Haavelmo (1944) proposed a probabilistic structure for econometric modeling, aiming to make econometrics useful for decision making. His fundamental contribution has become thoroughly embedded in econometric research, yet it could not answer all the deep issues that the author raised. Notably, Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models can at most approximate actuality. In the same period, Wald (1939, 1945) initiated his own seminal development of statistical decision theory. Haavelmo favorably cited Wald, but econometrics did not embrace statistical decision theory. Instead, it focused on study of identification, estimation, and statistical inference. This paper proposes use of statistical decision theory to evaluate the performance of models in decision making. I consider the common practice of as-if optimization: specification of a model, point estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the estimate were accurate. A central theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-based decision rule by its performance across the state space, listing all states of nature that one believes feasible, not across the model space. I apply the theme to prediction and treatment choice. Statistical decision theory is conceptually simple, but application is often challenging. Advancing computation is the primary task to complete the foundations sketched by Haavelmo and Wald.

KEYWORDS: Statistical decision theory, as-if optimization, econometric modeling.

1. INTRODUCTION: JOINING HAAVELMO AND WALD

EARLY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMETRICS, Trygve Haavelmo compared astronomy and planning to differentiate two objectives for modeling: to advance science and inform decision making. He wrote (Haavelmo (1943, p. 10)):

“The economist may have two different purposes in mind when he constructs a model …. First, he may consider himself in the same position as an astronomer; he cannot interfere with the actual course of events. So he sets up the system … as a tentative description of the economy. If he finds that it fits the past, he hopes that it will fit the future. On that basis he wants to make predictions, assuming that no one will interfere with the game. Next, he may consider himself as having the power to change certain aspects of the economy in the future. If then the system … has worked in the past, he may be interested in knowing it as an aid in judging the effect of his intended future planning, because he thinks that certain elements of the old system will remain invariant.”

Jacob Marschak, supporting Haavelmo’s work, made a related distinction between meteorological and engineering types of inference; see Bjerkholt (2010) and Marschak and Andrews (1944).

Astronomy and planning provide a metaphor for two branches of econometrics. In 1943, before space flight, an astronomer might model a solar system to advance physical science, but the effort could have no practical impact. An economist might similarly...
model an economy to advance social science. An economist might also model to inform society about the consequences of decisions that would change the economy.

Haavelmo’s doctoral thesis proposed a probabilistic structure for econometrics that aimed to make it useful for public decision making. To conclude, he wrote (Haavelmo (1944, p. 114–115)):

“In other quantitative sciences the discovery of “laws,” even in highly specialized fields, has moved from the private study into huge scientific laboratories where scores of experts are engaged, not only in carrying out actual measurements, but also in working out, with painstaking precision, the formulae to be tested and the plans for crucial experiments to be made. Should we expect less in economic research, if its results are to be the basis for economic policy upon which might depend billions of dollars of national income and the general economic welfare of millions of people?”

His thesis made fundamental contributions, but it could not answer all the issues that it raised. Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models only approximate actuality. He called attention to this in his chapters on “Abstract Models and Reality” and “The Degree of Permanence of Economic Laws,” but he did not resolve the matter.

Haavelmo wrote a chapter on “The Testing of Hypotheses,” expositing Neyman and Pearson (1928, 1933) and considering its use to evaluate the consistency of models with observed data. Testing models became widespread, both as a topic in econometric theory and as a practice in empirical research. However, Neyman–Pearson testing does not provide satisfactory guidance for decision making. See Section 2.3 below.

While Haavelmo was writing his thesis, Abraham Wald was initiating his own seminal development of statistical decision theory in Wald (1939, 1945) and elsewhere, culminating in his treatise Wald (1950). Wald’s work implicitly provides a framework for evaluating the use of models in decision making. I say “implicitly” because, writing abstractly, Wald did not explicitly examine decision making with models. Yet it is straightforward to use statistical decision theory this way. Explaining this motivates the present paper.

I find it intriguing to join the contributions of Haavelmo and Wald because they interacted personally during the wartime period when both were developing their ideas. Wald came to the United States in 1938 as a refugee from Austria. Haavelmo arrived in 1939 for what was intended to be a short visit, but which lasted many years when he could not return to occupied Norway; see Bjerkholt (2007, 2015).

Haavelmo’s appreciation of Wald is clear. In the preface of Haavelmo (1944), he wrote (p. v): “My most sincere thanks are due to Professor Abraham Wald of Columbia University for numerous suggestions and for help on many points in preparing the manuscript. Upon his unique knowledge of modern statistical theory and mathematics in general I have drawn very heavily.” The thesis cites several of Wald’s papers. Most relevant is the final chapter on “Problems of Prediction,” where Haavelmo suggested application of the framework in Wald (1939) to choose a predictor of a random outcome. I discuss this in Section 4.1 below.

Despite Haavelmo’s favorable citations of Wald, econometrics did not embrace statistical decision theory. Instead, it focused on identification, estimation, and statistical inference. No contribution in Cowles Monograph 10 (Koopmans (1950)) mentions statistical decision theory. Only one does so briefly in Cowles Monograph 14 (Hood and Koopmans (1953)). This appears in a chapter by Koopmans and Hood (1953), who referred to estimates of structural parameters as “raw materials, to be processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems.” See Section 4.1 for further discussion.

Modern econometricians continue to view parameter estimates as “raw materials” that may be used to solve decision problems. A widespread practice has been as-if optimization: specification of a model, point estimation of its parameters, and use of the point
estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the estimate were accurate. As-if optimization, also called plug-in or two-step decision making, has heuristic appeal when a model is known to be correct but less so when the model may be incorrect.

A huge hole in econometric theory has been the absence of a broadly applicable means to evaluate as-if optimization, and other uses of econometric models, in decision making. I propose use of statistical decision theory as a framework for evaluating model performance.

Section 2 reviews basic statistical decision theory. Section 3 shows how it may be used to evaluate decision making with models. One specifies a model space, which aims to approximate the state space. A model-based decision uses the model space as if it were the state space. I consider the use of models to perform as-if optimization. The theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization, and other model-based decision rules, by their performance across the state space, not the model space.

Sections 4 and 5 consider two decision problems central to econometrics, prediction and treatment choice. Both have drawn attention from the conditional Bayes perspective, but not so much using the Wald framework. A small body of work has evaluated the maximum regret of decision criteria. I present new computational findings on prediction and new analytical and computational findings on treatment choice.


Before we begin, I think it important to emphasize that Wald’s statistical decision theory is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Prescriptive decision analysis seeks to develop reasonable, even if not optimal, ways to make decisions under uncertainty. Descriptive analysis seeks to understand and predict how actual decision makers behave. See Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky (1988) for discussion of this distinction.

This paper does not perform descriptive analysis of behavior. Yet I have in mind that the objective of prescriptive decision theory is to give actual decision makers practical tools to improve their choices. In this sense, prescriptive and descriptive decision analysis are related to one another. I believe that statistical decision theory can potentially do much to improve actual decisions under uncertainty. I have previously argued that it should supplant the prevalent use of hypothesis testing to evaluate the findings of clinical trials in medicine (Manski (2019), Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019, 2021)). Here, I argue that it can improve how econometric models are used to inform decisions.

2. BASIC ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY

Wald began with the standard problem of a planner who must choose an action yielding welfare that depends on an unknown state of nature. The planner specifies a state space listing the states considered possible. He chooses without knowing the true state. Wald added to this standard problem by supposing that the planner observes sample data that may be informative about the true state. He studied choice of a statistical decision function (SDF), which maps each potential data realization into a feasible action.
2.1. Decisions Without Sample Data

First consider decisions with no sample data. A planner faces a predetermined choice set $C$ and believes that the true state of nature $s^*$ lies in state space $S$. Objective function $w(\cdot, \cdot): C \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ maps actions and states into welfare. The planner ideally would maximize $w(\cdot, s^*)$ over $C$, but he does not know $s^*$.

While the state space is subjective, informative data may affect its structure by eliminating some states as possibilities. This idea is central to analysis of identification. Haavelmo considered the state space to be a set of probability distributions that may possibly describe the system under study. The Koopmans (1949) formalization of identification contemplated unlimited data collection that enables one to shrink the state space, eliminating distributions that are inconsistent with the information revealed by observation.

It is generally accepted that choice should respect dominance. Action $c \in C$ is weakly dominated if there exists a $d \in C$ such that $w(d, s) \geq w(c, s)$ for all $s \in S$ and $w(d, s) > w(c, s)$ for some $s \in S$. To choose among undominated actions, decision theorists have proposed various ways of using $w(\cdot, \cdot)$ to form functions of actions alone, which can be optimized. In principle, one should only consider undominated actions, but it often is difficult to determine which actions are undominated. Hence, in practice it is common to optimize over the full set of feasible actions. I define decision criteria accordingly. I use max and min notation, without concern for the subtleties that sometimes make it necessary to use sup and inf operations.

One idea is to place a subjective probability distribution $\pi$ on the state space, average state-dependent welfare with respect to $\pi$, and maximize subjective average welfare $\int w(c, s) \, d\pi$ over $C$. The criterion solves

$$\max_{c \in C} \int w(c, s) \, d\pi. \tag{1}$$

Another idea seeks an action that, in some sense, works uniformly well over all of $S$. This yields the maximin and minimax-regret (MMR) criteria.

The maximin criterion maximizes the minimum welfare attainable across $S$, solving the problem

$$\max_{c \in C} \min_{s \in S} w(c, s). \tag{2}$$

The MMR criterion solves

$$\min_{c \in C} \max_{s \in S} \left[ \max_{d \in C} w(d, s) - w(c, s) \right]. \tag{3}$$

Here, $\max_{d \in C} w(d, s) - w(c, s)$ is the regret of action $c$ in state $s$. The true state being unknown, one evaluates $c$ by its maximum regret over all states and selects an action that minimizes maximum regret. The maximum regret of an action measures its maximum distance from optimality across states.¹

¹In this paper, I confine attention to polar cases in which a planner asserts a complete subjective distribution on the state space, or none. A planner might assert a partial subjective distribution, placing lower and upper probabilities on states as in Dempster (1968) or Walley (1991), and then maximize minimum subjective average welfare or minimize maximum average regret. These criteria combine elements of averaging across states and concern with uniform performance across states. Statistical decision theorists refer to them as $\Gamma$-maximin and $\Gamma$-minimax regret (Berger (1985)). The former has drawn attention from axiomatic decision theorists, who call it maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). See Chamberlain (2000b) for an application in econometrics.
2.2. Statistical Decision Problems

Statistical decision problems add to the above structure by supposing that the planner observes data generated by some sampling distribution. Sample data may be informative but, unlike the unlimited data contemplated in identification analysis, they do not enable one to shrink the state space.

Knowledge of the sampling distribution is generally incomplete. To express this, one extends state space $S$ to list the feasible sampling distributions, denoted $(Q_s, s \in S)$. Let $\Psi_s$ denote the sample space in state $s$; $\Psi_s$ is the set of samples that may be drawn under distribution $Q_s$. The literature typically assumes that the sample space does not vary with $s$ and is known. I assume this and denote the sample space as $\Psi$. Then a statistical decision function, $c(\cdot): \Psi \to C$, maps the sample data into a chosen action.

Wald’s concept of a statistical decision function embraces all mappings [data $\rightarrow$ action]. An SDF need not perform inference; that is, it need not use data to draw conclusions about the true state of nature. The prominent decision criteria that have been studied—maximin, minimax-regret, and maximization of subjective average welfare—do not refer to inference. The general absence of inference in statistical decision theory is striking and has been noticed; see Neyman (1962) and Blyth (1970).

Although SDFs need not perform inference, some do. These have the form [data $\rightarrow$ inference $\rightarrow$ action], first performing inference as discussed by Koopmans and Hood (1953) and then using the inference to make a decision. There seems to be no accepted term for such SDFs, so I call them inference-based.

SDF $c(\cdot)$ is a deterministic function after realization of the sample data, but it is a random function ex ante. Hence, the welfare achieved by $c(\cdot)$ is a random variable ex ante. Wald’s theory evaluates the performance of $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ by $Q_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$, the ex ante distribution of welfare that it yields across realizations $\psi$ of the sampling process. Thus, Wald’s theory is frequentist.

It remains to ask how planners might compare the welfare distributions yielded by different SDFs. Planners want to maximize welfare, so it seems self-evident that they should prefer SDF $d(\cdot)$ to $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ if $Q_s\{w[d(\psi), s]\}$ stochastically dominates $Q_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}$. It is less obvious how they should compare SDFs whose welfare distributions do not stochastically dominate one another.

Wald proposed measurement of the performance of $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ by its expected welfare across samples; that is, $E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\} = \int w[c(\psi), s] dQ_s$. An alternative that has drawn only slight attention measures performance by quantile welfare (Manski and Tetenov (2014)). Writing in a context where one wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, Wald used the term risk to denote the mean performance of an SDF across samples.

Not knowing the true state, a planner evaluates $c(\cdot)$ by the expected welfare vector $(E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\}, s \in S)$. Using the term inadmissible to denote weak dominance when evaluating performance by risk, Wald recommended elimination of inadmissible SDFs from consideration. As in decisions without sample data, there is no clearly best way to choose among admissible SDFs. Statistical decision theory has mainly studied the same criteria as has decision theory without sample data. Let $\Gamma$ be a specified set of SDFs, each mapping $\Psi \to C$. The statistical versions of criteria (1), (2), and (3) are

$$\max_{c(\cdot) \in \Gamma} \int E_s\{w[c(\psi), s]\} d\pi,$$

(4)
\[
\max_{c(\cdot) \in \Gamma} \min_{s \in S} \{ w[c(\psi), s]\},
\]
\[
\min_{c(\cdot) \in \Gamma} \max_{s \in S} \left( \max_{d \in C} \{ w(d, s) - E_s\{ w[c(\psi), s]\} \} \right).
\]

An Appendix discusses these criteria further.

### 2.3. Binary Choice Problems

SDFs for binary choice problems are simple and interesting. They can always be viewed as hypothesis tests. Yet the Wald perspective on testing differs considerably from that of Neyman–Pearson.

Let choice set \( C = \{a, b\} \). An SDF \( c(\cdot) \) partitions \( \Psi \) into two regions that separate the data yielding choice of each action. These are \( \Psi_{c(\cdot)a} \equiv \{ \psi \in \Psi : c(\psi) = a \} \) and \( \Psi_{c(\cdot)b} \equiv \{ \psi \in \Psi : c(\psi) = b \} \). A test motivated by the choice problem partitions \( S \) into two regions, say \( S_a \) and \( S_b \), that separate the states in which actions \( a \) and \( b \) are uniquely optimal. Thus, \( S_a \) contains the states \( \{ s \in S : w(a, s) > w(b, s) \} \) and \( S_b \) contains \( \{ s \in S : w(b, s) > w(a, s) \} \).

The choice problem does not provide a rationale to allocate states where the actions yield equal welfare. The standard practice is to give one action, say \( a \), a privileged status and place all states yielding equal welfare in \( S_a \). Then \( S_a \equiv \{ s \in S : w(a, s) \geq w(b, s) \} \) and \( S_b \equiv \{ s \in S : w(b, s) > w(a, s) \} \).

In the language of testing, SDF \( c(\cdot) \) performs a test with acceptance regions \( \Psi_{c(\cdot)a} \) and \( \Psi_{c(\cdot)b} \). When \( \psi \in \Psi_{c(\cdot)a} \), \( c(\cdot) \) accepts hypothesis \( \{ s \in S_a \} \) by setting \( c(\psi) = a \). When \( \psi \in \Psi_{c(\cdot)b} \), \( c(\cdot) \) accepts \( \{ s \in S_b \} \) by setting \( c(\psi) = b \). I say “accepts” rather than the traditional “does not reject” because choice is an affirmative action.

#### 2.3.1. Neyman–Pearson Testing

Although all SDFs for binary choice are interpretable as tests, Neyman–Pearson testing and statistical decision theory evaluate tests differently. Neyman and Pearson (1928, 1933) tests view states \( \{ s \in S_a \} \) and \( \{ s \in S_b \} \) asymmetrically, calling the former the null hypothesis and the latter the alternative. The sampling probability of rejecting the null when it is correct is the probability of a Type I error. A longstanding convention has been to restrict attention to tests in which the probability of a Type I error is no larger than a predetermined value \( \alpha \), usually 0.05, for all \( s \in S_a \). Thus, one restricts attentions to SDFs \( c(\cdot) \) for which \( Q_s[c(\psi) = b] \leq \alpha \) for all \( s \in S_a \).

Among such tests, it is desirable to use ones that have small probability of rejecting the alternative hypothesis when it is correct, the probability of a Type II error. However, it generally is not possible to attain small probability of a Type II error for all \( s \in S_b \). Letting \( S \) be a metric space, the probability of Type II error typically approaches \( 1 - \alpha \) as \( s \in S_b \) nears the boundary of \( S_a \). The practice has been to restrict attention to states in \( S_b \) that lie at least a specified distance from \( S_a \). Let \( \rho \) be the metric on \( S \). Let \( \rho_a > 0 \) be the specified minimum distance from \( S_a \). Neyman–Pearson testing seeks small values for the maximum value of \( Q_s[c(\psi) = a] \) over \( s \in S_b \) s. t. \( \rho(s, S_a) \geq \rho_a \).

#### 2.3.2. Expected Welfare of Tests

Decision theory does not restrict attention to tests that yield a predetermined upper bound on the probability of a Type I error. Nor does it aim to minimize the maximum value of the probability of a Type II error when more than a specified minimum distance
from the null hypothesis. Wald proposed for binary choice, as elsewhere, evaluation of the performance of SDF $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$ by the expected welfare that it yields across realizations of the sampling process. He first addressed testing this way in Wald (1939).

The welfare distribution in state $s$ in a binary choice problem is Bernoulli, with mass points $\max[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$ and $\min[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$. These coincide if $w(a, s) = w(b, s)$. When $w(a, s) \neq w(b, s)$, let $R_{c(\cdot)}$ denote the probability that $c(\cdot)$ yields an error, choosing the inferior action over the superior one. That is,

$$R_{c(\cdot)} = Q_s[c(\psi) = b] \quad \text{if} \quad w(a, s) > w(b, s),$$

$$= Q_s[c(\psi) = a] \quad \text{if} \quad w(b, s) > w(a, s).$$

(7)

These are the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors.

The probabilities that welfare equals $\max[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$ and $\min[w(a, s), w(b, s)]$ are $1 - R_{c(\cdot)}$ and $R_{c(\cdot)}$. Hence, expected welfare in state $s$ is

$$E_s[w[c(\psi), s]] = R_{c(\cdot)}[\min[w(a, s), w(b, s)]]$$

$$+ [1 - R_{c(\cdot)}]\{\max[w(a, s), w(b, s)]\}$$

$$= \max[w(a, s), w(b, s)] - R_{c(\cdot)} \cdot |w(a, s) - w(b, s)|.$$  

(8)

$R_{c(\cdot)} \cdot |w(a, s) - w(b, s)|$ is the regret of $c(\cdot)$ in state $s$. Thus, regret is the product of the error probability and the magnitude of the welfare loss when an error occurs.

Evaluation of tests by expected welfare constitutes a fundamental difference between the perspectives of Wald and Neyman–Pearson. Planners should care about more than the probabilities of test errors. They should care as well about the losses to welfare that arise when errors occur. A given error probability should be less acceptable when the welfare difference between actions is larger.

Computation of regret in a specified state is usually tractable. The welfare magnitudes $w(a, s)$ and $w(b, s)$ are usually easy to compute. The error probability $R_{c(\cdot)}$ may not have an explicit form, but it can be approximated by Monte Carlo integration. One draws repeated values of $\psi$ from distribution $Q_s$, computes the fraction of cases in which the resulting $c(\psi)$ selects the inferior action, and uses this to estimate $R_{c(\cdot)}$.

Whereas computation of regret in one state is tractable, finding maximum regret across all states may be burdensome. The state space commonly is uncountable in applications. A pragmatic process is to discretize $S$, computing regret on a finite subset of states that reasonably approximate the full state space.

2.3.3. Maximum Regret of Medical Decisions Using Neyman–Pearson Tests and the Empirical Success Rule

Medical decision making illustrates the difference between Neyman–Pearson testing and statistical decision theory. A core objective of trials comparing medical treatments is to inform treatment choice. Often the objective is to compare an existing treatment, called standard care, with an innovation. The prevailing statistical practice has been to conclude that the innovation is better than standard care only if a Neyman–Pearson test rejects the null hypothesis that the innovation is no better than standard care. Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019, 2021) compared the maximum regret of treatment choice using common Neyman–Pearson tests with decisions using the empirical success rule, which chooses a treatment maximizing the average sample outcome in the trial. The simplest context is
choice between two treatments, \( t = a \) and \( t = b \), when the outcome is binary, \( y(t) = 1 \) denoting success and \( y(t) = 0 \) failure. State \( s \) indexes a possible value for the pair of outcome probabilities, \( \{P_s[y(a) = 1], P_s[y(b) = 1]\} \). The welfare yielded by treatment \( t \) in state \( s \) is \( w(t, s) = P_s[y(t) = 1] \). The regret of SDF \( c(\cdot) \) is \( R_c(\cdot) \cdot |P_s[y(a) = 1] - P_s[y(b) = 1]| \). We suppose that the planner has no a priori knowledge of the outcome probabilities. Hence, the state space is \([0, 1]^2\). We approximate maximum regret by computing regret over a grid of states, discretizing the state space. Examining a wide range of sample sizes and designs, we find that the empirical success rule yields results that are always much closer to optimal than those generated by common tests.

3. DECISION MAKING WITH MODELS

3.1. Basic Ideas

I stated at the outset that decision theory begins with a planner who specifies a state space. This space should include all states that the planner believes feasible and no others. The state space may be a large set that is difficult to contemplate in its entirety. Hence, it is common to make decisions using a model.

The word “model” connotes a simplification or approximation of reality. Formally, a model \( m \) replaces \( S \) with a model space \( S_m \). A planner acts as if the model space is the state space. The planner might solve problem (4), (5), or (6) with \( S_m \) replacing \( S \). Section 3.2 discusses another approach, as-if optimization.

The states in a model space may or may not be elements of the state space. George Box famously wrote Box (1979): “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” The phrase “all models are wrong” indicates that Box was thinking of models that approximate reality in a way that one believes cannot be correct; then \( S_m \cap S = \emptyset \). On the other hand, researchers often use models that they believe could be correct but are not necessarily so; then \( S_m \subset S \). Economists have long used models of the second type.

A common practice when using models to predict outcomes is to compare predictions with observed realizations, judging the usefulness of models by the accuracy of the predictions (e.g., Diebold (2015), Patton (2020)). Measurement of accuracy requires selection of a loss function, typically square or absolute loss. This connects empirical practice with decision theory. However, model evaluation is performed ex post, with respect to observed outcomes, rather than ex ante as in statistical decision theory. This makes the practice fundamentally different.

A common practice in econometric theory poses an estimator that consistently estimates a well-defined estimand when a specified model is correct and characterizes the estimand to which the estimate converges when the model is incorrect in some sense. For example, Goldberger (1968) observed that the least squares estimate of a linear regression model converges to the best linear predictor of \( y \) given \( x \) if \( E(y|x) \) is not a linear function of \( x \). White (1982) observed that the maximum likelihood estimate of a model converges to the parameter that minimizes Kullback–Leibler information if the model is incorrect. Imbens and Angrist (1994) showed that an instrumental-variables estimate of a model of linear homogeneous treatment response converges to a local-average treatment effect if this model is incorrect, but a certain monotonicity assumption holds. Historically, research of this type has not been connected to statistical decision theory.

A persistent concern of econometric theory has been to determine when models have implications that may potentially be inconsistent with observable data. These models are called testable, refutable, or over-identified. Working in the Neyman–Pearson paradigm,
Econometricians have developed specification tests, which take the null hypothesis to be that the model is correct and the alternative to be that it is incorrect (e.g., Hausman (1978), White (1982)). Formally, the null is \( s^* \in S_m \) and the alternative is \( s^* \notin S_m \). However, econometricians have struggled to answer a central question raised by Haavelmo (1944) in his opening chapter on “Abstract Models and Reality” and restated succinctly by Masten and Poirier (2021). The latter wrote (p. 1449): “What should researchers do when their baseline model is refuted?” They discussed the many ways that econometricians have sought to answer the question, and they offered new suggestions.

The literatures cited above have not sought to evaluate the ex ante performance of models in decision making. Statistical decision theory accomplishes this. What matters is the SDF, say \( c_m(\cdot) \), that one chooses using a model. As with any SDF, one measures the performance of \( c_m(\cdot) \) by the vector of expected welfares \( \{E_s\{w[c_m(\psi), s]\}, s \in S\} \). The relevant states for evaluation of performance are those in \( S \), not \( S_m \).

Thus, statistical decision theory operationalizes Box’s assertion that some models are useful. One should not make an abstract assertion that a model is or is not useful. Usefulness depends on the decision context. Useful model-based decision rules yield acceptably high state-dependent expected welfare across the state space, relative to what is possible in principle.

3.1.1. Research on Robust Decisions

The remainder of this paper fleshes out these ideas on evaluation of model-based decisions. Before then, I discuss related ideas in research on robust decisions. This includes the statistical literature on robust estimation and prediction (e.g., Huber (1964, 1981), Hampel, Ronchetti, Rousseeuw, and Werner (1986)), the engineering literature on robust control (e.g., Zhou, Doyle, and Glover (1996)), and econometric work on robust macroeconomic modeling (e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008)). The idea that the usefulness of a model depends on the decision has been appreciated in research on robust decisions. Watson and Holmes (2016) stated (p. 466): “Statisticians are taught from an early stage that “essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful” … By “wrong” we will take to mean misspecified and by “useful” we will take to mean helpful for aiding actions (taking decisions), or rather a model is not useful if it does not aid any decision.”

Research on robust decisions proceeds in a different manner than statistical decision theory. Rather than begin by specifying a state space, it begins by specifying a model. Having specified the model, a researcher may be concerned that it is not correct. To recognize this possibility, the researcher enlarges the model space locally, using some metric to generate a neighborhood of the model space. He then acts as if the locally enlarged model space is correct. Watson and Holmes wrote (p. 465): “We then consider formal methods for decision making under model misspecification by quantifying stability of optimal actions to perturbations to the model within a neighbourhood of [the] model space.”

Although research on robust decisions differs procedurally from statistical decision theory, one can subsume the former within the latter if one considers the locally enlarged model space to be the state space. It is unclear how often this perspective characterizes what researchers have in mind. Articles often do not state explicitly whether the constructed neighborhood of the model space encompasses all states that authors deem sufficiently feasible to warrant formal consideration. The models specified in robust decision analyses often make strong assumptions and generated neighborhoods often relax these assumptions only modestly.
3.2. As-if Optimization

A familiar econometric practice specifies a model space called the parameter space. Sample data are used to select a point in the parameter space, a point estimate of the parameter. The estimation method is motivated by desirable statistical properties that hold if the true state lies in the model space.

As-if optimization chooses an action that optimizes welfare as if the estimate is the true state. Econometricians often use the term “plug-in” or “two-step” rather than “as-if.” I prefer “as-if,” which makes explicit that one acts as if the model is correct. Discussion of as-if optimization has a long history. A prominent case is the Friedman and Savage (1948) discussion of as-if expected utility maximization.

As-if optimization is a type of inference-based SDF. Whereas Wald supposed that a planner performs research and makes a decision, in practice there commonly is separation between the two. Researchers report inferences and planners use them to make decisions. Thus, planners perform the mapping [inference → decision] rather than the more basic mapping [data → decision]. Having researchers report estimates and planners use them as if they are accurate exemplifies this process.

Formally, a point estimate is a function \( s(\cdot): \Psi \to S_m \) that maps data into the model space. As-if optimization means solving the problem \( \max_{c \in C} w[c, s(\psi)] \). The result is an SDF \( c[s(\cdot)] \), where

\[
 c[s(\psi)] = \arg\max_{c \in C} w[c, s(\psi)], \quad \psi \in \Psi. \tag{9}
\]

A rationale for solving (9) is that using a point estimate to maximize welfare is easier than solving problems (4) to (6). However, computational appeal per se cannot justify this approach to decision making. To motivate as-if optimization, econometricians cite limit theorems of asymptotic theory that hold if the model is correct. They hypothesize a sequence of sampling processes indexed by sample size \( N \) and a corresponding sequence of estimates. They show that the sequence is consistent when specified assumptions hold. They derive the rate of convergence and limiting distribution of the estimate.

Asymptotic arguments assuming the model is correct do not prove that as-if optimization provides a well-performing SDF. Statistical decision theory evaluates as-if optimization in state \( s \) by the expected welfare \( E_s \{ w[c[s(\psi)], s] \} \) that it yields across samples of size \( N \), not asymptotically. It calls for study of expected welfare across the state space, not the model space.

3.2.1. As-if Optimization With Analog Estimates

Econometric research from Haavelmo onward has focused to a considerable degree on a class of problems that connect the state space and the sampling distribution in a simple way. These are problems in which states are probability distributions and the data are a random sample drawn from the true distribution. In such problems, a natural form of as-if optimization is to act as if the empirical distribution of the data is the true population distribution. Thus, one specifies the model space as the set of all possible empirical distributions and uses the observed empirical distribution as the estimate of the true state.

Goldberger (1968) called this the analogy principle. He wrote (p. 4): “The analogy principle of estimation ... proposes that population parameters be estimated by sample statistics which have the same property in the sample as the parameters do in the population.” The empirical distribution consistently estimates the population distribution and has further desirable properties. This suggests decision making using the empirical distribution as if it were the true population distribution.
3.2.2. As-if Decisions With Set Estimates

As-if optimization uses data to compute a point estimate of the true state and chooses an action that optimizes welfare as if this estimate is accurate. An obvious, but rarely applied, extension uses data to compute a set-valued estimate and acts as if the set estimate contains the true state. A set estimate \( S(\cdot) \) maps data into a subset of \( S_m \). For example, \( S(\cdot) \) could be a confidence set or an analog estimate of the identification region for a partially identified state. Sections 4.2 and 5.3 apply the latter idea to prediction and treatment choice. Decision making using confidence sets as set estimates is a topic for future research.²

Given data \( \psi \), one could act as if the state space is \( S(\psi) \) rather than the larger set \( S \). Specifically, one could solve these data-dependent versions of problems (1) through (3):

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{c \in C} \int w(c, s) \, d\pi(\psi), \\
\max_{c \in C} \min_{s \in S(\psi)} w(c, s), \\
\min_{c \in C} \max_{s \in S(\psi)} \left[ \max_{d \in C} w(d, s) - w(c, s) \right].
\end{align*}
\]

In the case of (1'), \( \pi(\psi) \) is a subjective distribution on the set \( S(\psi) \).

These as-if problems are generally easier to solve than problems (4) to (6). The as-if problems fix \( \psi \) and select one action \( c \), whereas problems (4) to (6) require one to consider all potential samples and choose an SDF \( c(\cdot) \). The as-if problems compute welfare values \( w(c, s) \), whereas (4) to (6) compute more complex expected welfare values \( E_s \{ w[c(\psi), s] \} \).

It is important not to confuse as-if decision making using set estimates, as described here, with sensitivity analysis, which does not apply statistical decision theory. A sensitivity analysis computes multiple point estimates under alternative assumptions. One performs as-if optimization with each estimate, yielding alternative decisions. When the multiple estimates or decisions coincide, researchers may state that the result is “robust,” although this meaning of “robust” differs from that in Section 3.1.1. When sensitivity analysis yields multiple disparate decisions, it does not offer a prescription for decision making.

4. PREDICTION WITH SAMPLE DATA

4.1. Haavelmo on Prediction

A familiar case of as-if optimization occurs when states are distributions for a real random variable and the decision is to predict a realization drawn from the true distribution.

²A confidence set with coverage \( \alpha \) is a set estimate \( S(\cdot) \) such that \( Q_s[\psi : s \in S(\psi)] \geq \alpha \), all \( s \in S \). Researchers have used confidence sets to quantify imprecision of inference, without reference to decision problems. They could be used to make as-if decisions. When studying this possibility, I expect that it will be productive to abandon the conventional practice of fixing the coverage probability of a confidence set. This practice mirrors Neyman–Pearson testing.

³An alternative replaces \( S \) by \( S(\psi) \) in the middle operations of (4) to (6), but does not replace \( E_s \{ w[c(\psi), s] \} \) by \( w(c, s) \) in the innermost operations. This simplifies (4) to (6) by shrinking the state space over which the middle operations are performed, but it is more complex than (1') to (3'). It requires choice of an SDF \( c(\cdot) \) rather than a single action \( c \), and it must compute \( E_s \{ w[c(\psi), s] \} \) rather than \( w(c, s) \). Chamberlain (2000a) used asymptotic considerations to suggest this type of as-if decision and presented an application.
When welfare is measured by square and absolute loss, the best predictors are the population mean and median. When the distribution is not known but data from a random sample are observed, the analogy principle suggests use of the sample average and median as predictors.

In his chapter on “Problems of Prediction,” Haavelmo (1944) questioned this common application of as-if optimization and recommended application of the Wald theory. He wrote (p. 109): “We see therefore that the seemingly logical ‘two-step’ procedure of first estimating the unknown distribution of the variables to be predicted and then using this estimate to derive a prediction formula for the variables may not be very efficient.” Citing Wald (1939), he proposed computation of the state-dependent risk for any proposed predictor function. Letting $E_2$ denote a predictor function and $(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N)$ be the sample data, he wrote (p. 109): “We have to choose $E_2$ as a function of $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N$, and we should, naturally, try to choose $E_2(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N)$ in such a way that $r$ (the ‘risk’) becomes as small as possible.” Recognizing that there does not exist a predictor function that minimizes risk across all states of nature, he suggested elimination of inadmissible predictors followed by choice of a minimax predictor among those that are admissible.4

It may be that econometrics would have progressed to make productive use of statistical decision theory if Haavelmo had been able to pursue this idea further. However, he cautioned regarding practicality, writing (p. 111): “The apparatus set up in the preceding section, although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra.” Aiming for tractability, he sketched an example of as-if optimization. With this, his chapter on prediction ended. Thus, Haavelmo initiated econometric consideration of statistical decision theory but was unable to follow through. Nor did other econometricians follow through in the period after publication of Haavelmo (1944). I observed earlier that no contribution in Cowles Monograph 10 mentioned statistical decision theory and only one did so briefly in Cowles 14. Cowles 10 and 14 contain several chapters by Haavelmo and by Wald, but these concern different subjects. The only mention in Cowles 14 appeared in Koopmans and Hood (1953). Considering “The Purpose of Estimation,” they wrote (p. 127):

> “if a direct prediction problem … can be isolated and specified, the choice of a method of estimation should be discussed in terms of desired properties of the joint distribution of the prediction(s) made and the realized values(s) of the variables(s) predicted. In particular, in a precisely defined prediction problem of this type, one may know the consequence of various possible errors of prediction and would then be able to use predictors minimizing the mathematical expectation of losses due to such errors. Abraham Wald [1939, 1945, 1950c], among others, has proposed methods of statistical decision-making designed to accomplish this.”

However, the contributors to Cowles 14 did not go further. Koopman and Hood wrote (p. 127):

> “The more classical methods of estimation applied in this volume are not as closely tailored to any one particular prediction problem. Directed to the estimation of structural parameters rather than values of

---

4I quote in full this key passage, which uses the notation $\Omega_1$ to denote the state space (p. 116): “In general, however, we may expect that no uniformly best prediction function exists. Then we have to introduce some additional principles in order to choose a prediction function. We may then, first, obviously disregard all those prediction functions that are such that there exists another prediction function that makes $r$ smaller for every member of $\Omega_1$. If this is not the case we call the prediction function considered an admissible prediction function. To choose between several admissible prediction functions we might adopt the following principle, introduced by Wald: For every admissible prediction function $E_2$ the ‘risk’ $r$ is a function of the true distribution $p$. Consider that prediction function $E_2$, among the admissible ones, for which the largest value of $r$ is at a minimum (i.e., smaller than or at most equal to the largest value of $r$ for any other admissible $E_2$). Such a prediction function, if it exists, may be said to be the least risky among the admissible prediction functions.”
endogenous variables, they yield estimates that can be regarded as raw materials, to be processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems—in particular, problems involving prediction of the effects of known changes in structure.”

This passage expresses the broad thinking that econometricians have used to motivate as-if optimization.

4.2. Prediction Under Square Loss

Haavelmo discussed prediction abstractly. Subsequent research using statistical decision theory has focused on the case of square loss. Here the risk of a predictor using sample data is the sum of the population variance of the outcome and the mean square error (MSE) of the predictor as an estimate of the mean outcome. The regret of a predictor is its MSE as an estimate of the mean, so an MMR predictor minimizes maximum MSE. MMR prediction of the outcome is equivalent to minimax estimation of the mean.

An early practical finding of statistical decision theory was reported by Hodges and Lehmann (1950). They derived the MMR predictor under square loss with data from a random sample, when the outcome has known bounded range and all sample data are observed. They assumed no knowledge of the shape of the outcome distribution. Let the outcome range be $[0, 1]$. Then the MMR predictor is $\left( \frac{\mu_N \sqrt{N} + 1}{\sqrt{N} + 1} \right)$, where $N$ is sample size and $\mu_N$ is the sample average outcome.

4.2.1. Prediction With Missing Data: Known Observability Rate

Extending the analysis of Hodges and Lehmann, Dominitz and Manski (2017, 2021) have studied prediction of bounded outcomes under square loss when some outcome data are missing. The former article concerns prediction of a scalar outcome. The latter studies prediction of bounded real functions of two-dimensional outcomes when data may be missing for one or both outcomes. I focus on the former case here.

It is challenging to determine the MMR predictor when data are missing. Seeking a tractable approach, we studied as-if MMR prediction. The analysis assumed knowledge of the population rate of observing outcomes, but no knowledge of the distributions of observed and missing outcomes. It used the empirical distribution of the observed data as if it were the population distribution of observable outcomes. Let $K$ be the number of observed outcomes, which is fixed rather than random under the assumed survey design.

With no knowledge of the distribution of missing outcomes, the population mean is partially identified when the outcome is bounded. Let $y$ be the outcome, normalized to lie in the $[0, 1]$ interval. Let $\delta$ indicate observability of an outcome, $P(\delta = 1)$ and $P(\delta = 0)$ being the fractions of the population whose outcomes are and are not observable. Manski (1989) showed that the identification region for $E(y)$ is the interval $[E(y|\delta = 1)P(\delta = 1), E(y|\delta = 1)P(\delta = 1) + P(\delta = 0)]$.

If this interval were known, the MMR predictor would be its midpoint $E(y|\delta = 1)P(\delta = 1) + \frac{1}{2}P(\delta = 0)$. With sample data, one can compute its sample analog $E_K(y|\delta = 1)P(\delta = 1) + \frac{1}{2}P(\delta = 0)$. We showed that the maximum regret of this midpoint predictor is $\frac{1}{4}[P(\delta = 1)^2/K + P(\delta = 0)^2]$.

4.2.2. Prediction With Missing Data: Unknown Observability Rate

The above assumes knowledge of the population rate of observable outcomes. A midpoint predictor remains computable when $P(\delta)$ is not known and is estimated by its
sample analog. Derivation of an analytical expression for maximum regret appears intractable, but numerical computation is feasible. Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) documented an algorithm coded in STATA for numerical computation of the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor and other user-specified predictors.

The program is applicable when \( y \) is binary or distributed continuously. In the latter case, \( P_s(y|\delta=1) \) and \( P_s(y|\delta=0) \) are approximated by Beta distributions. Subject to these restrictions on the shapes of outcome distributions, the user can specify the state space flexibly. For example, one may assume that nonresponse is no higher than 80% or that the mean outcome for nonresponders is no lower than 0.5. One may bound the difference between the distributions \( P_s(y|\delta=1) \) and \( P_s(y|\delta=0) \).

Whereas Dominitz and Manski (2017) assumed a sampling process in which the number \( K \) of observed outcomes is fixed, the algorithm considers a process in which one draws at random a fixed number \( N \) of population members and sees the values of the observable outcomes. Hence, the number of observed outcomes is random. The midpoint predictor is \( \frac{1}{N} \sum_i y_i + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_j \delta_j \).

Table I uses the program to compute the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor when \( y \) is binary. Table II displays maximum regret for prediction by the sample average of observed outcomes, a predictor commonly used when researchers assume that data are missing at random. Panels A and B of each table differ in their specification of the feasible outcome distributions. All distributions are feasible in Panel A. Panel B bounds the difference between the distributions of observed and missing data, assuming that \(-\frac{1}{2} \leq P(y=1|\delta=1) - P(y=1|\delta=0) \leq \frac{1}{2}\). Thus, prediction poses a severe identification problem in Panel A. The problem is less severe in Panel B, where the assumption constrains the distance between the distributions of observed and missing data. Statistical imprecision is a problem in both cases.

Each row of a table specifies a sample size, in increments of 25 from 25 to 100. Each column is a value of the observability rate, in increments of 0.1, from 0.1 to 1. Given \( N \) and \( P(\delta=1) \), the cell gives the approximate value of maximum MSE across feasible pairs of conditional outcome distributions. In each state of nature, MSE is approximated by Monte Carlo integration across 5000 simulated samples. Maximum MSE across feasible

\[
\text{TABLE I}
\]

MAXIMUM MSE OF MIDPOINT PREDICTOR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( N )</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.2</th>
<th>0.3</th>
<th>0.4</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.6</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>0.8</th>
<th>0.9</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Unrestricted Outcome Distributions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.1963</td>
<td>0.1567</td>
<td>0.1219</td>
<td>0.0917</td>
<td>0.0658</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
<td>0.0292</td>
<td>0.0184</td>
<td>0.0120</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.1956</td>
<td>0.1554</td>
<td>0.1200</td>
<td>0.0891</td>
<td>0.0632</td>
<td>0.0422</td>
<td>0.0258</td>
<td>0.0140</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.1953</td>
<td>0.1552</td>
<td>0.1196</td>
<td>0.0887</td>
<td>0.0624</td>
<td>0.0409</td>
<td>0.0243</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.1952</td>
<td>0.1548</td>
<td>0.1191</td>
<td>0.0881</td>
<td>0.0620</td>
<td>0.0404</td>
<td>0.0237</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) \(-\frac{1}{2} \leq P(y=1|\delta=1) - P(y=1|\delta=0) \leq \frac{1}{2}\)

| 25    | 0.1962 | 0.1567 | 0.1214 | 0.0912 | 0.0658 | 0.0451 | 0.0292 | 0.0184 | 0.0120 | 0.0105 |
| 50    | 0.1956 | 0.1553 | 0.1199 | 0.0890 | 0.0631 | 0.0422 | 0.0258 | 0.0140 | 0.0072 | 0.0052 |
| 75    | 0.1952 | 0.1552 | 0.1192 | 0.0885 | 0.0622 | 0.0408 | 0.0242 | 0.0125 | 0.0055 | 0.0034 |
| 100   | 0.1951 | 0.1548 | 0.1189 | 0.0881 | 0.0620 | 0.0402 | 0.0237 | 0.0119 | 0.0048 | 0.0025 |
TABLE II
MAXIMUM MSE OF PREDICTION WITH AVERAGE OBSERVED OUTCOME.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.2</th>
<th>0.3</th>
<th>0.4</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.6</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>0.8</th>
<th>0.9</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Unrestricted Outcome Distributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.7409</td>
<td>0.6150</td>
<td>0.4716</td>
<td>0.3465</td>
<td>0.2407</td>
<td>0.1543</td>
<td>0.0870</td>
<td>0.0389</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.7782</td>
<td>0.6166</td>
<td>0.4714</td>
<td>0.3464</td>
<td>0.2408</td>
<td>0.1542</td>
<td>0.0869</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
<td>0.0102</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.7793</td>
<td>0.6159</td>
<td>0.4713</td>
<td>0.3463</td>
<td>0.2406</td>
<td>0.1541</td>
<td>0.0868</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
<td>0.0098</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.7779</td>
<td>0.6151</td>
<td>0.4710</td>
<td>0.3462</td>
<td>0.2404</td>
<td>0.1541</td>
<td>0.0868</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
<td>0.0098</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) $-\frac{1}{2} \leq P(y = 1</td>
<td>\delta = 1) - P(y = 1</td>
<td>\delta = 0) \leq \frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.3189</td>
<td>0.2230</td>
<td>0.1599</td>
<td>0.1172</td>
<td>0.0576</td>
<td>0.0375</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.2654</td>
<td>0.1875</td>
<td>0.1411</td>
<td>0.1033</td>
<td>0.0732</td>
<td>0.0486</td>
<td>0.0298</td>
<td>0.0165</td>
<td>0.0082</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.2406</td>
<td>0.1773</td>
<td>0.1345</td>
<td>0.0987</td>
<td>0.0693</td>
<td>0.0457</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
<td>0.0141</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.2278</td>
<td>0.1719</td>
<td>0.1303</td>
<td>0.0957</td>
<td>0.0673</td>
<td>0.0442</td>
<td>0.0261</td>
<td>0.0132</td>
<td>0.0054</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome distributions is approximated by maximizing over a uniform grid of 100 values for each of the Bernoulli parameters $P_s(y = 1|\delta = 1)$ and $P_s(y = 1|\delta = 0)$. Someone who does not know $P(\delta = 1)$ but who finds it credible to bound it can approximate maximum regret at a specified sample size by the maximum entry across the relevant column cells of the table.

To interpret the entries in the tables, keep in mind that the maximum MSE of a predictor is determined by both statistical imprecision and the identification problem created by missing data. Maximum variance decreases with sample size $N$. Maximum squared bias decreases with the observability rate $P(\delta = 1)$.

Table IA shows that identification is the dominant inferential problem when the observability rate is less than 0.7. For all sample sizes from 25 to 100, computed maximum MSE is close to $\frac{1}{4}P(\delta = 0)^2$, the value of maximum squared bias. Imprecision is a more noticeable contributor to maximum MSE when the observability rate exceeds 0.7. When the observability rate is 1, imprecision is the sole problem.

Table IB constrains the state space to distributions satisfying $-\frac{1}{2} \leq P(y = 1|\delta = 1) - P(y = 1|\delta = 0) \leq \frac{1}{2}$. This mitigates the identification problem, yet the entries in Table IB are essentially the same as in Table IA. The explanation is that the states of nature generating maximum MSE when all distributions are feasible remain within the state space when the constraint is imposed. For all values of the observability rate, maximum MSE in Table IA occurs when $P(y = 1|\delta = 1) = \frac{1}{2}$ and $P(y = 1|\delta = 0)$ equals either 0 or 1. These states are in the constrained state space of Table IB. Hence, maximum MSE does not change.

Comparison of Tables IA and IIA shows that, when all outcome distributions are feasible, the midpoint predictor always outperforms prediction by the sample average of observed outcomes. The maximum MSE of the former predictor is approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ the predictor must be defined for this case. The program uses the $N$ simulated realizations of $\delta$ and $K$ realizations of $y$ to compute a simulated value of the predictor. For a specified positive integer $T$, the program repeats the above $T$ times and uses the $T$ simulated values of the predictor to approximate its MSE in state $s$.

$^6$ Computation of regret on a finite grid of states implies that computed maximum regret is less than or equal to true maximum regret, with equality attained if the grid contains the state yielding true maximum regret. The accuracy of the approximation may be improved by increasing grid density, at the expense of increased computation time.
size of the latter when the observability rate is less than or equal to 0.8, and about $\frac{1}{3}$ the size in the larger samples when the observability rate is 0.9. Constraining the state space in Table IIB changes the states that maximize regret for the sample-average predictor, improving its performance substantially.

5. TREATMENT CHOICE WITH SAMPLE DATA

5.1. Background

Econometricians have studied treatment response in randomized trials and observational settings. Some researchers perform causal inference, without study of a decision problem. Some aim to inform treatment choice. I am concerned with the latter. The many areas of important application across the planet range from medical and other health-related treatment to educational and labor market interventions.

I use the formalization of Manski (2004). States of nature are possible distributions of treatment response for a population of observationally identical persons who are subject to treatment. The term “observationally identical” means that these persons share the same observed covariates. Groups of persons with different observed covariates are considered as separate populations.

The problem is to choose treatments for the population. Treatment response is assumed individualistic. Welfare is the mean outcome across the population. Optimal treatment is infeasible because the true distribution of treatment response is not known. Decision making uses data on the outcomes realized by a sample of the population. Statistical decision functions are called statistical treatment rules in this context.

A simple way to use sample data is as-if optimization. Applying the analogy principle, one acts as if the empirical outcome distribution for each treatment equals its population outcome distribution. Emulating the fact that it is optimal to choose a treatment that maximizes the mean population outcome, one chooses a treatment that maximizes the average sample outcome. This is the empirical success (ES) rule.

When analyzing data from randomized trials, researchers have long used asymptotic arguments to motivate the ES rule, citing laws of large numbers and central limit theorems. A recent econometric literature has studied the maximum regret of the ES rule with trial data. This work considers an ideal trial, where all subjects comply with assigned treatments and all realized outcomes are observed. Moreover, it assumes the distribution of treatment response in the study population is the same as in the population to be treated. Then the feasible states of nature are ones where, for each treatment, the distribution of counterfactual outcomes equals that of realized outcomes.

Manski (2004) used a large-deviations inequality for sample averages of bounded outcomes to derive an upper bound on the maximum regret of the ES rule in problems of choice between two treatments. Generalizing to problems with multiple treatments, Manski and Tetenov (2016) used large-deviations inequalities to bound the maximum regret of the ES rule. Stoye (2009) showed that in trials with moderate sample size, the ES rule either exactly or approximately minimizes maximum regret in cases with two treatments and a balanced design. Hirano and Porter (2009, 2020) showed that the ES rule is asymptotically optimal in a formal decision-theoretic sense. Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019, 2021) developed algorithms for numerical computation of the maximum regret of the ES rule when outcomes are binary. Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) and Mbakop and Tabord-Meehan (2021) studied a generalization of the ES rule, empirical welfare maximization, intended for application when the set of feasible treatment policies is constrained in various ways. Also see the early related work on empirical risk minimization (e.g., Vapnik (1999)).
Econometricians have long analyzed data on realized treatments and outcomes when treatments are chosen purposefully rather than randomly. Haavelmo (1944) wrote (p. 7): “the economist is usually a rather passive observer with respect to important economic phenomena; he usually does not control the actual collection of economic statistics. He is not in a position to enforce the prescriptions of his own designs of ideal experiments.” A central contribution of early econometrics was to recognize that, when treatments are chosen purposefully, distributions of counterfactual and realized outcomes need not coincide.\footnote{The term “analysis of treatment response” has become widespread since the 1990s, but it was not used in early writing on econometrics. A central focus was identification and estimation of models of jointly determined treatments and outcomes. The mathematical notation typically defined symbols only for realized treatments and outcomes, leaving implicit the idea of potential outcomes under counterfactual treatments. See Manski (1995, Chapter 6) and Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000) for discussions that connect the early and recent literatures.}

Some recent applications of statistical decision theory have studied decision making when distributions of counterfactual and realized outcomes may differ. Manski (2007) studied trials with selective attrition and treatment choice with observational data. Stoye (2012) examined trials with forms of imperfect internal or external validity. Athey and Wager (2021) studied choice with observational data when the set of feasible treatment policies is constrained in various ways. Whereas Manski (2007) and Stoye (2012) provided finite-sample maximum-regret analysis in settings where average treatment effects are partially identified, Athey and Wager performed asymptotic analysis under assumptions that give point identification.

This paper presents new analysis of the maximum regret of rules for treatment with observational data when average treatment effects are partially identified. Section 5.2 develops algebraic findings for the limit case where one knows the distribution of realized outcomes in the study population. Section 5.3 reports numerical findings for treatment with sample data.

### 5.2. Treatment Choice With Knowledge of the Distribution of Realized Outcomes

I consider an observational study with two treatments \{a, b\} and outcomes taking values in \([0, 1]\). Each member of the study population has potential outcomes \([y(a), y(b)]\). Binary indicators \([\delta(a), \delta(b)]\) denote whether these outcomes are observable. Realized outcomes are observable, but counterfactual ones are not, so the possible indicator values are \([\delta(a) = 1, \delta(b) = 0]\) and \([\delta(a) = 0, \delta(b) = 1]\). State \(s\) denotes a possible distribution \(P[y(a), y(b), \delta(a), \delta(b)]\) of outcomes and observability. The problem is to choose treatments in a population with the same distribution of treatment response as the study population.

Given that only realized outcomes are observed, \(P[\delta(a) = 1] + P[\delta(b) = 1] = 1\). Let \(p \equiv P[\delta(b) = 1].\) If \(0 < p < 1\), observation asymptotically reveals the true \(P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\), and \(p\). It does not reveal \(P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 0]\) and \(P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 0]\). This limit setting has been studied in partial identification analysis of treatment response, as in Manski (1990). I proceed likewise here.

#### 5.2.1. MMR Treatment Choice

Manski (2007, Proposition 1) proved a simple result when the planner can make a fractional treatment allocation, assigning fraction \(z \in [0, 1]\) of the population to treatment \(b\) and \(1 - z\) to \(a\). Let all distributions of counterfactual outcomes be feasible. Let
$P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]$, and $p$ be known. Then the unique MMR allocation is

$$z_{\text{MMR}} = E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot p + \{1 - E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]\}(1 - p).$$

(10)

Its maximum regret is $z_{\text{MMR}}(1 - z_{\text{MMR}})$.

It may be that a planner cannot make a fractional allocation, being constrained to provide the same treatment to all of the population; see Manski (2009). Moreover, a planner may be required to choose between $z = 0$ and $z = 1$. The new analysis performed here studies this setting.

Welfare in state $s$ equals max{$E_s[y(b)], E_s[y(a)]$} or min{$E_s[y(b)], E_s[y(a)]$}. Section 2.3 showed that, in states where treatment $a$ is better, the regret of an SDF is the product of the sampling probability that the rule commits a Type I error and the loss in welfare when choosing $b$. When $b$ is better, regret is the probability of a Type II error times the loss in welfare when choosing $a$. Thus, regret is $R_{cs} \cdot |E_s[y(b)] - E_s[y(a)]|$. The treatment rule being singleton and deterministic, the error probability can only equal 0 or 1. Thus, regret is either 0 or $|E_s[y(b)] - E_s[y(a)]|$. With outcomes having range $[0, 1]$, $E_s[y(a)](1) = 0$ and $E_s[y(b)](1) = 0$ can take any values in this interval. Hence, by the law of iterated expectations, the feasible values of $E_s[y(a)]$ and $E_s[y(b)]$ are

$$E_s[y(a)] \in [E_s[y(a)](1) \cdot (1 - p), E_s[y(a)](1) \cdot (1 - p) + p],$$

(11a)

$$E_s[y(b)] \in [E_s[y(b)](1) \cdot p, E_s[y(b)](1) \cdot p + (1 - p)].$$

(11b)

With choice of treatment $a$, regret is zero when $E_s[y(b)] < E_s[y(a)]$ and positive when $E_s[y(b)] > E_s[y(a)]$. Maximum regret occurs when $E_s[y(a)](1) = 0$ and $E_s[y(b)](1) = 1$. Then regret is

$$R_{as} \cdot |E_s[y(b)] - E_s[y(a)]|$$

$$= E_s[y(b)](1) \cdot p + \{1 - E_s[y(a)](1)\}(1 - p)$$

$$= z_{\text{MMR}}.$$  

(12a)

With choice of $b$, maximum regret is

$$R_{bs} \cdot |E_s[y(b)] - E_s[y(a)]|$$

$$= E_s[y(a)](1) \cdot (1 - p) + \{1 - E_s[y(b)](1)\} \cdot p$$

$$= 1 - z_{\text{MMR}}.$$  

(12b)

Thus, treatment $b$ minimizes maximum regret if $z_{\text{MMR}} \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and treatment $a$ if $z_{\text{MMR}} \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

This shows that requiring a deterministic singleton treatment choice reduces welfare. The MMR value with the constraint is min{$z_{\text{MMR}}, 1 - z_{\text{MMR}}$}. When fractional allocations are permitted, it is $z_{\text{MMR}}(1 - z_{\text{MMR}})$.

5.2.2. Maximum Regret of the ES Rule

Researchers studying observational data sometimes assume that counterfactual and realized outcome distributions coincide, as in an ideal trial. Then treatment choice with the ES rule is optimal when the distribution of realized outcomes is known. However, the
ES rule need not perform well with larger state spaces. I examine the setting in which all counterfactual outcome distributions are feasible.

Given knowledge of the distribution of realized outcomes, the ES rule chooses treatment \( b \) if \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 > E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \) and \( a \) if \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 < E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \). Either choice is consistent with the rule if \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 = E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \).\(^8\)

When \( p = \frac{1}{2} \), the ES rule coincides with the deterministic singleton rule that minimizes maximum regret. We found above that treatment \( b \) minimizes maximum regret if \( Z_{MMR} \geq \frac{1}{2} \) and treatment \( a \) if \( Z_{MMR} \leq \frac{1}{2} \). When \( p = \frac{1}{2} \), expression (10) reduces to \( Z_{MMR} = \frac{1}{2} [ E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 - E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 ] + \frac{1}{2} \).

When \( p \neq \frac{1}{2} \), the ES and MMR rules yield the same treatment choice in some cases but different choices in others. Both treatments are consistent with the ES rule if \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 = E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \). Both are consistent with the MMR rule when \( Z_{MMR} = \frac{1}{2} \). When \( E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 > E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 \), the ES rule chooses treatment \( a \). By (12a), maximum regret is \( Z_{MMR} \). When \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 > E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \), the ES rule chooses \( b \). By (12b), maximum regret is \( 1 - Z_{MMR} \).

5.2.3. Illustration: Sentencing and Recidivism

To illustrate, I use the Manski and Nagin (1998) analysis of sentencing and recidivism of juvenile offenders in Utah. The treatments are sentencing options. Judges in Utah have had the discretion to order varying sentences for juvenile offenders. Some offenders are sentenced to residential confinement (\( a \)) and others are given sentences with no confinement (\( b \)). One possible counterfactual policy would replace judicial discretion with a mandate that all offenders be confined. Another might mandate no confinement.

To compare these mandates, we took the outcome of interest to be recidivism in the two-year period following sentencing. Let \( y = 1 \) if an offender commits no new offense and \( y = 0 \) otherwise. We obtained data on the sentences received and the outcomes realized by all male offenders in Utah born from 1970 through 1974 and convicted of offenses before age 16. The data reveal that 11 percent of the offenders were confined and that 23 percent of these persons did not offend again in the two years following sentencing. The remaining 89 percent were not confined and 41 percent of these persons did not offend again. Thus, \( P[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \) = 0.23, \( P[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 \) = 0.41, and \( p = 0.89 \).

Reviewing the criminology literature, we found little research on sentencing practices and disparate predictions of treatment response. Hence, we performed partial identification analysis of treatment response, assuming no knowledge of counterfactual outcomes. This makes the present analysis applicable. Equation (12a) shows that the maximum regret of treatment \( a \) is \((0.41)(0.89) + 0.11 - (0.23)(0.11) = 0.45 \). Equation (12b) shows that the maximum regret of \( b \) is \((0.23)(0.11) + 0.89 - (0.41)(0.89) = 0.55 \). Hence, treatment \( a \) minimizes maximum regret.

Suppose one assumes, without basis, that Utah judges have sentenced offenders randomly to treatments \( a \) and \( b \). One then might use the ES rule to choose between the two. Given that 0.41 > 0.23, the result is choice of treatment \( b \). Thus, the ES rule selects the treatment that is inferior from the minimax-regret perspective.

5.3. Treatment Choice With Observational Sample Data

The above analysis assumes knowledge of \( p \), \( E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \), and \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 \). Suppose that one only observes a random sample of the population. Sample data do

\(^8\)Maximum regret when \( E[y(b)] \delta(b) = 1 = E[y(a)] \delta(a) = 1 \) differs depending on whether a planner chooses a specified treatment or randomizes. Randomizing yields smaller maximum regret.
not reveal population distributions, so the state space has the higher-dimensional form \( \{P_s[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], P_s[y(a)|\delta(a) = 0], P_s[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1], P_s[y(b)|\delta(b) = 0], p_s, s \in S \} \).

Considering a planner who can make a fractional treatment allocation, Manski (2007, Proposition 2) proved that choosing the sample analog of \( z_{MMR} \) as the treatment allocation yields the same maximum regret as does \( z_{MMR} \). Here is the reasoning. The sample analog of \( z_{MMR} \) is:

\[
    z_N = E_N[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] \cdot p_N + \{1 - E_N[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]\}(1 - p_N) \\
    = E_N[y(b) \cdot \delta(b)] - E_N[y(a) \cdot \delta(a)] + (1 - p_N).
\] (13)

The second equality shows that \( E(z_N) = z_{MMR} \). This and the fact that welfare is linear in \( z_{MMR} \) imply that the finite-sample maximum regret achieved by \( z_N \) equals the maximum regret achieved by \( z_{MMR} \).

This finding extends to settings where a planner is not permitted to make a fractional allocation but can make a randomized singleton treatment choice. It is easy to modify \( z_N \) to obtain an MMR randomized singleton rule. Let \( u \) be a uniform random variable drawn independently of the sample data. Consider the rule \( z_{Nu} = 1[u \leq z_N] \). Then \( E(z_{Nu}|z_N) = z_N \) and \( E(z_{Nu}) = E[E(z_{Nu}|z_N)] = E(z_N) = z_{MMR} \).

Now suppose that a planner is constrained to choose a singleton function of the empirical distribution of realized outcomes and treatments. Thus, randomization with an independent uniform random variable is not permitted. The ES rule remains feasible. Another possibility, which I call the asymptotic minimax-regret (AMMR) rule, chooses \( b \) if \( z_N > \frac{1}{2} \) and \( a \) if \( z_N < \frac{1}{2} \), with a specified default choice if \( z_N = \frac{1}{2} \).

Algebraic computation of the maximum regret of the AMMR and ES rules appears intractable, a difficulty being that state-dependent error probabilities generally do not have explicit forms. Litvin and Manski (2021) documented an algorithm coded in STATA for numerical computation of the maximum regret of these and other user-specified treatment rules in settings with binary outcomes. Coding for the AMMR, ES, and some decision rules using instrumental variables is built in.

The program uses Monte Carlo integration to approximate error probabilities for a specified rule. Maximum regret is approximated by computing regret on a grid that discretizes the state space. The state space specifies feasible values for the five Bernoulli distributions \( \{P_s[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], P_s[y(a)|\delta(a) = 0], P_s[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1], P_s[y(b)|\delta(b) = 0], P_s[\delta(b) = 1], s \in S \} \). A user can place a flexible set of constraints on the feasible distributions. One may place lower/upper bounds on the values of the Bernoulli probabilities. One may bound the difference between the distributions of realized and counterfactual outcomes.

Tables III and IV use the program to compute the maximum regret of the AMMR and ES rules. Panels A and B of each table differ in the feasible outcome distributions. All distributions are feasible in Panel A. Panel B assumes that \( -\frac{1}{2} \leq P[y(t) = 1|\delta(t) = 1] - P[y(t) = 1|\delta(t) = 0] \leq \frac{1}{2} \), \( t \in \{a, b\} \). Each row of a table specifies a sample size \( N \), in increments of 25 from 25 to 100. Each column is a value of \( p \), in increments of 0.1 from 0.5 to 0.9. It is unnecessary to consider values of \( p \) below 0.5 because the state space in each panel views the two treatments symmetrically; hence, maximum regret is the same for \( p \) and \( 1 - p \).

Given values for \( N \) and \( p \), a cell entry presents the approximate value of maximum regret across feasible values of \( \{P[y(t)|\delta(t) = 1], P[y(t)|\delta(t) = 0]\}, t \in \{a, b\} \). In each
TABLE III  
MAXIMUM REGRET OF THE AMMR RULE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>p</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>0.3747</td>
<td>0.3782</td>
<td>0.3773</td>
<td>0.3792</td>
<td>0.3777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
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<td>0.3887</td>
<td>0.3899</td>
<td>0.3892</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.4023</td>
<td>0.4021</td>
<td>0.4011</td>
<td>0.4026</td>
<td>0.4022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) Unrestricted Outcome Distributions

(B) \[-\frac{1}{2} \leq P[y(t) = 1|\delta(t) = 1] - P[y(t) = 1|\delta(t) = 0] \leq \frac{1}{2}, \ t \in \{a, b\}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>p</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.3577</td>
<td>0.3713</td>
<td>0.3852</td>
<td>0.3927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum regret across feasible Bernoulli distributions is approximated by maximizing over a grid of 25 values for each Bernoulli parameter. Someone who does not know p but who finds it credible to bound it can approximate maximum regret at a specified sample size by the maximum entry across the relevant column cells of the table.

Table IIIA has many interesting features. The maximum regret of the AMMR rule varies negligibly with p. For each value of p, maximum regret rises rather than falls with N, increasing from about 0.34 at N = 25 to 0.40 at N = 100. Part of the explanation is that sampling variation makes the rule more randomized for small N and less so for large N. In the polar case N = 1, the AMMR rule coincides with the randomized single-

state, regret is approximated by Monte Carlo integration across 5000 simulated samples. Maximum regret across feasible Bernoulli distributions is approximated by maximizing over a grid of 25 values for each Bernoulli parameter. Someone who does not know p but who finds it credible to bound it can approximate maximum regret at a specified sample size by the maximum entry across the relevant column cells of the table.

Table IV has many interesting features. The maximum regret of the ES rule varies negligibly with p. For each value of p, maximum regret increases rather than falls with N, increasing from about 0.50 at N = 25 to 0.90 at N = 100. Part of the explanation is that sampling variation makes the rule more randomized for small N and less so for large N. In the polar case N = 1, the ES rule coincides with the randomized single-

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9To create a simulated sample, the program draws N observations \{\delta_i, i = 1, \ldots, N\} from P[\delta(b) = 1]. Let K = \sum \delta_i. It draws K observations \{y_i, i = 1, \ldots, K\} from P[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] and N-K from P[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]. It is possible that K = 0 or N, so the treatment rule must be defined for these cases. The program uses the simulated realizations of (\delta, y) to compute a simulated treatment choice. For a specified positive integer T, the program repeats the above T times and uses the T simulated treatment choices to approximate regret in state s.
ton rule $z_N$, which has maximum regret $\frac{1}{4}$ for all values of $p$.\footnote{When $N = 1$, $z_N$ can only take the value 0 or 1. Hence, $z_N = 1[\epsilon_N > \frac{1}{2}]$. For any value of $N$, the maximum regret of $z_N$ given knowledge of the distribution of realized outcomes is $z_{\text{MMR}}(1 - z_{\text{MMR}})$. Maximum regret across all $\{p, E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\}$ is $\frac{1}{4}$, which occurs when $z_{\text{MMR}} = \frac{1}{4}$. This occurs for every $p$ when $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$.\footnote{Given knowledge of the distribution of realized outcomes, the maximum regret of the MMR deterministic singleton rule is $\min(z_{\text{MMR}}, 1 - z_{\text{MMR}})$. Maximum regret across all $\{p, E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\}$ is $\frac{1}{4}$, which occurs when $z_{\text{MMR}} = \frac{1}{4}$. This occurs for every $p$ when $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$.\footnote{The ES rule does not benefit in small samples from the randomizing effect of random sampling because the states yielding maximum regret are polar ones where $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]$ and $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]$ equal 0 or 1. Holding $p$ fixed, the supremum of regret across $\{E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\}$ such that $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] > E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]$ is $p$ when $p > \frac{1}{2}$ and $1 - p$ when $p < \frac{1}{2}$. The former occurs when $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = 1$ and $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = 1$ and the latter when $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = 0$ and $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = 0$. The supremum of regret across $\{E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1], E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]\}$ such that $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] > E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]$ is again $p$ when $p > \frac{1}{2}$ and $1 - p$ when $p < \frac{1}{2}$. The former occurs when $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = 0$ and $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = 0$ and the latter when $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1] = 1$ and $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1] = 1$.}} As $N \to \infty$, the AMMR rule approaches the MMR deterministic singleton rule, which has maximum regret $\frac{1}{2}$ for all values of $p$.

Table IIIIB constrains the state space to bound the difference between realized and counterfactual outcome distributions. This mitigates the identification problem. The restriction reduces maximum regret moderately when $p = 0.5$, but only negligibly when $p = 0.9$.

Tables IVA and IVB consider the ES rule. Section 5.2.2 considered this rule when the distribution of realized outcomes is known. It was shown that maximum regret equals $z_{\text{MMR}}$ or $1 - z_{\text{MMR}}$. Holding $p$ fixed, maximum regret across all values of $E[y(a)|\delta(a) = 1]$ and $E[y(b)|\delta(b) = 1]$ is $\max(p, 1 - p)$. Table IVA shows that this is also maximum regret for the finite-sample ES rule.\footnote{Table IVA shows that bounding the difference between realized and counterfactual distributions reduces maximum regret. The findings are subtle due to the small-sample effect of constraining the state space, with different behavior for $p = 0.5$ and 0.6 than for $p \geq 0.76$.} Table IVB shows that bounding the difference between realized and counterfactual distributions reduces maximum regret. The findings are subtle due to the small-sample effect of constraining the state space, with different behavior for $p = 0.5$ and 0.6 than for $p \geq 0.76$.

6. CONCLUSION

To reiterate, use of statistical decision theory to evaluate econometric models is conceptually simple. A planner specifies a state space listing all states of nature deemed feasible. One evaluates the performance of any SDF by the state-dependent vector of expected welfare that it yields. One evaluates model-based SDFs by their performance across the state space, not across the model space.

The primary challenge to use of statistical decision theory is computational. In his discussion sketching application of statistical decision theory to prediction, Haavelmo (1944) remarked that such application (p. 111): “although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra.” Many mathematical operations that were infeasible in 1944 are tractable now, as a result of advances in analytical and numerical methods. The advances include important theorems yielding useful large-deviations bounds and local-asymptotic approximations, as well as revolutionary developments in computer capabilities that enable approximate numerical solution of decision problems. Hence, it has increasingly become possible to use statistical decision theory when performing econometric research that aims to inform decision making. Future advances should continue to expand the scope of applications.
A.1. Bayes Decisions

Supposing that one wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, research in statistical decision theory often refers to (4) as minimization of Bayes risk. This term may seem odd given the absence of reference to Bayesian inference. Criterion (4) places a distribution on the state space ex ante and optimizes subjective average welfare. No posterior distribution computed after observation of data appears.

Justification for use of the word Bayes rests on a mathematical result relating (4) to conditional Bayes decision making. Here one performs Bayesian inference, using the likelihood function for the observed data to transform the prior distribution on $S$ into a posterior distribution. One then chooses an action that maximizes posterior subjective welfare. See, for example, the seminal text of DeGroot (1970) on Optimal Statistical Decisions or discussions of applications to randomized trials in Spiegelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar (1994), Cheng, Su, and Berry (2003), and Scott (2010). The conditional Bayes perspective has long been used to study not only static decisions but also sequential ones, formalized as dynamic programming problems. These include problems of sequential experimentation, sometimes called bandit problems.

As described above, conditional Bayes decision making is unconnected to Wald’s frequentist statistical decision theory. However, suppose that the set of feasible SDFs is unconstrained and that certain regularity conditions hold. Then Fubini’s theorem shows that the conditional Bayes decision for each possible data realization solves Wald’s problem of maximization of subjective average welfare. See Berger (1985, Section 4.4.1) for general analysis and Chamberlain (2007) for application to a linear econometric model with instrumental variables. On the other hand, Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018), Athey and Wager (2021), and Mbakop and Tabord-Meehan (2021) studied problems in which the set of feasible SDFs is constrained. Then (4) need not yield the same actions as conditional Bayes decisions.

The equivalence of criterion (4) and conditional Bayes decisions holds under specified conditions. Philosophical advocates of the conditional Bayes paradigm go beyond the mathematics. They assert as an axiom that decision making should condition on observed data and should not perform frequentist thought experiments examining how SDFs perform in repeated sampling; see Berger (1985, Chapter 1).

Considering the mathematical equivalence of minimization of Bayes risk and conditional Bayes decisions, Berger asserted that the conditional Bayes perspective is “correct,” and the Wald frequentist perspective “bizarre.” He stated (p. 160): “from the conditional perspective together with the utility development of loss, the correct way to view the situation is that of minimizing $\rho(\pi(\theta|x), a)$. One should condition on what is known, namely $x$ … and average the utility over what is unknown, namely $\theta$. The desire to minimize $r(\pi, \delta)$ would be deemed rather bizarre from this perspective.” Here $a$ is an action, $x$ is data, $\theta$ is a state of nature, $\pi(\theta|x)$ is the posterior distribution on the state space, $\rho$ is posterior loss with choice of action $a$, $\delta$ is an SDF, $\pi$ is the prior distribution on $S$, and $r(\pi, \delta)$ is Bayes risk.

I view Berger’s normative statement to be overly enthusiastic for two reasons. First, the statement does not address how decisions should be made when part of the decision is choice of a procedure to collect data, as in experimental design. Such decisions must be made ex ante, before collecting data. Hence, frequentist consideration of the performance of SDFs across possible realizations of the data is inevitable. Berger recognized this in his chapter on “Preposterior and Sequential Analysis.”
Second, the Bayesian prescription for conditioning decision making on sample data presumes that the planner feels able to place a credible subjective prior distribution on the state space. Bayesians have long struggled to provide guidance on specification of priors and the matter continues to be controversial. When one finds it difficult to assert a credible subjective distribution, Bayesians may suggest use of some default distribution, called a “reference” or “conventional” or “objective” prior; see Berger (2006). However, there is no consensus on the prior that should play this role. The chosen prior affects decisions.

A.2. Maximin and Minimax Regret

Concern with specification of priors motivated Wald (1950) to study the minimax criterion, writing (p. 18): “a minimax solution seems, in general, to be a reasonable solution of the decision problem when an a priori distribution ... does not exist or is unknown to the experimenter.” I similarly am concerned with decision making with no subjective distribution on states. However, I have mainly measured the performance of SDFs by maximum regret rather than by minimum expected welfare. The maximin and MMR criteria are equivalent only in special cases, particularly when optimal welfare is invariant across states. They differ more generally. Whereas maximin considers only the worst outcome that an action may yield across states, MMR considers the worst outcome relative to what is achievable in a given state.

Practical and conceptual reasons motivate focus on maximum regret. From a practical perspective, MMR decisions behave more reasonably than do maximin ones in the important context of treatment choice with data from randomized trials. In common settings with balanced designs, the MMR rule is well approximated by the empirical success rule, which chooses the treatment with the highest observed average outcome in the trial; see Section 5. In contrast, the maximin criterion ignores the trial data, whatever they may be. This was recognized verbally by Savage (1951), who stated that the criterion is “ultrapessimistic” and wrote (p. 63): “it can lead to the absurd conclusion in some cases that no amount of relevant experimentation should deter the actor from behaving as though he were in complete ignorance.” Savage did not flesh out this statement, but it is easy to show that this occurs with trial data; see Manski (2004).

The conceptual appeal of using maximum regret to measure performance is that it quantifies how lack of knowledge of the true state of nature diminishes the quality of decisions. The term “maximum regret” is a shorthand for the maximum sub-optimality of a decision criterion across the feasible states of nature. An SDF with small maximum regret is uniformly near-optimal across all states. This is a desirable property. Minimax regret has drawn diverse reactions from decision theorists. In a famous early critique, Chernoff (1954) observed that MMR decisions are not always consistent with the choice axiom known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). He considered this a serious deficiency. Chernoff’s view has been endorsed by some modern decision theorists, such as Binmore (2009). However, Sen (1993) argued that adherence to axioms such as IIA does not per se provide a sound basis for evaluation of decision criteria. He asserted that consideration of the context of decision making is essential.

Manski (2011) argued that adherence to the IIA axiom is not a virtue per se. What matters is how violation of the axiom affects welfare. I observed that the MMR violation of the IIA axiom does not yield choice of a dominated SDF. The MMR decision is always undominated when it is unique. There generically exists an undominated MMR decision when the criterion has multiple solutions. Hence, I concluded that violation of the IIA axiom is not a sound rationale to dismiss minimax regret.
A.3. Choosing the Welfare Function, State Space, and Decision Criterion

Statistical decision theory views the welfare function, state space, and decision criterion as separate meta-choices made by a planner. It views these meta-choices as predetermined rather than matters to be studied within the theory. Arguably, planners might choose welfare functions, state spaces, and decision criteria jointly. A practical reason is that some joint choices yield decision problems that are easier to solve than others. A planner might find it desirable to make a joint choice that yields tractable solutions.

An issue for meta-choice is that some choices may not be implementable. Consider maximization of subjective expected welfare on a nonparametric state space. It is delicate to specify distributions on some nonparametric spaces. For example, the familiar notion of a flat prior may not be well-defined.

Another issue is that implementable choices which initially seem appealing may yield solutions that seem “unattractive” in some sense. An example is Savage’s conclusion that maximin treatment choice with data from a randomized trial is unattractive because it ignores the data entirely. Stoye (2009) studied a more subtle case of decisions that ignore trial data entirely, occurring when members of the population have an observable covariate that is continuously distributed and when the state space does not constrain how treatment response varies with the covariate. His analysis focuses on MMR, but his method of proof uses the equivalence of MMR to maximization of subjective expected welfare with a certain worst-case prior. Hence, his result also holds for this case of maximization of subjective expected welfare.

REFERENCES


