

**EMPIRICAL SIMILARITY**

**By**

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# Empirical Similarity\*

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## Abstract

An agent is asked to assess a real-valued variable  $Y_p$  based on certain characteristics  $X_p = (X_p^1, \dots, X_p^m)$ , and on a database consisting  $(X_i^1, \dots, X_i^m, Y_i)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . A possible approach to combine past observations of  $X$  and  $Y$  with the current values of  $X$  to generate an assessment of  $Y$  is *similarity-weighted averaging*. It suggests that the predicted value of  $Y$ ,  $\bar{Y}_p^s$ , be the weighted average of all previously observed values  $Y_i$ , where the weight of  $Y_i$ , for every  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , is the similarity between the vector  $X_p^1, \dots, X_p^m$ , associated with  $Y_p$ , and the previously observed vector,  $X_i^1, \dots, X_i^m$ . We axiomatize this rule. We assume that, given every database, a predictor has a ranking over possible values, and we show that certain reasonable conditions on these rankings imply that they are determined by the proximity to a similarity-weighted average for a certain similarity function. The axiomatization does not suggest a particular similarity function, or even a particular functional form of this function. We therefore proceed to suggest that the similarity function be estimated from past observations. We develop tools of statistical inference for parametric estimation of the similarity function, for the case of a continuous as well as a discrete variable. Finally, we discuss the relationship of the proposed method to other methods of estimation and prediction.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Motivation

Economic agents as well as various professionals are often required to assess the value of a certain numerical variable. In many situations, available data are relevant for the assessment problem, but they do not suggest a value that is indisputably the only reasonable assessment to make. Consider the following examples.

1. A home owner considers selling her house, and she wonders how much she could get for it. Naturally, she should be basing her assessment on the prices at which other houses were sold. Yet, every house has its idiosyncratic characteristics. Hence the "market value" of her house is a variable that needs to be assessed based on observations of other transactions, but cannot be uniquely determined by these transactions in the same way that the price of a ton of wheat can.

2. An art dealer wants to sell a painting by a reasonably famous painter. Evidently, the market price of the painting is related to the prices at which other, similar paintings were sold. Yet, the painting is unique, and its price may differ from the prices of all other paintings, as well as from their average.

3. An analyst is asked to predict the rate of inflation for the coming year. Using past empirical frequencies of various inflation rates is hardly an option in this case, since every year differs from past years in several ways. Yet, it is obvious that past inflation rates are informative and should somehow be used for the prediction.<sup>1</sup>

4. The same analyst is now asked to assess the probability of a stock market crash within the next six months. Again, she is expected to generate an assessment that is based on past observations. However, every two situations would typically differ in the values of certain important economic variables.

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<sup>1</sup>This application was suggested by Raul Drachman.

5. A physician is asked to assess the probability of success of an operation to be performed on a certain patient. Past experience with other patients is clearly relevant and should inform the assessment process. Yet, every human body is unique, and simple relative frequencies of success do not summarize all the relevant information.

6. A lawyer is asked by her client what are the chances of winning a case. Clearly, every case is idiosyncratic. Yet, the rulings in similar cases and under like-minded judges are relevant for the assessment.

In all of these problems one attempts to assess the value of a variable  $Y_p$  based on the values of relevant variables,  $X_p = (X_p^1, \dots, X_p^m)$ , and on a database consisting of the variables  $(X_i^1, \dots, X_i^m, Y_i)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . The question is, how do and how should people combine past observations of  $X$  and  $Y$  with the current values of  $X$  to generate an assessment of  $Y$ ?

This problem is extensively studied in statistics, machine learning, and related fields. Among the numerous methodologies that have been suggested and used to solve such problems one may mention parametric and non-parametric regression, neural nets, linear and non-linear classifiers,  $k$ -nearest neighbor approaches (Fix and Hodges (1951, 1952), Cover and Hart (1967), Devroye, Györfi, and Lugosi (1996)), kernel-based estimation (Akaike (1954), Rosenblatt (1956), Parzen (1962), Silverman (1986), Scott (1992)), and others. Each of these methodologies has considerable success in a variety of applications. Moreover, each methodology can also be viewed as a tentative model of human reasoning. How should we choose among these approaches for descriptive and for normative applications?

Our approach to this problem is axiomatic and empirical. We start with a system of axioms that characterizes a class of assessment rules. We do not expect the axiomatic approach, or other theoretical considerations to fully specify the parameters of the assessment rule. Rather, we suggest that these parameters be estimated from data. This estimation is done in the context of a probability model that allows statistical inference. We now turn to describe

this approach in more detail.

## 1.2 Axiomatization of Similarity-Weighted Averaging

For the axiomatic model we assume that, given a database  $B = (X_i, Y_i)_{i \leq n}$ , where  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $X_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , and  $Y_i \in \mathbb{R}$ , and a new data point  $X_p \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , the agent has a ranking  $\succsim_{B, X_p}$  over the possible values of  $Y_p$ . The interpretation of  $\xi \succsim_{B, X_p} \zeta$  is that, given the database  $B$  and the new data point  $X_p$ ,  $\xi$  is more likely to be observed than is  $\zeta$ . We study the rankings  $\succsim_{B, X_p}$  that the agent would generate given various possible databases, holding  $m$  fixed. We formulate axioms on such rankings, and show that the rankings satisfy these axioms if and only if they can be represented by similarity-weighted averaging. Specifically, the axioms are equivalent to the existence of a function  $s : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  such that, given a database  $B = (X_i, Y_i)_{i \leq n}$  and a new data point  $X_p = (X_p^1, \dots, X_p^m) \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , two possible estimates of  $Y_p$  are ranked according to their proximity to the similarity-weighted average of all observations in the database, namely,

$$\bar{Y}_p^s = \frac{\sum_{i \leq n} s(X_i, X_p) Y_i}{\sum_{i \leq n} s(X_i, X_p)} \quad (1)$$

This rule for generating predictions is reminiscent of kernel estimation. (See Akaike (1954), Rosenblatt (1956), and Parzen (1962). See details in subsection 2 below.) We prefer the term "similarity" since it suggests a cognitive interpretation of the function, as opposed to the more technical "kernel". This is obviously only a matter of interpretation.<sup>2</sup>

The axioms we propose are not universal and they need not be satisfied by all types of human reasoning. Specifically, when people use the data to develop theories, and then use these theories to generate predictions, they are

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<sup>2</sup>Our axiomatization relies on that of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, 2003). Yet, the former is not a special case of the latter. Moreover, the analysis conducted here employs the fact that the variable  $Y$  is real-valued.

unlikely to satisfy our axioms, or to follow (1). (We elaborate on this point after the presentation of the axioms in Section 3.) Our axioms attempt to describe the assessment of an agent who aggregates data, but who does not engage in theorizing. When agents do reason by general rules, or theories, a model such as regression analysis may be a better model than the similarity-weighted averaging we discuss here.

We also axiomatize the relation "more likely than" that corresponds to a set of agents, constituting a "market", and we show that, under our axioms, one may replace all agents with their subjective similarity functions by a "representative" agent with an appropriately defined similarity function.

### 1.3 The Empirical Similarity

The axiomatization we propose does not specify a particular similarity function, or even a particular functional form thereof.<sup>3</sup> Where do the similarity numbers come from? In this paper we do not attempt to provide a theoretical answer to this question. Rather, we suggest an empirical approach: given a database  $B = (X_i, Y_i)_{i \leq n}$ , we assume that past values  $Y_i$  were also generated in accordance with equation (1), adapted for  $p = i$  and  $n = i - 1$ , that is,

$$\bar{Y}_i^s = \frac{\sum_{k < i} s(X_k, X_i) Y_k}{\sum_{k < i} s(X_k, X_i)} \quad (2)$$

relative to the similarity function  $s$  of the representative agent. We then ask which similarity function  $s : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  can best fit the data  $B$  under this assumption. This function, dubbed *the empirical similarity*, can then be used to generate assessments of  $\bar{Y}_p^s$ . In this paper we address a parametric version of this question. We suggest a functional form of  $s$ , and estimate its parameters by maximum likelihood estimator in a statistical model that

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<sup>3</sup>Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004) offer an axiomatization of a particular functional form of a similarity function. Assuming that an agent employs a similarity-weighted averaging as suggested here, they impose additional axioms on the agent's assessments given various databases and various new data points, which are equivalent to the existence of a norm on  $\mathbb{R}^m$  such that the similarity function is a negative exponent of this norm.

we define shortly. However, an "empirical similarity function" may be any function that is estimated from the data, or that is chosen to fit the data according to equation (2).

Further discussion of our estimation methodology and the assumptions underlying it is deferred to sub-section 6.2. We now proceed to describe a statistical model within which this estimation can be analyzed.

## 1.4 Statistical Analysis

The empirical similarity we obtain can be viewed as a point estimate of a similarity function, if we embed equation 1 in a statistical model. Specifically, we are interested in similarity functions that depend on a weighted Euclidean distance,

$$d_w(x, x') = \sqrt{\sum_{j \leq m} w_j (x_j - x'_j)^2}$$

such as  $s_w = e^{-d_w}$  or  $s_w = \frac{1}{1+d_w}$ . Observe that the weights  $(w_j)_j$  are not restricted to sum to 1. This allows some flexibility in the relative weight of closer versus more remote observations. For instance, multiplying all weights  $(w_j)_j$  by a constant  $\lambda^2 > 0$  is tantamount to multiplying  $d_w$  by  $\lambda > 0$ . If  $\lambda > 1$ , this transformation reduces the relative impact of remote points.

For  $t = 1, \dots, n$ , we assume that

$$Y_t^s = \frac{\sum_{i < t} s(X_i, X_t) Y_i}{\sum_{i < t} s(X_i, X_t)} + \varepsilon_t \quad (3)$$

where  $\varepsilon_t \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} N(0, \sigma^2)$ .

In such a model it makes sense to ask whether the point estimates of the unknown parameters are significantly different from a pre-specified value, and in particular, from zero. In this paper we focus on maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters  $(w_j)_j$ , and we develop tests for such hypotheses.

For some applications, including examples 5 and 6 above, the observed values of  $Y_t$  are categorical. In this case one cannot assume a model such as (3), and the latter should be replaced with a model of the form

$$P(Y_t = 1 | X_1, Y_1, \dots, X_{t-1}, Y_{t-1}) = F(Y_t^s)$$

where  $F$  is a cumulative distribution function, and  $X_i$  is an  $m$ -vector. This model differs from discrete choice models in a way that parallels the difference between our model for a continuous  $Y_t^s$  and linear regression. Specifically, the probability that  $Y_t$  assumes the value 1 depends on the weighted relative frequency of 1 among past values  $\{Y_i\}_{i < t}$ , where the weight of the value  $Y_i$  depends on the similarity between the vector  $X_i$  observed in the past and the current observation  $X_t$ . We provide a statistical model for this case, and develop tests for hypotheses about the values of the parameters  $(w_j)_j$  in this model as well.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relationship between our methodology and existing statistical methodologies. Section 3 provides the axiomatization of similarity-weighted averaging, for a single agent and for a set of agents. In Section 4 we develop the statistical theory for the continuous case, whereas Section 5 deals with the discrete case. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Related Techniques

Our main focus is on human reasoning. We are interested in data that are generated by people, and we take the similarity-weighted average as a possible model of how people generate assessments. That is, we interpret our model as describing a causal relationship.

Our methodology can be applied also to databases in which the variable  $Y$  is not a result of human reasoning. In this case our model should not be interpreted causally, but one may still find a similarity function that

best fits the data. Moreover, one may even conduct hypotheses tests for the parameters of the similarity function, to the extent that one believes that the data generating process may be in agreement with one of the models specified above. In other words, the empirical approach suggested here, coupled with the statistical inference that accompanies it, may be viewed as a general-purpose statistical technique dealing with the prediction of a variable  $Y$  based on variables  $X_1, \dots, X_m$  and past observations of all these variables in conjunction.

Viewed from this perspective, one might wonder how our prediction technique compares with established ones, such as regression analysis. An obvious weakness of our approach is that it does not attempt to identify trends. For instance, assume that there exists a single variable  $X$  which denotes time, and that the data lie on a line  $Y = X$ . This obvious trend will not be recognized by our technique, which will continue to expect the next value of  $Y$  to be a weighted average of past values of  $Y$ . The prediction technique we suggest makes sense especially when one might believe that past observations were obtained under similar circumstances.

## 2.1 Non-Linear Regression

Our approach differs from non-linear regression in that we do not assume that the data generating process follows a basic functional relationship of the form  $Y = f(X^1, \dots, X^m)$ . Rather, we assume that  $Y$  is distributed around a weighted average of its past values, where the  $X$ 's determine these weights.

If, however, one does assume that there exists an underlying functional relationship  $Y = f(X^1, \dots, X^m)$ , our technique may still be used for prediction of  $Y$ . As long as  $f$  is sufficiently smooth, one may hope that, with a large number of observations that are evenly scattered in terms of their  $X$  values, the similarity-weighted averaging will result in reasonable predictions. Indeed, the similarity-weighted average is reminiscent of Nadaraya-Watson's estimator of a non-parametric functional relationship. Observe that, as op-

posed to Nadaraya-Watson's technique and related literature, we do not attempt to find an optimal kernel function based on theoretical considerations, but find the kernel/similarity function that best fits the data.

Observe that our estimation of the similarity function  $s$  is parametric. This does not imply that we restrict the function  $f$  to a parametrized family of functions, should a relationship  $Y = f(X^1, \dots, X^m)$  actually exist. Any function  $s$  may be used to generate predictions in a non-parametric problem. To simplify our estimation problem, we restrict attention to functions  $s$  within a parametrized family of similarity functions. Thus, we try to parametrically estimate how to best perform non-parametric estimation.

## 2.2 Kernel Estimation and Case-Based Reasoning

If we think of similarity-weighted averaging as a model of human reasoning, we find that a case-based reasoner, as modeled by this formula, can be viewed as someone who believes in a general rule of the form  $Y = f(X^1, \dots, X^m)$  but does not know the functional form of  $f$  and therefore attempts to estimate it by non-parametric techniques.

The notion that people reason by analogies dates back to Hume (1748) at the latest. In artificial intelligence, this idea was reincarnated as case-based reasoning by Schank (1986) and Schank and Riesbeck (1989). Inspired by this work, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001, 2003) developed a formal, axiomatically-based theory of decision and prediction by analogies. In this literature it has been mentioned that case-based reasoning is a natural and flexible mode of thinking and decision making. Our statistical approach strengthens this intuition by pointing out that case-based reasoning may be a way to estimate a functional rule.

Taking an evolutionary viewpoint, assume that nature programs the mind of an organism who needs to operate in an unknown environment. The organism will need to learn certain functional rules of the form  $Y = f(X^1, \dots, X^m)$ , but it is not yet known what form the function  $f$  might take. The statistical

viewpoint suggest case-based assessment by similarity-weighted averaging as a procedure to predict  $Y$ , which may perform well in a variety of possible environments  $f$ . Moreover, it turns out that the similarity-weighted averaging does not explicitly resort to general rules and theories, and thus does not require abstract thinking. Case-based reasoning therefore appears to be a flexible methodology of learning rules, which can be implemented on simple machines. Admittedly, this methodology is limited and human reasoning requires also abstract thinking and the development of explicit general theories. Yet, the evolutionary viewpoint seems to support case-based reasoning as a simple but powerful technique.

### 2.3 Interpolation

Our prediction methodology can also be viewed as a type of interpolation. Consider first the case  $m = 1$ , that is, a single variable  $X$ . Every past case is a point  $(x_i, y_i) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ , and we are asked to assess the value of  $Y$  for a new point  $x_p \in \mathbb{R}$ . Assume for simplicity that  $x_p$  is in the interval  $[\min_i x_i, \max_i x_i]$ . Linear interpolation would generate a prediction by the line segment connecting  $(x_i, y_i)$  and  $(x_k, y_k)$  for the two values  $x_i$  and  $x_k$  that are closest to  $x_p$  in either direction. This approach may be a bit extreme since it uses only the  $y$  values for the closest  $x$ 's. In this respect, it is similar to a (single) nearest neighbor technique. Other types of interpolation, such as polynomial interpolation, would take into account also other points  $(x_l, y_l)$  for  $x_l$  that is not necessarily the closest to  $x_p$  on either side.

These interpolation techniques implicitly assume that the values observed are the actual, precise values of an unknown function. If, however, we recognize that there is some inherent randomness in the process, that we may not measure certain hidden variables, or that there are measurement errors, we might opt for a technique that is less sensitive to each particular value of  $Y$ . Following this line of thought, our approach can be viewed as performing *statistical interpolation*: every observation is used in the interpolation

process, where closer points have a higher impact on the predicted value. As opposed to interpolation by high-order polynomials, when many points have been observed, no particular point would have a large impact on the predicted value.

When we consider the case  $m > 1$ , generalizing this interpolation technique requires a multi-dimensional distance function. Our methodology might therefore be conceptualized as a multi-dimensional statistical interpolation technique, where the distance function is empirically learnt.

## 2.4 Bayesian Updating

A special case of the formula (1) is when  $s$  is constant (say,  $s \equiv 1$ ), and the formula boils down to the simple average (of  $Y$ ) over the entire database. This could be viewed as an estimator of the unconditional expectation of  $Y$ , having not observed any  $X$ 's.

By contrast, one may consider an extreme similarity function given by  $s(X_i, X_p) = 1_{\{X_i=X_p\}}$ . That is, two data points are considered to be perfectly similar if they have exactly the same  $X$  values, and absolutely dissimilar otherwise.<sup>4</sup> In this case, the formula (1) yields the average of  $Y$  over the sub-database defined by the values  $X_p$ , and it can be viewed as an estimate of the *conditional* expectation of  $Y$ , *given*  $X_p$ .

Thus, the formula (1) provides a continuum between conditional and unconditional expectations. When  $s(X_i, X_p) = 1_{\{X_i=X_p\}}$ , the reasoner only considers identical cases as relevant, and all of them are then deemed equally relevant. By contrast, if  $s \equiv 1$ , the reasoner considers all cases as identically relevant. In between, (1) allows for various cases to have a varying degree of relevance. Given the new datapoint  $X_p$ , past points  $X_i$  are judged for their relevance, but not in a dichotomous way. In other words, Bayesian updating may be viewed as a special case of (1), where similarity is evaluated in a

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<sup>4</sup>In our model the similarity function is positive everywhere. This simplifies the formula and the axiomatization alike. But one can extend the model to include similarity functions that may vanish, or consider zero similarity values as a limit case.

binary way: two observations are similar if and only if they are identical in every possible known aspect.

As compared to Bayesian updating, a reasoner who employs (1) might be viewed as a less extreme assessor of similarity. She does not use only the observations with identical  $X$  values, but also other, less relevant ones. Why would she do that? Why should she contaminate her assessment of  $Y$  for  $X_p$  with  $Y$  that were observed for other  $X$ 's?

The answer is, presumably, the scarcity of data. If we are faced with a database in which the very same  $X_p$  values appear a very large number of times, it would seem reasonable to assess the conditional expectation of  $Y$  given  $X_p$  based solely on the observations that share the exact values of  $X_p$ . But one may find that these exact values were encountered very few times, if at all. Indeed, the  $X$ 's might include certain variables, such as time and location, that uniquely identify the observation. In this case, no two observations ever share the exact  $X$  values, and conditioning on  $X_p$  leaves one with an empty sub-database. Even in less extreme examples, the resulting sub-database may be too meager for generating predictions. In those cases, the formula (1) offers an alternative, in which the similarity of the observations is traded off for the size of the database.

Viewed thus, the formula (1) may deserve the title "kernel updating". As in other kernel-based techniques, the relevance of an observation  $(X_i, Y_i)$  is not restricted to identical datapoints  $X_p = X_i$ , but is extended to other datapoints  $X_p$ , to an extent determined by the kernel values  $s(X_i, X_p)$ . The use of a kernel function in this case is justified by the paucity of the data, that is, by the fact that observations with precisely the same  $X_p$  are scarce. This parallels the motivation for the use of kernel functions in kernel estimation of a density function and in kernel classification.

Finally, we observe that the use of observations  $(X_i, Y_i)$  where  $X_i \neq X_p$  for the prediction of  $Y_p$  may also follow from Bayesian updating if one assumes

that the  $X$  variables are observed with noise.<sup>5</sup>

## 2.5 Auto-Regression Models

From a mathematical viewpoint, the similarity-weighted average can be regarded as a type of an auto-regression model. In auto-regression models, as well as in our case,  $Y_t$  is distributed around a linear function of past values of  $Y$ . Yet, the similarity-weighted average formula differs from auto-regression models in several important ways. Mathematically, the weights that past values  $\{Y_i\}_{i < t}$  have in the equation of  $Y_t$  do not depend on the time difference  $(t - i)$ , but on the similarity of the corresponding  $X$  values, that is on  $s(X_i, X_t)$ . In particular, observe that the weights of  $\{Y_i\}_{i < t}$  in the determination of the expectation of  $Y_t$  are not known before time  $t$ , because these weights depend on  $X_t$ . Observe also that in our case each  $Y_t$  depends on *all* past observations. Thus, our model is an auto-regression model whose order is not bounded a-priori. Another important difference is that in our case the index  $t$  has no cardinal significance. We use it only to order the data, but our procedure does not rely on the fact that the time difference between observations  $t - 1$  and  $t$  is the same as the time difference between observations  $t - 2$  and  $t - 1$ .<sup>6</sup>

Conceptually, our model assumes that similar situations in the past might have a significant impact on current values of  $Y$ , even if they occurred a long time ago. When one discusses natural phenomena, such as population growth, one expects the weight of past observations to be increasing as a function of their recency. But when we deal with human reasoning, as in the case of inflationary expectations, less recent, but more similar situations in the past may have a greater impact on the future than would more recent but less similar situations. In a sense, human memory may serve as a channel

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<sup>5</sup>This comment is due to Mark Machina.

<sup>6</sup>In fact, our procedure can be easily adapted to the case in which observations are only partially ordered. As we briefly mention below, a different variant of our model can deal with situations in which the observations that are not ordered at all.

through which past periods can affect future periods without the mediation of the periods in between.

The above need not imply that our model ignores time completely. One may introduce time as one of the variables  $X^j$ . This would allow more recent periods to have greater impact on the prediction than less recent ones, simply because the time difference is translated, via the variable  $X^j$ , to a distance in the  $X$  space, and thus to a lower degree of similarity.

## 2.6 How to Analyze Time Series

We conclude that the relationship between our model and auto-regression models is superficial. Yet, our model can be adapted to deal with time series in a way that resembles auto-regression in a more profound way. Auto-regression can be viewed, in bold strokes, as explaining a variable by its own past values, with statistical techniques such as linear regression. The natural counterpart in our case would be to predict the variable  $Y$  by equation (1) where the variables  $(X^j)_j$  include lagged values of  $Y$  itself. For example, assume that  $Y_t$  is a quarterly growth rate. Introducing  $Y_{t-1}, \dots, Y_{t-k}$  as  $X_t^1, \dots, X_t^k$  would suggest that the predicted rate of growth at period  $t$  be a (weighted) average of the rates of growth in similar periods in the past, *where similarity is defined by the pattern of growth rates in the most recent  $k$  periods*. Our technique would find weights  $w_1, \dots, w_k$  that best fit the data when one uses the equation

$$\bar{Y}_t^s = \frac{\sum_{i < t} s_w((Y_{i-k}, \dots, Y_{i-1}), (Y_{t-k}, \dots, Y_{t-1})) Y_i}{\sum_{i < t} s_w((Y_{i-k}, \dots, Y_{i-1}), (Y_{t-k}, \dots, Y_{t-1}))} \quad (4)$$

where

$$s_w((Y_{i-k}, \dots, Y_{i-1}), (Y_{t-k}, \dots, Y_{t-1})) = e^{-\sqrt{\sum_{j \leq k} w_j (Y_{i-j} - Y_{t-j})^2}}$$

This estimation technique could be interpreted as follows. We first ask, what determines the similarity of patterns of growth? That is, is a "pattern"

defined by the most recent period, or by several most recent periods, how many of these, and what are the relative weights? The estimation of the weights  $w_j$  attempts to answer this question. While the resulting weights need not be monotonically decreasing in  $j$  (the time difference), one would expect that these weights would become small for large values of  $j$ . In fact, in determining the number of periods that define a "pattern",  $k$ , one implicitly assumes that periods more distant than  $k$  are not part of the "pattern". The selection of this  $k$  may be compared to the selection of the order  $p$  in auto-regression models of order  $p$  (AR( $p$ )).

Once the weights  $w_j$  have been determined, we search the entire database for periods  $i$  such that the pattern preceding  $i$ ,  $(Y_{i-k}, \dots, Y_{i-1})$ , resembles the current pattern,  $(Y_{t-k}, \dots, Y_{t-1})$ . For such periods, the value  $Y_i$  would have a higher weight in the prediction of  $Y_t$  than would the value corresponding to periods for which  $(Y_{i-k}, \dots, Y_{i-1})$  resembles  $(Y_{t-k}, \dots, Y_{t-1})$  to a lesser degree. Again, one may also add time as an additional variable  $X^{k+1}$  to make sure that the prediction discounts the past.

### 3 Axiomatization

#### 3.1 Single Agent

The axiomatization does not require that past data points range over all of  $\mathbb{R}^m$ . We assume that they belong to a non-empty subset  $\Gamma \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ . However, we do assume that every possible data point in  $\Gamma$  may have been observed together with every value  $y \in \mathbb{R}$  any finite number of times. We therefore model the database as a vector of counters, denoted  $I$ , rather than the set of observations  $B$  used in the introduction.

Specifically, let  $C = \Gamma \times \mathbb{R}$  denote *case types*. A case type  $(x, \xi) \in C$  is interpreted as an observation of a *data point*  $x \in \Gamma$  coupled with the value  $\xi \in \mathbb{R}$ . *Memory* is a non-zero function  $I : C \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_+$  such that  $\sum_{c \in C} I(c) < \infty$ , specifying for every case type  $c$  how many cases of that type have appeared.

Let  $\mathcal{I}$  be the set of all memories.

We are currently presented with a new data point  $x_p \in \Gamma$ . The task is to estimate the value  $\eta \in \mathbb{R}$  that corresponds to  $x_p$ . We assume that the predictor does not only choose one such  $\eta$ , but has a likelihood ranking over all possible predictions. Formally, for  $I \in \mathcal{I}$ , let  $\succsim_I \subset \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}$  be a binary relation over the reals. For  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $\xi \succsim_I \eta$  is interpreted as ‘‘Given memory  $I$ ,  $\xi$  is a more likely value for the variable  $Y$  at the new data point  $x_p$  than is  $\eta$ ’’. Observe that in the formal notation we suppress  $x_p$ . This new data point is fixed throughout this section.

We now state axioms on  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$ . The first three are identical to those appearing in Gilboa-Schmeidler (2001, 2003).

**A1 Order:** For every  $I \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\succsim_I$  is complete and transitive on  $\mathbb{R}$ .

**A2 Combination:** For every  $I, J \in \mathcal{I}$  and every  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ , if  $\xi \succsim_I \eta$  ( $\xi \succ_I \eta$ ) and  $\xi \succsim_J \eta$ , then  $\xi \succsim_{I+J} \eta$  ( $\xi \succ_{I+J} \eta$ ).

**A3 Archimedean Axiom:** For every  $I, J \in \mathcal{I}$  and every  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ , if  $\xi \succ_I \eta$ , then there exists  $l \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $\xi \succ_{lI+J} \eta$ .

Observe that in the presence of Axiom 2, Axiom 3 also implies that for every  $I, J \in \mathcal{I}$  and every  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ , if  $\xi \succ_I \eta$ , then there exists  $l \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for all  $k \geq l$ ,  $\xi \succ_{kI+J} \eta$ .

Axiom A1 is rather standard. It requires that, given any memory, the ‘‘more likely than’’ relation be a weak order.

Axiom A2 is the main axiom of Gilboa-Schmeidler (1997, 2001, and 2003). Roughly, it states that, if  $\xi$  is more likely than  $\eta$  given each of two memories, then  $\xi$  should also be more likely than  $\eta$  given their union. This axiom is satisfied by a variety of statistical techniques, such as kernel estimation, kernel classification, and maximum likelihood rankings. Yet, it is by no means universal, and it should not be expected to hold in several important classes of problems. If the union of memories results in new insights, or if the similarity function is being learnt by the predictor while she produces predictions, then the combination axiom should not be expected to hold. Similarly, if the

estimator uses both inductive and deductive reasoning, she may well violate this axiom. However, A2 appears reasonable as a requirement on simple aggregation of evidence.

A3 states that, if memory  $I$  contains evidence that  $\xi$  is more likely than  $\eta$ , then, for each other memory  $J$  there exists a large enough number,  $l$ , such that  $l$  repetitions of  $I$  would be sufficient to overwhelm the evidence provided by  $J$ , and suggest that  $\xi$  is more likely than  $\eta$  also given the union of  $J$  and  $l$  times  $I$ . Thus A3 precludes the possibility that one piece of evidence is infinitely more weighty than another.

Gilboa-Schmeidler (1997, 2001, and 2003) also use a diversity axiom, which we do not use here. Instead, we impose a new axiom that is specific to our set-up. It states that, if memory  $I$  consists solely of cases that relate to the same data point  $x$ , then the ranking  $\succsim_I$  is consistent with simple averaging. Observe that for such databases there is nothing to be learnt from the values of  $x$  since they do not change at all. In this case, it makes sense that the most likely value of  $y$  be the average of its observed values, and that possible values be ranked according to their proximity to this average.

For  $x \in \Gamma$ , define  $\mathcal{I}_x$  to be the set of memories in which only data point  $x$  has been observed. Formally,  $\mathcal{I}_x = \{I \in \mathcal{I} \mid I((x', y)) = 0 \text{ for } x' \neq x\}$ . For  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ , define the average  $y_I \in \mathbb{R}$  by

$$y_I = \frac{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))y}{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))}.$$

The last axiom we employ is:

**A4 Averaging:** For every  $x \in \Gamma$ , every  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ , and every  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $\xi \succsim_I \eta$  iff  $|\xi - y_I| \leq |\eta - y_I|$ .

Our result can now be stated:

**Theorem 1** *Let there be given  $\Gamma$ , and  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$ . Then the following two statements are equivalent:*

- (i)  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  satisfy A1-A4;

(ii) There is a function  $s : \Gamma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  such that:

$$(*) \quad \begin{cases} \text{for every } I \in \mathcal{I} \text{ and every } \xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}, \\ \xi \succsim_I \eta \quad \text{iff} \quad |\xi - y_{s,I}| \leq |\eta - y_{s,I}|, \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } y_{s,I} = \frac{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} s(x)I((x,y))y}{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} s(x)I((x,y))}$$

**Furthermore**, in this case the function  $s$  is unique up to multiplication by a positive number.

### 3.2 Discussion

The theorem states that, if we rank possible predictions of  $Y$  by their proximity to the average of past values of  $Y$  whenever the values of  $X^1, \dots, X^m$  are fixed, and we wish to extend it to general databases in a way that satisfies our axioms (notably, the combination axiom), we are bound to do it by proximity to weighted averages.

The axiomatization we provide can be interpreted descriptively or normatively. From a descriptive point of view, the theorem suggests that, if an agent's rankings of possible value of a variable  $y$  given various databases satisfy our axioms, she can be ascribed a similarity function  $s$  such that her rankings are determined by proximity to a similarity-weighted average of past values of  $y$ , calculated by the similarity function  $s$ . >From a normative viewpoint, the axiomatization might be used to convince an agent that similarity-weighted averaging is a reasonable way to assess the variable  $y$  given a database of past observations. Finally, the axiomatization also suggests a definition of an agent's similarity function, and method of elicitation for it.

A weighted averaging formula is also axiomatized in Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2003). In their model a reasoner is asked to name a probability vector based on a memory  $I$ . Billot et al. impose an appropriate version of the combination axiom to conclude that the probability vector given a memory  $I$  is the weighted average of the vectors induced by each

case separately. Unfortunately, the result of Billot et al. only applies if there are at least 3 states of the world, that is, if the probability vector has at least two degrees of freedom. For the special case of a single-dimension probability simplex, their theorem does not hold. In this sense, the present paper complements Billot et al. (2003).

### 3.3 Representative Agent

The theorem above shows under what conditions an agent's "more likely than" relation will follow the similarity-weighted average formula for an appropriately chosen similarity function. It relates the theoretical concept of "similarity" to the relation "more likely than", which is assumed to be observable.

In practice, however, one can often observe only aggregate data. For instance, one may observe market prices of houses or paintings, but not the assessments of these prices by agents. What properties should such assessments satisfy? How are individual assessments aggregated over agents? Can such aggregates also be described as similarity-weighted averages?

To answer these questions, we extend the model presented above to incorporate more than one agent. Specifically, let  $P = \{1, \dots, p\}$  be a set of agents, and re-define the case types to be  $C = P \times \Gamma \times \mathbb{R}$ . Case of type  $(i, x, y)$  is interpreted as "agent  $i \in P$  has observed a data point  $x \in \Gamma$  and a corresponding value of  $y \in \mathbb{R}$ ". Thus, every observation in this model specifies the observer, and not only the observed.

We continue as before to define *memory* as a non-zero vector  $I : C \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_+$  such that  $\sum_{c \in C} I(c) < \infty$ . Let  $\mathcal{I}$  be the set of all memories. We now think of memory  $I$  as a matrix of counters, specifying how many times each agent has observed any possible  $(x, y) \in \Gamma \times \mathbb{R}$  combination.

The relation  $\succsim_I$  is interpreted as follows. For  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $\xi \succsim_I \eta$  means that, if  $I$  specifies how many times each agent has seen each pair  $(x, y)$ , then  $\xi$  is more likely than  $\eta$  to be the assessment of the set of agents. This assessment

is supposed to reflect some collective opinion, and it does not reflect economic power or strategic considerations. If, for instance, we discuss the value of a painting by van Gogh, every agent is expected to have some assessment of the value of the painting, regardless of their ability or willingness to pay for it.

The axioms we use are the same axioms verbatim. The logic behind the axioms mirrors that of the single agent case, though, naturally, in the multi-agent case the axioms are more demanding.

We first state the theorem as applied to this case:

**Corollary 2** *Let there be given  $P, \Gamma$ , and  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$ . Then the following two statements are equivalent:*

- (i)  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  satisfy A1-A4;
- (ii) There exist functions  $\{s_i : \Gamma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}\}_{i \in P}$  such that:

$$(**) \quad \begin{cases} \text{for every } I \in \mathcal{I} \text{ and every } \xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}, \\ \xi \succsim_I \eta \quad \text{iff} \quad |\xi - y_{s,I}| \leq |\eta - y_{s,I}|, \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } y_{s,I} = \frac{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s_i(x) I((i,x,y)) y}{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s_i(x) I((i,x,y))}$$

**Furthermore**, in this case the functions  $\{s_i\}_{i \in P}$  are unique up to joint multiplication by a positive number.

We wish to show that, if we assume that all information is shared, then a set of agents  $P$ , characterized by functions  $\{s_i\}_{i \in P}$ , is indistinguishable from a representative agent whose similarity function is the average of  $\{s_i\}_{i \in P}$ . To this end, define  $\mathcal{I}_{sh}$  as the set of memories in which all agents have the same information, that is:  $\mathcal{I}_{sh} = \{I \in \mathcal{I} \mid I((i, x, y)) = I((i', x, y)) \text{ for all } i, i' \in P\}$ .

We now have

**Corollary 3** *Let there be given  $P, \Gamma$ , and  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$ . Assume that  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  satisfy A1-A4. Then there exists a function  $s : \Gamma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  such that:*

$$(**) \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{for every } I \in \mathcal{I}_{sh} \text{ and every } \xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}, \\ \xi \succsim_I \eta \quad \text{iff} \quad |\xi - y_{s,I}| \leq |\eta - y_{s,I}|, \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{where } y_{s,I} = \frac{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s(x)I((i,x,y))y}{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s(x)I((i,x,y))}$$

**Furthermore**, in this case the function  $s$  is unique up to multiplication by a positive number.

Observe that the identification of individual similarity functions  $s_i$  requires that memories  $I \notin \mathcal{I}_{sh}$  be considered, that is, memories in which different agents may have observed different cases. Measuring  $\succsim_I$  for  $I \notin \mathcal{I}_{sh}$  and testing our axioms may be done in a controlled experiments in a laboratory. It is more challenging to observe  $\succsim_I$  for  $I \notin \mathcal{I}_{sh}$  in empirical data. Yet, one may imagine that such relations exist, and satisfy our axioms.

As long as we restrict attention to shared information, namely, to memories in  $\mathcal{I}_{sh}$ , we only observe the average similarity function. Attributing this average similarity to a representative agent, we conclude that the assessment made by a set of agents will be equivalent to that made by the representative agent.

The observability of  $\succsim_I$  mirrors the observability of a utility function in economics: in principle, one may measure each agent's utility function. In reality, often only aggregate data are available. Under certain conditions, one may assume that the decisions of a set of agents can be described by the decision of a single, representative agent. Similarly, in our case one may, in principle, measure each agent's similarity function. In practice, we often observe only aggregate assessments. However, under the conditions specified above, we may replace the set of agents by a single, representative agent, and obtain the same assessment for shared information. It is this similarity function, of a representative agent, that we attempt to estimate.

## 4 Statistical Inference for a Continuous Model

### 4.1 The Model and the Likelihood Function

We now impose the assumption that the similarity function is exponential in a weighted Euclidean distance. That is, we assume that there are positive weights  $w_j > 0$ ,  $j = 1, \dots, m$ , such that

$$s_w(x, x') = e^{-d_w(x, x')}$$

where

$$d_w(x, x') = \sqrt{\sum_{j \leq m} w_j (x^j - x'^j)^2}.$$

This function is axiomatized in Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004). However, it is used here only as an example, and our analysis can be extended to any other similarity function that depends on a finite number of parameters.

Next we suppose that the data generating process is given by

$$Y_t = \frac{\sum_{i < t} s_w(x_t, x_i) Y_i}{\sum_{i < t} s_w(x_t, x_i)} + \varepsilon_t, \quad t = 2, \dots, n \quad (5)$$

with

$$\varepsilon_t \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma^2), \quad \forall t.$$

Equation (5) can be written in matrix form as

$$S y = \varepsilon,$$

where  $S = S(w)$  is an  $n \times n$  lower triangular matrix that does not depend on the variables  $Y_i$  (see details in sub-section 4.3 below),  $y = (Y_1, \dots, Y_n)'$ , and  $\varepsilon$  is an  $n \times 1$  vector of i.i.d. Gaussian variables with zero mean and variance  $\sigma^2$ . Since the joint density of  $\varepsilon$  is

$$f(\varepsilon) = (2\pi\sigma^2)^{-n/2} \exp\left(-\frac{\varepsilon' \varepsilon}{2\sigma^2}\right),$$

and since  $\det(S) = 1$ , the joint density of  $y$  is

$$f(y) = (2\pi\sigma^2)^{-n/2} \exp\left(-\frac{y'S'Sy}{2\sigma^2}\right). \quad (6)$$

We use the notation  $\theta = (\sigma^2, w_1, \dots, w_m)$  for the vector of all unknown parameters in our model, and observe that  $\theta \in \Theta \subset R_+^{m+1}$ . We propose to estimate the weights ( $w_j$ ) by maximum likelihood. Set  $H = S'S/\sigma^2$ . In view of (6), the log-likelihood of  $\theta$  is

$$l(\theta) = -\frac{n}{2} \log(2\pi\theta_1) - \frac{1}{2}y'H(\theta)y.$$

The maximum likelihood estimator of  $\theta$  is

$$\hat{\theta} = \arg \max_{\Theta \subset R_+^{m+1}} l(\theta).$$

## 4.2 Hypotheses Tests

We now wish to develop a statistical test for the null hypothesis  $H_0 : w_j = 0$ . Rejecting this hypothesis will imply that the variable  $X^j$  is significant in the determination of  $Y$ , in the sense that the distance function, according to which  $Y_t$  is determined in (5), does not ignore the  $j$ -th variable.

We know that

$$\sqrt{n}(\hat{\theta} - \theta) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, IA(\theta)^{-1}),$$

where

$$IA(\theta) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} I(\theta)$$

and  $I(\theta)$  is the Fisher information matrix, given by

$$I(\theta) = -E_{\theta} \left( \frac{\partial^2 l(\theta)}{\partial \theta \partial \theta'} \right).$$

To obtain the matrix of second order derivatives, it will be convenient to rewrite  $l(\theta)$  as

$$l(\theta) = -\frac{n}{2} \log(2\pi) + \frac{1}{2} \log \det(H(\theta)) - \frac{1}{2}y'H(\theta)y.$$

By standard calculations,

$$\frac{\partial l(\theta)}{\partial \theta_r} = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \dot{H}_r \right) - \frac{1}{2} y' \dot{H}_r y$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2 l(\theta)}{\partial \theta_r \partial \theta_s} = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( -H^{-1} \dot{H}_s H^{-1} \dot{H}_r + H^{-1} \ddot{H}_{rs} \right) - \frac{1}{2} y' \ddot{H}_{rs} y.$$

Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} I_{r,s}(\theta) &= - \left[ \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( -H^{-1} \dot{H}_s H^{-1} \dot{H}_r + H^{-1} \ddot{H}_{rs} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \ddot{H}_{rs} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \dot{H}_s H^{-1} \dot{H}_r \right). \end{aligned}$$

The asymptotic information matrix is given by

$$IA(\theta) = \left( \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{2n} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \dot{H}_s H^{-1} \dot{H}_r \right) \right)_{1 \leq r, s \leq m+1}.$$

To conduct a hypothesis test of the form

$$H_0 : \theta_r = 0 \text{ vs. } H_1 : \theta_r > 0, \text{ for } r = 2, \dots, m+1$$

we need to use the statistic

$$\frac{\sqrt{n} \hat{\theta}_r}{\left( IA^{-1}(\hat{\theta}) \right)_{r,r}^{1/2}}.$$

Since the limit is generally unknown, we can replace  $IA(\hat{\theta})$  by  $I(\hat{\theta})/n$  and use

$$t = \frac{\sqrt{n} \hat{\theta}_r}{\left( \left( I(\hat{\theta})/n \right)^{-1} \right)_{r,r}^{1/2}} = \frac{\hat{\theta}_r}{\sqrt{\left( I^{-1}(\hat{\theta}) \right)_{r,r}}}. \quad (7)$$

We reject  $H_0$  when  $t$  is large (e.g., when it exceeds 1.645, if a 5% significance level is desired).

For multiple linear hypotheses of the form

$$H_0 : R\theta = r \text{ vs. } H_1 : R\theta \neq r,$$

where  $R$  is a  $q \times (m + 1)$  matrix consisting of  $q \leq (m + 1)$  independent linear hypotheses, we can use the Wald test, given by

$$W = (R\hat{\theta} - r)' [RI^{-1}(\hat{\theta})R']^{-1} (R\hat{\theta} - r).$$

The statistic is distributed  $\chi^2(q)$  under  $H_0$ . We reject  $H_0$  when  $W$  is large.

### 4.3 Calculations

The analysis in the previous sub-sections does not depend on the functional form of the function  $s$ . In this sub-section we calculate  $\dot{H}_r$  for the case of an exponential function of the weighted Euclidean distance.

Let  $s_{w,i,j} = s_w(x_i, x_j) = e^{-d_w(x_i, x_j)}$ . Denote

$$A_w = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ s_{w,2,1} & 0 & \dots & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ s_{w,n,1} & \dots & s_{w,n,n-1} & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

and let  $1$  be an  $n \times 1$  vector of 1's, and  $e_j$  – the canonical vector of 0's apart from the  $j$ -th position where it is set to unity. Set

$$B_w = \begin{pmatrix} (e'_1 A_w 1)^{-1} & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & (e'_2 A_w 1)^{-1} & \dots & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & (e'_n A_w 1)^{-1} \end{pmatrix}.$$

It is easily seen that

$$S(w) = I - B_w A_w,$$

where  $I$  is the identity matrix of order  $n$ . So,

$$H(w) = \frac{(I - B_w A_w)' (I - B_w A_w)}{\sigma^2}.$$

Now,

$$\frac{\partial s_{w,i,j}}{\partial w_r} = -\frac{s_{w,i,j} (x_{ri} - x_{rj})^2}{2d(x_i, x_j)}. \quad (8)$$

Write

$$C_{w,r} = \frac{\partial A_w}{\partial w_r} = \dot{A}_{w,r}$$

and

$$D_{w,r} = \frac{\partial B_w}{\partial w_r} = - \begin{pmatrix} \frac{e'_1 \dot{A}_{w,r} 1}{(e'_1 A_w 1)^2} & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{e'_2 \dot{A}_{w,r} 1}{(e'_2 A_w 1)^2} & & \dots \\ \dots & & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & \frac{e'_n \dot{A}_{w,r} 1}{(e'_n A_w 1)^2} \end{pmatrix}.$$

It follows that

$$\dot{H}_1 = -\frac{S'S}{\sigma^4}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{H}_r &= \frac{1}{\sigma^2} (\dot{S}'_r S + S' \dot{S}_r) \\ &= -\frac{1}{\sigma^2} [(D_{w,r} A_w + B_w C_{w,r})' S - S' (D_{w,r} A_w + B_w C_{w,r})]. \end{aligned}$$

for  $r = 2, \dots, m+1$

## 5 Statistical Inference for the Discrete Case

### 5.1 The Model and the Likelihood Function

We now deal with the case in which each  $Y_t$  is categorical. In particular, consider examples 5 and 6 above, in which an expert is asked to estimate the probability of a certain event, and the observed values of  $Y$  can only be  $\{0, 1\}$ . In these examples the assessed values can be anywhere in the interval  $[0, 1]$ . Indeed, the formula

$$\bar{Y}_p^s = \frac{\sum_{i \leq n} s_w(X_i, X_p) Y_i}{\sum_{i \leq n} s_w(X_i, X_p)}$$

may generate any value in  $[0, 1]$ . But in this case one cannot assume that previously observed values of  $Y$  were generated by a Normal distribution

centered around a similarity-weighted average such as  $\bar{Y}_p^s$ , as in model (5) above.<sup>7</sup>

We therefore assume the following model<sup>8</sup>

$$P(Y_t = 1 | \mathcal{F}_{t-1}) = F_t(z_t(w)), \quad t = 1, \dots, n, \quad (9)$$

where  $F_t$  is a continuous conditional distribution function with density  $f_t$ ,  $\mathcal{F}_{t-1} = \sigma(Y_{t-1}, \dots, Y_1)$  and

$$z_t = \frac{\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i) Y_i}{\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i)}. \quad (10)$$

In this setting the  $x$ 's are taken to be fixed. Letting  $F_t$  be the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) leads to a probit type model whereas letting  $F_t$  be the logistic distribution leads to a logit type model. Since  $z_t \in [0, 1]$ , it might be sensible to let  $F_t$  be a beta distribution. Note that in the classical case, corresponding to the rule based model, it is postulated that  $P(Y_t = 1 | X) = F(X\beta)$ . Unlike our case, no  $Y_j$ 's appear on the right hand side and the model (9) is nonlinear through both  $F_t$  and  $z_t$ .

In view of (9) and (10)

$$\frac{\partial P(Y_t = 1 | \mathcal{F}_{t-1})}{\partial s_w(X_t, X_j)} = f_t(z_t) \frac{\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i) (Y_j - Y_i)}{(\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i))^2},$$

which is non-negative if  $Y_j = 1$  and non-positive when  $Y_j = 0$ . In other words, when the similarity between  $Y_t$  and  $Y_j$  increases, the conditional probability that  $Y_t = 1$  will not fall when  $Y_j = 1$  and will not rise when  $Y_j = 0$ . The model thus makes sense at least in this respect.

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<sup>7</sup>Other reasons for which model (5) is inappropriate in this case are that the  $R^2$  of regression (5) would typically be low and that, because of the non-Gaussian nature of the observations, OLS would be inefficient.

<sup>8</sup>The categorical variables we discuss here may only assume the values 0 or 1. However, the analysis that follows can be extended to the case of a categorical variable assuming more than two categories.

Given our setup, the likelihood function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} L &= \prod_{t=1}^n P(Y_t | \mathcal{F}_{t-1}) \\ &= \prod_{t=1}^n F_t(z_t)^{Y_t} (1 - F_t(z_t))^{(1-Y_t)}. \end{aligned}$$

The log-likelihood is given by

$$l = \ln(L) = \sum_{t=1}^n (Y_t \ln(F_t(z_t)) + (1 - Y_t) \ln(1 - F_t(z_t))).$$

The MLE's are the solutions of

$$\frac{\partial l}{\partial w_j} = \sum_{t=1}^n \frac{Y_t - F_t}{F_t(1 - F_t)} f_t v_{t,j} = 0, \quad j = 1, \dots, m$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} v_{t,j} &= \partial z_t / \partial w_j \\ &= \frac{(\sum_{i < t} \dot{s}_{w,j}(X_t, X_i) Y_i) (\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i)) - (\sum_{i < t} \dot{s}_{w,j}(X_t, X_i)) (\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i) Y_i)}{(\sum_{i < t} s_w(X_t, X_i))^2} \end{aligned}$$

and  $\dot{s}_{w,j}(X_t, X_i)$  is given in (8).

## 5.2 Hypothesis Tests

It is not difficult to show that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 l}{\partial w_j \partial w_k} &= \sum_{t=1}^n \left\{ \frac{Y_t - F_t}{F_t(1 - F_t)} f'_t - \left( \frac{Y_t - F_t}{F_t(1 - F_t)} \right)^2 f_t^2 \right\} v_{t,j} v_{t,k} \quad (11) \\ &\quad + \sum_{t=1}^n \frac{Y_t - F_t}{F_t(1 - F_t)} f_t v_{t,j,k}, \end{aligned}$$

$f'_t$  being the derivative of the conditional density with respect to its argument and  $v_{t,j,k} = \partial^2 z_t / \partial w_j \partial w_k$ . Let  $g_{t-1}$  be any function of all information up to

and including  $t - 1$ . Using the law of iterated expectations we get

$$\begin{aligned} E((Y_t - F_t)g_{t-1}) &= E((E(Y_t - F_t) | \mathcal{F}_{t-1})g_{t-1}) \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} E((Y_t - F_t)^2 g_{t-1}) &= E((E(Y_t - F_t)^2 | \mathcal{F}_{t-1})g_{t-1}) \\ &= E(F_t(1 - F_t)g_{t-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the  $(j, k)$ -th element of the information matrix is given by

$$\begin{aligned} I(j, k) &= -E\left(\frac{\partial^2 l}{\partial w_j \partial w_k}\right) \\ &= E\left(\sum_{t=1}^n \frac{f_t^2}{F_t(1 - F_t)} v_{t,j} v_{t,k}\right), \end{aligned}$$

which does not seem to have a simple closed form. For hypothesis tests of the form  $H_0 : w_j = w_j^0$ , we can either use the observed information (11), evaluated at estimates, or apply the likelihood ratio test

$$\text{LRT} = 2\{l(\hat{w}) - l(\tilde{w})\},$$

where  $\hat{w}$ ,  $\tilde{w}$  are the unrestricted and restricted MLE's, respectively. The statistic is distributed  $\chi^2(1)$  under  $H_0$ . Given the form of (11), the LRT seems to be computationally more attractive than the Wald or LM tests, because the LRT does not use the information matrix whereas the others do.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

### 6.1 Unordered Data

In the statistical analysis we assumed that each observation  $Y_t$  is distributed around a weighted average of past  $Y_i$ , or that  $P(Y_t = 1)$  depends on such a

weighted average. Such an ordering is necessary for a causal interpretation of our models. But if we consider a non-causal relationship, one may assume a model in which the distribution of each  $Y_i$  conditional on the other variables  $\{Y_k\}_{k \neq i}$  is, say, normal around the weighted average of  $\{Y_k\}_{k \neq i}$ . Indeed, such a model may be more natural for applications in which the data are not naturally ordered. For this case, one should adapt the statistical model and the estimation of the similarity function accordingly.

## 6.2 Assessments versus Actual Values

The assumptions underlying our estimation process call for elaboration. The axiomatic model aims to describe how an *assessment* of  $Y_p, \bar{Y}_p^s$ , is generated based on *actually observed* values of the variable in question, namely, past values  $(Y_i)_{i \leq n}$ , such as selling prices of houses or of paintings. Applied to each past observation  $Y_i$ , it suggests that the *assessment* of  $Y_i, \bar{Y}_i^s$ , is generated by (2) for *actually observed* past values  $(Y_k)_{k < i}$ . That is, when we explain  $Y_i$  by past observations  $(Y_k)_{k < i}$ , we treat  $Y_i$  as if it were an assessment. When we explain  $Y_l$  for  $l > i$ , we treat  $Y_i$  as if it were an actual value. What justifies this confusion between the actual value of a variable and an assessment thereof?

For many applications of interest the answer lies in the notion of equilibrium. If all economic agents agree in their assessment of the price of a house or a painting, this joint assessment will indeed be its market price. Similarly, the price of a financial asset would equal its own assessment, if all agents agree on the latter. In these cases, one may assume that, as a feature of equilibrium, actually observed data coincide with their assessments.<sup>9</sup>

There may be applications in which one has direct access to, or indirect measurement of both actual values  $(Y_i)$  and to their assessments, say  $(Z_i)$ . In these cases one may find the similarity function  $s$  that best fits the data

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<sup>9</sup>To a lesser degree, the rate of inflation and the probability of a stock market crash are also influenced by what economic agents assess them to be.

according to

$$\bar{Z}_i^s = \frac{\sum_{k < i} s(X_k, X_i) Y_k}{\sum_{k < i} s(X_k, X_i)} \quad (12)$$

namely, a function  $s$  that provides values  $(\bar{Z}_i^s)_i$  that are close to  $(Z_i)_i$ , and then use this function to generate an estimate of  $Z_p$ ,  $\bar{Z}_p^s$ , using actual values  $Y_k$  by equation (12) applied to  $i = p$ .

Yet another class of applications involves only the assessments  $(Z_i)$ . Assume, for instance, that one only observes asking prices,  $(Z_i)$ , and not actual selling prices,  $(Y_i)$ . (This is the case in Gayer, Gilboa, and Lieberman (2004).) If everyone has access only to the asking prices  $(Z_i)$ , one may apply our axiomatization to these variables, and conclude that the asking price of a new observation  $Z_p$  will be a similarity-weighted average of past asking prices  $(Z_i)_{i \leq n}$ . Moreover, it makes sense to assume that the same similarity function governed the generation of past values  $Z_i$  as a function of their past,  $(Z_k)_{k < i}$ . Hence one may estimate the similarity function in equation (2) with  $Z_i$  instead of  $Y_i$ , and use the estimated similarity for the prediction of  $Z_p$ .

Finally, there are situations in which one does not have access to the assessments  $(Z_i)$ , and in which there is no theoretical reason to assume that  $Z_i = Y_i$ . In these cases our empirical approach could still be applied. That is, one may still ask, which function  $s : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  can best fit the data under the assumption that there were generated by equation (2), and the function can then be used for prediction of  $Y_p$  by equation (1). In this type of application,  $(Y_i)$  can be viewed as proxies for  $(Z_i)$ . Observe that it is only in the estimation of  $s$  that we replace  $(Z_i)$  by  $(Y_i)$ . In the generation of the prediction  $\bar{Z}_p^s$  using the estimated  $s$ , we use the actual values  $(Y_i)$  as indeed we should.

### 6.3 Applications

This paper is devoted to the theory of similarity-weighted averaging. This technique is used in Gayer, Gilboa, and Lieberman (2004) for the assessment

of real estate prices, as in example 1. Their paper compared this method, representing case-based reasoning, to linear regression, representing rule-based reasoning. Drachman (2004) applies the method developed here to the problem of inflationary expectations.

## 7 Appendix: Proofs

### Proof of Theorem 1

We begin by proving sufficiency of the axioms (that is, that (i) implies (ii)), and the uniqueness of the function  $s$ . Consider a pair  $\xi, \eta \in \mathbb{R}$ . Restricting  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  to  $\{\xi, \eta\}$ , one notices that they satisfy the conditions of the representation theorem in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, Theorem 3.1, p. 67, or 2003, Theorem 2, p. 16). Indeed, the first three axioms follow directly from A1-A3, whereas the diversity axiom for two alternatives follows from the averaging axiom, A4. To apply this theorem we have also to define the trivial relation for the memory  $I = 0$ :  $\succsim_0 = \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}$ . Hence there exists a function  $v^{\xi\eta} : \Gamma \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , unique up to multiplication by a positive number, such that, for every  $I \in \mathcal{I}$ ,

$$\xi \succsim_I \eta \quad \text{iff} \quad \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y)) v^{\xi\eta}(x,y) \geq 0.$$

Next consider a triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\} \subset \mathbb{R}$ . Restricting  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  to  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  will no longer satisfy the diversity axiom in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001). This axiom would state that for every permutation of the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  there exists  $I \in \mathcal{I}$  such that  $\succsim_I$  agrees with that permutation. This condition does not follow from our A4. Indeed, the diversity axiom is too strict for our purposes. If  $\xi > \eta > \varsigma$ , then no  $\succsim_I$  represented by (\*) will satisfy  $\xi \succ_I \varsigma \succ_I \eta$ .

However, the proof of Gilboa and Schmeidler's theorem does not require the full strength of their diversity axiom. All that is required for three alternatives  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  is that  $v^{\xi\eta}$  not be a multiple of  $v^{\eta\varsigma}$ . To this end, it suffices that there be three different permutations in  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  (restricted to  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$ ). This

latter condition is guaranteed by our A4. Specifically, by the averaging axiom A4, for every distinct  $(\xi, \eta, \varsigma)$ , there exists  $I \in \mathcal{I}$  such that  $\xi \succ_I \eta, \varsigma$ . Hence there are at least three permutations in  $\{\succ_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$  (restricted to  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$ ), and the representation theorem for triples holds. Observe also that this argument does not employ all the relations  $\{\succ_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}}$ , and it can also be used for a restricted domain  $\{\succ_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}_x}$  for any  $x \in \Gamma$ .

It follows that, for every triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$ , one can find  $v^\xi, v^\eta, v^\varsigma : \Gamma \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that, for every  $a, b \in \{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$ , for every  $I \in \mathcal{I}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} a \succsim_I b & \text{ iff } \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))v^a(x,y) \geq \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))v^b(x,y) \\ & \Leftrightarrow \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))[v^a(x,y) - v^b(x,y)] \geq 0. \quad (\text{B1}) \end{aligned}$$

In this case, the matrix  $(v^\xi, v^\eta, v^\varsigma)$  is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant and addition of a constant to each row. Fix one such matrix  $(v^\xi, v^\eta, v^\varsigma)$ .

Fix  $x \in \Gamma$  and consider  $\mathcal{I}_x$ . Restrict attention to  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}_x}$ . Since (B1) applies to all  $I \in \mathcal{I}$ , it definitely holds for all  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x \subset \mathcal{I}$ . However, we claim that, even on this restricted domain, the matrix  $(v^\xi, v^\eta, v^\varsigma)$  is unique as above. To see this, recall that our derivation of (B1), coupled with the uniqueness result, holds true for  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}_x}$  for any  $x \in \Gamma$ .

Observe that the relations  $\{\succsim_I\}_{I \in \mathcal{I}_x}$  are completely specified by A4. Specifically, for every  $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ , for every  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ ,

$$a \succsim_I b \quad \text{iff} \quad |a - y_I| \leq |b - y_I| \quad (\text{B2})$$

where

$$y_I = \frac{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))y}{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))}.$$

That is,  $a \succsim_I b$  iff  $a$  is closer to the average  $y_I$  than is  $b$ . Consider

$$f_I(\alpha) = \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))(\alpha - y)^2.$$

The function  $f_I(\alpha)$  is quadratic (in  $\alpha$ ), and it has a minimum at  $\alpha = y_I$ . It follows that for every  $a, b$ , for every  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ ,

$$f_I(a) \leq f_I(b) \quad \text{iff} \quad |a - y_I| \leq |b - y_I|.$$

Combining this fact with the definition of  $f_I$  and with (B2), we conclude that, for every  $a, b \in \{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  and for every  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} a \succsim_I b \quad \text{iff} \quad & \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))(a-y)^2 \leq \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))(b-y)^2 \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad & \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))[(a-y)^2 - (b-y)^2] \leq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B3})$$

The uniqueness of the representation in (B1) and (B3) imply that there exists a constant  $s(x) > 0$  such that

$$v^a(x, y) - v^b(x, y) = -s(x)[(a-y)^2 - (b-y)^2] \quad (\text{B4})$$

for every  $a, b \in \{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  and for every  $y \in \mathbb{R}$ . Obviously, once  $v^a(x, y), v^b(x, y)$  are fixed,  $s(x)$  is uniquely determined by (B4).

We now turn to discuss various  $x$ 's, while still focusing on the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$ . Consider  $I$  in  $\mathcal{I}$  (but not necessarily in  $\mathcal{I}_x$  for any  $x$ ). Combine (B1) and (B4) to conclude that, for  $a, b \in \{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  and for all  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} a \succsim_I b \quad \text{iff} \quad & \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))s(x)(a-y)^2 \leq \\ & \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))s(x)(b-y)^2 \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad & \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))s(x)[(a-y)^2 - (b-y)^2] \leq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B5})$$

Define

$$g_I(\alpha) = \sum_{(x,y) \in C} I((x,y))s(x)(\alpha - y)^2.$$

As the function  $f_I$  above, the function  $g_I(\alpha)$  is also quadratic (in  $\alpha$ ), and it has a minimum at

$$\alpha = y_{s,I} = \frac{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} s(x)I((x,y))y}{\sum_{(x,y) \in C} s(x)I((x,y))}.$$

It follows that for every  $a, b$ , for every  $I \in \mathcal{I}_x$ ,

$$g_I(a) \leq g_I(b) \quad \text{iff} \quad |a - y_{s,I}| \leq |b - y_{s,I}|. \quad (\text{B6})$$

Combining (B5) with (B6) we obtain

$$a \succsim_I b \quad \text{iff} \quad |a - y_{s,I}| \leq |b - y_{s,I}|,$$

that is,  $\{s(x)\}_x$  satisfies  $(*)$  for the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$ .

Observe that  $\{s(x)\}_x$  are unique up to multiplication by a positive number. In fact, we argue that if  $s$  and  $s'$  both satisfy  $(*)$  for particular  $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $a \neq b$ , then there exists  $\lambda > 0$  such that  $s'(x) = \lambda s(x)$  for all  $x \in \Gamma$ . Indeed, assume that  $s$  and  $s'$  both satisfy  $(*)$  for particular  $a, b$ . This would imply that they both satisfy (B5) for these  $a, b$ , and then the uniqueness of  $v^a(x, y) - v^b(x, y)$  in (B1), combined with (B4), implies that there exists  $\lambda > 0$  such that  $s'(x) = \lambda s(x)$  for all  $x \in \Gamma$ .

It remains to show that the function  $s(x)$  does not depend on the choice of the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\} \subset \mathbb{R}$ . Consider the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \tau\}$  where  $\tau \neq \varsigma$ . Since (B6) applied to  $\xi$  and  $\eta$  holds both for the function  $s$  of the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  and that of the triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \tau\}$ , these two functions have to be positive multiples of each other. Using this argument inductively implies that all functions  $s$  derived from different triples differ only by a constant. Since  $s$  can always be multiplied by a positive constant and still satisfy  $(*)$ , one may choose an  $s$  of one triple  $\{\xi, \eta, \varsigma\}$  arbitrarily and use it for all other triples as well.

We need to prove the necessity of the axioms, that is, that (ii) implies (i). The necessity of A1, A2, and A3 is proved as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, 2003), whereas the necessity of A4 follows directly from  $(*)$ .  $\square$

### **Proof of Corollary 2**

This result is a re-writing of Theorem 1 for the special case in which  $C$  is the product of two sets.  $\square$

**Proof of Corollary 3**

Use Corollary 2 and define  $s(x) = \frac{1}{p} \sum_{i \in P} s_i(x)$ . For  $I \in \mathcal{I}_{sh}$ ,

$$\frac{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s_i(x) I((i,x,y)) y}{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s_i(x) I((i,x,y))} = \frac{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s(x) I((i,x,y)) y}{\sum_{(i,x,y) \in C} s(x) I((i,x,y))} = y_{s,I}$$

which concludes the proof.  $\square$

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