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## Rule-Based and Case-Based Reasoning in Housing Prices

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# Rule-Based and Case-Based Reasoning in Housing Prices\*

Gabrielle Gayer, Itzhak Gilboa, and Offer Lieberman

## Abstract

People reason about real-estate prices both in terms of general rules and in terms of analogies to similar cases. We propose to examine empirically which mode of reasoning fits the data better. To this end, we develop the statistical techniques required for the estimation of the case-based model. It is hypothesized that case-based reasoning will have relatively more explanatory power in databases of rental apartments, whereas rule-based reasoning will have a relative advantage in sales data. We motivate this hypothesis on theoretical grounds, and find empirical support for it by comparing the two statistical models (rule-based and case-based) on two databases (rentals and sales).

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 The problem

Mary wishes to sell her apartment in the city. How should she determine her asking price? She would probably base her decision on the data available to her regarding apartment prices as a function of the apartment's characteristics, such as location, area, view, and so forth. Mary might wish to assess the value of her apartment based on more sophisticated theories. For instance, she might start with the price she paid for her apartment and add an annual appreciation that seems reasonable to her. Or she might try to predict market trends and figure out how much the apartment should be worth. But such theories should also be consistent with the data regarding the sales of other apartments. Indeed, considering price as a function of characteristics directly might be viewed as a reduced form model that Mary can use as a proxy for more involved theories.

How would Mary go about assessing the value of her apartment given a database of the prices of other apartments? Casual observation suggests that two modes of reasoning are very common in generating such assessments. The first relies on general rules, such as, "In this area, the price per squared meter is \$3,000". The second is case-based, as in the argument, "The apartment next door, practically identical to mine, was just sold for \$300,000". Indeed, in the US the standard assessment procedure involves two assessments, one that is rule-based and another that is case-based.

It seems safe to assume that, for the most part, both types of reasoning are present when a person attempts to assess the market price of a real-estate asset. The question we wish to address is whether one can make any qualitative predictions regarding the relative importance of rule-based versus case-based reasoning. In particular, what economic considerations might affect the type of reasoning that agents tend to engage in?<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The precise distinction between rule-based and case-based reasoning is an interesting

## 1.2 Motivation

Are modes of reasoning that agents use for determining apartment prices relevant to economics? Modes of reasoning seem to belong to disciplines such as psychology or marketing. Economics, by contrast, concerns itself with actual behavior. Moreover, housing decisions are typically weighty enough to warrant serious consideration by the agents involved. Hence, one might argue that agents would think about such problems long and hard, and eventually reach the appropriate decision, given their tastes, information, and subjective beliefs. All modes of reasoning should agree on the right answer, and if they don't, the individual should know which mode of reasoning is the correct one, and use it alone.

Contrary to this view, we maintain that economics in general, and the study of housing markets in particular, cannot afford to ignore cognitive processes. There are three main reasons that support this claim. First, the highly rational image of economic agents has come under considerable attack by the celebrated project of Kahneman and Tversky (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981). While their work has been largely restricted to laboratory experiments, recent developments in behavioral economics extend this line of work to weighty economic decisions. "Irrational" behavior such as dynamic inconsistency and procrastination are analyzed in the context of serious economic problems including consumption vs. savings decisions (see Laibson, 2001, Laibson and Harris, 2001, Rabin, 1998, Rabin and O'Donoghue, 1999a,b). By analogy, trading in real estate is probably also not immune to various mistakes and biases. Indeed, Case and Shiller (1988, 1989, 1990) provide evidence for both inertia and "irrational exuberance" in real estate prices. It follows that studying the way people think about the real estate market

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issue (see the discussion in Section 4). However, in this paper we use two very simple models, one of which quite clearly formulates succinct general rules, whereas the other captures case-based reasoning, involving potentially large databases.

might inform us regarding the way this market works.<sup>2</sup>

Second, many of the problems that economic agents face in reality are very complex. In fact, some of these problems are “NP-Complete” in the computer science terminology. NP-Complete problems would be too hard to solve even if one were allowed to employ the best algorithms hitherto developed and the fastest computers available (or that are likely to be available in the future). In a recent paper, Aragoes, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2005) show that finding the “best” regression model for a given data set is an NP-Complete problem. For this reason, economic agents may not be able to find simple regularities that hold true in the database available to them. In particular, finding a good regression model to explain housing prices might be a non-trivial computational task. Indeed, the very fact that many trained economists cope with this problem suggests that it might not be optimally solved by most agents in the market. These agents are therefore likely to satisfy themselves with sub-optimal solutions. Which sub-optimal solutions will they find? Understanding reasoning processes promises to shed light on this issue.

Finally, many important markets, including the housing market, involve a significant speculative component. In these markets, the price of an asset is what most agents believe the price of the asset should be. It is therefore important to analyze how agents reason, in order to predict the beliefs they would maintain. More generally, whenever one encounters an equilibrium selection problem, one is led to ask how agents would think about this problem, and which equilibrium would they expect to result. When different modes of reasoning are available, one may conceptualize the problem as an equilibrium in the choice of a reasoning mode: if most agents reason in a certain way,

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<sup>2</sup>Observe that inertia introduces history-dependence that cannot be captured by a functional relationship between an asset characteristics and its price. In this paper, we consider modes of reasoning that are more “rational”. By focusing on an apartment’s characteristics and ignoring its history, our agents will ignore sunk cost, whether they use rule-based or case-based reasoning.

this mode of reasoning will indeed be a correct predictor of prices, making it rational for agents to follow this reasoning process. As in any coordination game, if there is a certain a-priori reason to prefer a certain strategy (mode of reasoning), it is likely to become a focal point (Schelling, 1960) and to be reinforced by equilibrium dynamics. In this context, our question can be restated as asking, which mode of reasoning is likely to be a focal point in the housing market?

To conclude, understanding how economic agents reason may help up predict how they will behave. This is true for agents who are blatantly "irrational", for those who are boundedly rational, capable of all but the most complex computations, and for agents who are fully rational, but who operate in a speculative market and attempt to guess which equilibrium is going to be played.

### **1.3 Hypothesis**

We hypothesized that, due to the speculative nature of the real-estate market, it will give rise to rule-based reasoning more than would other, less speculative markets. As a reference for comparison we take the market for rental apartments. This appears to be a similar market, where the speculative component is practically nonexistent. Indeed, a rental apartment is almost a pure consumption good. Apartments do sometimes get sublet, but subletting is not always possible, and is rarely planned a-priori. It seems safe to assume that a person who rents an apartment does not focus on how much it could be sublet for as much as a person who buys an apartment focuses on how much it could be sold for.

An apartment for sale is partly a consumption good, and partly an investment. Its value, should one wish to re-sell it, is determined by the market. It follows that a person who considers buying an apartment needs to worry not only about how much the apartment is worth to her, but also how much it is worth to others. The purchase of apartment becomes a coordination

game of sorts: to a large extent, an apartment is worth what people think it is worth, namely, whatever price the market coordinates on. It is this coordination aspects that is missing from the problem of assessing the rent of an apartment.<sup>3</sup>

When we compare the two modes of reasoning, we are led to ask, which is a more reasonable equilibrium in the context of a coordination game? If the market has to coordinate on one mode of reasoning, is it more likely to coordinate on case-based or on rule-based reasoning? We suggest that the answer is the latter, namely, that rule-based reasoning is easier to coordinate on. The reason is that rules are simple to state and to transmit, whereas cases are numerous and difficult to convey. To illustrate this point, imagine that an experienced real-estate agent wishes to transfer her knowledge to a young colleague. If this knowledge takes the form of a rule, it will generally be succinct and easily stated. If, however, the expert's knowledge is case-based, it is necessary to convey the expert's similarity judgments, but also the entire database of cases that she uses for generating assessments. It follows that rules, which are by nature succinct and easy to describe, are easier to coordinate on than are cases. We therefore hypothesize that case-based reasoning will be relatively more prevalent in the rental market, whereas rule-based reasoning will have a relative advantage in the sales market.

## 1.4 Methodology

How could we find which mode of reasoning people use? More generally, how can we tell how people think? The most direct evidence seems to come from neuroscience. Measuring brain activity appears to be the closest one can get to actual thinking processes. Unfortunately, neuroeconomics does not

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<sup>3</sup>It was pointed out to us that another aspect of coordination, which might be present in both markets, is the coordination among sellers/owners regarding the price/rent they ask. It appears, however, that both markets appear to be competitive enough to rule out coordination among sellers. In any event, our hypothesis relies only on the argument that the sales market has a stronger coordination component than the rental market.

yet offer direct tests of thought processes such as rule-based vs. case-based reasoning.

An alternative approach would be to use behavior data as indirect evidence for the type of thinking that must have brought them about. This can be done experimentally or empirically, where each method has its familiar merits and weaknesses. In this paper we adopt an empirical approach. We analyze two databases of asking prices on apartments in the greater Tel-Aviv area: one consists of apartments for rent, and the other – for sale. Each database is analyzed using two different statistical techniques, where each technique is interpreted as a model of the actual reasoning processes that agents go through in generating the asking prices in our databases. For this purpose, we choose the simplest models of rule-based reasoning and of case-based reasoning. We do not compare the most sophisticated statistical techniques in an attempt to obtain accurate numerical predictions. Rather, we compare the most intuitive models in an attempt to capture some of the features of the reasoning of actual agents in the market.

Clearly, this empirical approach does not directly test the hypothesis stated above. First, we use market data that can only serve as indirect evidence regarding processes of thinking. Second, the two models we compare are rather extreme, and we tend to believe that none of them is perfectly realistic. Third, various assumptions will be made in the estimation process, most notably, that different agents share the values of various parameters. Finally, we do not offer a statistical test of our hypothesis. Rather, we compare two non-nested models by using their out-of-sample prediction error, their in-sample likelihood value and their Akaike and Schwartz criteria, as measures of their relative success.<sup>4</sup>

Having said that, we suggest that the exercise conducted in this paper is

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<sup>4</sup>The Akaike (AIC, Akaike, 1974) and Schwartz (SC, Schwartz, 1978) criteria are common measures for model selection, which are based on the sum of the normalized log-likelihood and a penalty that is an increasing function of the number of parameters. The preferred model is the one that has lower criteria values.



relevant to the question we raise. We start with an a-priori, theoretical reason to believe that rule-based reasoning will be relatively more prevalent than case-based reasoning in the sales market as compared to the rental market. At the end of the exercise we find evidence that supports this claim. While short of a compelling proof, the present analysis appears to be a relevant piece of evidence for the hypothesis in question.

## 1.5 Method

For a simple model of rule-based reasoning we turn to hedonic regression (see Rosen, 1974), where the asking price is regressed linearly on certain characteristics of the apartment such as its size, number of rooms, floor, etc. If we denote the asking price in observation  $i$  by  $Y_i$  and the vector of characteristics – by  $X_i = (X_i^1, \dots, X_i^m)$ , we estimate the regression

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i^1 + \dots + \beta_m X_i^m + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

What could serve as the counterpart case-based model? We need a simple model of case-based assessments and we need to know how to estimate it. We begin with Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004), who axiomatize an assessment rule that is based on a similarity function  $s : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$ . Given such a function  $s$ ,  $n$  observations  $(X_i^1, \dots, X_i^m, Y_i)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , and a new apartment with characteristics  $X_{n+1} = (X_{n+1}^1, \dots, X_{n+1}^m)$ , they suggest that  $Y_{n+1}$  be assessed by the similarity-weighted average of past  $Y_i$  values. More explicitly,

$$Y_{n+1} = \frac{\sum_{i \leq n} s(X_i, X_{n+1}) Y_i}{\sum_{i \leq n} s(X_i, X_{n+1})} + \varepsilon_{n+1} \quad (2)$$

where  $\varepsilon_i \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} N(0, \sigma^2)$ .<sup>5</sup>

This formula should be interpreted as follows. Ms. A wants to sell her apartment, with characteristics  $X_{n+1} = (X_{n+1}^1, \dots, X_{n+1}^m)$ . She has to determine her asking price,  $Y_{n+1}$ . She gets to observe the asking prices on other,

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<sup>5</sup>See also Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2005), who axiomatize a multi-dimensional version of this formula.

similar apartments,  $Y_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . She evaluates the similarity between the characteristics of her apartment,  $X_{n+1}$ , and the characteristics of each apartment she has seen on the market,  $X_i$ . This similarity is  $s(X_i, X_{n+1})$ . Next, Ms. A decides that a reasonable asking price for her apartment will be the similarity-weighted average of the asking prices she has observed, where the price  $Y_i$  gets a weight proportional to the similarity of apartment  $i$  to apartment  $n + 1$ . As usual, the error term  $\varepsilon_{n+1}$  stands for various unobservable variables, inherent uncertainty, and measurement errors.

Suppose that equation (2) models the way people determine asking prices. We would now like to estimate the function  $s$  from the data, in a way that parallels the estimation of the coefficients  $(\beta_j)_{0 \leq j \leq m}$  in linear regression. To this end, we would like to assume that an equation such as (2) governed the process that generated  $(Y_t)_{t \leq n}$ . However, the data we have are not ordered. Therefore, in the estimation process we assume that each  $Y_t$  is distributed around the weighted average of *all* other values,  $(Y_i)_{i \neq t}$ . Specifically,

$$Y_t = \frac{\sum_{i \neq t} s(X_i, X_t) Y_i}{\sum_{i \neq t} s(X_i, X_t)} + \varepsilon_t \quad \text{for every } t \leq n \quad (3)$$

Observe that we assume that the function  $s$  is the same for all individuals who generated past data  $(Y_t)_{t \leq n}$ . This assumption parallels the assumption in equation (1), that the coefficients  $(\beta_j)_{0 \leq j \leq m}$  are independent of  $i$ .<sup>6</sup>

Since we use model (3) rather than (2), the statistical analysis in Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004) is no longer appropriate for our purposes. The analysis of model (3) is presented in this paper.

Estimating the function  $s$  from a given database is consistent with a scenario in which all sellers have access to exactly the same database, which is also the one we analyze. This would be the case if all sellers obtained the same database that we have, and, more importantly, had no access to asking prices of other sellers posted in other databases. This assumption is,

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<sup>6</sup>Alternatively, one may view our approach as estimating a similarity function of a representative agent, as axiomatized in Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004).

of course, not very realistic. Moreover, in reality we cannot expect to have access to the actual database that each and every seller has. Hence, we take the single database that we have as a proxy for the databases that each seller had. Should our database be representative of the information that sellers actually have, we might hope that the estimation process will be unbiased.

The equations (3) do not suffice to specify the values of  $(Y_t)_{t \leq n}$  as a function of  $(\varepsilon_t)_{t \leq n}$ . These equations can be solved to extract the differences between any two  $Y_t$ 's. But if  $(Y_t)_{t \leq n}$  solve (3), so would  $(Y_t + \lambda)_{t \leq n}$  for every  $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$ . We therefore add a parameter  $\alpha$  to the model, which will stand for the expected value of  $(Y_t)_{t \leq n}$ . The resulting model is:

$$\sqrt{n}(\bar{Y}_n - \alpha) = \varepsilon_1$$

where

$$\bar{Y}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \leq n} Y_i$$

and, for every  $1 < t \leq n$ ,

$$Y_t = \frac{\sum_{i \neq t} s(X_i, X_t) Y_i}{\sum_{i \neq t} s(X_i, X_t)} + \varepsilon_t \quad (4)$$

In this paper we take a parametric approach to the estimation of the function  $s$  in the system (4). The advantages of a parametric approach in our case are threefold. First, a parametric approach simplifies the analysis. Second, it serves as a reasonable counterpart to the parametric approach of linear regression, and allows a comparison of two models with the same number of unknown parameters. Finally, our parametric approach will also allow us to test hypotheses about the significance of particular variables in the similarity model (4), in a way that parallels the tests of significance in the regression model (1).

Specifically, we are interested in similarity functions that depend on a weighted Euclidean distance. Define, for a vector  $w \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^m$ , the  $w$ -weighted

squared Euclidean distance:

$$d_w(x, x') = \sum_{j \leq m} w_j (x_j - x'_j)^2 \quad (5)$$

This function allows different variables to have different impact on the measure of “distance”. There are two reasons for which we resort to a weighted Euclidean distance rather than, say, standard Euclidean distance. First, the variables are on different scales. For instance a difference of 1 in “number of rooms” is quite different from a difference of 1 in “area in square feet”. Second, even if the variables were normalized, a variable such as “number of rooms” would probably be more influential than a variable such as “the apartment has bars on its windows”. The weighted Euclidean distance allows a wide range of distance functions, weighing the relative importance of the variables involved.

Next, we wish to translate the distance function to a similarity function. It is natural to assume that the similarity function is decreasing in the distance, and as the distance goes up from 0 to  $\infty$ , the similarity function goes down from 1 (maximal similarity) to 0. We define the similarity function by

$$s_w(x, x') = \frac{1}{1 + d_w(x, x')} \quad (6)$$

Plugging this function into the system (4) we obtain the parametric version of our model, which we estimate. We will henceforth refer to (4) with the additional specification  $s = s_w$ .

Given estimators  $(\hat{\beta}_j)_{0 \leq j \leq m}$  of the parameters  $(\beta_j)_{0 \leq j \leq m}$  in equation (1), and estimators  $(\hat{w}_j)_{1 \leq j \leq m}$  of the parameters  $(w_j)_{1 \leq j \leq m}$  in equation (4), we can ask which model fits the data better, for each of the databases we analyze. Observe that the two models have exactly the same number of parameters, namely,  $m+2$  (including  $\sigma^2$ ). We wish to compare the two models in terms of their likelihood functions, as well as in terms of the out-of-sample predictions generated by their maximum likelihood estimators. To this end we need

to compute the likelihood function of (4). Maximization of this likelihood function will provide an estimate of the weights  $(w_j)_{1 \leq j \leq m}$ , and will also allow us to test them for significance, in a way that parallels significance tests for  $(\beta_j)_{0 \leq j \leq m}$  in linear regression.

## 1.6 Related Literature

Hedonic regression has been a standard tool for studying real-estate pricing for decades (see Rosen, 1974). Spatial methods have also been well-established and widely used tools. (See Ord, 1975, Ripley 1981, 1988, Anselin, 1988, and Dubin, 1988.) A typical model would regress the price variable on several hedonic variables, as well as on other price variables, in a manner that bears mathematical resemblance to autocorrelation techniques. Specifically, whereas in an autocorrelation model a variable  $Y_t$  is regressed on its past values  $Y_{t-1}, Y_{t-2}, \dots$ , in spatial models real-estate properties that are geographically close are assumed to be interrelated. Recent models of this type include Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) and Brasington and Hite (2004), who use the following model

$$\nu = \rho W\nu + X\beta + W\underline{X}\alpha + \varepsilon, \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I_n) \quad (7)$$

where  $W$  is a fixed, known matrix.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in this model, the price vector  $\nu$  depends on a weighted sum of itself,  $W\nu$ . In this respect, our model (4) resembles (7). However, in (7), the matrix  $W$  is assumed fixed, whereas we derive it from a similarity function and estimate this function.

The regression model we use in this paper is a classical example of the hedonic regression family. It is much simpler than spatial regression models such as (7). By contrast, our similarity model does not seem to have a counterpart in the literature. It differs from spatial regression models in two

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<sup>7</sup>The efficacy of purely hedonic and of spatial regression models has also been a topic of study. (See Gao, Asami, and Chung, 2002.)

important ways. First, as mentioned above, in our model the similarity matrix is estimated empirically. Second, our model uses a similarity-weighted average formula, rather than a linear formula, as the underlying data generating process.

Our goal in this paper is to compare two modes of reasoning, represented by two statistical methodologies. To this end, we chose to use exactly the same variables in each model.<sup>8</sup> In doing so, we also provided each model with equally low levels of preliminary reasoning or external information. It stands to reason that one may combine the two models in a way that parallels the combination of rule-based and case-based techniques in human reasoning, and thereby to obtain a better fit for the data than either model can achieve on its own.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the statistical theory. It computes the likelihood function for the model (4), and develops tests for the significance of weights  $(w_j)_{1 \leq j \leq m}$ . Section 3 describes the data, the analysis conducted, and the results. It also comments on some statistical issues that arise in the interpretation of the results. Section 4 concludes with final remarks.

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<sup>8</sup>The encoding of qualitative variables may introduce differences in the number of formal variables  $m$  in the two models. The reason is that a qualitative variable with  $l > 2$  possible values is encoded in the similarity model by  $l$  indicator variables, and in the regression model – by  $(l-1)$ . As can be seen from Tables 4a and 5, this encoding introduced a difference only in the sales database, where the regression uses  $m = 19$  formal variables, and the similarity –  $m = 20$ .

## 2 Statistical Theory

### 2.1 The Likelihood function

Define

$$S = S(w) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} & \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} & \dots & \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \\ -\frac{s_{w,2,1}}{\sum_{i \neq 2} s_{w,2,i}} & 1 & & -\frac{s_{w,2,n}}{\sum_{i \neq 2} s_{w,2,i}} \\ \dots & & \dots & \\ -\frac{s_{w,n,1}}{\sum_{i \neq n} s_{w,n,i}} & & -\frac{s_{w,n,n-1}}{\sum_{i \neq n} s_{w,n,i}} & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The structural and reduced form models are

$$Sy = \sqrt{n}\alpha e_1 + \varepsilon$$

and

$$y = \sqrt{n}\alpha S^{-1}e_1 + S^{-1}\varepsilon.$$

where  $e_i$  is the  $i$ -th unit vector,  $y$  and  $\varepsilon$  are  $n \times 1$  vectors, with  $\varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I)$ .

Note that  $S1 = \sqrt{n}e_1$ , where  $1$  is the  $n \times 1$  vector whose entries are all 1.

Hence  $S^{-1}e_1 = n^{-1/2}1$ , so that

$$y = \alpha 1 + S^{-1}\varepsilon.$$

That is, the unconditional expectation of the  $y$ -vector is  $\alpha$ .

Set

$$H = \frac{S'S}{\sigma^2}.$$

The log-likelihood function is

$$l(\theta) = -\frac{n}{2} \log(2\pi) + \frac{1}{2} \log \det(H) - \frac{1}{2} (y - \alpha 1)' H (y - \alpha 1).$$

Clearly, for any given  $(w_j)_{1 \leq j \leq m}$ , the profile MLE of  $\alpha$  is

$$\hat{\alpha} = (1'H1)^{-1} 1'H y = \bar{Y}_n,$$

since  $1'S' = \sqrt{n}e_1'$ .

Define

$$S_0 = S_0(w) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ -\frac{s_{w,2,1}}{\sum_{i \neq 2} s_{w,2,i}} & 1 & & -\frac{s_{w,2,n}}{\sum_{i \neq 2} s_{w,2,i}} \\ \dots & & \dots & \\ -\frac{s_{w,n,1}}{\sum_{i \neq n} s_{w,n,i}} & \dots & -\frac{s_{w,n,n-1}}{\sum_{i \neq n} s_{w,n,i}} & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Now,  $Sy - \sqrt{n}\bar{Y}_n e_1 = S_0 y$ . The profile log-likelihood function is readily seen to be

$$l_P(w) = -\frac{n}{2} [\log(2\pi) + 1 - \log n] - \frac{n}{2} \log(y' S_0'(w) S_0(w) y) + \frac{1}{2} \log \det(S'(w) S(w)).$$

It follows that the log-likelihood function will be maximized for  $(w_j)_{1 \leq j \leq m}$  that maximize

$$-\frac{n}{2} \log(y' S_0'(w) S_0(w) y) + \frac{1}{2} \log \det(S'(w) S(w)).$$

## 2.2 Inference

Set  $\theta = (\sigma^2, w_1, \dots, w_m, \alpha)$ . For inference, we can use the asymptotic  $N(0, IA(\theta)^{-1})$  distribution<sup>9</sup>, where

$$IA(\theta) = \lim \frac{1}{n} I(\theta),$$

and  $I(\theta)$  is the Fisher information matrix, given by

$$I(\theta) = -E_\theta \left( \frac{\partial^2 l(\theta)}{\partial \theta \partial \theta'} \right).$$

Now,

$$\frac{\partial l(\theta)}{\partial \theta_r} = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \dot{H}_r \right) - \frac{1}{2} (y - \alpha 1)' \dot{H}_r (y - \alpha 1), r = 1, \dots, m + 1,$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2 l(\theta)}{\partial \theta_r \partial \theta_s} = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr} \left( -H^{-1} \dot{H}_s H^{-1} \dot{H}_r + H^{-1} \ddot{H}_{rs} \right) - \frac{1}{2} (y - \alpha 1)' \ddot{H}_{rs} (y - \alpha 1), r, s = 1, \dots, m + 1.$$

<sup>9</sup>The asymptotic theory of empirical similarity models under verifiable conditions is discussed in Lieberman (2005).



Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} I_{r,s}(\theta) &= -\left[\frac{1}{2}\text{tr}\left(-H^{-1}\dot{H}_s H^{-1}\dot{H}_r + H^{-1}\ddot{H}_{rs}\right) - \frac{1}{2}\text{tr}\left(H^{-1}\ddot{H}_{rs}\right)\right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2}\text{tr}\left(H^{-1}\dot{H}_s H^{-1}\dot{H}_r\right), r, s = 1, \dots, m+1. \end{aligned}$$

Also,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial l(\theta)}{\partial \alpha} &= 1'H(y - \alpha 1) \\ \frac{\partial^2 l(\theta)}{\partial \alpha^2} &= -1'H1 = -\frac{n}{\sigma^2} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2 l(\theta)}{\partial \alpha \partial \theta_r} = 1'\dot{H}_r(y - \alpha 1), r = 1, \dots, m+1.$$

The asymptotic information matrix is seen to be

$$IA(\theta) = \begin{pmatrix} \left(\lim \frac{1}{2n}\text{tr}\left(H^{-1}\dot{H}_s H^{-1}\dot{H}_r\right)\right)_{1 \leq r, s \leq m+1} & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \end{pmatrix}.$$

A more explicit calculation of  $IA(\theta)$  will be given in the next sub-section.

To conduct a hypothesis test of the form

$$H_0 : \theta_r = 0 \text{ vs. } H_1 : \theta_r > 0, r = 1, \dots, m+1,$$

we need to use the statistic

$$\frac{\sqrt{n}\hat{\theta}_r}{\left(IA^{-1}(\hat{\theta})\right)_{r,r}^{1/2}}.$$

Since the limit is generally unknown we can replace  $IA(\hat{\theta})$  by  $I(\hat{\theta})/n$  and use

$$t = \frac{\sqrt{n}\hat{\theta}_r}{\left(\left(I(\hat{\theta})/n\right)^{-1}\right)_{r,r}^{1/2}} = \frac{\hat{\theta}_r}{\sqrt{\left(I^{-1}(\hat{\theta})\right)_{r,r}}}. \quad (8)$$

We reject  $H_0$  when  $t$  is large (e.g., when it exceeds 1.645, if a 5% significance level is desired).

Note that

$$\sqrt{n}(\hat{\alpha} - \alpha) \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

in finite samples. The variance  $\sigma^2$  of  $\sqrt{n}(\hat{\alpha} - \alpha)$  follows from the  $(m + 2, m + 2)$ -th element of the inverse of  $IA(\theta)^{-1}$ .

For multiple linear hypotheses of the form

$$H_0 : R\theta = r \text{ vs. } H_1 : R\theta \neq r,$$

where  $R$  is a  $q \times (m + 2)$  matrix consisting of  $q < (m + 2)$  independent linear hypotheses, one can use the Wald test

$$W = (R\hat{\theta} - r)' [RI^{-1}(\hat{\theta})R']^{-1} (R\hat{\theta} - r),$$

with an asymptotic  $\chi^2(q)$  distribution under  $H_0$ . We reject  $H_0$  when  $W$  is large.

### 2.3 Calculation of $IA(\theta)$

Some simplification of the calculation of  $IA(\theta)$  results from the following.

$$\dot{H}_1 = -\frac{1}{\sigma^2}H$$

from which follows that

$$IA_{1,1} = \frac{1}{2\sigma^4}.$$

Also,

$$\dot{H}_r = \frac{\dot{S}'_r S + S' \dot{S}_r}{\sigma^2}, r = 2, \dots, m + 1$$

implying that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2n} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \dot{H}_r H^{-1} \dot{H}_1 \right) &= -\frac{1}{2n\sigma^2} \text{tr} \left( H^{-1} \dot{H}_r \right) \\ &= -\frac{1}{2n\sigma^2} \text{tr} \left( \left( \frac{S' S}{\sigma^2} \right)^{-1} \frac{\dot{S}'_r S + S' \dot{S}_r}{\sigma^2} \right) \\ &= -\frac{1}{n\sigma^2} \text{tr} \left( S^{-1} \dot{S}_r \right). \end{aligned}$$

## 3 Data and Results

### 3.1 Data

We obtained two databases of apartments, one consisting of apartments for sale, and one – for rent. Both databases are maintained by the Student Association of Tel-Aviv University.<sup>10</sup> Tel-Aviv University students have free access to the databases, whereas non-students can obtain it for a fee. Anyone may post an apartment in the appropriate database for a fee. Posting an apartment is done by filling out a questionnaire over the phone, where certain data are mandatory, and various verbal descriptions can be added as comments. Each posting is paid for two months, but it is updated every two weeks at most. At the end of a two-week cycle, the owner of the apartment is called and asked whether she wishes to keep the posting, and if so, whether she would like to update the asking price. The database is therefore best conceptualized as atemporal: the asking price of an early posting may be updated in light of newer asking prices that were posted later on. This is reflected in the seemingly circular nature of the system (4).

The two databases were sampled at the same time, early August 2003. The rental database contained about 2000 entries, whereas the sales database – about 300. This size difference is typical because the students, who have free access to the databases, are more often interested in renting than in buying apartments.

All apartments were in the greater Tel-Aviv area. In more remote (and less expensive) suburbs there were mostly apartments for sale. To control for a possible effect of the suburb/township, we restricted attention to three municipalities, in all of which there were relatively large number of apartments in both databases: Tel-Aviv, Ramat-Gan, and Givataim. These municipalities are geographically contiguous.

Ideally, we would like to have the exact location of each apartment as

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<sup>10</sup>We thank the Student Association of Tel-Aviv University for the data.

part of the data. Unfortunately, the databases only contained street names, rather than exact addresses.<sup>11</sup> We therefore approximated the street address by the exact location of the midpoint of the street. We excluded from the data very long streets, for which such an approximation would not be very informative. We ended up with  $n = 1240$  apartments for rent, and  $n = 219$  apartments for sale.<sup>12</sup>

The complete list of variables for each database is given in Appendix A.

### **3.2 Method–Details**

Each database was split two: a sample (learning database), consisting of 75% of the observations, and a prediction (test) database, consisting of the remaining 25%. The prediction database was selected as each fourth observation. Since the observations were ordered by the apartment size, the sample and prediction databases were slightly more representative of the entire database they were drawn from than a completely random selection would have been. In addition, for each data set and for each method we computed the Akaike and Schwartz criteria over the whole sample.

For the sales and the rental database we performed the following. (i) Regressing  $Y$  on  $X^1, \dots, X^m$  in the sample; (ii) finding the maximum likelihood similarity function for the system (4) in the sample; (iii) computing the maximum likelihood values for the two models (regression and similarity) on the sample; (iv) generating predictions for the prediction database using the two methods, and computing their SSPE (sum of squared prediction errors).

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<sup>11</sup>This is typical of such databases. Because sellers normally do not grant real estate agents exclusivity rights, agents do not provide the exact address until they meet the buyer/renter and have them sign an exclusivity form. As a result, exact addresses almost never appear in public postings.

<sup>12</sup>We thank Professor Juval Portugali of Tel-Aviv University for access to a database that contained street lengths, as well as geographical coordinates of each street's midpoint.

### 3.3 Results

Appendix B contains the estimated values of the relevant parameters and their standard deviations.

The main results are reported in Table 1.

Table 1: Goodness of fit measures for regression and similarity, for the two databases.

	Sales ( $n = 219$ )		Rent ( $n = 1240$ )	
	Regression	Similarity	Regression	Similarity
LIKE	-876	-902	-5,420	-5,380
SSPE	146,759	185,160	2,550,834	1,985,600
AIC	10.86	11.17	11.74	11.60
SC	11.17	11.50	11.84	11.70

LIKE – Value of the log-likelihood function (in-sample, 75% of the data points)

SSPE – Sum of Squared Prediction Errors (out of sample, remaining 25% of the data points)

AIC – Akaike Information Criterion (computed over the whole sample)

SC – Schwarz Criterion (computed over the whole sample)

Table 1 reports the value of the log-likelihood function (LIKE), the value of the sum of squared prediction errors (SSPE) and the values of the Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (SC) criteria, for the two databases, for both the regression and the similarity models.

Table 1 shows that on the database of apartments for sale, the regression model performs better than does the similarity model: the likelihood function in the sample is higher for the regression, and the SSPE out-of-sample is lower. This pattern is reversed in the database of apartments for rent: in this database, the similarity model achieves a higher value of the likelihood function, as well as lower value of the SSPE. The AIC and SC values are consistent with this pattern.

The results appear to support our hypothesis: in databases of apartments for sale, the rule-based (regression) model performs better than does the case-based (similarity) model, whether it is in terms of maximizing the likelihood function in the sample, minimizing the sum of squared errors out-of-sample, or minimizing the AIC or SC criteria. This pattern is reversed in databases of apartments for rent.

### **3.4 Statistical Issues**

Perusing Tables 1 and 2, one notices the difference in the sample size between the two databases considered. The number of apartments for sale,  $n = 219$ , is lower than the number of the apartments for rent,  $n = 1240$ , by a factor of 6 almost. This discrepancy raises the question, can the difference between the performance of the regression and the similarity models in the two database be simply due to the sizes? That is, is it possible that the effect we have found is solely a statistical artifact, and has nothing to do with the economic reasoning behind purchase and rental decisions?

This possibility might appear quite plausible. The regression model uses the data only for the estimation of the regression equation. If the data generating process (DGP) were indeed (1), and if we were to miraculously discover the actual parameters  $\beta_0, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_m, \sigma^2$ , then we would need no further data in order to make the best predictions possible. By contrast, the similarity model (3) is inherently data-dependent. Datapoints are not only used to estimate the parameters  $\alpha, w_1, \dots, w_m, \sigma^2$ : datapoints also enter the DGP of (4) itself. Hence, having a larger database will improve the predictions generated by the similarity model even if the true parameters were known to us. Conversely, more datapoints may improve the predictions of the similarity model even if the estimates of the parameters  $w_1, \dots, w_m$  are not accurate.

To see this point more clearly, assume that the actual DGP involves a non-linear relationship between  $Y$  and  $X^1, \dots, X^m$ . The regression model is restricted to linear relationships. By contrast, the similarity model generates

predictions according to

$$\hat{Y}_{n+1} = \frac{\sum_{i \leq n} \hat{s}(X_i, X_{n+1}) Y_i}{\sum_{i \leq n} \hat{s}(X_i, X_{n+1})} \quad (9)$$

where  $\hat{s}$  is the estimated similarity function. Thus, for every prediction  $\hat{Y}_{n+1}$ , the similarity model uses all datapoints, in a formula that may be viewed as local interpolation. This prediction is akin to the Nadaraya-Watson estimator for non-parametric regression, where the estimated  $\hat{s} / \sum_{i \leq n} \hat{s}(X_i, X_{n+1})$  plays the role of the kernel function. Finding the appropriate kernel function is typically considered a theoretical problem. In our model, we turn it into an empirical problem.<sup>13</sup> But even a similarity function  $\hat{s}$  that does not have the optimal weights  $w_1, \dots, w_m$  could serve as a kernel function, and may be expected to generate better predictions for  $Y$  than would linear regression, provided that  $n$  is large and that the similarity function is not too “flat”.

To test the possibility that our results are solely an artifact of the sample size, we ran the two models on sub-samples of the rental database. The number of datapoints in the sample of the sales database was 164 (roughly 75% of  $n = 219$ ). Hence we wished to test the models on a sub-sample of  $n_k = 164$  datapoints from the rental database. Recall that the corresponding number in the entire rental database was 930 (75% of 1240). We also took a sample for an intermediate value of 620 (a half of 1240). For each sample size,  $n_k = 164, 620, \text{ and } 930$ , we selected a sample of the apartments for rent, ran the two models, and compared them in terms of LIKE and SSPE. The SSPE was computed over the remaining database. Thus, for a sample of  $n_k$  datapoints we had a prediction database containing  $(1240 - n_k)$  observations. The results are reported in Table 2.

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<sup>13</sup>Finding an optimal bandwidth for the kernel function is often done empirically. In our model, all  $m$  parameters of the kernel functions are estimated from the data, allowing us to empirically determine their relative importance.

Table 2: LIKE and SSPE for the two models, for various samples of the rental database.

$k$		Regression	Similarity	SSE ratio
164	MLE	-951	-974	
	SSE	8,690,667	7,853,000	1.11
620	MLE	-3630	-3,605	
	SSE	4,543,413	3,783,500	1.20
930	MLE	-5,420	-5,380	
	SSE	2,550,834	1,985,600	1.28

LIKE – Value of the log-likelihood function (in-sample, 75% of the data points)

SSPE – Sum of Squared Prediction Errors (out of sample, remaining 25% of the data points)

Table 2 indicates that the sample size does indeed have an effect on the relative performance of the two methods. Considering the LIKE criterion first, the similarity model does not perform as well as the regression model for a small sample ( $n_k = 164$ ). The two models have very similar likelihood values for a mid-size sample ( $n_k = 620$ ), and it is only for a large sample ( $n_k = 930$ ) that the similarity model performs better than does the regression model.

Turning to the SSPE criterion, it turns out that the similarity model performs better than does the regression model on all three databases. Yet, when we compare the SSPE's generated by the two models, we find that for a larger sample the advantage of the similarity model increases. To see this, we computed the ratio of the SSPE of the regression to the SSPE of the similarity model (in the last column of the table). As can be seen, this ratio grows with  $n_k$ : whereas the regression model's prediction is worse than that of the similarity model only by 11% for a small sample, this factor grows to 28% for a large database.

Thus, our data indicate that the statistical effect we suspected does indeed exist. Yet, it is important to note that this statistical effect does not explain



the entire pattern of results obtained. Even for a small database, the SSPE of the similarity model was lower than that of the regression model, while this pattern was reversed on an equally-sized database of apartments for sale. Hence, the statistical effect cannot be solely responsible for the results reported in Tables 1 and 2, and the economic effect we hypothesized probably plays a role as well.

Table 2 also suggests that if we had a larger database of apartments for sale, it is quite possible that the similarity model would have obtained better results than would the regression model. Generally speaking, one should expect the similarity model to perform better for larger databases. We conjecture that this statistical effect would be independent of the type of the data analyzed. The economic effect, however, implies that for rental data the similarity model would be better than the regression model already for smaller databases than for sales data.

The statistical effect we conjecture might also be reflected in human reasoning. Specifically, it is possible that people use rule-based reasoning when they have a database that is not too large, but that they switch to case-based reasoning when the database is very large. This might be optimal because, when the database is large enough, there is no need to develop theories (or rules): every possible instance, that is, every relevant combination of values of  $X^1, \dots, X^m$ , has enough cases in memory that are similar to it, for the person to be able to come up with a good assessment of the value of  $Y$  based on these similar cases.<sup>14</sup>

Observe that the similarity model performs better than the regression model in terms of a low SSPE already for small sample sizes (low values of  $n_k$  above), whereas a better performance in terms of a higher LIKE is obtained

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<sup>14</sup>When the database is very small, it may not contain enough datapoints to support any theory. Thus, case-based reasoning may be more prevalent than rule-based reasoning for small and for large databases, whereas rule-based reasoning may be more prevalent for medium-sized databases, that contain enough observations to generate theories, but not enough observations to do without theories.

only for larger samples. We speculate that this pattern is not coincidental. The reason might be the following. The LIKE criterion is the criterion by which we choose the parameters of both models. It should therefore be expected that the parameters chosen for a particular sample will not perform as well on the prediction database (out-of-sample).<sup>15</sup> This bias exists to the same degree for the regression and for the similarity model. However, the similarity model has a self-correction mechanism: because it uses the entire database for each prediction it generates, it may perform well out-of-sample even if the similarity function, which was chosen based on in-sample performance, is not necessarily the best one. By contrast, the regression model does not have any similar self-correction mechanism: the regression coefficients that were chosen based on their in-sample performance are used for out-of-sample prediction with no further aid from the data.

## 4 Concluding Remarks

It stands to reason that certain combinations of the regression and the similarity models may perform better than both in terms of providing the best fit. For instance, one may use our similarity-weighted average and plug it into the regression model as another explanatory variable. This would resemble a hedonic spatial regression, in which one attempts to estimate the weight matrix (along the lines suggested in this paper). However, such a hybrid model will not be able to compare the two modes of reasoning in their pure form.

An interesting theoretical question is the precise definition of rule-based vs. case-based reasoning. For instance, if one chooses five cases for generating

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<sup>15</sup>This might be viewed as a type of “regression to the mean” phenomenon: the particular values of the parameters that we choose are those that happen to perform well in the sample. Part of the success of these parameters might be due to random factors, and these need not be equally auspicious outside the sample. It follows that one should not expect the chosen parameters to perform on a new database as well as they did on the sample.

predictions, is this a rule-based or a case-based method? And what should the method be called if there is a fixed rule for choosing these five cases? Or, to consider an extreme example from a different context, suppose that a voter in a presidential election votes for the candidate who is most similar to JFK. Is this a case-based method, because JFK was a particular case? Or is it a rule-based method, because it can be described as a simple rule?

In general, we propose to refer to a method as "rule-based" if it depends continuously on a bounded number of parameters, and as "case-based" if the number of parameters needed to describe it increases to infinity with the size of the database. However, given our simplistic modeling, the distinction between rule-based and case-based reasoning is quite clear: the former is modeled by linear regression, which is a general rule, making no reference to particular cases, whereas the latter is modeled by a similarity-weighted average that makes use of *all* the available data points. Thus, both models avoid the tricky examples, such as the voting example above, and it seems safe to suggest that the regression model is "more rule-based than case-based" as compared to the similarity-weighted average model.

We do not expect to obtain a qualitatively clear result, saying that people think in terms of cases or in terms of rules. We believe that both modes are involved in almost any reasoning, and that a variety of factors may affect their relative importance. Our focus in this paper is on a particular economic factor, namely, the nature of the market under discussion. We conjecture that in general, in comparison to rule-based reasoning, case-based reasoning will be more prevalent in non-speculative markets than in speculative ones.

## 5 Appendix A: The Variables

Table 3a: Variables Names and Descriptions – Sales database

Variable	Description
Rooms	
Size	in $m^2$
Floor	
Elevator	indicator
Parking	indicator
Air-conditioning	indicator
Renovated	verbal
Quiet	verbal
Balcony	verbal
x coordinate	
y coordinate	
No sections in the street	indicates length of street
View	verbal
Roof	verbal
Direction of ventilation	no. of directions of apt's windows
Face front	indicator
Face rear	indicator
Face both	indicator
Other	

Comments (for Tables 3a and 3b): “Indicator” variables are mandatory. “Verbal” variables are also indicator variables that were picked from the verbal description. The variables “x coordinate”, “y coordinate”, and “No of sections in the street” were obtained from the geographical database using the street name. The rest of the variables originate from the posting.

Table 3b: Variables names and descriptions – Rentals database

Variable	Description
Rooms	
Big	verbal
Floor	
Elevator	indicator
Parking	indicator
Air-Conditioned	indicator
Renovated	verbal
Quiet	verbal
Balcony	verbal
x coordinate	
y coordinate	
No sections in the street	indicates length of street
Furnished	verbal
Garden	verbal
Duplex	verbal
Gallery	indicates a sleeping gallery (loft style)
Studio	verbal
Washer	verbal
Boiler	verbal
Villa	verbal
Roof	verbal
Bars	indicates if windows have bars

(See Comments following Table 3a.)

## 6 Appendix B: Estimates of Parameters

Table 4a: Variables and estimated coefficients (and standard deviations) for Regression and Similarity – Sales database

Variable	Regression $\hat{\beta}_j$	Similarity $\hat{w}_j$
Rooms	14.163 (8.420)	453.650* (21.334)
Size	1.625* (0.293)	0.002* (0.000)
Floor	-2.285 (3.018)	0.000 (0.012)
Elevator	24.234* (11.800)	0.000 (0.201)
Parking	5.898 (10.426)	0.638* (0.244)
Air-conditioning	8.869 (10.785)	0.000 (0.212)
Renovated	4.093 (8.771)	0.000 (0.200)
Quiet	19.210 (10.505)	0.000 (0.127)
Balcony	0.662 (10.944)	0.000 (0.189)
x coordinate	-0.008* (0.003)	0.000* (0.000)
y coordinate	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)

Variable	Regression $\hat{\beta}_j$	Similarity $\hat{w}_j$
No sections in the street	-1.060 (0.915)	0.342* (0.014)
View	21.184 (15.434)	86.016* (10.668)
Roof	18.376 (22.229)	0.000 (0.356)
Direction of ventilation	6.322 (15.143)	0.000 (0.204)
Face front	10.988 (12.108)	0.000 (0.213)
Face rear		0.260 (0.185)
Face both	18.587 (13.030)	0.000 (0.173)
Other	3.106 (12.595)	0.094 (0.196)
C	1,388.505* (474.029)	192.415* (4.286)

\* – Significant at the 5% level.

Standard deviation of 0.000 indicates a positive number smaller than 0.0005.

Table 4b: Variables and estimated coefficients (and standard deviations) for Regression and Similarity – Rentals database

Variable	Regression $\hat{\beta}_j$	Similarity $\hat{w}_j$
Rooms	127.033* (4.247)	3,496.100* (360.011)
Big	14.821* (6.148)	0.806* (0.076)
Floor	12.836* (2.225)	0.226* (0.016)
Elevator	36.733* (10.644)	0.000 (0.087)
Parking	16.513 (8.966)	0.000 (0.099)
Air-Conditioned	25.677* (6.604)	25.460* (0.934)
Renovated	7.519 (5.734)	0.000 (0.064)
Quiet	1.940 (5.776)	0.000 (0.067)
Balcony	19.356* (6.377)	3.636* (0.157)
x coordinate	-0.017* (0.002)	0.000* (0.000)
y coordinate	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)



Variable	Regression $\hat{\beta}_j$	Similarity $\hat{w}_j$
No sections in the street	-1.533* (0.530)	0.009* (0.001)
Furnished	16.365* (5.984)	0.000 (0.074)
Garden	20.339 (13.653)	6.385* (0.520)
Duplex	40.773 (48.352)	82.656* (20.846)
Gallery	-19.548 (24.427)	0.000 (0.063)
Studio	37.977* (17.943)	11.847* (0.374)
Washer	-20.661 (22.659)	0.052 (0.292)
Boiler	3.610 (7.267)	0.192* (0.091)
Villa	11.619 (32.616)	0.000 (0.796)
Roof	-10.825 (20.419)	0.932* (0.133)
Bars	24.676* (7.176)	0.000 (0.059)
C	3,298.435* (297.705)	593.090* (2.494)

\* – Significant at the 5% level.

Standard deviation of 0.000 indicates a positive number smaller than 0.0005.

Table 5: Number of significant coefficients for Regression and Similarity –  
for the sales database and various sample sizes of the rental database

	k	Regression	Similarity
Sales	164	4	7
No. of Coefficients-Sales		19	20
Rent	164	5	10
Rent	620	9	15
Rent	930	13	13
No. of Coefficients-Rent		23	23

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