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A Model for Stochastic Decision Making^{1/}

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Denote: u_i = a stochastic "utility variable" assigned to a_i

$$\hat{u}_A = \text{Max}_{a_i \in A} u_i, \quad \hat{u}_{A-a} = \text{Max}_{j \neq i} u_j$$

a_c = alternative chosen

A = the set of possible choices.

$$(*\text{Axiom}) P_{i,A} = P(a_c = a_i) \stackrel{*}{=} P(\hat{u}_A = u_i) = \int_{x=-\infty}^{\infty} P(\hat{u}_{A-a_1} \leq x < u_i \leq x + dx)$$

$$P_{A'A} = \sum_{a_i \in A'} P_{i,A}, \quad P(\) = \text{Probability of } (\).$$

The conditional probability that $a_c = a_i$ when $a_c \in A' \subset A, a_i \in A'$

we denote

$$P(a_c = a_i | a_c \in A') = \frac{P_{i,A}}{P_{A';A}} = P_{i;A',A}$$

If $P_{i;A',A}$ is independent of $A-A' = A''$ we say that the probabilities of choice $P_{i;A'}$ inside a group of alternatives is independent of alternatives

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outside the group. In this case

$$(1) \quad P_{i;A',A} = \frac{P_{i;A}}{P_{A';A}} = \frac{P_j}{P_{A'}} = P_{i;A'} = \int_{x=-\infty}^{\infty} P(u_{A'-a_i} \leq x, x < u_i \leq x + dx)$$

Definition.

If the condition (1) is fulfilled for all relevant subsets A' of A we say that the probabilities of choice are relatively stable to non-admissible alternatives $A - A'$ and call the probability field describing the choice situation as a relatively stable probability field of choice.

We will first study the case when A' contains only three alternatives

$A' = (a_1, a_2, a_3)$ and denote $P_{ij} = P_{i;A'-a_k}$ where (i,j,k) is some permutation of $(1,2,3)$. If further

$$P_{ijk} = P(u_{A'} = u_i, u_{A'-a_i} = u_j)$$

we have always

$$P_{ij;A'} = P_{i;A'} + P_{kij}, \quad P_{ijk} = P_{jk;A'} P_{j;A'}$$

If we consider a relatively stable probability field of choice we have

$$P_{ij;A'} = \frac{P_i}{P_i + P_j}, \quad P_{ji;A'} = 1 - P_{ij;A'} = \frac{P_j}{P_i + P_j};$$

$$P_{ijk} = \frac{P_i P_j}{P_j + P_k} = P_i P_{jk;A'} = \frac{P_i P_j}{1 - P_i}; \quad \text{if } P_i + P_j + P_k = 1$$

If $P_i \geq P_j \geq P_k$ we have

$$\frac{P_{ij}}{P_{ji}} = \frac{P_i}{P_j} \geq 1, \quad \frac{P_{jk}}{P_{kj}} = \frac{P_j}{P_k} \geq 1, \quad \frac{P_{ik}}{P_{ki}} = \frac{P_i}{P_k} = \frac{P_{ij}}{P_{ji}} \cdot \frac{P_{jk}}{P_{kj}} \geq 1$$

If thus $P_{ij} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $P_{jk} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ then the transitivity property $P_{ik} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ holds. For not relatively stable probability fields of choice it can however happen that the transitivity relation in this sense is not fulfilled.

(Ex. * $P_{123} = 0.19, P_{231} = 0.28, P_{132} = 0.24, P_{213} = 0.05, P_{321} = P_{312} = 0.12$
 $P_{12} = P_{123} + P_{132} + P_{312} = 0.55, P_{23} = 0.52$ but $P_{13} = 0.48$
 $P_1 = 0.43, P_2 = 0.53, P_3 = 0.24,$

the probability $P_{213} = 0.05$ is however peculiarly small compared with $P_{231} = 0.28$. If the transitivity property however is defined by help of $P_i \geq P_j \geq P_k$ it is always possible to partition a set of alternatives A into three sets $A_i^{(+)}, A_i^{(0)}, A_i^{(-)}$ such that the alternatives belonging to $A_i^{(-)}$ can be said to be inferior to a_i the alternatives belonging to $A_i^{(0)}$ equivalent to a_i and the alternatives $A_i^{(+)}$ as superior to a_i . Thereafter it is in principle possible to apply the method of indifference surfaces $A_i^{(0)}$ to the theory of choice. A multivariate normally distributed probability field for u_i always fulfil the transitivity relations in the first sense; We have namely in this case

$$P_{ij} = \Phi\left(\frac{m_i - m_j}{\sigma(u_i - u_j)}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \text{ if } m_i \geq m_j$$

$$P_{jk} = \Phi\left(\frac{m_j - m_k}{\sigma(u_j - u_k)}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \text{ if } m_j \geq m_k.$$

$$P_{ik} = \Phi\left(\frac{m_k - m_i}{\sigma(u_i - u_k)}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \text{ if } P_{ij} \geq \frac{1}{2}, \text{ and } P_{jk} \geq \frac{1}{2}.$$

It is however not possible to conclude that $P_{ik} \geq \text{Min}(P_{ij}, P_{jk})$ because $\sigma(u_i - u_k)$ can be much larger than the other standard deviation.

It is perhaps of interest not note that for a relatively stable probability field of choice

$$P_{ijk} = P_i P_{jk} = \frac{P_{ij} P_{jk} P_{ik}}{1 - P_{ji} P_{ki}}$$

$$P_i = \frac{P_{ij} P_{ik}}{1 - P_{ji} P_{ki}}$$

* When P_{ij} are given for all pairs (i, j) we have two degrees of freedoms left for the six probabilities of the kind P_{ijk} , which can be used for fixing P_{321} and P_{312} .

$$\text{If } P(\hat{u}_{A'-a_1} \leq x, x \leq u_1 \leq x + dx) = \frac{P_i}{P_{A'}} d_x P(\hat{u}_{A'} \leq x)$$

for every A' the probability field of choice is surely relatively stable.

In this case all the variables u_i are independent with marginal distributions $(P(u_A \leq x))^{P_i}$.

For relatively stable probability fields of choice the "utility distance" between two alternatives can be defined by means of the formula:

$$d_{ij} = \frac{\log P_{i;A'} - \log P_{j;A'}}{\alpha} = \frac{\log P_i - \log P_j}{\alpha}$$

In this case we have

$$P_{i;A} = \frac{e^{\alpha d_{ij}}}{\sum_{a_1 \in A} e^{\alpha d_{ij}}}, \quad P_{i;A'} = \frac{e^{\alpha d_{ij}}}{\sum_{a_1 \in A'} e^{\alpha d_{ij}}}$$

$$\text{If } P(u_i - u_j \leq x_{ij}) = 2^{-\sum_{a_1 \in A} e^{\alpha(d_{ij} - x_{ij})}}$$

the probability field of choice is relatively stable with $P_{i;A'}$ given by the formulas mentioned. The number d_{ij} denote the median of $u_i - u_j$ and α determines the concentration of probability in the neighborhood of this point. If $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$ all $P_{iA'}$ for which d_{ij} is smaller than $\max_{a_1 \in A'} d_{ij}$ converges to zero.

In this case of relatively stable probability field of choice we have

$$(2) \quad P_{i_1 i_2 \dots i_u} = \prod_{v=1}^u P_{i_v; B_v} = \prod_{v=1}^u \frac{P_{i_v}}{P_{B_v}}$$

where

$$P_{B_V} = \sum_{\mu=V}^u P_{i_\mu} = \sum_{\mu=1}^u P_{i_\mu} - \sum_{\mu < V} P_{i_\mu} \leq 1 - \sum_{\mu < V} P_{i_\mu}$$

The probability $P_{i_1 \dots i_n}$ is the largest of all $P_{i_1 \dots i_u}$ if $P_{i_1} \geq P_{i_2} \dots \geq P_{i_u}$
denote the n largest P_{i_μ} among P_{i_μ} ; $a_i \in A$.

A probability field of choice with the property (2) could be called a relatively independent-stable probability field of choice.

A quite different aspect on the decision making problem we have when we study the problem of estimating x_i , when to different alternatives a_i corresponds different probability distributions over possible consequences of the choices made hypothetically. But we shall not here try to work out the connections between $P_{i_1 \dots i_n}$ and the forms of these distributions.