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Personal Information:

Date of birth: July 24th, 1990
Sex: Male
Marital Status: Single
Citizenship: United States

Undergraduate Studies:

S.B. in Mathematics (with Honors), A.B. in Economics (with Honors), A.B. in Statistics
University of Chicago, 2008-2012

Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2012 to present
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
Thesis Title: Information and Learning in Mechanism Design
Expected Completion Date: May 2018

References:

Professor Drew Fudenberg
MIT Department of Economics
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Professor Jerry Green
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Professor Benjamin Golub
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary field: Microeconomic Theory
Secondary fields: Organizational Economics, Industrial Organization

Teaching Experience:

AY 2015/16, 2016/17	Econ 985TA/985TB, “Research In Economic Theory, Modeling, Industrial Organization and Econometrics” Senior Thesis Tutorial, Harvard University, section leader
Spring 2014	Econ 2052, “Game Theory I: Equilibrium Theory” (graduate game theory topics course), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Drew Fudenberg

Research Experience and Other Employment:

Summer 2016	Research Assistant for Professor Benjamin Golub
Fall 2014- Summer 2015	Research Assistant for Professor Tomasz Strzalecki
Summer/Fall 2013	Affiliate, Program for Evolutionary Dynamics
Summer 2012	Research Assistant for Professor Xavier Gabaix

Professional Activities:

Department service:

Organizer: Games and Markets Lunch, AY 2015/16, 2016/17

Master of Ceremonies: Economics Department Holiday Party, December 2014

Referee:

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

AY 2017-2018	Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University
Fall 2016 and Spring 2017	Bok Center Award for Teaching (awarded two times)
Spring 2015	Institute for Humane Studies PhD Scholarship Award
Spring 2012	Paul R. Cohen Award (Top 5 record in mathematics among graduating seniors)
Spring 2012	David S. Hu Award (Departmental award for graduating seniors in economics)
Spring 2012	Phi Beta Kappa

Job Market Paper:

“Informational Robustness in Intertemporal Pricing” with Xiaosheng Mu

Consumers may be unsure of their willingness-to-pay for a product if they are unfamiliar with some of its features or have never made a similar purchase before. How does this possibility influence optimal pricing? To answer this question, we introduce a dynamic pricing model where buyers have the ability to learn about their value for a product over time. A seller commits to a pricing strategy, while buyers arrive exogenously and decide when to make a one-time purchase. The seller does not know how each buyer learns about his value for the product, and seeks to maximize profits against the worst-case information arrival processes. With only a single quality level and no known informational externalities, a constant price path delivers the optimal profit, which is also the optimal profit in an environment where buyers cannot delay. We then demonstrate that introductory pricing can be beneficial when the seller knows information is conveyed across buyers, and that intertemporal incentives arise when there are gradations in quality.

Other Research Papers

“False Positives and Transparency in Scientific Research”

This paper develops a model of costly information acquisition, focusing on an application to scientific research. When research protocols are not fully transparent, scientists are incentivized to make their experiments more susceptible to false positives, even though they obtain higher surplus from more informative experiments. On the other hand, non-transparency can induce a scientist to undertake a costlier but more informative experiment if it also enables her to commit to acting scrupulously. Our analysis suggests, counterintuitively, that policies establishing greater transparency in scientific methodology might therefore ultimately lead to some scientists undertaking research that is worse for those interested in the results.

“Prototyping under Competition”

Allocations of contracts for new technology development are often done prior to the total resolution of uncertainty regarding ultimate viability. A common method of allocation involves prototyping—demonstrating some preliminary version of the project with the intention of bringing it to completion. This considers the value of competition in these settings, relating the results to challenges faced by policymakers. When agents share the same ordinal preferences over their projects as the principal (for instance, if surplus is ultimately divided according to Nash bargaining between the principal and selected agent), an optimal mechanism need not feature stochastic project choice when randomizations across agents are feasible. Such mechanisms may be suboptimal without the alignment of the principal's and agent's incentives. The resulting policy requires commitment whenever randomization is involved, despite the optimality of deterministic mechanisms in the single agent case.

Research in Progress

“Informed Principal with Evolving Private Information”

Procurers often require contracts to be written in the presence of evolving uncertainty on the procurer's side. Motivated by these applications, this paper adapts a sequential screening model to accommodate private information on the principal's (procurer's) side. Both the agent's cost and the principal's demand parameter are privately observed by each party, and the agent takes an action at time 1, which we interpret as investment. Results on information irrelevance are obtained in cases where the agent's type is uncorrelated across periods, and when the investment action does not influence the principal's type. Without these features, distortions arise as the principal must promise payments in order to prevent the agent from becoming a “victim of his own success.”

“Contracting with Experiment Choice: Interpreting Failure”

This paper develops a model for contracting for experimentation that distinguishes the *match quality* between the principal and the agent and the project quality of a particular research activity. Match quality is symmetrically unknown but learned about over time, though project quality is privately observed by the agent. This paper shows how the optimal level of discretion depends on the uncertainty over match quality. Specifically, an incentive conflict arises when there is uncertainty about match quality, with the agent preferring to change projects in case failure causes the principal to become pessimistic too early.