 0$ for all $\theta \leq \hat{\theta}$ and, therefore, we can always find a better solution by setting $x_L^*(\theta) = 0$ for all $\theta \leq \hat{\theta}$ (note that this does not affect feasibility in ($P_R$)). So assume $\mu_L(\theta) > 0$ for all $\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_3)$, then it must be the case that

$$u_H + \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_H(z)f_H(z)dz = u_L + \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_L(z)f_H(z)dz, \quad (B-5)$$

otherwise we could increase $x_1$ and obtain an strict improvement in the objective. There are two cases:

1. $\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f_H(z)dz \geq \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f_H(z)dz$.

   In this case consider decreasing $x_2$ by $\epsilon_2 > 0$ and increasing $x_1$ by $\epsilon_1 > 0$, in such a way that equation (B-5) remains with equality, that is,

   $\epsilon_1 \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f_H(z)dz - \epsilon_2 \cdot \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f_H(z)dz = 0. \quad (B-6)$

   The change in equation (B-4) is

   $$\alpha_L \cdot \frac{\epsilon_2 \cdot \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f_H(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f_H(z)dz} \cdot \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz - \alpha_L \cdot \epsilon_2 \cdot \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz, \quad (B-7)$$
which under our current assumption is non-negative. So we can weakly improve our objective, indeed we can do it so until \( x_1 + \epsilon_1 \) and \( x_2 - \epsilon_2 \) are equal,

\[
x_1 + \epsilon_1 = x_2 - \epsilon_2 \iff x_1 + \epsilon_2 + \frac{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} F_H(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz} = x_2 - \epsilon_2 \iff \epsilon_2 = \frac{(x_2 - x_1)}{1 + \frac{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} F_H(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz}},
\]

since \( x_2 > x_1 \) we have \( \epsilon_2 > 0 \) and, therefore, we have shown that it is possible to increase \( x_1 \) and to decrease \( x_2 \) in such a way the objective is weakly improved and the solution is constant in \( (\theta_1, \theta_3) \).

b) \( \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz} < \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z) d\theta}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz} \): In this case consider increasing \( x_2 \) by \( \epsilon_2 > 0 \) and decreasing \( x_1 \) by \( \epsilon_1 > 0 \) in such a way that equation (B-5) remains with equality. By doing this the change in the objective is strictly positive, and we do it until either \( x_1 = x_2^*(\theta_1^-) \) or \( x_2 = x_2^*(\theta_3^+) \).

This proves the result for interim type \( L \) and case (2).

In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for type \( L \) in cases (1) and (2), we can always consider \( x_2^* \) to be a step function with at most one intermediate step as in the statement of the proposition.

Now we proceed with interim type 2.

- **interim type \( H \) case (1):** Suppose there is an arbitrary interval \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) in which \( x_2^*(\theta) \) is continuously strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note that if \( \tilde{\theta}_H < \theta_2 \) then we can set \( x_H^*(\theta) = x_H^*(\theta_2) \) for all \( \theta \) in \((\tilde{\theta}_H, \theta_2)\). This strictly increases the objective function and maintains feasibility. So we can assume \( \tilde{\theta}_H \geq \theta_2 \), which in turn implies that \( \mu_H(\cdot) \) is non-positive in the interval \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\).

Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217), \( x_2^*(\theta) \) must maximize the Lagrangian

\[
\mathcal{L}(u, x, \lambda, w) = u_L(w_L - \lambda - \alpha_L) + u_H(\lambda - \alpha_H + w_H) + \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_L(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz + \int_0^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_H(z) \cdot \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz,
\]

with \( \lambda, w_L, w_H \geq 0 \). Define \( L_H(\cdot) \) by

\[
L_H(\theta) \triangleq \alpha_H \mu_H(\theta) f_H(\theta) + \lambda F_H(\theta),
\]

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then it must be the case that $L_H(\theta) = 0$ for all $\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$. Suppose this is not true, then we could have $\hat{\theta} \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$ such that $L_H(\hat{\theta}) > 0$, since $L_H(\cdot)$ is a continuous function this must also be true for all $\theta \in (\hat{\theta} - \epsilon, \hat{\theta} + \epsilon)$ for $\epsilon > 0$ small enough. But then we can obtain an strict improvement by setting $x_2(\theta) = x_H^*(\hat{\theta} + \epsilon)$ for all $\theta \in (\hat{\theta} - \epsilon, \hat{\theta} + \epsilon)$. A similar argument holds when $L_H(\hat{\theta}) < 0$. Therefore, we have just proved that $L_H(\theta) = 0$ for all $\theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$. In other words,

$$\alpha_H \frac{\mu_H(\theta)f_H(\theta)}{F_H(\theta)} = -\lambda, \quad \forall \theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2). \quad \text{(B-8)}$$

Also note that by the second mean value theorem for integrals, there exists $\hat{\theta} \in (\theta_1, \theta_2)$ such that

$$x_H^*(\hat{\theta}) = \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x_H^*(z)f_H(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz}. \quad \text{(B-9)}$$

Going back to $(P_R)$, we have that the part of objective associated to $x_H^*$ in $(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ is

$$\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_H x_H^*(z)\mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz = -\lambda \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz,$$  \quad \text{(B-10)}

where in the equality we have used (B-8). Now, consider modifying $x_H^*$ to be $\tilde{x}_H^*$ equal to $x_H^*(\hat{\theta})$ in $(\theta_1, \theta_2)$. Then from (B-8), (B-9) and (B-10) we get

$$\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x_H^*(z)\alpha_H \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz = -\lambda \cdot x_H^*(\hat{\theta}) \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz$$

$$= x_H^*(\hat{\theta}) \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \alpha_H \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz$$

$$= \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \tilde{x}_H^*(z)\alpha_H \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz,$$

therefore, the modified $\tilde{x}_H^*$ has the same objective value than the old one. Also, note that we have preserved feasibility because

$$u_H + \int_{0}^{\theta_{\max}} \tilde{x}_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz = u_H + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \tilde{x}_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz + \int_{(\theta_1, \theta_2)^c} \tilde{x}_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz$$

$$= u_H + x_H^*(\hat{\theta}) \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{(\theta_1, \theta_2)^c} x_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz$$

$$\overset{(a)}{=} u_H + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz + \int_{(\theta_1, \theta_2)^c} x_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz$$

$$= u_H + \int_{0}^{\theta_{\max}} x_H^*(z)F_H(z)dz,$$

where in (a) we used equation (B-9).
interim type H case (2): Suppose \( x_H^\ast(\cdot) \) is an optimal solution to \((P_R)\) for which there exists \( \theta_1 < \theta_2 \) and \( 0 < x < 1 \) such that \( x_H^\ast(\theta) = x \) in \( (\theta_1, \theta_2) \). Similar to the proof of type L assume \( x_H^\ast(\theta^-_1) < x < x_H^\ast(\theta^+_2) \).

Then the part of the objective for the interim type 2 in this interval is

\[
\alpha_H \cdot x \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_H(z) f_H(z) dz.
\]

(B-11)

If \( \mu_H(\tilde{\theta}) \geq 0 \) for some \( \tilde{\theta} \in (\theta_1, \theta_2) \) then because of (DHR), \( \mu_H(\theta) \geq 0 \) for all \( \theta \geq \tilde{\theta} \) and, therefore, we can always find a better solution by setting \( x_H^\ast(\theta) = 1 \) for all \( \theta \geq \tilde{\theta} \) (note that this does not affect feasibility in \((P_R)\)). So assume \( \mu_H(\theta) < 0 \) for all \( \theta \in (\theta_1, \theta_2) \), then it must be the case that

\[
u_H + \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_H(z) F_H(z) dz = u_L + \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} x_L(z) F_H(z) dz,
\]

(B-12)

otherwise we could decrease \( x \) and obtain an strict improvement in the objective. Now, consider splitting the interval in half, that is, take \( \hat{\theta} = (\theta_1 + \theta_2)/2 \) and note that because of (DHR) we always have

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_H(z) f_H(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta} F_H(z) dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} \mu_H(z) f_H(z) dz}{\int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz}.
\]

(B-13)

We can modify \( x_H^\ast(\theta) \) in \( (\theta_1, \theta_2) \) as follows and obtain an, at least weakly, objective improvement. For \( \theta \in (\theta_1, \hat{\theta}) \) set \( x_H^\ast(\theta) = x - \epsilon_1 \) and for \( \theta \in (\hat{\theta}, \theta_2) \) set \( x_H^\ast(\theta) = x + \epsilon_2 \) with \( \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 > 0 \), and such that

\[
-\epsilon_1 \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) dz + \epsilon_2 \cdot \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz = 0.
\]

With this modification the change in the objective is

\[
-\alpha_H \cdot \frac{\epsilon_2 \cdot \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} F_H(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\hat{\theta}} F_H(z) dz} \cdot \int_{\theta_1}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_H(z) f_H(z) dz + \alpha_H \cdot \epsilon_2 \cdot \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\theta_2} \mu_H(z) f_H(z) dz,
\]

which by equation (B-13) is non-negative. Then we can keep increasing \( \epsilon_2 \) until either \( x - \epsilon_1 = x_H^\ast(\theta^-_1) \) or \( x + \epsilon_2 = x_H^\ast(\theta^+_2) \). This proofs we can, at least weakly, improve the objective. It also proves that we can modify the solution in such a way that for one of the two halves of the intervals the step reaches the boundary bound given by either \( x_H^\ast(\theta^-_1) \) or \( x_H^\ast(\theta^+_2) \). For the half that did not reach the boundary, we can do the same procedure described above and then repeat this procedure until we completely get rid of the intermediate step between \((x_H^\ast(\theta^-_1), x_H^\ast(\theta^+_2))\). Note that this process can be potentially infinite, in which case a more rigorous argument is required.
Suppose the process described above goes for infinitely many steps. In this case, an allocation sequence 
\( \{x^n_H(\theta)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) defined in \([\theta_1, \theta_2]\) is generated. To prove that the argument works, we need to show that there exists \( \theta_\infty \in [\theta_1, \theta_2] \) such that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} x^n_H(z)\mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz = x^\ast_H(\theta_1) \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_\infty} \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz + x^\ast_H(\theta_2) \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_\infty} \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz. \tag{B-14}
\]

To prove this, let \( \{\theta_n, \overline{\theta}_n, \widehat{\theta}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) be the sequence generated in the infinite process where:

- \( \theta_n \) and \( \overline{\theta}_n \) correspond to the lower and upper bound of the interval. For example, at the beginning \( \theta_1 = \theta_1 \) and \( \overline{\theta}_1 = \theta_2 \). At the next iteration we will have either \( \theta_2 = \theta_1 \) and \( \overline{\theta}_2 = \widehat{\theta} \) or \( \theta_2 = \theta_1 \) and \( \overline{\theta}_2 = \theta_2 \). Note that for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \): \( \theta_n, \overline{\theta}_n \in [\theta_1, \theta_2] \).
- \( \widehat{\theta}_n \) is defined to be the half of the interval. So \( \widehat{\theta}_1 = \widehat{\theta} \), and \( \overline{\theta}_2 = (\theta_2 + \overline{\theta}_2)/2 \).

From these definitions we have that \( \theta_n \) and \( \overline{\theta}_n \) are bounded monotonic sequences (the first non-decreasing and the second non-increasing), thus both converge to a limit. Also,

\[
\overline{\theta}_n = \frac{\theta_n + \overline{\theta}_n}{2},
\]

then all three quantities, \( \theta_n, \overline{\theta}_n \) and \( \widehat{\theta}_n \), converge to the same limit which we denote by \( \theta_\infty \in [\theta_1, \theta_2] \) (if the limit was not the same we could continue iterating the process). From this we can conclude that the following limit holds almost surely

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} x^n_H(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
  x^\ast_H(\theta^{-}_1) & \text{if } \theta < \theta_\infty \ 
  x^\ast_H(\theta^{+}_2) & \text{if } \theta \geq \theta_\infty,
\end{cases} \forall \theta \in [\theta_1, \theta_2].
\]

Finally, we can use the almost surely version of the dominated convergence theorem to obtain (B-14).

This completes the proof for interim type 2 and case (2).

In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for type \( H \) in cases (1) and (2), we can always consider \( x^\ast_H \) to be a threshold allocation as in the statement of the proposition.

**Part 2.** From what we have just proved we can write down \( (\mathcal{P}_R) \) as follows

\[
\max \sum_{k \in \{L, H\}} \alpha_k u_k + \alpha_1 \chi \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_1(z)f_1(z)dz + \alpha_1 \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\max}} \mu_1(z)f_1(z)dz + \alpha_2 \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\max}} \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz \\
\text{s.t. } \chi \in [0, 1], \ \theta_1 \leq \theta_2 \\
\alpha_k \geq 0, \ k \in \{L, H\} \\
u_L + \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\max}} F_H(z)dz \geq u_L + \chi \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\max}} F_H(z)dz.
\]
• $u_L = 0$: From the formulation above it is clear that is always optimal to set $u_L = 0$.

• $\tilde{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1$: Suppose the opposite, that is, $\tilde{\theta}_L > \theta_1$. This implies that between $\theta_1$ and $\tilde{\theta}_1$, $\mu_L(\cdot)$ is negative. Then, we can increase $\theta_1$ while keeping feasibility and, at the same time, increasing the objective function. Note this argument is also valid when $\theta_1 = \theta_2$. Also, note that we can obtain a strict improvement only when $x > 0$; however, when $x = 0$ we can only obtain a weak improvement. In either case, we can always consider $\hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1$.

• $\theta_H \leq \tilde{\theta}_H$: Suppose the opposite, $\theta_H > \tilde{\theta}_H$. Since $\mu_H(\theta) > 0$ for all $\theta \geq \tilde{\theta}_H$, we can can decrease $\theta_H$ and obtain an objective improvement while maintaining feasibility.

• $u_H = 0$: Suppose $u_H > 0$, then we must have

$$u_H + \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{max}} \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz = x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz,$$

(B-15)

otherwise, we could decrease $u_H$ and, by doing so, improve the objective. Since $u_H > 0$, equation (B-15) yields

$$0 < u_H = x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz - \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz,$$

(B-16)

then it must be true that $\theta_1 < \theta_H$; otherwise, from equation (B-16) we would have ($\theta_1 \leq \theta_2$)

$$\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz < x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz,$$

which implies

$$\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz < 0,$$

a contradiction. Thus, $\theta_1 < \theta_H$.

Now consider, a new contract for type $H$ which consists on decreasing the cut-off $\theta_H$ by $\epsilon > 0$ sufficiently small, but at the same time maintaining the equality in equation (B-15). Specifically, let $\theta_H(\epsilon) = \theta_H - \epsilon > 0$ (which we can do because as we just saw $\theta_H > \theta_1 \geq 0$) and let $u_H(\epsilon)$ be

$$u_H(\epsilon) = x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz - \int_{\theta_H(\epsilon)}^{\theta_{max}} F_H(z)dz,$$

note that by taking $\epsilon$ small we still have $u_H(\epsilon) > 0$. We claim that this new contract, characterized by $\theta_1, \theta_2, x, \theta_H(\epsilon)$ and $u_H(\epsilon)$, yields a larger objective that the old contract, characterized by $\theta_1, \theta_2, x, \theta_H$ and $u_H$. The old contract objective’s is

$$-\alpha_H u_H + \alpha_L x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz + \alpha_L \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{max}} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)dz + \alpha_H \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{max}} \mu_H(z)f_H(z)dz,$$
and using equation (B-15) it becomes

\[
x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} (\alpha L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \alpha_H F_H(z))dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} (\alpha L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \alpha_H F_H(z))dz + \alpha_H \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} zdz.
\]

We obtain a similar expression for the new contract’s objective. Specifically, the first two terms in the expression above are the same and the third term differs in \( \theta_H \). Hence, the new contract yields an improvement over the old one if and only if

\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} zf_H(z)dz < \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} z f_H(z)dz.
\]

Since \( \theta_H(e) < \theta_H \) this last inequality is true. Thus, if \( u_H > 0 \) we can always construct a new contract yielding a larger objective value and, therefore, at any optimal contract we must have \( u_H = 0 \).

- \( \theta_H \leq \theta_2 \): Since at any optimal solution \( u_H = 0 \), the IC constraint is

\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz \geq x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz.
\]

Hence, if \( \theta_H > \theta_2 \) from the expression above we would have

\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz \geq x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz,
\]

which implies \( \theta_H = \theta_2 \), a contradiction.

- \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \): First we show that \( \theta_1 \leq \hat{\theta}_H \). Suppose the opposite, that is, \( \theta_1 > \hat{\theta}_H \). Then, since \( \hat{\theta}_H \geq \theta_H \) we must have \( \theta_1 > \theta_H \) and, therefore,

\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz = \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_1} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz \\
> \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz \\
= \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz \\
\geq \chi \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)dz.
\]

That is, the IC constraint is not binding. Therefore, since \( \theta_1 > \hat{\theta}_H \) we can slightly decrease \( \theta_1 \) and, in this way, obtain an objective improvement whenever \( x > 0 \). When \( x = 0 \), because \( \theta_2 \geq \theta_1 \), we can decrease \( \theta_2 \) and obtain an objective improvement as well. Hence, at any optimal solution we must have \( \theta_1 \leq \hat{\theta}_H \).
In order to complete the proof, suppose \( \theta_1 > \theta_H \) then, as before, we have
\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)\,dz > x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)\,dz.
\]

Using that \( \theta_1 \leq \hat{\theta}_H \) implies \( \theta_H < \hat{\theta}_H \), we can slightly increase \( \theta_H \) (maintaining feasibility) and thus obtain an objective improvement. In conclusion, at any optimal solution we must have \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \).

- \( x = \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz / \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz \): since \( \hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta \), the part of the objective that involves \( x \) is always non-negative and, therefore, it is optimal to make \( x \) as large as possible. The IC constraints give an upper bound for \( x \) which is precisely \( \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz / \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz \), thus the result.

**Proof of Theorem 3.** We divide the proof into two parts. In part 1 we show that the solution to the relaxed problem and the original problem coincide. In part 2 we prove that the three conditions that we state after the theorem are sufficient to characterize the optimality of the static contract.

**Part 1.** It is enough to show that the solution of \((P_R)\) is feasible in \((P)\). From Theorem 2 we know that we can formulate \((P_R)\) as
\[
(P_R) \quad \max_{\theta_L, \theta_H, \theta_2} \alpha_L \chi \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz + \alpha_L \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz + \alpha_H \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu_H(z)f_H(z)\,dz
\]
\[
\text{s.t.} \quad \chi = \frac{\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz}
\]
\[
\hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \leq \hat{\theta}_H.
\]
\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)\,dz \geq \chi \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_H(z)\,dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} F_H(z)\,dz.
\]

Let \( \theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2 \) and \( x \) be the optimal solution to \((P_R)\). If this solution corresponds to the optimal static contract or yields the same objective than it, we are done because this contract is always feasible in \((P)\). If this solution is different from the optimal static contract and yields a strictly larger objective than it, it must be the case that
\[
\int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu(z)\,dz < \alpha_L \chi \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz + \alpha_L \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz + \alpha_H \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \mu_H(z)f_H(z)\,dz. \quad (B-17)
\]

This is true because the contract \((u_1, u_2, x_1, x_2) = (0, 0, 1_{\{\theta \geq \theta_H\}}, 1_{\{\theta \geq \theta_H\}})\) is a feasible static contract and, therefore, its associated revenue is bounded by that of the optimal static contract. From the formulation of \((P_R)\) we know that \( \hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \leq \theta_2 \), this and equation \((B-17)\) deliver
\[
0 \leq \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz < x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z)f_L(z)\,dz.
\]

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Thus the left hand side in (B-20) holds. Equivalently, $x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\max}} F_L(z)dz \geq \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\max}} F_L(z)dz$, (B-19) or, equivalently, $x \geq \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz / \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz$. In order to see why (B-19) holds, observe that from Lemma B-1 (which we state and prove after the present proof) we have

$$\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz < x. \quad (B-18)$$

Also, since $x \leq 1$ we must have $\theta_1 < \theta_H$. Note that since $\hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1 < \theta_2$ the denominator above is strictly positive.

Now we argue that the contract optimizing $(P_R)$ characterized by $\theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2$ and $x$ is feasible for $(P)$. Since the high to low IC constraint is satisfied, we only need to verify the low to high IC constraint. That is, we need to verify the following inequality

$$x \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\max}} F_L(z)dz \geq \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_{\max}} F_L(z)dz,$$

or, equivalently, $x \geq \int_{\theta_H}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz / \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz$. In order to see why (B-19) holds, observe that from Lemma B-1 (which we state and prove after the present proof) we have

$$\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \equiv \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \cdot (B-20)$$

The right hand side in (B-20) always holds thanks to (DHR), indeed,

$$\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} = \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz}.$$ 

Thus the left hand side in (B-20) holds. Equivalently,

$$\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} \mu_L(z) f_L(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} F_L(z)dz}.$$ 

Using this, together with equation (B-18), delivers equation (B-19). This concludes the proof for Part 1.

**Part 2.** In this part we prove the following optimality conditions for the thresholds $\theta_1 \leq \theta_H \leq \theta_2$:

1. $R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \leq \min_{\theta_2 \leq \theta} R^{LH}(\theta_2, \theta)$;
2. $\max_{\theta \leq \theta_2} R^{LH}(\theta, \theta_2) \leq R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2)$;
3. $\alpha_L \cdot R^{LH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) + \alpha_H r^{HH}(\theta_1) = 0.$
It is enough to prove that under the conditions the optimal contract characterized by \((\theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2)\) is optimal for \((P_R)\). To prove this we use a Lagrangian relaxation (we do not relax the monotonicity constraints) and show that this relaxation is optimized by the contract characterized by \((\theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2)\).

First, we establish some properties that can be derived from conditions (1) to (3). Condition (3) implies that \(\theta_2 \geq \hat{\theta}_L\); otherwise, \(\theta_1, \theta_2 < \hat{\theta}_L\) which would imply that \(L^{HH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) < 0\). In turn, condition (3) would give \(R^{HH}(\theta_H) > 0\) which would imply that \(\hat{\theta}_H < \theta_H\). Since \(\theta_H \leq \theta_2\) we would have \(\hat{\theta}_H < \theta_H \leq \theta_2 < \hat{\theta}_L\), that is, \(\hat{\theta}_H < \hat{\theta}_L\) which is not possible. Moreover, condition (2) together with the fact that \(\theta_2 \geq \hat{\theta}_L\) imply that \(\theta_1 \geq \hat{\theta}_L\). This yields \(L^{HH}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \geq 0\), and thus we can use condition (3) again to deduce that \(\theta_H \leq \hat{\theta}_H\). In summary, \(\hat{\theta}_L \leq \theta_1\) and \(\theta_H \leq \hat{\theta}_H\).

Now we provide the main argument. If \(\theta_1 = \theta_2\), then we also have \(\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \theta_H\). Condition (3) implies that the contract characterize by \((\theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2)\) is the static contract. Conditions (1) and (2) together yield (APR) and, therefore, from Theorem 1 we deduce that the static contract is optimal. Next suppose that \(\theta_1 < \theta_2\), and define

\[
\Omega \triangleq \{x : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] : x(\cdot) \text{ is non-decreasing}\}.
\]

We use \(x^*\) to denote the solution characterize by \((\theta_1, \theta_H, \theta_2)\). The Lagrangian for \((P_R)\) is

\[
\mathcal{L}(u, x, \lambda, w) = u_L(w_L - \lambda - \alpha_L) + u_H(\lambda - \alpha_H + w_H)
\]

\[
+ \int_0^{\theta_{\max}} x_L(z) \cdot \left[\alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_H(z)(z)\right] dz
\]

\[
+ \int_0^{\theta_{\max}} x_H(z) \cdot \left[\alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z)\right] dz,
\]

consider the following multipliers

\[
\lambda = \alpha_L \cdot L^{HH}(\theta_1, \theta_2), \quad w_L = \lambda + \alpha_L, w_H = -\lambda + \alpha_H,
\]

note that \(\lambda\) and \(w_L\) are non-negative, and for \(w_H\) we have

\[
w_H \geq 0 \iff \alpha_H + \alpha_H H^{HH}(\theta_H) \geq 0 \iff H^{HH}(\theta_H) \geq -1 \iff \theta_H - h^{HH}(\theta_H) \geq -h^{HH}(\theta_H) \iff \theta_H \geq 0,
\]

where in the first if and only if we used condition (3) in our hypothesis. Thus when we optimize the Lagrangian we obtain:

\[
\max_{(u, x) \in \Omega} \mathcal{L}(x, u, \lambda, w) = \max_{0 \leq \theta \leq \theta_{\max}} \int_0^{\theta_{\max}} \left[\alpha_1 \mu_1(z) f_1(z) - \lambda F_2(z)\right] dz
\]

\[
+ \max_{0 \leq \theta \leq \theta_{\max}} \int_0^{\theta_{\max}} \left[\alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z)\right] dz,
\]

(B-21)
where we can reduce attention to threshold strategies because \( x_L(\cdot), x_H(\cdot) \) are non-decreasing (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). If we are able to show that \( \mathcal{L}(x, u, \lambda, w) \) evaluated at our candidate solution is an upper bound for the RHS above we are done. Let’s begin with the second term, take any \( 0 \leq \theta \leq \theta_{\text{max}} \) then

\[
\int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz = \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) - \alpha_H r_{HH}(\theta_H) F_H(z) \right] dz
\]

\[
= \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \alpha_H F_H(z) \left[ r_{HH}(z) - r_{HH}(\theta_H) \right] dz
\]

\[
\leq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \alpha_H F_H(z) \left[ r_{HH}(z) - r_{HH}(\theta_H) \right] dz
\]

\[
= \int_{0}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_H^*(z) \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz,
\]

where in the first equality we used condition (3) and the inequality comes from the fact that \( r_{HH}(\cdot) \) is non-decreasing. Now we look into the first term in equation (B-21), consider first \( \theta \geq \theta_2 \)

\[
\int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_2(z) \right] dz = \int_{\theta_{\text{max}}}^{\theta_2} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_2(z) \right] dz
\]

\[
- \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_2(z) \right] dz
\]

\[
\leq \int_{\theta_{\text{max}}}^{\theta_2} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_2(z) \right] dz,
\]

where we have used the following

\[
- \int_{\theta_{2}}^{\theta} \left[ \alpha_L \mu_L(z) f_L(z) - \lambda F_2(z) \right] dz \leq 0 \Leftrightarrow \alpha_L \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta_{2}}^{\theta} T_H(z) r_{2H}(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_{2}}^{\theta} F_H(z) dz} = \lambda \leq \alpha_L \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta_{2}}^{\theta} T_2(z) r_{2H}(z) dz}{\int_{\theta_{2}}^{\theta} F_H(z) dz},
\]

which thanks to condition (1) in our hypothesis is true. A similar argument holds for \( \theta \leq \theta_2 \), but using condition (2). Since \( \mathcal{L}(x^*, 0, \lambda, w) \) equals

\[
x \int_{\theta_{1}}^{\theta_{2}} \left[ \alpha_1 \mu_1(z) f_1(z) - \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_1 \mu_1(z) f_1(z) - \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz + \int_{\theta_{\text{max}}}^{\theta_2} \left[ \alpha_1 \mu_1(z) f_1(z) - \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz,
\]

which by the definition of \( \lambda \) simplifies to

\[
\int_{\theta_{2}}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_1 \mu_1(z) f_1(z) - \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz + \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \left[ \alpha_1 \mu_1(z) f_1(z) - \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz + \int_{\theta_{\text{max}}}^{\theta_2} \left[ \alpha_H \mu_H(z) f_H(z) + \lambda F_H(z) \right] dz,
\]

we conclude that \( \max_{(u, x) \in \Omega} \mathcal{L}(u, x, \lambda, w) \leq \mathcal{L}(0, x^*, \lambda, w) \), as required. \( \blacksquare \)
Lemma B-1 Let \( \theta_i \in [0, 1] \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \) be such that \( \theta_1 < \theta_2 < \theta_3 \). Also, consider functions \( f, g : [\theta_1, \theta_3] \to I \), with \( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} g(z)dz, \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz > 0 \). Then,

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz} \text{ if and only if } \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz}.
\]

Proof of Lemma B-1.

\[
\frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz} \Leftrightarrow \left( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz \right) \left( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f(z)dz \right) \leq \left( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} g(z)dz \right) \left( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz \right)
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \left( \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz \right) \left( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} f(z)dz \right) \leq \left( \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_2} g(z)dz \right) \left( \int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz \right)
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \frac{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz} \leq \frac{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} f(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_2}^{\theta_3} g(z)dz}
\]

Proof of Proposition 3. We use the sufficient condition in Theorem 3. First note that since the support of the exponential distribution is unbounded from above, we can take \( \theta_2 = \infty \) which eliminates condition (1). Conditions (2) and (3) can be cast as

\[
\theta_1 e^{-\theta_1 (\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \geq \theta e^{-\theta (\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \quad \forall \theta \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_L \cdot \lambda_H \theta_1 e^{-\theta_1 (\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} = -\alpha_H \cdot (\lambda_H \theta_1 - 1), \quad (B-22)
\]

By optimizing the first term in (B-22) we obtain

\[
\theta_1 = \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H},
\]

and then solving for \( \theta_H \) yields

\[
\theta_H = \frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \frac{\alpha_L}{\alpha_H} \frac{e^{-1}}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H}.
\]

What we need to check (and it is not obvious at a first glance) is that \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_H \). First, we show

\[
\alpha_L (\theta_1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_L}) \lambda_L e^{-\lambda_L \theta_1} + \alpha_H (\theta_1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}) \lambda_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta_1} < 0. \quad (B-23)
\]

To prove this inequality notice that since \( \hat{\theta} \) is the optimal static cutoff we have

\[
\alpha_L \hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_L \hat{\theta}} + \alpha_H \hat{\theta} e^{-\lambda_H \hat{\theta}} \geq \alpha_L \theta_1 e^{-\lambda_L \theta_1} + \alpha_H \theta_1 e^{-\lambda_H \theta_1}, \quad (B-24)
\]

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\[ \alpha_L(\theta_L - \frac{1}{\lambda_L})\lambda_L e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L} + \alpha_H(\theta_L - \frac{1}{\lambda_L})\lambda_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta_L} = \alpha_L \theta_L^1(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L^1} + \alpha_L \theta_L^1 \lambda_H e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L^1} \]
\[+ \alpha_H \theta_L^1 \lambda_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta_L^1} - \alpha_L e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L^1} - \alpha_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta_L^1} \]
\[= \alpha_L e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L^1} + \lambda_H (\alpha_L \theta_L^1 e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L^1} + \alpha_H \theta_L^1 e^{-\lambda_H \theta_L^1}) \]
\[- \alpha_L e^{-\lambda_L \theta_L^1} - \alpha_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta_L^1} \]
\[\leq \lambda_H (\alpha_L \theta_L^1 e^{-\lambda_L \tilde{\theta}} + \alpha_H \theta_L^1 e^{-\lambda_H \tilde{\theta}}) - \alpha_H e^{-\lambda_H \theta_L} \]
\[= \lambda_H \alpha_L \theta_L^1 e^{-\lambda_L \tilde{\theta}} + \lambda_H \alpha_H e^{-\lambda_H \tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta} - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}) \]
\[= \alpha_L e^{-\lambda_L \tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta} - \lambda_L - \lambda_H + 1) \]
\[< 0, \]

where (a) comes from equation (B-24), (b) is true because the function \(-e^{-\lambda_H \theta}\) increasing and \(\theta_1 < \tilde{\theta}\), (c) comes from equation (8). And (d) comes from \(\theta_1 < \tilde{\theta}\). With this we have proven (B-23) and thus

\[ \lambda_L \alpha_H \cdot (\theta_H - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}) \]
\[= -\lambda_L \alpha_L \cdot \theta_L^1 e^{-\theta_L^1(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \]
\[= -\lambda_L \alpha_L \cdot \left(\theta_L^1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_L}\right)e^{-\theta_L^1(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} - \lambda_L \alpha_L \cdot \frac{1}{\lambda_L} e^{-\theta_L^1(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \]
\[> \alpha_H (\theta_L^1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_L}) \lambda_H - \alpha_L \cdot e^{-\theta_L^1(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)} \]
\[= \alpha_H (\theta_L^1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_L}) \lambda_H + \frac{\alpha_L}{\theta_L^1} \cdot (\theta_H - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}), \]

where in (a) and (c) we used the definition of \(\theta_H\), and in (b) we used equation (B-23). From this we have that

\[ (\theta_H - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}) \cdot \left(\lambda_L \alpha_H - \frac{\alpha_H}{\theta_1}\right) > \alpha_H (\theta_1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_H}) \lambda_H, \]

but replacing \(\theta_1\) with \(1/(\lambda_L - \lambda_H)\) in this last expression we get \(\theta_H > \theta_1\).

Finally, \(x\) is given by

\[ x = \frac{\int_{\theta_H^1}^{\theta_H} \mathcal{F}_H(z)dz}{\int_{\theta_1}^{\theta_H^1} \mathcal{F}_H(z)dz} = \frac{e^{-\lambda_H \theta_H}}{e^{-\lambda_H \theta_1}} = \exp \left( -\lambda_H \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda_H} - \frac{\alpha_L}{\alpha_H} \frac{e^{-1}}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} - \frac{1}{\lambda_L - \lambda_H} \right] \right). \]

\[60\]
C Proofs for section 6

Proof of Theorem 4. In Lemma C-2 (which we state and prove after this proof) we show that \( A \) is non-empty. Next we prove the necessary and sufficient condition.

We prove both directions separately. First we show that if there exists \( \lambda \in A \) satisfying the properties then the static contract is optimal. Then we show that if the static contract is optimal then we can always solve for \( \lambda \) satisfying the properties.

Define

\[
\Omega \triangleq \{ x : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] : x(\cdot) \text{ is non-decreasing} \}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Omega^K \triangleq \Omega \times \cdots \times \Omega^{\text{K times}}.
\]

For the first part we use a Lagrangian relaxation approach. That is, we dualize the IC constraints for a specific set of multipliers. This gives an upper bound to the seller’s problem. Then we show that for our choice of multipliers the relaxation is maximized at the static allocation. The Lagrangian is

\[
\mathcal{L}(x, u, \lambda, w) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} u_k \left( -\alpha_k + w_k + \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{\theta_{\max}}^{\theta_{\max}} x_k(z) \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} F_j(z) \right) dz,
\]

where \( \lambda \) correspond to the multipliers associated with the ICs, and \( w \) to the multipliers associated with the ex-post IR constraints. Let us define \( \lambda \) to be equal to the \((\lambda_{ij})_{i,j \in \{1, \ldots, K\}}\) we are assuming to exist, that is \( \lambda \in A \), and let

\[
w_k = \alpha_k + \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk}, \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}. \tag{C-25}
\]

Note that by our choice of \( \lambda \) (\( \lambda \in A \)), \( w_k \) is non-negative for all \( k \). With this choice of \( w \) the first summation in the Lagrangian becomes zero. Now, we need to show that for this choice of multipliers the Lagrangian is maximized at the static contract. In order to show this observe that

\[
\max_{x \in \Omega^K, u \geq 0} \mathcal{L}(x, u, \lambda, w) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \max_{x_k \in \Omega} \int_{\theta_{\max}}^{\theta_{\max}} x_k(z) \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} F_j(z) \right) dz, \tag{C-26}
\]

thus we just need to verify that the RHS of (C-26) is bounded above by

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{\theta_{\max}}^{\theta_{\max}} \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} F_j(z) \right) dz. \tag{C-27}
\]

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Note that the RHS of (C-26), for each \( k \), is maximized at some threshold contract \( \theta_k \in [0, 1] \). So to prove that (C-27) is an upper bound of (C-26) is enough to show that for all \( k \) and for any \( \theta_k \in [0, 1] \)

\[
\int_{\theta_k}^{\theta_{max}} \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right) dz \leq \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right) dz.
\]

Consider \( \theta_k \geq \hat{\theta} \) in (C-28), then (C-28) becomes

\[
0 \leq \int_{\theta_k}^{\theta_{max}} \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right) dz,
\]

this is equivalent to

\[
- \left( \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right) \cdot \int_{\theta_k}^{\theta_{max}} F_k(z) dz \leq \int_{\theta_k}^{\theta_{max}} \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} F_j(z) \right) dz, \quad \forall \theta_k \geq \hat{\theta},
\]

which can be rewritten as

\[
- \left( \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right) \leq \min_{\hat{\theta} \leq \theta} \left\{ \alpha_k \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} F_k(z) dz - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{max}} F_j(z) dz \right\}. \tag{C-29}
\]

Similarly, if \( \theta_k \leq \hat{\theta} \) then (C-28) is equivalent to

\[
0 \geq \int_{\theta_k}^{\hat{\theta}} \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} F_j(z) \right) dz, \quad \forall \theta_k \leq \hat{\theta},
\]

which is equivalent to

\[
\max_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_k \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z) dz - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z) dz \right\} \leq - \left( \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right). \tag{C-30}
\]

In summary, proving that (C-28) holds is equivalent to showing that both (C-29) and (C-30) hold. To see why this is true, note that

\[
\lim_{\theta \to \hat{\theta}^+} \alpha_k \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z) dz - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z) dz = \frac{\alpha_k \cdot \mu_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot f_k(\hat{\theta}) - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \cdot F_j(\hat{\theta})}{F_k(\hat{\theta})} = - \left( \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right), \tag{C-31}
\]

where the last equality comes from the choice of the multipliers. Since the limit is taken for values above \( \hat{\theta} \), this implies that

\[
\min_{\theta \leq \theta} \left\{ \alpha_k \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z) dz - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z) dz \right\} \leq \lim_{\theta \to \hat{\theta}^+} \alpha_k \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z) f_k(z) dz \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z) dz - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \cdot \int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z) dz
\]

\[
= - \left( \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right).
\]

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A similar argument (taken the limit for values below \( \hat{\theta} \) this time) can be used to show that
\[
-\left( \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right) \leq \max_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_k \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z)f_k(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z)dz} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z)dz} \right\}.
\]
Since we are assuming that the minimum is an upper bound to the maximum above, we can conclude that both (C-29) and (C-30) hold (with equality). This concludes the proof for the first direction.

For the second direction we need to show that if the static contract is optimal then we can find \( \lambda \) satisfying condition (APR\textsuperscript{M}). Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217) gives then the existence of Lagrange multipliers such that the static contract maximizes the Lagrangian (here we use the interior point condition in the assumptions). In other words, \( \exists \lambda, w \geq 0 \) such that
\[
\mathcal{L}(x^s, 0, \lambda, w) \geq \mathcal{L}(x, u, \lambda, w), \quad \forall u, x \in \mathbb{R}_+^K \times \Omega^K.
\] (C-32)
Note that (C-32) holds for any \( u, x \in \mathbb{R}_+^K \times \Omega^K \). Thus we can first consider \( x = x^s \) in (C-32), this yields
\[
0 \geq \sum_{k=1}^{K} u_k \left( -\alpha_k + w_k + \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} \right), \quad \forall u \in \mathbb{R}_+^K.
\]
Which implies that
\[
-\alpha_k + w_k + \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} = 0, \quad \forall k,
\]
and since \( w_k \geq 0 \) we can conclude that
\[
\alpha_k \geq \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk}, \quad \forall k,
\]
as required. Now, fix \( k \) and consider a solution \( x \in \Omega^K \) such that \( x_j = x^s \) for all \( j \neq k \) and \( x_k \) is \( 1_{\{\theta \geq \theta_k\}} \) for some \( \theta_k \in [0, 1] \). Then equation (C-32) delivers equation (C-28). And we already saw that (C-28) is equivalent to both equations (C-29) and (C-30). Putting these two equations together yields
\[
\max_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_k \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z)f_k(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z)dz} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z)dz} \right\} \leq \left( \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right)
\]
\[
\leq \min_{\theta \leq \hat{\theta}} \left\{ \alpha_k \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \mu_k(z)f_k(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z)dz} - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot \frac{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_j(z)dz}{\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} F_k(z)dz} \right\},
\]
that is, condition (APR\textsuperscript{M}) holds for any \( k \). We only need to check that \( \lambda \in \mathcal{A} \). Observe that both the maximum and the minimum are bounded from below and above (respectively) by
\[
\frac{\alpha_k \cdot \mu_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot f_k(\hat{\theta}) - \sum_{j:j\neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot F_j(\hat{\theta})}{F_k(\hat{\theta})}.
\] (C-33)
To see this we can take the limit as before. For the maximum we take the limit of $\theta$ approaching to $\hat{\theta}$ from below. This limit converges to the expression in (C-33) and is bounded above by the maximum. The same argument applies to the minimum but this time taking the limit from above $\hat{\theta}$. In turn implies that

$$\alpha_k \cdot \mu_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot f_k(\hat{\theta}) - \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{jk} \cdot F_j(\hat{\theta}) = -\left( \sum_{j:j \neq k} \lambda_{kj} \right),$$

and we can conclude that $\lambda \in \mathcal{A}$. ■

**Lemma C-2** The set $\mathcal{A}$ is non-empty.

**Proof of Lemma C-2.** We want to show that $\mathcal{A} \neq \emptyset$, which amount to proving that the linear system

$$\sum_{j=1,j \neq k}^{K} \lambda_{jk} \cdot F_j(\hat{\theta}) = \alpha_k \cdot \mu_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot f_k(\hat{\theta}) + F_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot \sum_{j=1,j \neq k}^{K} \lambda_{kj}, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\},$$

$$\alpha_k = w_k + \sum_{j=1,j \neq k}^{K} \lambda_{kj} - \sum_{j=1,j \neq k}^{K} \lambda_{jk}, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\},$$

with $(\lambda, w) \geq 0$ has a solution. We begin by writing down the system with matrices and then we apply Farkas’ lemma.

First, the vector $\lambda$ is given by

$$\left( \begin{array}{c}
\lambda_{12}, \lambda_{13}, \ldots, \lambda_{1K}, \\
\lambda_{21}, \lambda_{23}, \ldots, \lambda_{2K}, \\
\lambda_{K1}, \lambda_{K2}, \ldots, \lambda_{KK-1}
\end{array} \right),$$

note that the terms $\lambda_{kk}$ for any $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ do not form part of the vector. Now, consider matrix $A$ with $K(K-1) + K$ columns and $2K$ rows given by

$$A = \begin{bmatrix}
F^1 & F^2 & \cdots & F^K & 0_{K \times K} \\
B^1 & B^2 & \cdots & B^K & I_{K \times K}
\end{bmatrix},$$

where $0_{K \times K}$ is the zero matrix of dimension $K \times K$ and $I_{K \times K}$ is the identity matrix of dimension $K \times K$. Also, $F^k$ is a matrix of dimension $K \times (K-1)$ defined by

$$F^k_{ij} = \begin{cases}
-F_k(\hat{\theta}) & \text{if } i = k \\
F_k(\hat{\theta}) & \text{if } i < k, j = i \\
F_k(\hat{\theta}) & \text{if } i > k, j = i - 1 \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$
and $B^k$ is a matrix of dimension $K \times (K - 1)$ defined by

$$B^k_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } i = k \\
-1 & \text{if } i < k, j = i \\
-1 & \text{if } i > k, j = i - 1 \\
0 & \text{if o.w}
\end{cases}.$$ 

Finally, let $b$ be a vector defined by

$$b = (\alpha_L \mu_1(\hat{\theta}) f_1(\hat{\theta}), \alpha_2 \mu_2(\hat{\theta}) f_2(\hat{\theta}), \ldots, \alpha_K \mu_K(\hat{\theta}) f_K(\hat{\theta}), \alpha_L, \ldots, \alpha_K).$$

Then, the linear system can be rewritten as

$$A \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \lambda \\ w \end{bmatrix} = b, \quad \lambda, w \geq 0.$$

Now we use Farkas’ lemma, if this system does not have a solution then it must be the case that the following system has a solution

$$A^\top \cdot \begin{bmatrix} y^F \\ y^B \end{bmatrix} \geq 0, \quad b^\top \cdot \begin{bmatrix} y^F \\ y^B \end{bmatrix} < 0. \quad (C-34)$$

Explicitly, we have $(y^F, y^B)$ solve

$$F_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot (y^F_j - y^F_k) - (y^B_j - y^B_k) \geq 0, \quad \forall k, \forall j \neq k$$

$$y^B_k \geq 0, \quad \forall k$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \mu_k(\hat{\theta}) f_k(\hat{\theta}) \cdot y^F_k + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y^B_k < 0.$$
Let \( y_m^F \) be equal to \( \min_k \{ y_k^F \} \) \((m\) is the index that achieves the minimum) then
\[
\sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \mu_k(\bar{\theta}) f_k(\bar{\theta}) \cdot y_k^F + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_k^B \overset{(a)}{=} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \mu_k(\bar{\theta}) f_k(\bar{\theta}) \cdot (y_k^F - y_m^F) + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_k^B
\]
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \left( \bar{\theta} - \frac{\bar{F}_k(\bar{\theta})}{f_k(\bar{\theta})} \right) f_k(\bar{\theta}) \cdot (y_k^F - y_m^F) + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_k^B
\]
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \left( \bar{f}_k(\bar{\theta}) - \bar{F}_k(\bar{\theta}) \right) \cdot (y_k^F - y_m^F) + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_k^B
\]
\[
\geq \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \bar{F}_k(\bar{\theta}) \cdot (y_k^F - y_m^F) + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_k^B
\]
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot (y_m^B - y_k^B) + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_k^B
\]
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \cdot y_m^B
\]
\[
\overset{(d)}{=} y_m^B \geq 0,
\]
a contradiction. Where in (a) we use the fact that \( \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \mu_k(\bar{\theta}) f_k(\bar{\theta}) = 0 \), in (b) we use the definition of \( y_m^F \), in (c) we use the first set of equations in (C-34) and in (d) we use the fact that \( \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k = 1 \) and \( y_m^B \geq 0 \). □

**Proof of Proposition 4.** We make use of Lemma C-3 which we state and prove after the present proof. In that lemma we need to define the function

\[
L_k(z|\lambda) \triangleq \alpha_k \mu_k(z) + \frac{\bar{F}_k(z)}{f_k(z)} \cdot \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{\ell k} \cdot \frac{\bar{F}_\ell(z)}{f_k(z)}.
\]

for any \( \lambda \geq 0 \). For exponential distributions \( L_k(z|\lambda) \) becomes:

\[
L_k(z|\lambda) = \alpha_k \cdot z + \frac{1}{\lambda_k} \cdot \left( \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \alpha_k \right) - \sum_{\ell: \ell > k} \frac{\lambda_{\ell k} e^{-z(\lambda_\ell - \lambda_k)}}{\lambda_k} - \sum_{\ell: \ell < k} \frac{\lambda_{\ell k} e^{-z(\lambda_k - \lambda_\ell)}}{\lambda_\ell}.
\]

Hence, \( L_k(\cdot|\lambda) \) is concave, which means that it crosses zero at most two times. Using Lemma C-3 we conclude that in the exponential case allocations have at most one step in which randomization occurs. □
Lemma C-3  For any dual-feasible variable $\lambda$ associated to the IC constraints define

$$L_k(z|\lambda) \triangleq \alpha_k \mu_k(z) + \frac{\bar{F}_k(z)}{f_k(z)} \cdot \sum_{\ell : \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \sum_{\ell : \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} \frac{\bar{F}_\ell(z)}{f_\ell(z)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (F)

If $L_k(z|\lambda)$ crosses zero at most $p$ times then the optimal allocation $x_k$ has at most $\lfloor p/2 \rfloor$ intervals where randomization occurs.

**Proof of Lemma C-3.** We divide the proof into two parts. In the first part we construct a new dual problem and state the complementary slackness conditions. This part of the proof follows the general theory of linear programming in infinite dimensional space developed by Anderson and Nash (1987). In the second part we exploit the complementary slackness conditions to show that the optimal allocation $x_k$ has at most $\lfloor p/2 \rfloor$ intervals where randomization occurs.

**Part 1.** Define the cone of non-negative non-decreasing functions

$$\mathcal{K} \triangleq \{x : [0, \theta_{\text{max}}] \to \mathbb{R} | x \text{ is non-negative and non-decreasing function}\}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (Primal Cone)

The general formulation of the seller’s problem is

$$\text{(P)} \quad \begin{array}{ll}
\text{max} & - \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k u_k + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_{0}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_k(z) \mu_k(z)f_k(z)dz \\
\text{s.t.} & x_k(\cdot) \in \mathcal{K}, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \\
& x_k(\theta) \leq 1, \quad \forall \theta \in [0, \theta_{\text{max}}], \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \\
& u_k \geq 0, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \\
& u_k + \int_{0}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_k(z)\bar{F}_k(z)dz \geq u_{k'}, + \int_{0}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_{k'}(z)\bar{F}_k(z)dz, \quad \forall k, k' \in \{1, \ldots, K\}.
\end{array}$$

Note that the dual cone of $\mathcal{K}$ is

$$\mathcal{K}^* = \{\beta : \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \beta(z)dz \geq 0, \quad \forall \theta \in [0, \theta_{\text{max}}]\}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (Dual Cone)

The Lagrangian is

$$L(x, u, \lambda, \beta, w) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} u_k \cdot \left( - \alpha_k + w_k + \sum_{\ell : \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \sum_{\ell : \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} \right)$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} x_k(z) \left( \alpha_k \mu_k(z) f_k(z) + \bar{F}_k(z) \cdot \sum_{\ell : \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \sum_{\ell : \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} \bar{F}_\ell(z) + \beta_k(z) - \eta_k(z) \right) dz$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{\theta_{\text{max}}} \eta_k(z)dz.$$
where $\beta_k$ are the dual variables associated with the monotonicity constraints, $\eta_k$ are dual variables associated with the constraints $x_k(\theta) \leq 1$. While $\lambda, w$ correspond to the dual variables associated with the IC an non-negativity constraints respectively. This yields the following Dual program (D):

$$
(D) \quad \min \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\max}} \eta_k(z)dz \\
\text{s.t} -\alpha_k + w_k + \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{\ell k} = 0, \quad \forall k \\
\alpha_k\mu_k(z)f_k(z) + F_k(z) \cdot \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{k\ell} - \sum_{\ell: \ell \neq k} \lambda_{\ell k} F_{\ell}(z) = \eta_k(z) - \beta_k(z), \quad \forall k, \quad \forall z \in [0, \theta_{\max}]
$$

$\lambda, w, \eta, \beta \geq 0, \quad \beta_k \in K^*, \quad \forall k.$

And we must have complementary slackness:

- For the monotonicity constraints (the cone constraints) this means that if $x_k(\cdot)$ changes at some $\theta$ then $\int_{\theta}^{\theta_{\max}} \beta_k(z)dz = 0$. Also $x(0) \cdot \int_{0}^{\theta_{\max}} \beta(z)dz = 0$. All of this for all $k$.

- For the upper bound constraints: $(1 - x_k(\theta)) \cdot \eta_k(\theta) = 0$ for all $\theta \in [0, \theta_{\max}]$ and for all $k$.

**Part 2.** Consider an optimal primal-dual pair. Let $x_k$ be the primal solution for interim type $k$, and $\beta_k, \eta_k$ and $\lambda, w$ the corresponding dual solutions. Observe that from dual feasibility we must have

$$
f_k(z) \cdot L_k(z|\lambda) = \eta_k(z) - \beta_k(z), \quad \forall z \in [0, \theta_{\max}]. \tag{C-35}
$$

Let us denote by $\hat{z}_1 < \cdots < \hat{z}_p$ the points where $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ crosses zero, and we let $\hat{z}_0 = 0$ and $\hat{z}_{p+1} = \theta_{\max}$. Note that $L_k(\theta_{\max}|\lambda) = \alpha \cdot \theta_{\max} > 0$, and by the feasibility of $\lambda$ we have $L_k(0|\lambda) = -w_k/f_k(0) \leq 0$.

Let $z_1^* \triangleq \inf \{z \in [0, \theta_{\max}] : x_k(z) = 1\}$ (if $x_k(z)$ never equals 1 we take $z_1^* = \theta_{\max}$). We can assume that $z_1^* > 0$, otherwise $x_k(z)$ would be equal to 1 everywhere in $[0, \theta_{\max}]$ and the result would follow. In turn, there has to be a change on $x_k$ around $z_1^*$ and, therefore, complementary slackness implies that $\int_{z_1^*}^{\theta_{\max}} \beta_k(z)dz = 0$. Moreover, since $x_k(z) < 1$ for all $z < z_1^*$ complementary slackness implies that $\eta_k(z) = 0$ for all $z < z_1^*$. Therefore, Eq. (C-35) becomes

$$
f_k(z) \cdot L_k(z|\lambda) = -\beta_k(z), \quad \forall z \in [0, z_1^*]. \tag{C-36}
$$

Let $q$ be the largest index in $\{0, 1, \ldots, p\}$ such that $\hat{z}_q \leq z_1^*$. Note that $z_1^* \in [\hat{z}_q, \hat{z}_{q+1}]$. We show the following claim:

**Claim 1.** $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is positive in $(\hat{z}_q, \hat{z}_{q+1})$ and $z_1^* = \hat{z}_q$. 

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Proof of Claim 1. First suppose that $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is positive in $(\hat{z}_q, \hat{z}_{q+1})$ we show that $z^*_q = \hat{z}_q$. If not then for any $z \in (\hat{z}_q, z^*_q)$ we have $L_k(z|\lambda) > 0$ which thanks to Eq. (C-36) yields $\beta_k(z) < 0$ for any $z \in (\hat{z}_q, z^*_q)$ and, therefore,

$$\int_{z}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz = \int_{z}^{z^*_q} \beta_k(z)dz + \int_{z^*_q}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz = \int_{z}^{z^*_q} \beta_k(z)dz < 0,$$

but this contradicts the fact that $\beta_k \in K^*$. That is, $z^*_q \leq \hat{z}_q$ but since $\hat{z}_q \leq z^*_q$ we conclude that $\hat{z}_q = z^*_q$. To complete the argument suppose $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is negative in $(\hat{z}_q, \hat{z}_{q+1})$ then, in particular, $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is negative in $(z^*_q, \hat{z}_{q+1})$ and from Eq. (C-35) we deduce that $\beta_k(z') > 0$ for all $z' \in (z^*_q, \hat{z}_{q+1})$. Hence, for any $z' \in (z^*_q, \hat{z}_{q+1})$

$$0 = \int_{z^*_q}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz = \int_{z^*_q}^{z'} \beta_k(z)dz + \int_{z'}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz > 0,$$

a contradiction. In the second bracket we use the fact that $\beta_k \in K^*$. This concludes the proof of Claim 1.

This shows that $x_k(\cdot)$ equals 1 in $(\hat{z}_q, \theta_{max}]$ and that it changes value at $\hat{z}_q$. Now, from Claim 1 we now that $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is negative in $(\hat{z}_{q-1}, \hat{z}_q)$ and, therefore, from Eq. (C-36) we deduce that $\beta_k(\cdot)$ is positive in $(\hat{z}_{q-1}, \hat{z}_q)$. This together with $\int_{z^*_q}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz = 0$ imply that $x_k(\cdot)$ is constant in $(\hat{z}_{q-1}, \hat{z}_q)$ (by means of complementary slackness any change would yield a contradiction). Let’s denote the value of $x_k(\cdot)$ in $(\hat{z}_{q-1}, \hat{z}_q)$ by $\chi_q$. Note that of $\chi_q = 0$ we are done. Similarly to what we did before we define $z^*_2 \triangleq \inf \{z \in [0, \hat{z}_{q-1}) : x_k(z) = \chi_q\}$. Note that $z^*_2 < \hat{z}_{q-1}$, If $z^*_2 = 0$ then we $x_k(\cdot)$ equals $\chi_q$ for all values below $z_q$ and, therefore, there is nothing more to prove. So assume $z^*_2 > 0$. If $z^*_2 = \hat{z}_{q-1}$ then $x_k(\cdot)$ changes value at $\hat{z}_{q-1}$ and, therefore, by complementary slackness $\int_{z^*_2}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz = 0$. However, $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is positive in $(\hat{z}_{q-2}, \hat{z}_{q-1})$ which by Eq. (C-36) implies that $\beta_k$ is negative in $(\hat{z}_{q-2}, \hat{z}_{q-1})$ but this would contradict the dual feasibility of $\beta_k$. Hence, we can assume that $z^*_2 < \hat{z}_{q-1}$.

Let $q_2$ be the largest index in $\{0, 1, \ldots, q - 1\}$ such that $\hat{z}_{q_2} \leq z^*_2$. Note that $z^*_2 \in [\hat{z}_{q_2}, \hat{z}_{q_2+1}]$. As before we can show that $L_k(\cdot|\lambda)$ is positive in $(\hat{z}_{q_2}, \hat{z}_{q_2+1})$ and $z^*_2 = \hat{z}_{q_2}$. Note that this implies that the value $\chi_q$ of $x_k(\cdot)$ extends for at least two intervals, namely, $(\hat{z}_{q-2}, \hat{z}_{q-1})$ and $(\hat{z}_{q-1}, \hat{z}_q)$.

The previous argument can be applied iteratively over all intervals defined by $\hat{z}_1 < \cdots < \hat{z}_p$. Since in each step of the argument we cover two interval we deduce that there can be at most $\lfloor p/2 \rfloor$ different value of $\chi_{q'}$ where $q'$ is defined in every step as we did before. Moreover, if $L_k(0|\lambda) < 0$ then in the interval $(0, \hat{z}_1)$ the dual variable $\beta_k(\cdot)$ is positive. Because $\int_{\hat{z}_1}^{\theta_{max}} \beta_k(z)dz = 0$ (this follows from the
steps of the argument) and \( x(0) \cdot \int_{0}^{\theta_{max}} \beta(z)dz = 0 \) we must have \( x(0) = 0 \) and so in the last interval \( x_k \) equals 0.