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TOWARDS KEYNESIAN MICRO-DYNAMICS OF PRICE, WAGE, SALES AND EMPLOYMENT

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TOWARDS KEYNESIAN MICRO-DYNAMICS OF
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by

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1. Introduction and Summary

The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple short-run model of an individual firm which operates in a non-Walrasian disequilibrium economy in order to provide microeconomic foundations of Keynesian dynamic theory of unemployment and inflation.¹

In the next section we shall develop our basic view of the non-Walrasian disequilibrium economy. It will turn out that our picture of the economy drawn as a basis for Keynesian disequilibrium analysis is akin to that of the theory of monopolistic or imperfect competition. It is indeed surprising to notice that both so-called Keynesian revolution and so-called monopolistic competition revolution in 1930's did not go as far

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as their originators had expected and the ancien régime of neoclassical competitive equilibrium theory has succeeded in counter-revolution.\textsuperscript{2}

However, it is all the more surprising to find out that these two theories have seldom been tried to be synthesized.\textsuperscript{3} One of the intentions of the present paper is to show that some elements of the theory of monopolistic competition are indispensable microeconomic basis for the Keynesian disequilibrium analysis.

In Section 3 we shall set up the basic framework of the model of an individual firm producing a single product by employing a single variable factor, labor. Essentially, the model is composed of an entrepreneur's subjective product demand and labor supply schedules he faces in the markets and a production function which summarizes the firm's production activity. In Section 4, we shall explore the structure of optimal sales and employment policies for our entrepreneur under the assumption that he is a myopic decision-maker.\textsuperscript{4} It will be shown that his decisions on sales and employment are constrained either by the realized supply in the labor market,


\textsuperscript{4}The assumption of myopic decision-making will be relaxed in Appendix 2.
by the realized demand in the product market, or by the firm's economic productive capacity. When either the realized product demand or the economic productive capacity is insufficient, we shall observe that some workers are involuntarily unemployed in the sense that they are refused to be hired even if they are ready to accept the current money wage. In the next Section 5, we shall try to relate our micro theory of involuntary unemployment to that of Keynes. The involuntary unemployment, we shall claim, is the price that workers are forced to pay for the entrepreneur's mistakes due to his imperfect information about his market environment.

In Section 6 we shall determine optimal product price and money wage. The optimal conditions require our myopic entrepreneur to adopt the monopolistic-cum-monopsonistic pricing rule and to plan to clear both the product market and the labor market while anticipating the economic productive capacity to be underutilized. Of course, no plans can be free from errors in a non-Walrasian economy, and, ex post, the firm's activity will be constrained either by the labor supply, by the product demand or by its economic capacity.

The optimal price and money wage policies are governed by the entrepreneur's short-term expectations about the product demand and labor supply schedules he is facing, with reference to his long-term expectations embodied in the existing capital equipment. But these short-term expectations are somehow formed by his experiences in the past markets. As time goes on, he acquires new observations and revises his short-term expectations according to them. But changes in expectations, in turn, urge him to adjust both product price and money wage if changing them
incurs no costs. Therefore, the theory of price and wage adjustments by a single firm is nothing but a dynamic system of simultaneous equations composed of the optimal product price and money wage equations which state how price and wage are dependent upon the entrepreneur's short-term expectations and of his expectation-formation equations which specify how he revises his short-term expectations responding to new observations he obtains in the current market.

In Section 7 a plausible specification of our basic model will enable us to derive simple price and wage adjustment equations. They state that proportional increases in both price and money wage are linear functions of a realized rate of excess demand in the product market, a realized rate of excess supply in the labor market, a deviation of capacity utilization from the normal rate, a rate of change in expected aggregate price, a rate of change in expected aggregate wage and a growth rate of real capital stock. It is clear that all these explanatory variables but the last one can be regarded as measures of the entrepreneur's errors in his short-term expectations variously revealed in the current markets. These adjustment equations are a generalization and a choice-theoretic derivation of the well-known law of supply and demand. However, while the conventional law is an impersonal one pretending to be a pseudo-behavioral equation of a fictional market participant--Walrasian auctioneer or Invisible Hand, our more complicated law is deduced as true behavioral equations of a Visible Hand--the firm--which is actively participating in market transactions in the non-Walrasian economy. However, in contrast with the Walrasian tâtonnement model of price change, our adjustment
equations imply that changes in price and wage will be followed by changes in employment and sales, which may, in turn, generate involuntary unemployment and/or involuntary unfilled-orders whose burdens are borne by workers and customers. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret our new law of supply and demand as a microeconomic characterization of the so-called (short-run) Phillips curve relations.  

Before embarking on detail analysis of our model, we must emphasize here that our theory is a partial disequilibrium theory in the sense that it concerns only with an individual firm's short-run behaviors in disequilibrium markets. However, each firm constitutes only a minute part of the whole economy which is composed of many firms, many households, and many other economic institutions. The dynamic workings of the economy as a whole should be analyzed by taking full account of dynamic interactions among its basic economic agents. The present paper is no more than a preliminary step towards the general dynamic theory of the whole economy out of equilibrium, whose foundation was laid out by Keynes more than thirty-five years ago.

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2. **On the Non-Walrasian Economy**

We start our analysis by banishing the Walras' Demon-market auctioneer from our picture of the economy. Once we have abandoned the well-told fable of Walras that there exists an auctioneer in a market, who quotes a market price, signals it to all the market participants free of charge, calculates the market demand and supply, and adjusts the price according to excess demand or supply until the market is finally cleared, we can no longer rely comfortably on the basic assumptions of the conventional neoclassical equilibrium theory. If the price is ever to be changed, somebody in the economy who is actively participating in market transactions must take over the process of price determination. The so-called impersonal law of supply and demand must be somehow personalized.

We picture the economy consisting of many firms and households; firms are selling products and buying factors; households are selling factors, especially their labor-services, to firms and buying back desired commodities from them. However, since no one in the economy supplies complete information about possible trading opportunities open to market

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participants, each buyer must search for sellers and each seller, in turn, must search for buyers. Relevant information must be acquired by each market participant's own search requiring his own economic resources. Costs required to obtain perfect information concerning all the possible trading opportunities—location of customers or suppliers, their quoting prices, characteristics of commodities, rivals' reactions, etc.—are, of course, prohibitive. Hence, each transactor has no coince but to be content with imperfect information in deciding whether to trade with such-and-such a person or firm at such-and-such a price. The price may vary from one seller to another, from one buyer to another and from one trade to another.\footnote{G. Stigler, "The Economics of Information," \textit{Journal of Political Economy} (June 1961). It is often misunderstood that the dispersion of prices is a necessary condition for the existence of monopolistic or monopsonistic powers among market participants in the market for a homogeneous commodity. But it is almost tautological to point out that so long as search is costly there is no way for an individual trader to ascertain whether prices are, in fact, uniform or dispersed. Moreover, if the price dispersion is perceived to be smaller, then it becomes less worthwhile to keep searching and traders may choose to be less informed of the actual price distribution than before, which may, in turn, enhance the monopolistic power of price-setters. Of course, in order to settle this issue, we need a model of the market as a whole. See Rothschild, \textit{op.cit.}} In this economy all the market participants share, more or less, some responsibility of the determination of exchange prices which is monopolized by a fictional market auctioneer in the Walrasian equilibrium theory.

In such a monopolistic-monopsonistic economy, exchange prices may be settled by bilateral negotiations between a seller and a buyer, both exerting their monopolistic and monopsonistic influences directly on the process of price determination. However, the price negotiation itself is a costly economic activity. It requires both the seller and the buyer to have detailed information about the other; it is frustrating and time-
consuming and its outcomes are uncertain. If a seller must deal with
large number of prospective customers, or if a buyer must buy from many
sellers, the costs incurred in each price negotiation may be absurdly
high relative to the profit to be gained from a resulting transaction.
Then the trader may find it less costly to abandon the opportunities of
price negotiations and adopt the policy of uniform, take-it-or-leave-it
pricing. By this we mean that the seller or the buyer announces a single
price for his selling product or desired commodity and asks his prospective
buyers or sellers to trade at this price if they find it advantageous to
do so or else leave it. This trader can save the costs of troublesome
price negotiations at the expense of extra profits that could be gained
if discriminatory pricing were made possible by negotiations. It should
be emphasized that the uniform price thus unilaterally announced is not
only the mere figure of an exchange ratio between the commodity in question
and the means of payment (money) but also functioning as a conveyor of
partial information concerning prospective trading opportunities obtainable
from this trader. Clearly, the larger the number of his dealings, the
more effective can the uniform price function as an information signal.
It is like a public good. Moreover, for the price to work as an effective
signal it must be announced by the firm prior to actual transactions and
fixed for a while to enhance its reliability.

If one side of the market adopts the uniform, take-it-or-leave-it
pricing policy, traders in the other side of the market have little choice
but to take the unilaterally imposed price as a given parameter. Thus,
even though the traders in the clustered side of the market are potential
monopolists or monopsonists, they are forced to behave as if they were price-takers; they can influence the determination of prices only indirectly through their search for the most advantageous trading partners but not directly.

In any case, as K. Arrow forcefully points out, the immediate location of price or wage settings depends essentially on the structure of the market in question, even in the case of the well-organized market for a homogeneous commodity. However, in the capitalist economy, the firm is by definition a large economic agent relative to a household, which hires not a small number of workers and usually sells its products to not a small number of customers. It often differentiates its products from the rivals' by slightly changing physical characteristics, by offering special services to the customers, by exploiting the privileges allowed by patents and trademarks, by relying on its reputations, or through differences in geographical location. Therefore, it is usually the firm as a seller of its own products that monopolizes the control on the price and asks its prospective customers to take this price or else leave it.

The situation in labor markets can be easily understood if we reinterpret workers as buyers of the money-wage and the firm as its seller; the means of payments for their trades are, of course, various kinds of labor-services.

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9 See K. J. Arrow, op.cit.

10 In fact, it is almost impossible to discuss the problem of search costs without imagining the market of some differentiated products. If the commodity is homogeneous and all the shops are located at one spot, then why is search necessary? This is exactly the structure of markets in which the Walrasian paradigm works.
The firm can differentiate its money wage by geographical location, by special privileges to its facilities, by types of works, etc., even though it is selling the most homogeneous commodity--money--to workers. Therefore, in the markets for unorganized labors it is again the firm that adopts the policy of uniform, take-it-or-leave-it pricing, so long as it employs workers and is not employed by them.

The economy which we shall examine in the present paper is the one in which every firm is a monopolist for its own products and a monopsonist for its workers and adopts the uniform, take-it-or-leave-it pricing policy in both the markets. This picture of the economy is akin to that of the theory of monopolistic competition initiated by J. Robinson and E. H. Chamberlain among others.\textsuperscript{11} This is certainly a bad description for some producers' goods markets and for many organized labor markets, in which prices and/or wages are settled by bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Such oligopolistic price and wage determinations require a careful game-theoretic analysis, which is beyond the scope of the present paper.

3. The Basic Framework of the Model of a Firm

Let us consider a firm which produces a single product by employing a single variable factor, labor-service, in the non-Walrasian economy.\textsuperscript{12} At the beginning of period, say $t$, the firm announces its product price


\textsuperscript{12}We can easily extend our model to the case where the firm produces multiple products by employing many variable factors.
$p_t$ and its money wage $w_t$ and starts selling its product and recruiting workers. Then, customers attracted by this product price send orders to its sales department and workers who want to work at the announced money wage apply for their jobs to its recruiting department.

The firm is both a monopolist for its product and a monopsonist for its workers. The product demand schedule and the labor supply schedule which its entrepreneur faces in the current markets are usually downward-sloping with respect to the current product price and upward-sloping with respect to the current money wage, respectively. However, an individual firm can be neither a perfect monopolist nor a perfect monopsonist. Customers' decisions whether to send orders to its sales department and prospective workers' decisions whether to apply for their jobs to its recruiting department are influenced not only by its product price and money wage but also by numerous other factors that are beyond the direct control of an individual firm. The latters may include such variables as the spectrum of rivals' current prices and money wages, sizes and distributions of the aggregate income and the aggregate labor supply, the extent of unemployment pool, weather, etc... Some of them are, in principle, observable in the markets by the end of period $t$; but when the entrepreneur announces $p_t$ and $w_t$ they are unknown parameters to be regarded as random variables. The product demand and labor supply schedules may also depend on such time-series data as prices and money wages, labor turn-over rates, queues of unfilled orders, etc. of this firm as well as its rivals up to period $t-1$. 
However, that the demand for the firm's product and the labor supply to the firm are influenced by the variables listed above should not be confused with the statement that the entrepreneur actually takes account of all these variables in making his decisions. On the contrary, in our non-Walrasian economy, he cannot know how all these variables interdependently affecting product demand and labor supply. In other words, his subjective demand and supply schedules may differ from the true or objective demand and supply schedules. And, of course, it is the subjective schedules that are only relevant to the entrepreneur's short-run decisions in disequilibrium markets. We must pay attention to the objective schedules only when we shall examine the workings of the whole economy consisting of many interdependent monopolistic and monopsonistic firms.

Let us assume that the entrepreneur's subjective product demand function and the subjective labor supply function can be respectively expressed as follows:

\[(1) \quad x_t = X(p_t, a_t),\]

\[(2) \quad L_t = L(w_t, b_t),\]

where \(a_t\) is a vector of random variables which the entrepreneur believes affecting the product demand in period \(t\), \(b_t\) is a vector of random variables which he believes affecting the labor supply in period \(t\), \(x_t\) is the amount of orders he expects to receive in period \(t\), and \(L_t\) is the number of workers expected to apply for the jobs in period \(t\).
Both $x_t$ and $l_t$ are regarded as random variables at the beginning of period $t$.

We suppose that both (1) and (2) satisfy the following conditions.

(3a) $X(p,a) > 0$ and $\frac{\partial X(p,a)}{\partial p} = x_p < 0$ for $0 \leq p < p^*$, $X(p,a) = 0$
    for $p \geq p^*$, where $0 < p^* < +\infty$,

(3b) $L(w,b) = 0$ for $0 \leq w \leq w^*$, $L(w,b) > 0$ and $\frac{\partial L(w,b)}{\partial w} = l_w > 0$
    for $w > w^*$, where $0 \leq w^* < +\infty$,

(4a) $\frac{\partial^2 X(p,a)}{\partial p^2} = 2x_p = px_{pp} > 0$ for $0 \leq p < p^*$,

(4b) $\frac{\partial^2 L(w,b)}{\partial w^2} = 2l_w + wL_{ww} > 0$ for $w > w^*$,

(5a) $\lim_{p \to p^*} pX(p,a) \geq 0$, $\lim_{p \to 0} pX(p,a) < +\infty$,

(5b) $\lim_{w \to w^*} wL(w,b) = 0$, $\lim_{w \to +\infty} wL(w,b) = +\infty$.

The conditions (3a) and (3b) imply, among other things, that the entrepreneur believes that his firm is monopolistic in the current product market and monopsonistic in the current labor market. The conditions (4a) and (4b) are standard assumptions in the theories of monopoly and monopsony; namely, they are respectively equivalent to assuming that the marginal revenue curve is downward-sloping and that the marginal
factor-cost curve is upward-sloping in Marshallian quantity-price diagrams. The remaining conditions in (5) are imposed so as to take care of the behaviors of (1) and (2) at the end points.

By the end of period $t$, the entrepreneur observes the actual amount of orders, $\bar{x}_t$, he received during period $t$ and the actual number of workers, $\bar{\ell}_t$, willing to work at the announced money wage $w_t$. Now he can hire $\bar{\ell}_t$ workers if he wishes and he can accept $\bar{x}_t$ orders if he has sufficient outputs at hand. However, this does not necessarily mean that the entrepreneur actuarially hires all the willing workers and accepts all the received orders. Indeed, they only impose the following market constraints on his ex post policies on sales and employment.

\begin{align*}
\text{(6)} \quad s_t & \leq \bar{x}_t, \\
\text{(7)} \quad n_t & \leq \bar{\ell}_t,
\end{align*}

where $s_t$ is the sales or the actual amount of orders he has accepted during period $t$ and $n_t$ is the actual number of workers he has hired during period $t$.

It goes without saying that the entrepreneur cannot pursue both the sales policy and the employment policy independently. They are interconnected through the firm's production activity. Let us assume that its production activity can be summarized by a production function:

\begin{align*}
\text{(8)} \quad q_t = F(n_t, k_t),
\end{align*}
where $k_t$ is an index of real capital endowed at the beginning of period $t$ in the forms of machines, buildings, technical-knowhows, managerial skills, intermediate products, etc., and $q_t$ is the level of outputs producible from $n_t$ workers with the help of the existing real capital $k_t$. We shall assume that labor-service is an indispensable productive factor and its marginal product is positive.

\[(9) \quad F(0,k) = 0 \text{ for } k \geq 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 F(n,k)}{\partial n^2} = F_n > 0.\]

We shall also suppose that the production function (8) is twice-differentiable, strictly concave and satisfying the boundary conditions specified below.

\[(10) \quad \frac{\partial^2 F(n,k)}{\partial n^2} = F_{nn} < 0, \quad \lim_{n \to 0} F_n(n,k) = +\infty, \quad \lim_{n \to 0} F_n(n,k) = 0.\]

But these strong conditions are imposed solely for an expository simplicity. Most of our subsequent arguments will remain intact even if we drop the conditions (10) and allow weakly concave or linear or even mildly increasing returns production functions. The so-called U shaped marginal cost case which presupposes an increasing S shaped production function can be also dealt with within our framework. Let $I_t$ be the level of inventory inherited from the previous period and $\Phi_t$ is the level of inventory the entrepreneur plans to carry over to the next period. Then, by the end of period $t$ he can supply $q_t + I_t - \Phi_t$ in the product market. In other words, he is entitled to accept the above amount of orders without embarrassing his clients. Thus, we have
\[ s_t \leq F(n_t, k_t) + I_t - \delta_t. \]

The argument given above implicitly presupposed that the production period is negligible. However, if we reinterpret \( s_t \) as the number of products which the entrepreneur has promised to his customers to be able to deliver in near future, we may dispense with this rather restrictive assumption in establishing (11). According to this interpretation, actual delivery of products will be made in some future period after the production has been completed, while the sales contracts between our entrepreneur and his customers are signed in the present period.\(^\text{13}\) Of course, this implicitly assumes the absence of technological uncertainties in the production activity.

4. The Optimal Sales and Employment Policies

Let us now turn to the examination of the entrepreneur's optimal policies on product price, money wage, sales and employment. It is clear that he cannot make all of these decisions simultaneously. In fact, both product price and money wage must be determined and announced at the beginning of period \( t \), while the full determination of both employment and sales must wait until the close of the period when he obtains full knowledge of the actual product demand and labor supply that have been induced by his price and wage and revealed in the product and labor

\(^{13}\)Of course, this is not the only possible modeling of the relation between production and sales. In our previous paper cited in footnote 1, we considered another model in which the entrepreneur can sell products only after their production has been completed and they are actually in his hands. It seems that both versions are practiced in the real economy.
markets. Therefore, the information structure on which his sales and employment decisions are based are different from and newer than the one on which the price and wage decisions are based. In order to take account of this evolutionary information structure, we shall reverse chronological order of the entrepreneur's decisions and examine his sales and employment policies first.

Let us assume for a while that the entrepreneur is a myopic maximizer who ignores all the dynamic interactions between his decisions in this period and his economic activities in the future periods. This assumption has at least three implications. Firstly, price and money wage in period $t$ are decided without taking into consideration of their effects on future product demand and labor supply. In other words, he neglects both the learning processes of his prospective customers and workers who are searching in the markets based upon their past experiences and also ignores oligopolistic interdependence with his rivals. Secondly, since his world ends at the close of the present period, he has no intention to carry over inventories beyond the current period; namely, we have $\dot{I}_t = 0$ in (11). In the following, however, we shall allow the possibility that the firm has somehow inherited some inventory $I_t \geq 0$ from the past periods. Thirdly, we treat the index of real capital $k_t$ as an exogenously determined parameter. In Appendix 2 we shall relax this myopic assumption and briefly discuss the firm's optimal inventory adjustment, although we shall stick to the assumption of the exogeneity of real capital throughout the present paper.
The single-period profit is written as

\[ r_t = p_t s_t - w_t n_t. \]

(12)

It involves no random element at the end of period \( t \). Therefore, in the determination of \( s_t \) and \( n_t \), we do not have to worry about the entrepreneur's attitude towards risk. Thus, the problem imposed on him at the end of period \( t \) is to find \( s_t \) and \( n_t \) that maximizes the single-period profit, (12), subject to the two market constraints (6) and (7) and to the single production constraint (11).

Define the Lagrangean function as:

\[ p_t s_t - w_t n_t - \lambda(s_t - x_t) - \mu(n_t - \bar{l}_t) - \nu(s_t - F(n_t, k_t) + I_t), \]

(13)

where \( \lambda \geq 0, \mu \geq 0 \) and \( \nu \geq 0 \) are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with three inequalities, (6), (7) and (11). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions to this constrained maximization problem are given by

\[ p_t - \lambda - \nu \leq 0, \quad s_t \geq 0, \quad (p_t - \lambda - \nu)s_t = 0, \]

\[ \forall F\left(n_t, k_t\right) - (w_t + \mu) \leq 0, \quad n_t \geq 0, \quad \left\{\forall F\left(n_t, k_t\right) - (w_t + \mu)\right\}n_t = 0, \]

\[ s_t \leq \bar{x}_t, \quad \lambda \geq 0, \quad (s_t - \bar{x}_t)\lambda = 0, \]

\[ n_t \leq \bar{l}_t, \quad \mu \geq 0, \quad (n_t - \bar{l}_t)\mu = 0, \]

\[ s_t \leq F(n_t, k_t) + I_t, \quad \nu \geq 0, \quad \left\{s_t - F(n_t, k_t) - I_t\right\}\nu = 0. \]

Because of the strict-concavity of the production function, these conditions
uniquely determine the optimal sales level $s^*_t$ and the optimal employment level $n^*_t$.

A close inspection of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions will lead us to realize that $s^*_t$ and $n^*_t$ can be characterized by the following switching rules. $^{14}$

\begin{align}
  n^*_t &= \min[\tilde{L}_t, G(x_t - I_t, k_t), N^*_t], \\
  s^*_t &= F(n^*_t, k_t) + I_t = \min[F(\tilde{L}_t, k_t) + I_t, x_t, Q^*_t + I_t].
\end{align}

In the above formulae, $G(x,k)$ is defined as the inverse function of $F(n,k)$ with respect to $n$, i.e., $F(G(x,k), k) = x$, with the understanding that $G(x,k) = 0$ when $x \leq 0$, and $N^*_t$ and $Q^*_t$ are defined as the level of employment and the level of output at which the so-called competitive marginal productivity principle holds; i.e., they are defined respectively as follows,

\begin{align}
  p_t F_n(N^*_t, k_t) &= w_t, \\
  Q^*_t &= F(N^*_t, k_t).
\end{align}

By (10) both $N^*_t$ and $Q^*_t$ are uniquely determined so long as neither $p_t$ nor $w_t$ is zero. It is also easy to see from (16) and (17) that they are continuous functions of a predetermined price-wage ratio $p_t/w_t$ and a given index of real capital $k_t$; $^{15}$ i.e.,

\[ N^*_t = N^*(p_t/w_t, k_t), \]
\[ Q^*_t = Q^*(p_t/w_t, k_t), \]

where both \( N^*_t \) and \( Q^*_t \) are increasing in \( p_t/w_t \), \( Q^*_t \) is increasing in \( k_t \), and \( N^*_t \) is increasing in \( k_t \) if \( \frac{\partial^2 F(n,k)}{\partial n \partial k} = F_{nk} < 0 \) and decreasing in \( k_t \) if \( F_{nk} > 0 \).

We shall call \( Q^*_t \) and \( N^*_t \) the economic productive capacity and the capacity employment, respectively. At the capacity employment level our entrepreneur is, in fact, maximizing the single-period profit (12) if he were not to be bound by a market constraint, (6) or (7). It will not pay for him to hire more than \( N^*_t \) workers and expand the production beyond \( Q^*_t \), even if he can, for it would only reduce his profit. The economic capacity \( Q^*_t \) should not be confused with the so-called physical capacity for the firm's production. Our \( Q^*_t \) depends not only on the real capital stock \( k_t \) endowed in the firm but also on the price-wage ratio \( p_t/w_t \) set by the entrepreneur at the beginning of the period.

We are now in a position of interpreting our optimal employment and sales policies given by (14) and (15). They state that our entrepreneur's sales-cum-employment activity is bound either by the realized supply in the labor market, by the realized demand in the product market, or by the economic productive capacity and the associated capacity employment.

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15 If the production function (8) exhibits constant returns to labor input \( n \), i.e., if \( y = cn \), \( c > 0 \), then \( Q^* = N^* = +\infty \) for \( p \geq cw \) and \( Q^* = N^* = 0 \) for \( p < cw \). If it is subject to increasing returns to scale, they also become unbinding at least for a certain domain of the values of \( p \) and \( w \). In the case of S-shaped production function, they are discontinuous functions of \( p/w \).
When the labor supply $\bar{l}_t$ turns out to be the smallest component in the right-hand-side of equation (14), the labor market condition becomes a constraint on our entrepreneur's activity. In this case of labor shortage, he must hire all the workers willing to work at the announced money wage $w_t$, while he refuses to accept excess orders $\bar{x}_t - F(\bar{l}_t, k_t) - I_t$ received in the product market, thus leaving some customers frustrated, and also fails to utilize the economic capacity fully; i.e., $F(\bar{l}_t, k_t)/Q^*_t < 1$.

When the demand for product $\bar{x}_t$ turns out to be the smallest component in the right-hand-side of equation (15), the product market condition restricts our entrepreneur's activity. In this deficient demand case, he must accept all the orders $\bar{x}_t$ received from his customers, while he must refuse to hire some excessive workers $\bar{l}_t - G(\bar{x}_t - I_t, k_t)$, even though they are eager to accept the announced money wage $w_t$. He must also lower the capacity utilization rate $(\bar{x}_t - I_t)/Q^*_t$ below unity. This case might be regarded as a microeconomic characterization of the Keynesian involuntary unemployment caused by the deficiency of effective demand in the product market. Finally, the entrepreneur may find that the economic capacity $Q^*_t$ and the associated capacity employment $N^*_t$ are binding his activity. Then, he hires only $N^*_t$ workers in the labor market and accepts only $Q^*_t + I_t$ orders in the product market. In other words, we observe that the involuntary unemployment, $\bar{l}_t - N^*_t$, and the unfilled orders, $\bar{x}_t - Q^*_t - I_t$, coexist in this case of insufficient economic capacity.
5. **On Involuntary Unemployment**

In our very simple model of an individual firm, we could grasp two different but closely related sources of involuntary unemployment. The one lies in the deficiency of effective demand in the product market and the other is due to the insufficiency of its economic capacity of production. In either case some workers are involuntarily unemployed in the sense that their offers are rejected by their employer, even if they are willing to accept the money wage announced by him and would work in his firm if they were offered jobs there.

One of the definitions of involuntary unemployment given by Keynes is that the marginal disutility of employment falls short of the marginal product of labor. Keynes maintains that "the mere existence of an insufficiency of effective demand may, and often will, bring the increase of employment to a standstill before a level of full employment has been reached" and that "the insufficiency of effective demand will inhibit the process of production in spite of the fact that the marginal product of labor still exceeds in value the marginal disutility of employment." In other words, "the equality of the real wage to the marginal disutility of employment presupposed by the second postulate [of the classical theory of employment], realistically interpreted, corresponds to the absence of 'involuntary' unemployment." Since Keynes has never denied the first postulate of the classical theory that "the [real] wage is equal to the marginal product of labor," he uses these two concepts, the real wage and the marginal product of labor, interchangeably.

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16 All these quotations are from J. M. Keynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 31, 15 and 5, respectively.
However, by allowing the possibility that the product market condition today directly affects the entrepreneur's employment policy today, our theory of involuntary unemployment denies not only the second postulate as Keynes did but also the first postulate of the classical employment theory which he retained. That is to say, in our model the actual employment $N^*_t$ may not be equal to the firm's capacity employment level $N_t^* = N^*(p_t^*/w_t, k_t)$ at which level of employment the real wage, $w_t^*/p_t$, equals the marginal product of labor, $F_n(N_t^*, k_t)$. When the product demand $Y_t$ is deficient, the real wage may diverge from both the marginal product of labor and the marginal disutility of employment. In other words, both the first and the second postulates of the classical theory are violated. (The marginal disutility of employment in our model can be interpreted as being congealed into the true labor supply schedule which our entrepreneur observes at the end of the period in the labor market.)

This deficient product demand case seems to correspond to the so-called Keynesian involuntary unemployment due to the insufficiency of effective demand. However, our model points out another possible source of involuntary unemployment, which is not directly dependent upon the current state of effective demand. Namely, when the firm's economic capacity $N_t^* = N^*(p_t^*/w_t, k_t)$ is insufficient the entrepreneur must curtail his employment below the full-employment level. The classical first postulate is retained, while the second one is violated in this case. This is attributable either to the wrong price-wage ratio predetermined at the beginning of the period or to the underaccumulation of real capital in this firm. Since "past expectations, which have not yet worked themselves
out, are embodied in the today's capital equipment with reference to which the entrepreneur has to make today's decisions, this is nothing but a manifestation of our entrepreneur's wrong decisions in the past based upon incorrect long-term expectations.

Essentially, these involuntary unemployment phenomena are created by the fact that, in an economy where no Walrasian auctioneer takes charge of price and wage adjustments, each individual firm must commit itself to the determination of product price and money wage before it starts recruiting workers and selling products. Since price and money wage are chief conveyors of information concerning possible transactions opportunities to prospective customers and workers, they must be announced before the customers and workers start searching in the markets and at least temporarily fixed to facilitate their searches. Therefore, the entrepreneur's price and wage decisions have to be guided by his expectations of his trading partners' trading preferences which are summarized in the forms of subjective product demand and labor supply functions. But expectations are expectations; there is no guarantee that they will be fulfilled in the actual markets without the omniscient auctioneer. If the entrepreneur has underestimates the supply of labor relative to the actual product demand and the capacity employment level, some workers must be involuntarily unemployed. The involuntary unemployment is, therefore, the price that workers are forced to pay for the errors made by

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17 Keynes, op.cit., p. 50.
entrepreneur because of the latter's imperfect information about his market environment.\footnote{18}

Needless to say, the fundamental concern of Keynes in his General Theory is why can the effective demand be persistently deficient and how does the involuntary unemployment persist in the labor market. This is essentially a dynamic macroeconomic problem, in which the problem of volatile fixed investments plays the central role. It seems, however, that the precise microeconomic understanding of how the involuntary unemployment is generated by the deficiency of effective demand or by other reasons is a prerequisite for the more ambitious investigation of the phenomenon of persistent unemployment as a dynamic macroeconomic problem.

\footnote{18 Therefore, our theory of microeconomic involuntary unemployment is a rebuttal against the recently current view that unemployment is essentially self-employment in information collection for the better job prospects. See, for example, A. Alchian, "Information Costs, Pricing and Resource Unemployment," pp. 27-52, in Phelps, \textit{op.cit.} Keynes would have included this kind of unemployment in the category of "frictional" unemployment in the sense that it is compatible with the classical second postulate whose validity he adamantly denied. The second postulate that the real wage equals the marginal utility of employment is another way of saying that the actual employment is always on the labor supply schedules derived from workers' ex ante utility maximization. However, our theory suggests that the frictional unemployment due to differential search costs between while employed and while unemployed is not the only kind of unemployment workers experience in the non-Walrasian economy. There exist ample possibilities that workers are refused to be hired by the entrepreneur even though the current money wage is perfectly agreeable to their ex ante utility maximization. We do not deny that some kind of unemployment is consistent with the workers' ex ante utility maximization and that they are important, but unless workers can control both their supply and their own employment it seems wide of the mark to construct the theory of unemployment based solely on their individualistic utility maximization behaviors.}
Note in passing that, as a counterpart of the involuntary unemployment, we also observe in the product market that some orders sent by the customers are sometimes declined by the entrepreneur. These orders are involuntarily unfilled either because the labor market is stringent or because the firm's economic capacity of production is insufficient. We can examine the phenomena of involuntary unfilled-orders in exactly the same way as the phenomena of involuntary unemployment.

6. The Optimal Product Price and Money Wage Policies

So far we have discussed how the entrepreneur makes his decisions on employment, production and sales at the end of period $t$ when he already determined and fixed price and money wage. Our next problem is to examine how he determines these two price variables at the beginning of the period, although this is chronologically a preceding problem.

At the beginning of period $t$, our entrepreneur has no choice but to regard the product demand and the labor supply which will be revealed by the close of the period as random variables depending upon vectors of random parameters, $a_t$ and $b_t$. So, when viewed at the beginning of period $t$, the optimal employment and sales policies, (14) and (15), derived in Section 4, should be reinterpreted as being conditional on the random parameters, $a_t$ and $b_t$, yet to be realized. We can then rewrite them as stochastic functions,

$$n_t^* = \text{Min}[L(w_t, b_t), G(X(p_t, a_t) - I_t, k_t), N^*(p_t/w_t, k_t)] ,$$

$$s_t^* = \text{Min}[F(L(w_t, b_t), k_t) + I_t, X(p_t, a_t), Q^*(p_t/w_t, k_t) + I_t] .$$
Then, uncertain profit in period $t$ calculated at the beginning can be expressed as

$$(22) \quad r_t = p_t \cdot s^*_t - v_t \cdot n^*_t.$$  

If we adopt the expected utility hypothesis, we can determine the optimal product price and money wage by maximizing $E[u(r_t) | \Pi_t(a_t, b_t)]$, where $u(\cdot)$ is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and $E[\cdot | \Pi(a,b)]$ is the expectation operator defined relative to our entrepreneur's subjective joint probability distribution of $a_t$ and $b_t$ formed at the beginning of period $t$ and denoted by $\Pi_t(a,b)$.

However, this requires a very messy calculation. In the present paper, we shall instead assume that our entrepreneur has a poor computational ability and his decisions on product price and money wage are solely based upon his point-expectations of $a_t$ and $b_t$, to be denoted by $\hat{a}_t$ and $\hat{b}_t$ respectively.\(^{19}\) Under this simplifying assumption, the entrepreneur can obtain the optimal product price $p^*_t$ and the optimal money wage $w^*_t$ simply by maximizing his expected profit, $\hat{E}_t$, defined below, independent of the functional form of $u(\cdot)$.

\(^{19}\)This is a drastic simplification. But even if we examine the more general stochastic maximization case we will obtain qualitatively similar results to ours. In fact, our previous paper (Iwai, op.cit.,) handled the case where the entrepreneur maximizes the expected linear utility of the profit relative to his subjective probabilities and compared the optimal price and wage policies under uncertainty with those obtained under the degenerate one adopted here, though the model itself is different.
\[(23) \hat{t}_t = p_t \text{ Min} \{F(L(w_t, \hat{b}_t), k_t) + I_t, X(p_t, \hat{a}_t), Q^*(p_t/w_t, k_t) + I_t \} \]
\[- w_t \text{ Min} \{L(w_t, \hat{b}_t), G(X(p_t, \hat{a}_t) - I_t, k_t), H^*(p_t/w_t, k_t) \} \].

We shall show in Appendix 1 that $p^*_t$ and $w^*_t$ are uniquely determined by the following two conditions, if $I_t < X(0, \hat{a}_t)$. \(^{20}\)

\[(24) \quad X(p^*_t, \hat{a}_t) = F(L(w^*_t, \hat{b}_t), k_t) + I_t ; \]
\[(25) \quad MR(p^*_t, \hat{a}_t)F_n(L(w^*_t, \hat{b}_t), k_t) = ME(w^*_t, \hat{b}_t) , \]

where $MR(p, \hat{a})$ represents the expected marginal (unconstrained) revenue: $p [1 + X(p, \hat{a})/pX_p(p, \hat{a})]$ and $ME(w, \hat{b})$ the expected marginal (unconstrained) expenditure: $w [1 + L(w, \hat{b})/wL_w(w, \hat{b})]$.

The first optimal condition states that our entrepreneur must equalize the expected product demand with the expected full-employment product supply. However, since he can manipulate both $p^*_t$ and $w^*_t$ simultaneously, there still remains one degree of freedom. The second optimal condition maintains that he uses up this remaining freedom by adopting the so-called monopolistic-cum-monopsonistic pricing rule, by which we mean that he equalizes the expected marginal revenue product, $MR(p^*_t)F_n(L,k)$, with the expected marginal expenditure on wage, $ME(w, \hat{b})$.

\(^{20}\text{If } I_t < X(0, \hat{a}_t) \text{, } w^*_t \text{ is any wage between } 0 \text{ and } \bar{w} \text{ and } p^*_t \text{ is determined by } X(p^*_t, \hat{a}_t) = I_t \).
Let us define \( \lambda^*_t \) and \( \xi^*_t \) by

\[
\lambda^*_t = L(w^*_t, \hat{b}_t),
\]

\[
\xi^*_t = X(p^*_t, \hat{a}_t).
\]

We can interpret \( \lambda^*_t \) as the expected labor supply and \( \xi^*_t \) as the expected product demand. Then, the second optimal condition \((25)\) can be rewritten as

\[
MR(p^*_t, \hat{a}_t)F_n(\lambda^*_t, k_t) = ME(w^*_t, \hat{b}_t).
\]

Comparing this with the definition of the capacity employment \( N^*_t \) given by \((16)\), and noting that \( MR(p^*_t, \hat{a}_t)/ME(w^*_t, \hat{b}_t) \) is strictly smaller than \( p^*_t/w^*_t \) by \((3)\) and also noting that \( F_n(n, k) \) is decreasing in \( n \) by \((10)\), we can obtain inequalities:

\[
\lambda^*_t = N^*(MR_t/ME_t, k_t) < N^*(p^*_t/w^*_t, k_t) = N^*_t,
\]

\[
\xi^*_t = F(\lambda^*_t, k_t) + I_t < F(N^*_t, k_t) + I_t = \xi^*_t + I_t.
\]

While equation \((24)\) indicates that the entrepreneur expects that both his product and labor markets will be cleared if his expectations \( \hat{a}_t \) and \( \hat{b}_t \) turn out to be correct, the above inequalities assert that he predicts that he will underutilize the firm's economic capacity if his expectations are fulfilled. It should be noted, however, that this remark applies only in an \textit{ex ante} sense. No expectations can be free from errors, and \textit{ex post} anything can happen in the markets. At the end of period \( t \)
his actual activity may turn out to be constrained either by the insufficiency of the economic capacity, by the shortage of the labor supply or by the deficiency of the product demand, as was extensively discussed in Section 4.

7. The Dynamic Theory of Price and Wage Adjustments

In the previous section, we discussed the structure of the optimal product price and money wage policies for our entrepreneur. If we solve the two optimal conditions, (24) and (25), we can express $p^*_t$ and $w^*_t$ as functions of point-expectations of random parameters, $\hat{a}_t$ and $\hat{b}_t$, a given index of real capital, $k_t$, and a given level of initial inventory, $I_t$.

\[
(30) \quad p^*_t = \pi(\hat{a}_t, \hat{b}_t, k_t, I_t), \quad w^*_t = \omega(\hat{a}_t, \hat{b}_t, k_t, I_t).
\]

The functional forms of the above policy functions are dependent upon specific functional forms of the basic structural equations; namely, the subjective product demand function (1), the subjective labor supply function (2) and the (objective) production function (8). Although we can proceed comparative statics of $p^*_t$ and $w^*_t$ by mechanical use of calculus, we rather prefer this to be left for interested readers.

Since $I_t$ and $k_t$ are treated as exogenous parameters in our myopic model, the entrepreneur's decisions on product price and money wage are governed by his short-term expectations concerning the current market environment which are expressed in the forms of point-expectations $\hat{a}_t$ and $\hat{b}_t$. If his expectations are rigid, i.e., if $\hat{a}_t$ and $\hat{b}_t$ are
believed to be fixed, then equations (29) and (30) are all what can be said about his price and wage determinations.

However, our entrepreneur is making his decisions in a non-Walrasian disequilibrium economy in which nobody has perfect information and everybody is searching for the most advantageous trading partners. We have supposed that he gave up differentiating his customers and workers and adopted the uniform, take-it-or-leave-it price and wage policy. This does not mean, however, that he stops searching in the markets. On the contrary, it only means that his searching activity now consists in forming the best point-expectations of the random parameters in his subjective product demand and labor supply functions. In general, he has little choice but to predict them from his own experiences in the past markets. According to the theory of rational expectation, a rational entrepreneur has a certain econometric model, however crude it might be, of the dynamic workings of the economy which he has been participating in. He stores a set of time-series data of observable variables which, he believes, systematically influence the random parameters $a_t$ and $b_t$ within the framework of his own econometric model. He calculates their forecasts $\hat{a}_t$ and $\hat{b}_t$ so as to optimize a certain criterion, for instance, the minimum mean square error of predictions. In the present paper, however, we shall not get involved into detailed discussions on how our entrepreneur

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can rationally obtain the best point-expectations \( \hat{a}_t \) and \( \hat{b}_t \).\(^{22}\) Here, we simply state that they are often expressed as weighted averages of time-series observations of relevant variables that appear in his econometric model.

As time goes on our entrepreneur acquires new observations from his market activities and revises his point-expectations in the light of new information. We shall suppose in this paper that there are no institutional pressures against wage and price changes and that other costs of changing them accrued to the firm are also negligible. Then, revisions of expectations will necessarily lead its entrepreneur to adjust its announced product price and money wage according to the optimal price and wage equations (29) and (30). Thus, dynamics of price and wage determination by a single firm under no adjustment costs is completely characterized by a system of dynamic equations composed of the optimal price and wage equations which relates price and wage to expectations of relevant parameters and of the expectation-formation equations which specify how the entrepreneur revises his expectations in accordance with new observations acquired in the current markets.

In order to illustrate this, let us consider the following simple specification of the model. Assume that the entrepreneur's subjective product demand function (1), his subjective labor supply function (2) and the firm's production function (8) are all of the constant-elasticity

\(^{22}\)Iwai, op. cit., developed a theory of optimal predictions under the hypothesis of rational expectation using some of the results in Nerlove, op. cit.
type, which can be expressed as:

\[ x_t = \left( \frac{p^*_t}{p_t} \right) \eta \, y_t, \quad \eta > 1, \]

\[ \ell_t = \left( \frac{w^*_t}{w_t} \right)^\varepsilon \, z_t, \quad 0 < \varepsilon < 1, \]

\[ q_t = n^\gamma \delta \, t, \quad 0 < \gamma < (1+\varepsilon) \eta / \varepsilon(\eta-1), \quad \delta > 0. \]

\( p_t \) and \( w_t \) are aggregate product price and money wage (or some indices of price and wage distributions) of the economy (or the industry) as a whole, and \( y_t \) summarizes all the real forces in the economy, such as aggregate real income, which influence the demand for this firm's products, and \( z_t \) is an amalgam of all the real variables that affect workers' total labor supply. Equations (31) and (32) state that our entrepreneur believes that customers and workers are free from money illusions and, other things being equal, concerned only with relative price, \( p^*_t/p_t \), and relative wage, \( w^*_t/w_t \). Demand and supply elasticities, \( \eta \) and \( \varepsilon \), are assumed to be known and invariant over time.\(^{23}\) We shall assume that \( p_t \) and \( w_t \)

\(^{23}\) When a consumer's preferences are representable by an addilog indirect utility function: \( \psi(p,M) = \sum_i \alpha_i (M/p_i) ^{\beta_i} \), where \( p_i \) is the price of \( i^{\text{th}} \) commodity, \( M \) his fixed money income, and \( \alpha_i \) and \( \beta_i \) positive constant, his demand function can be expressed as:

\[ x_i = \alpha_i \beta_i M / \sum_j \alpha_j \beta_j M / p_j. \]


\[ P = \left( \sum_j (\alpha_j \beta_j / \sum_k \alpha_k \beta_k)M/p_j \right)^{-\beta_i}, \quad \text{and} \quad y = (\alpha_i \beta_i / \sum_k \alpha_k \beta_k)M/P, \text{ then} \]
are unknown random variables at the beginning of period \( t \) but are observable in the markets by the end of period \( t \); whereas \( y_t \) and \( z_t \) will be assumed to be unobservable both \textit{ex ante} and \textit{ex post}. As for the Cobb-Douglas production function (33), note that it allows not only decreasing returns but also increasing returns to labor input, at least to some degree. Its factor elasticities, \( \gamma \) and \( \delta \), are again assumed to be invariant over time and known.

It can be easily shown that the optimal price and wage equations given by (30) can be now expressed by the following log-linear forms, if

\[
I_t = 0:
\]

\[
\text{the above demand function becomes equivalent to the one given by (31), although the aggregate price } P \text{ requires a fairly complicated aggregation procedure. In the special case of CES indirect utility function where } \beta_i = \eta^{-1} \text{ for all } i, \text{ the aggregate price can be simply written as}
\]

\[
P = \left( \sum_j (\alpha_j / \sum_k \alpha_k) P_j^{-(\eta-1)} \right)^{-1/(\eta-1)}
\]

\[
\text{independently of money income } M. \text{ A similar justification for the form of the labor supply function (32) may be possible. It should be noted that we can incorporate workers' leisure-labor choices, etc. into (32) by making the variables } z_t \text{ as a function of aggregate real wage } W_t / P_t.
\]

\[
24 \text{ If the entrepreneur can observe some of the real variables affecting } y_t \text{ and } z_t \text{ by the end of period } t, \text{ then they should be further decomposed into observable and unobservable parts. For the sake of simplicity the present paper will not seek this generalization.}
\]
(34) \[ \log p_t^* = -c_0 + c_1 \log \hat{P}_t + (c_1 / \eta) \log \hat{\gamma}_t + (1 - c_1) \log \hat{W}_t \]

\[ - (1 - c_1) \log z_t - c_2 \log k_t , \]

(35) \[ \log w_t^* = d_0 + d_1 \log \hat{P}_t + (d_1 / \eta) \log \hat{\gamma}_t + (1 - d_1) \log \hat{W}_t \]

\[ - (1 - d_1) \log z_t + d_2 \log k_t , \]

where \( \hat{P}_t, \hat{W}_t, \hat{\gamma}_t \) and \( \hat{z}_t \) are point-expectations of \( P_t, W_t, \gamma_t \) and \( z_t \), respectively; constant coefficients \( c_i \) and \( d_i \) are all positive and defined by \( c_0 = \sigma \gamma \log (\eta/(1+\epsilon)) \gamma (1-\gamma) \), \( d_0 = \sigma \gamma \log (\eta/(1+\epsilon)) \gamma (1-\gamma) \), \( c_1 = \sigma \gamma + \epsilon \gamma (1-\gamma) \) \( < 1 \), \( d_1 = \sigma \gamma < 1 \), \( c_2 = \sigma \delta (1+\epsilon) \) and \( d_2 = \sigma \delta (1-\gamma) \), where \( 1/\sigma = \gamma + \epsilon \gamma + \eta \epsilon (1-\gamma) > 0 \).

Let us transform these price and wage equations into time-difference forms:

(36) \[ \Delta \log p_t^* = c_1 \Delta \log \hat{P}_t + (1 - c_1) \Delta \log \hat{W}_t + (c_1 / \eta) \Delta \log \hat{\gamma}_t \]

\[ - (1 - c_1) / \epsilon \Delta \log \hat{z}_t - c_2 \Delta \log k_t , \]

(37) \[ \Delta \log w_t^* = d_1 \Delta \log \hat{P}_t + (1 - d_1) \Delta \log \hat{W}_t + (d_1 / \eta) \Delta \log \hat{\gamma}_t \]

\[ - (1 - d_1) / \epsilon \Delta \log \hat{z}_t + d_2 \Delta \log k_t , \]

where \( \Delta \) is the time-difference operator defined by \( \Delta \log p_t^* \equiv \log p_{t+1}^* - \log p_t^* = \log (p_{t+1}^* / p_t^*) \equiv (p_{t+1}^* - p_t^*) / p_t^* \) and so forth. In words, both the rates of changes in price and money wage are linear functions of the rates of changes in expected aggregate price, expected aggregate money wage, expectations of two real random variables and real
capital stock. Adjustments of price and wage are thus seen to hinge crucially upon how the entrepreneur forms the expectations of the four point-expectations, \( \hat{P}_t \), \( \hat{W}_t \), \( \hat{Y}_t \) and \( \hat{Z}_t \) in the right-hand-side of equations (36) and (37).

As an illustrative example, let us assume that our entrepreneur forms these expectations employing the so-called multiplicative Koyck-lag formulae and, accordingly, revises their levels based upon the following multiplicative adaptive expectation equations.

\[
\Delta \log \hat{P}_t = \mu (\log \overline{P}_t - \log \hat{P}_t),
\]
\[
\Delta \log \hat{W}_t = \nu (\log \overline{W}_t - \log \hat{W}_t),
\]
\[
\Delta \log \hat{Y}_t = \alpha (\log \overline{Y}_t - \log \hat{Y}_t),
\]
\[
\Delta \log \hat{Z}_t = \beta (\log \overline{Z}_t - \log \hat{Z}_t),
\]

where adaptive coefficients, \( \mu \), \( \nu \), \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are numbers between zero and one, and \( \overline{P}_t \), \( \overline{W}_t \), \( \overline{Y}_t \) and \( \overline{Z}_t \) are the realized values of \( P_t \), \( W_t \), \( Y_t \) and \( Z_t \) in period \( t \). While \( \overline{P}_t \) and \( \overline{W}_t \) are observable in the markets at least by the end of period \( t \), \( \overline{Y}_t \) and \( \overline{Z}_t \) are unobservable. Instead, our entrepreneur can only observe the actual product demand \( \overline{X}_t \) and the actual labor supply \( \overline{L}_t \) in his own markets, which are partly determined by \( \overline{Y}_t \) and \( \overline{Z}_t \) but also partly influenced by \( \frac{p_t^*}{P_t} \) and \( \frac{w_t^*}{W_t} \). Therefore, the values of \( \overline{Y}_t \) and \( \overline{Z}_t \) must be indirectly inferred from other variables whose observations are available.
to him. If the entrepreneur believes that the functional forms of his subjective product demand and labor supply schedules, (31) and (32), are invariant over time, he can solve them for $y_t$ and $z_t$ and compute their realized values as log-linear functions of the observations at hand, $\bar{x}_t$, $\bar{l}_t$, $\bar{p}_t$, $\bar{w}_t$, $p^*_t$ and $w^*_t$.

\begin{align*}
\log \bar{y}_t &= \log \bar{x}_t + \eta \log p^*_t - \eta \log \bar{p}_t, \\
\log \bar{z}_t &= \log \bar{l}_t - \epsilon \log w^*_t + \epsilon \log \bar{w}_t.
\end{align*}

(42) \hspace{1cm} (43)

On the other hand, similar log-linear expressions can be obtained for $\hat{y}_t$ and $\hat{z}_t$ simply by rewriting the definitions of $\xi^*_t$ and $\lambda^*_t$ given by (26) and (27) under the constant-elasticity assumptions.

\begin{align*}
\log \hat{y}_t &= \log \xi^*_t + \eta \log p^*_t - \eta \log \hat{p}_t, \\
\log \hat{z}_t &= \log \lambda^*_t - \epsilon \log w^*_t + \epsilon \log \hat{w}_t.
\end{align*}

(44) \hspace{1cm} (45)

Substituting (38), (39), (42)-(45) into (40) and (41), we can express the adaptive expectation equations of $\hat{y}_t$ and $\hat{z}_t$ in the following way.

\begin{align*}
\Delta \log \hat{y}_t &= \alpha \log (\bar{x}_t/\xi^*_t) - \eta \alpha \log (\bar{p}_t/\hat{p}_t) \\
&= \alpha \log (\bar{x}_t/\xi^*_t) - (\eta \alpha/\omega) \Delta \log \hat{p}_t, \\
\Delta \log \hat{z}_t &= \beta \log (\bar{l}_t/\lambda^*_t) + \epsilon \beta \log (\bar{w}_t/\hat{w}_t) \\
&= \beta \log (\bar{l}_t/\lambda^*_t) + (\epsilon \beta/\nu) \Delta \log \hat{w}_t.
\end{align*}

(46) \hspace{1cm} (49)
The term \( \log(\bar{x}_t/p^*_t) = (\bar{x}_t - p^*_t)/p^*_t \) is a proportional rate of discrepancy between realized and expected product demand. It is a measure of the entrepreneur's forecasting error of the demand in the product market. However, since \( p^*_t \) would be the level of output which would be supplied by him if all of his expectations were fulfilled in the current markets, \( \log(\bar{x}_t/p^*_t) \) might be regarded as an index of "excess demand" pressure in the current product market. By the same token, the proportional rate of discrepancy between actual and expected labor supply, \( \log(\bar{L}_t/\lambda^*_t) = (\bar{L}_t - \lambda^*_t)/\lambda^*_t \), might be regarded as an index of "excess supply" pressure in the current labor market. Our entrepreneur revises his expectations of real random variables in his subjective demand and supply schedules when he has found excess demand or excess supply, other things being equal. However, other things may not be equal. In fact, equations (46) and (47) maintain that changes in \( \hat{Y} \) and \( \hat{z} \) are also made by his realization of the forecasting errors in the aggregate price and wage, which, in turn, leads to the revision of their expectations according to (38) and (39). In other words, the excess demand and excess supply in the current markets must be decomposed into two different components—the one consisting of the forecasting error of the real variables and the other being that of the aggregate price (or nominal) variables in the economy.

Combining the adaptive expectation equations, (38), (39), (46) and (47) with equations (36) and (37), we can obtain the following price and wage adjustment equations.
\begin{align}
\Delta \log p^*_t &= (c_1 \alpha / \pi) \log (\bar{x}_t / \xi^*_t) - (1 - c_1) (\beta / \epsilon) \log (\bar{y}_t / \lambda^*_t) + c_1 (1 - \alpha / \mu) \Delta \log \hat{p}_t \\
&\quad + (1 - c_1)(1 - \beta / \nu) \Delta \log \hat{w}_t - c_2 \Delta \log k_t,
\end{align}

\begin{align}
\Delta \log w^*_t &= (d_1 \alpha / \pi) \log (\bar{x}_t / \xi^*_t) - (1 - d_1) (\beta / \epsilon) \log (\bar{y}_t / \lambda^*_t) \\
&\quad + d_1 (1 - \alpha / \mu) \Delta \log \hat{p}_t + (1 - d_1)(1 - \beta / \nu) \Delta \log \hat{w}_t + d_2 \Delta \log k_t,
\end{align}

with \( \Delta \log \hat{p}_t = \mu (\log \bar{p}_t - \log \hat{p}_t) \) and \( \Delta \log \hat{w}_t = \nu (\log \bar{w}_t - \log \hat{w}_t) \).

If we, as an econometrician, possesses time-series data of the variables appearing in the above adjustment equations, we can, in principle, estimate their constant coefficients, which themselves are simple functions of the constant structural parameters, \( \pi, \epsilon, \gamma, \delta, \mu, \nu, \alpha \) and \( \beta \). If we could somehow estimate the values of these structural parameters, these price and wage adjustment equations can be used not only for predicting the entrepreneur's price and wage policies in disequilibrium markets but also for detecting his perceived market environment summarized by \( \pi \) and \( \epsilon \), his expectation-formation structure represented by \( u, \nu, \alpha \) and \( \beta \), and his available technology specified by \( \gamma \) and \( \delta \). Unfortunately, the indices of excess demand and excess supply, \( \log (\bar{x}_t / \xi^*_t) \) and \( \log (\bar{y}_t / \lambda^*_t) \), in equations (48) and (49) are not "revealed" to us in the markets. They exist only in the mind of our entrepreneur. (This is also true for \( \Delta \log \hat{p}_t \) and \( \Delta \log \hat{w}_t \).) However, after some manipulation they can be transformed into observable variables in the following manner.

It can be easily shown that under the constant-elasticity assumption the expected product demand \( \xi^*_t \) is a constant fraction of the economic
capacity \( Q_t^* \), i.e.,

\begin{equation}
\tilde{s}_t^* = \Theta Q_t^*,
\end{equation}

where \( \Theta = [\eta(\eta-1)\varepsilon/(1+\varepsilon)\eta]/(1-\gamma) \) is smaller than unity. This constant fraction \( \Theta \) is the rate of capacity utilization which is optimal in an ex ante sense; when the entrepreneur's expectations turn out to be correct, he will utilize the economic capacity at the rate \( \Theta \). Thus, it will be called the normal capacity utilization rate. Decomposing \( \log(\tilde{x}_t/\tilde{s}_t^*) \) and \( \log(\tilde{\lambda}_t/\lambda_t^*) \), substituting (50) and rearranging terms, we obtain:

\begin{equation}
\log(\tilde{x}_t/\tilde{s}_t^*) = \log(\tilde{x}_t/s_t^*) + \log\{(s_t^*/Q_t^*)/\Theta\},
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\log(\tilde{\lambda}_t/\lambda_t^*) = \log(\tilde{\lambda}_t/n_t^*) + (1/\gamma)\log\{(s_t^*/Q_t^*)/\Theta\},
\end{equation}

where \( s_t^* \) and \( n_t^* \) are the optimal (and actually chosen) levels of sales and employment. Therefore, \( \log(\tilde{x}_t/s_t^*) \approx (\tilde{x}_t - s_t^*)/s_t^* \) is the ratio of unfilled orders to the actual sales, and \( \log(\tilde{\lambda}_t/n_t^*) \approx (\tilde{\lambda}_t - n_t^*)/n_t^* \) is the ratio of involuntary unemployment to the actual employment. The former is nothing but the observable rate of excess product demand and the latter the observable rate of excess labor supply. They are revealed to us in the markets. The remaining term \( \log\{(s_t^*/Q_t^*)/\Theta\} \approx \{(s_t^*/Q_t^*) - \Theta\}/\Theta \) is the proportional rate of deviation of the actual capacity utilization rate from the normal rate. In practice, this might be approximated by a variation in capacity utilization rate around its average computed over some relevant time periods.
We are now in a position of presenting our price and wage adjustment equations. Substituting (51) and (52) into (48) and (49), we finally obtain

\begin{align}
(53) \quad \Delta \log p^*_t &= (c_1 \alpha / \eta) \log(x^*_t / s^*_t) - (1 - c_1) (\beta / \epsilon) \log(e_t / n^*_t) \\
& \quad + c_3 \log(s^*_t / q_t^*) + c_2 \Delta \log k_t + c_1 (1 - \alpha / \mu) \Delta \log \hat{p}_t \\
& \quad + (1 - c_1) (1 - \beta / \nu) \Delta \log \hat{w}_t,
\end{align}

\begin{align}
(54) \quad \Delta \log w^*_t &= (d_1 \alpha / \eta) \log(x^*_t / s^*_t) - (1 - d_1) (\beta / \epsilon) \log(e_t / n^*_t) \\
& \quad + d_3 \log(s^*_t / q_t^*) + d_2 \Delta \log k_t + d_1 (1 - \alpha / \mu) \Delta \log \hat{p}_t \\
& \quad + (1 - d_1) (1 - \beta / \nu) \Delta \log \hat{w}_t,
\end{align}

with \( \Delta \log \hat{p}_t = \mu \log(\hat{p}_0 / \hat{p}_t) \) and \( \Delta \log \hat{w}_t = \nu \log(\hat{w}_0 / \hat{w}_t) \). (The coefficients of the third terms are defined by \( c_3 = \sigma[\epsilon \alpha (1 - \gamma) + (\alpha - \beta)] \) and \( d_3 = \sigma[\epsilon \beta (\gamma / 1 - 1) + (\alpha - \beta)] \). Their signs are a little bit ambiguous; but so long as the values of \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are close we can suppose they are both positive. In the following we shall assume that this is indeed the case.)

Our price and wage adjustment equations say that, other things being equal, the existence of excess demand in the product market will work to increase both product price and money wage and that the existence of excess supply in the labor market will reduce both of them. Moreover, when the economic capacity is overutilized relative to its normal operation rate (if other things are equal) the price will be raised and the money wage will be lowered in order to restore the normal capacity utilization...
rate; and conversely for the case of underutilization. The productivity
growth due to capital accumulation tends to lower the price and raise
the money wage. Thus, we have succeeded in establishing the personalized
law of demand and supply. The so-called Walrasian law of demand and supply
is mathematically formulated as \( dp/dt = H(\text{Excess-Demand}) \), \( H(0) = 0 \)
and \( H'(\cdot) > 0 \).\(^{25}\) This ad hoc law is introduced into the Walrasian
equilibrium analysis as a pseudo-behavioral equation of a fictional market
auctioneer or Invisible Hand in a market out of equilibrium. In contrast
with this well-told fable, our price and wage adjustment equations are
deduced choice-theoretically as true behavioral equations of an individual
firm—a Visible Hand—in the economy where no deus ex machina is in sight.

In spite of their formal similarity, the economic implications of
our model of price and wage adjustments are very different from the
Walrasian tâtonnement model of price adjustment.\(^{26}\) In our model, changes
in price and wage are followed by changes in sales and employment policies.
So long as the entrepreneur's expectations about his market environment
are subject to errors, the burden of their adjustments is partly borne
by workers and customers in the form of involuntary unemployment and
unfilled-orders. In this sense it seems more appropriate to interpret

\(^{25}\) See, for example, P. A. Samuelson, *Foundations of Economic Analysis*

\(^{26}\) We should also point out that there exists a spill-over effect between
the product market and the labor market in our price and wage adjustment
equations. These two markets are interconnected through the firm's pro-
duction activity.
our price and wage adjustment equations as a microeconomic characterization of the so-called Phillips curve relations. 27

In addition to the variables representing market demand and supply pressures, \( \log(\bar{x}_t/\bar{x}_t^*) \), \( \log(\bar{z}_t/\lambda_t^*) \) and \( \log((s_t^*/Q_t^*)/\theta) \), and the variable representing productivity change, \( \Delta \log k_t \), adjustments of price and wage are also correlated with the entrepreneur's revisions of his expectations of aggregate price and aggregate wage, \( \Delta \log \hat{P}_t \), and \( \Delta \log \hat{W}_t \). However, how they are correlated is somewhat ambiguous. It hinges upon whether the entrepreneur adapts his expectations of \( P_t \) and \( W_t \) to their realized values more promptly than his adaptation of the expectations of \( y_t \) and \( z_t \) to their realized values; namely, it depends on whether \( \mu < \alpha \) and \( \nu < \beta \). If \( \mu < \alpha \) and \( \nu < \beta \), we will have a paradoxical situation in which upward (downward) revisions of \( \hat{P}_t \) and \( \hat{W}_t \) will be followed by downward (upward) changes in \( p_t^* \) and \( w_t^* \). Of course, since \( P_t \) and \( W_t \) are observable random variables whereas \( y_t \) and \( z_t \) are not, it is plausible for us to expect that the formers are more quickly adjusted than the latter. However, even if we suppose \( \mu > \alpha \) and \( \nu > \beta \), the sum of the coefficients of \( \Delta \log \hat{P}_t \) and \( \Delta \log \hat{W}_t \), \( 1 - c_1 \alpha/\mu - (1 - c_1) \beta/\nu \), falls short of unity, so long as \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are both non-zero. In other words, our micro Phillips relations appear to involve dynamic money illusion, even though our entrepreneur is free from any form of money illusion at least in a static sense. This apparent money illusion is due to the fact that when he observes

27 See Nordhaus op. cit. for the survey of recent developments in both theoretical and empirical studies of the Phillips relations.
excess demand or excess supply in the market it must be attributed not only to his forecasting error of real variables in the economy but also to his failure to anticipate aggregate price or wage correctly, as is shown in equations (46) and (47). Although it is tempting here to make a general comment on the controversy between proponents of long-run Phillips relation and those of natural unemployment rate, we shall not go into this in the present paper. The problem concerning the existence of long-run Phillips relation is essentially a macroeconomic problem requiring a careful model-building of the economy as a whole, which goes far beyond the scope of this article.

Our discussions of the micro Phillips relations have been so far based upon several naive assumptions concerning the entrepreneur's expectation formations. In particular, the assumption that he predicts the levels of the random variables according to the Koyck-lag formulae presupposes a very simplistic stationary property about the underlying stochastic processes generating their dynamic movements. The more realistic model of micro Phillips relation undoubtedly necessitates the more elaborate formulation of the expectation formation, which, in turn, presupposes a much more complicated econometric model being in the mind of our entrepreneur. In fact, we can supply unlimited number of alternative price and wage adjustment equations by introducing various distributed or other lag formulae. However, the theory of expectation formation is the most mysterious area in economic science; and, no matter how complicated can we make their formulations, our main theme remains the same. We shall not, therefore, pursue this problem further in this already long article.

\[28\] For example, from the macroeconomic viewpoint there may exist some correlations between \(\log(\hat{X}_t/s^*_t)\) and \(\Delta \log \hat{p}_t\) and between \(\log(\hat{I}_t/n^*_t)\) and \(\Delta \log \hat{w}_t\), which may disturb the Phillips relations expressed in (53) and (54) in the long-run.
APPENDIX 1

The Determination of the Optimal Price and Wage Policies

The purpose of this appendix is to derive the optimal conditions for \( p_t^* \) and \( w_t^* \) given by (24) and (25) in the text. The maximand of our problem is the expected profit function (23). Since this is not a concave function of \( p_t \) and \( w_t \), we must carefully examine the phase-diagram of its gradient vectors to find out the optimal solution.

It is easy to see that the non-negative orthant of \( p-w \) plane is partitioned into three regions, A, B and C. (See the diagram below.) They are respectively defined by \( A = \{(p,w) | Q^*(p/w) \leq X(p) \} \) and \( F(L(w)) + I \), \( B = \{(p,w) | X(p) \leq Q^*(p/w) \} \) and \( F(L(w)) + I \) and...
\( C = \{ (p, w) | F(L(w)) + I \leq \theta(p/w) \text{ and } X(p) \} \). (In the following we shall suppress the parameters, \( k_t \), \( \lambda_t \) and \( \delta_t \) and also time-subscript \( t \) to simplify the notation.) Omitting tedious calculations, positive directions of normal vectors of the iso-profit contours are indicated by arrows in the diagram. They point in the directions of higher expected profit.

It is clear that no maximum can attain in the region \( A \), because all the arrows there point in the south-west direction. Regions \( B \) and \( C \) are further divided into three subregions according to the directions of the arrows. However, it is also clear from the diagram that we can find no maximum in the interiors of these two regions. Instead we can quickly conclude that the maximum point which corresponds to a stationary point of gradient flow vectors is located somewhere along the line of the boundary between the regions \( B \) and \( C \). This boundary line is characterized by

\[
X(p) = F(L(w)) + I,
\]

which is nothing but the first optimal condition (24). Along this line the expected profit function (23) can be expressed as

\[
\hat{X} = X^{-1}(F(L(w)) + I) \{ F(L(w)) + I \} - wL(w),
\]

where \( X^{-1}(x) \) is the inverse function of \( x = X(p) \) defined over

\( 0 \leq x \leq X(0) \). Since this is now a function of a single variable \( w \), its optimal solution is easy to obtain. We shall assume that \( 0 \leq I < X(0) \).

Then, in view of (3), (4), (5), (9) and (10) the above function attains the unique maximum at the point defined by the following monopolistic-cum-monopsonistic pricing rule, if \( MR(X^{-1}(I)) > 0 \):

\[ \text{MR}(X^{-1}(F(L(w)) + I))F_n(L(w)) = \text{ME}(w). \]

But if \( \text{MR}(X^{-1}(I)) \leq 0 \), it is obviously maximized at any \( w \) between 0 and \( w^\ast \).

**APPENDIX 2**

Far-Sighted Policy and Optimum Inventory Adjustment

In this appendix, we shall briefly discuss how our preceding analysis must be modified if we drop the assumption that our entrepreneur is concerned only with a single-period profit in his decision-makings. Suppose now that he extends his planning horizon to more than two but still finite periods and maximizes the discounted sum of expected profits:

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{T} \alpha^t F_t,
\]

where \( 2 \leq T < +\infty \) is a given planning horizon and \( \alpha > 0 \) is a given discount factor. Then, following the standard backward-induction procedure in the finite-horizon dynamic programming, he can solve this dynamic maximization problem backward from \( t = T \) to \( t = 0 \). In the final period of the planning horizon, however, the entrepreneur is necessarily a myopic optimizer; his world will end at the close of that period. His optimal policies in the final period are exactly the same as the ones we discussed in the text. Thus, we can skip \( t = T \) and immediately enter into the analysis of the optimal policies in period \( T-1 \).
Let us calculate the maximum expected profit in period $T$ by substituting the optimal price and wage policies given by (30) into (23). It can be expressed as a function of $\hat{a}_T$, $\hat{b}_T$, $k_T$, and $I_T$; i.e.,

$$\max: f_T = R(\hat{a}_T, \hat{b}_T, k_T, I_T).$$

The point-expectations, $\hat{a}_T$ and $\hat{b}_T$, and an index of real capital $k_T$ are uncontrollable by our entrepreneur. However, at the end of period $T-1$, he can decide how much inventory to be carried over to the next period. Thus, if we neglect inventory depreciation, we have

$$I_T = \hat{I}_{T-1},$$

where $\hat{I}_{T-1}$ is the level of intended inventory accumulation determined at the end of period $T-1$. (There exists no unintended inventory in this far-sighted model.) In view of (24) and (25) it is easy to show that

$$\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial R}{\partial I} &= R_1(\hat{a}, \hat{b}, k, I) = MR(p^*, \hat{a}) > 0 \text{ when } 0 \leq I < \hat{I} \\
&= MR(x^{-1}(I, \hat{a}), \hat{a}) \leq 0 \text{ when } \hat{I} \leq I < x(0, \hat{a}), \\
\frac{\partial^2 R}{\partial I^2} &= R_{11}(\hat{a}, \hat{b}, k, I) < 0 \text{ for all } 0 \leq I < x(0, \hat{a}),
\end{align*}$$

(A.1)

where $\hat{I}$ is defined by $MR(x^{-1}(\hat{I}, \hat{a}), \hat{a}) = 0$ and $p = x^{-1}(x, a)$ is the inverse function of $x = X(p, a)$ in respect to $p$.

Now the far-sighted entrepreneur's maximization problem at the end of period $T-1$ can be formulated as
Max: \( \text{CR}(\hat{s}_T, \hat{b}_T, k_T, \hat{n}_{T-1}) + p_{T-1}s_{T-1} - w_{T-1}n_{T-1} \)

s.t.: \( s_{T-1} \leq \bar{x}_{T-1}, \ n_{T-1} \leq \bar{I}_{T-1}, \ s_{T-1} \leq F(n_{T-1}, k_T-1) + I_T - \bar{x}_{T-1} \),

where his control variables are \( s_{T-1} \geq 0, \ n_{T-1} \geq 0 \) and \( \bar{x}_{T-1} \geq 0 \).

(In the following we shall occasionally omit the parameters, \( \hat{s}_T, \hat{b}_T, k_T \) and \( k_{T-1} \) and the time subscript \( T-1 \) to simplify our exposition.)

The Kuhn-Tucker theorem implies that the optimal solution is determined by the following set of complementary slackness conditions.

\[
\begin{align*}
    p - \lambda - \nu &\leq 0, \ s \geq 0, \ (p - \lambda - \nu)s = 0; \\
    \forall F_n(n) - w - \mu &\leq 0, \ n \geq 0, \ (\forall F_n(n) - w - \mu)n = 0; \\
    \text{CR}_I(\bar{x}) - \nu &\leq 0, \ \bar{x} \geq 0, \ (\text{CR}_I(\bar{x}) - \nu)\bar{x} = 0; \\
    s &\leq \bar{x}, \ \lambda \geq 0, \ (s-\bar{x})\lambda = 0; \ n \leq \bar{I}, \ \mu \geq 0, \ (n-\bar{I})\mu = 0; \\
    s &\leq F(n) + I - \bar{x}, \ \nu \geq 0, \ (s - F(n) - I + \bar{x})\nu = 0;
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \lambda, \ \mu \) and \( \nu \) are Lagrangean multipliers.

Careful examinations of these Kuhn-Tucker conditions enable us to conclude that the structure of the optimal sales, employment and inventory policies in period \( T-1 \) are completely characterized by the following switching rule:

\[
\begin{align*}
    s^* &= \min[\bar{x}, \ \max\{F(\bar{I}) + I - \varphi(p), \ 0\}], \ \max\{Q^* + I - \varphi(p), \ 0\}], \ \\
    n^* &= \min[\bar{I}, \ G(\bar{x} - I + \theta(w, \bar{x} - I)), \ \max\{N^*, \ G(-I + \theta(w, -I))\}], \ \\
    \bar{x}^* &= F(n^*) + I - s^*,
\end{align*}
\]
where $Q^*$ and $N^*$ are economic productive capacity and capacity employment which are defined by (16) and (17); $n = G(q)$ is the inverse function of $q = F(n)$ with $G(q) = 0$ when $q \leq 0$. The new functions $\varphi(p)$ and $\theta(w, \chi)$ are respectively defined by

$$\varphi_R I(\varphi(p)) \equiv p \text{ when } \varphi R I(0) > p, \text{ and } \varphi(p) = 0 \text{ otherwise;}$$

$$w \equiv \varphi R R(\varphi(\chi + \theta(w, \chi))) R I(\theta(w, \chi)) \text{ when } w > \varphi R R(\varphi(\chi)) R I(0) \text{ and } \chi > \bar{r},$$

$$\theta(w, \chi) \equiv 0 \text{ when } w \leq \varphi R R(\varphi(\chi)) R I(0) \text{ and } \chi > \bar{r},$$

and

$$\theta(w, \chi) \equiv \bar{r} \text{ when } \chi \leq \bar{r}.$$  

In view of (A-1) both functions are unambiguously defined. Note that $\varphi(p)$ is also dependent upon $\hat{a}_T$, $\hat{b}_T$, $k_T$ and $\theta(w, \chi)$ upon $\hat{a}_T$, $\hat{b}_T$, $k_T$ and $k_{T-1}$. These far-sighted optimal policies are similar to the myopic optimal policies discussed in the text. However, in contrast with the latter there exist basically four possible combinations of the optimal sales, employment and inventory policies. They are:

$$\begin{cases}
(i) \quad n^* = \max[N^*, G(-I + \theta(w, -I))] , \quad s^* = \max[Q^* - I - \varphi(p), 0] \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{and } \xi^* = \min[\varphi(p), \theta(w, -I)], \quad \\
(ii) \quad n^* = \bar{k} , \quad s^* = \max[F(\bar{k}) + I - \varphi(p), 0] \text{ and } \xi^* = \varphi(p), \\
(iii) \quad n^* = G(\bar{k} - I + \theta(w, \bar{k} - I)) , \quad s^* = \bar{k} \text{ and } \xi^* = \theta(w, \bar{k} - I) , \quad \\
(iv) \quad n^* = \bar{k} , \quad s^* = \bar{k} \text{ and } \xi^* = F(\bar{k}) + I - \bar{k} .
\end{cases}$$
(i), (ii) and (iii) correspond to the three possible cases in the myopic sales and employment policies except that the entrepreneur now decides how much inventory to carry over to the next period. As before, they state that his activity is constrained either by the economic capacity for production, by the labor market condition or by the product market condition. The level of intended inventory is set at \( \min[\varphi(p), \phi(w, s^* - I)] \).

However, the last case (iv) is new. It says that our far-sighted entrepreneur hires all the workers and at the same time accepts all the orders when the realized product demand and the realized labor supply turn out to be in a non-degenerate zone characterized by \( F(\bar{I}) + I - \varphi(p) \geq \bar{x} \geq \max[F(\bar{I}) + I - \varphi(w/F_n(\bar{I})), 0] \). In this case, the level of inventory can be profitably adjusted at the end of the period so as to clear both the labor and product markets. In other words, an introduction of the intended inventory adjustment into our model somewhat lessens the friction of disequilibrium markets revealed in the form of involuntary unemployment and involuntary unfilled-orders.

At the beginning of period \( T-1 \), our entrepreneur must decide the optimal price \( p^*_{T-1} \) and the optimal wage \( w^*_{T-1} \). However, different from the myopic case his price and wage decisions in period \( T-1 \) influence not only his activity in the same period but also his activity in the next period. Firstly, they will change the optimal inventory policy at the end of the period, which will, in turn, alter the product supply condition in the next period. Secondly, they may directly influence the product demand and labor supply schedules in the next period. Taking account of these intertemporal dependences and maximizing the discounted
sum of the expected profits in period $T$ and $T-1$, we can obtain the optimal conditions for $p_{T-1}^*$ and $w_{T-1}^*$. In the special case where product demand and labor supply schedules in period $T$ are believed to be independent of $p_{T-1}$ and $w_{T-1}$ they can be expressed as:

$$MR(p_{T-1}^*, \hat{a}_{T-1}) = ME(w_{T-1}^*, \hat{b}_{T-1}),$$

$$MR(p_{T-1}^*, \hat{a}_{T-1}) = MR(p_{T-1}^*, \hat{a}_{T-1}),$$

where $\hat{a}_{T-1} = F(L(w_{T-1}^*, \hat{b}_{T-1}), k_{T-1}) + I_{T-1} - X(p_{T-1}^*, \hat{a}_{T-1})$. Here, we have ignored the possibility of corner solutions. The first optimal condition is the same monopolistic-monopsonistic pricing rule as (25). The second one states that the entrepreneur sets $p_{T-1}^*$ and $w_{T-1}^*$ so as to bring an equality between the discounted marginal contribution of the intended inventory to the expected profit in period $T$ and the expected marginal revenue in period $T-1$. We should also point out that if his expectations turns out to be correct the product demand and labor supply are realized in the zone (iv) in which labor and product markets are simultaneously cleared and the economic productive capacity is underutilized. However, in the general case where demand and supply schedules in period $T$ are directly affected by $p_{T-1}$ and $w_{T-1}$, we can no longer get any transparent optimal conditions. Suffice it to say here that both $p_{T-1}^*$ and $w_{T-1}^*$ are again expressible as functions of $k_{T-1}$, $k_T$, $I_{T-1}$ and the point expectations of the random parameters in demand and supply schedules in period $T-1$ as well as period $T$. 
Repeating similar analyses given above for period $T-2$, period $T-3$, ..., up to the initial planning period, we can, in principle, characterize the whole structure of the dynamic optimal policies of prices, wages, sales, employments and inventories for our far-sighted entrepreneur. If we again introduce certain expectation-formation equations of the random parameters in his subjective demand and supply schedules in the future as well as present periods, we can develop the fully dynamic theory of price and wage adjustments in the non-Walrasian, non-myopic disequilibrium economy.