

UNIVERSITIES AS INCUBATORS OF MASS UPRISING

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Universities as Incubators of Mass Uprising

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Abstract

We link high-frequency geocoded protest data during Bangladesh’s 2024 Monsoon Revolution, Facebook measures of protest activity and social connectivity, university enrollment and demographics to establish: (1) campus protest precedes off-campus mobilization; (2) student concentration predicts both on- and off-campus protest, while non-student youth, educated adults, urbanization, and locations of “placebo” universities authorized but not yet operating do not; and (3) social connectivity to campus protests predicts off-campus diffusion one week later. Universities appear to incubate mass uprising by making dissent visible, coordinated, and capable of spreading beyond campus. Such patterns are also evident in U.S. Vietnam War protests and in global data. These results can rationalize why governments in Hungary, Turkey, Iran, India, Russia, Bangladesh, Israel, and the United States have targeted campuses to suppress dissent.

Keywords: universities, student protests, revolution.

JEL Codes: D74, I23, P16.

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1 Introduction

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina ruled Bangladesh uninterrupted from 2009 to August 2024. Over those fifteen years, her government became increasingly authoritarian, carrying out enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture, imprisoning political opponents, and restricting free speech ([Human Rights Watch, 2025](#); [Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, 2026](#)). It systematically weakened the political and organizational infrastructure of the opposition, leaving them unable to mount a serious challenge in three consecutive elections marked by intimidation, political arrests, ballot stuffing, and other electoral irregularities ([Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018](#); [United Nations Human Rights Experts, 2024](#)). Yet in July 2024, a student protest movement that began on the Dhaka University campus forced the government from power within five weeks, amid violence that left roughly 1,400 people dead ([UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025](#)). A leader who had suppressed organized political opposition for fifteen years was quickly forced into exile.

The central role of universities and students in this political rupture was striking, but not unprecedented. Bangladesh has a long history of student-led political mobilization. The 1952 Language Movement, also centered on the University of Dhaka campus, became a formative episode in Bengali nationalism after police killed students who demanded recognition of Bengali as a state language of Pakistan ([van Schendel, 2020](#)).

The political importance of universities extends well beyond Bangladesh. U.S. university campuses were major sites of antiwar protest during the Vietnam War ([Miller, nd](#)). Governments, recognizing the threat posed by universities, in turn frequently target universities and student activism during periods of political contestation ([Scholars at Risk, 2023](#)). For example, following the failed 2016 coup, Turkish authorities dismissed thousands of academics, detained student activists, and brought the appointment of university rectors under direct state control ([Human Rights Watch, 2018b](#); [Freedom House, 2026](#)). Similar efforts to curb political dissent on university campuses have appeared in Hungary, Iran, Israel, India, and Russia ([Human Rights Watch, 2018a, 2022](#); [UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2026](#); [Human Rights Watch, 2019](#); [Amnesty International, 2021](#)). In the United States, the federal government froze more than \$2.2 billion in grants and \$60 million in contracts to Harvard University in April 2025 after the university rejected demands concerning campus activism and governance ([Casey, 2025](#)).

The 2024 uprising in Bangladesh emerged from a comparatively narrow dispute over access to public-sector jobs. A longstanding quota system reserved up to 30 percent of civil-service positions for descendants of participants in Bangladesh’s 1971 War of Independence,

placing those positions outside open competition for other applicants. Dhaka University students began organizing demonstrations after a June 2024 High Court decision preserved the quota. Relative to the broader repression associated with Awami League rule, the quota was a limited grievance. Its political significance instead lay in the constituency it directly affected. University students facing a weak labor market could readily identify others with the same grievance, gather in common physical spaces, coordinate through dense peer and digital networks, and gain safety in numbers under a regime that routinely detained and forcibly “disappeared” isolated dissidents to suppress opposition (Sadik, 2026). As protests spread across campuses, ruling-party supporters and police attacked student demonstrators on July 15. Images and videos of the violence circulated widely, and protests spread beyond campuses and into city streets. Security forces responded with increasingly lethal force, including live ammunition, alongside curfews, internet shutdowns, mass arrests, and nationwide deployments. As mobilization and repression intensified, what began as a dispute over access to civil-service jobs evolved into a broader anti-government movement challenging state repression and authoritarian rule.

Our empirical analysis traces this progression from campus mobilization to broader protest. We construct a district-week panel of both on-campus and off-campus protest activity¹ to examine (1) what geographic and demographic characteristics predict where the Monsoon Uprising originates, and (2) how it spreads. To answer the origin question, we link the protest data to university and college enrollment measured before the uprising, and conduct an event study around the June 5, 2024 High Court “quota trigger”. Districts with larger shares of university and college students exhibit larger increases in protest activity after the quota trigger. In contrast, the share of residents of the same age who are not enrolled in a university or college does not predict protest. Nor do the shares of educated adults or urban residents. These comparisons show that student concentration is not simply proxying for the presence of young people, education, or urbanization. Instead, the pattern points to a distinctive role for universities as settings that facilitate coordination and collective action. To explore whether this relationship is causal, we also test whether locations of universities that had been authorized – but not yet operational and no students enrolled in July 2024 – predict protest activity. These “placebo” campuses do not predict protests, which makes it less likely that some unobserved correlate of campus siting decisions explains heightened protests near active campuses.

We next study the diffusion of protests over time and space. First, we show that on-

¹The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2023) recorded near-daily event-level coverage of demonstrations in Bangladesh from mid-2023 onward, allowing protests to be classified by location (on-campus; off-campus), actor composition, and level of violence.

campus protest clearly precedes off-campus protests, so the direction of diffusion is clear from the chronology. Facebook activity exhibits the same sequence: discussion of student protests rises sharply alongside on-campus mobilization, followed by broader discussion of protests that coincides with the subsequent increase in off-campus activity recorded by ACLED. State repression and fatalities likewise rise following protest activity, particularly as mobilization moves beyond university campuses.

Second, the spatial expansion follows a similar pattern. By late July, off-campus protests reach districts without university campuses, extending the uprising beyond the urban centers in which campus mobilization initially concentrated. Third, we combine protest locations with Facebook measures of social connectivity and show that districts that were more socially connected with locations that hosted campus protests the previous week experience greater off-campus mobilization one week later. Campuses not only serve as local sites of organization, but also as early nodes that catalyze wider political mobilization.

Why do universities play this distinctive role in political dissent, thereby becoming targets of state repression? Campuses bring educated young people into common physical spaces, generate repeated interaction, and sustain social and organizational networks that may make grievances easier to observe and collective action easier to coordinate (Cantoni et al., 2019). Recent episodes elsewhere are consistent with this interpretation. Student dissatisfaction with education and employment conditions also featured prominently in protests in Nepal in 2025 and the India Cockroach Janata Party movement in 2026, episodes often described collectively as part of a “Gen-Z Revolution” (Human Rights Watch, 2025). Yet our results from Bangladesh suggest that youth alone does not account for the pattern: university student concentration predicts mobilization but the local Gen-Z population share does not. Suggestive evidence from other settings points to a similarly distinctive role for universities. In the United States, early mobilization against the Vietnam War during 1967–69 occurred in college towns, conditional on county population density, education, urbanization, and state fixed effects. In a panel dataset covering 226 countries, (a) university enrollment and political protest activity are positively correlated, and (b) inter-temporal *changes* in university enrollment within countries predict *changes* in political protests.

Related Literature Our paper contributes to the literature on collective action and political mobilization. Cantoni et al. (2024) document geographic diffusion as a feature of protest movements across 218 countries. Kaur and Yuchtman (2024) and Yuchtman (2025) emphasize the political role of universities. Protest participation depends on beliefs about others’ behavior, so institutions that make participation visible can lower barriers to collective action (Cantoni et al., 2019). Initial mobilization can also have persistent effects on later

political participation (Madestam et al., 2013; Bursztyn et al., 2021), while social networks help sustain political engagement and the diffusion of collective action (Enikolopov et al., 2020; González, 2020). Student friendship networks shape political participation (Algan et al., 2026) and social-image concerns affect political expression (Braghieri, 2024).

We also contribute to the literature on how institutions can provide durable infrastructure for collective action (Dell et al., 2018; Satyanath et al., 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2014). We show that universities are one such institution when students coordinate around shared economic and political concerns. Cutler and Glaeser (2026) trace how organizational forms associated with intellectual autonomy have repeatedly placed universities in tension with political and legal authority.

2 Background

Universities and Protest. A long tradition in historical political science emphasizes the role of students and universities in political mobilization. Universities bring together educated young people in dense social and organizational networks, lowering the costs of coordination and providing a natural setting for collective action (Tarrow, 1994). Student-led mobilization has featured prominently in episodes of political contention and transformation (Huntington, 1968). During the Vietnam War, U.S. campuses hosted teach-ins, draft resistance, and demonstrations against military recruitment. In France in May 1968, campus disputes over university rules and policing expanded into a nationwide student-worker movement as millions joined a general strike, catalyzing major social and political changes (Ross, 2002). In Mexico in 1968, student demands for civil liberties and democratic reform preceded the Tlatelolco killings. Universities also served as important organizing sites during South Korea’s 1987 pro-democracy movement (Boren, 2001).

These examples inspire our investigation into whether universities matter for political mobilization, over and above its constituent components: the energy of youth, the political awareness of an educated population, or the agglomeration of dense urban locations. Campuses combine these characteristics in a common institutional environment with repeated interaction, student organizations, residence halls, dense peer networks, and visible public spaces. We examine the role of universities in political activism while separately controlling for many of these characteristics in isolation: youth, education, urbanization, density, and local economic structure.

University Politics in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has a long history of politically consequential student mobilization. Universities, and the University of Dhaka in particular, were

central to several political movements that preceded independence. During the 1952 Language Movement, Dhaka University students mobilized against the attempt to make Urdu the sole state language of Pakistan; student organizations subsequently played important roles in the 1969 mass uprising that led to the 1971 Liberation War ([van Schendel, 2020](#); [Haque, 2025](#)). University campuses had an established place in national political life well before the 2024 uprising.

Public universities have always remained closely connected to national politics through student wings of national political parties. University governance has also been politically consequential, with vice-chancellor appointments, residence-hall control, student organizations, and campus policing shaping the political life of higher education. Campuses provided organizational spaces through which national political conflicts were expressed. The coercive apparatus of the Hasina period made this role particularly salient. The [Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances \(2026\)](#) documents state repression of politically active student organizations.

The Quota Trigger. The 2024 movement began around the reinstatement of public-sector job quotas. On June 5, 2024, Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a quota system that had previously been abolished following mass student protests, restoring a 30 percent reservation of civil-service positions for descendants of veterans of the 1971 Liberation War. The Awami League first came to power in 1971, and critics associated the freedom-fighter category with political loyalty to the party ([Amnesty International, 2024b](#)).

For university students and recent graduates facing a weak labor market, access to public employment represented an important channel of formal-sector opportunity. The ruling therefore created a grievance shared by students across the country ([Human Rights Watch, 2025](#)). The quota dispute provided a focal issue around which students mobilized.

The Monsoon Revolution. After the quota trigger, protest expanded rapidly. On July 15, ruling-party supporters and police attacked student protesters on university campuses. The following day, police shot and killed Abu Sayed, a student organizer at Begum Rokeya University in Rangpur. Footage of his death circulated widely and became a prominent symbol of state violence ([Amnesty International, 2024b](#)). The government subsequently imposed curfews, restricted internet access, conducted mass arrests, and deployed security forces using lethal weapons ([United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025](#)).

By late July, the conflict had moved beyond the original quota demand. Protest spread into streets, neighborhoods, and districts outside university settings, and by early August –

which students labeled “32nd July” to maintain momentum – the movement had become a broad challenge to the government ([Amnesty International, 2024a](#)). Sheikh Hasina fled the country on August 5, ending more than fifteen years of uninterrupted rule ([Human Rights Watch, 2025](#)).

This sequence motivates the empirical distinction at the center of the paper. If mobilization primarily reflected the presence of young people, similarly aged young people should predict the post-quota response in much the same way as university students. If it primarily reflected an educated and urban politically-aware population, those variables should account for the relationship. But if universities provided a distinctive organizational setting, student concentration should be more closely associated with the timing, location, and diffusion of mobilization.

3 Data

The analysis is built around a district-week panel that combines protest-event records with census-based measures of population, age structure, education, occupation, urbanization, and district-level institutional characteristics. This section describes the main variables used in the analysis. Further details on sources and variable construction are provided in the [Online Appendix A](#).

Protest Outcomes. Our main outcomes are district-week counts of protest events. We separately measure total, on-campus, and off-campus protest. In our coding, an event is classified as on-campus when ACLED’s actor, associated-actor, or notes fields identify a university, college, campus, or student connection; remaining protest events are classified as off-campus. We capture campus- and student-linked mobilization rather than relying only on the reported geographic coordinates of the event.

Students and Universities. Our key explanatory variable is the district-level share of university and college students in the population compiled from [Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics \(2024\)](#), measured *before* the 2024 uprising. In Bangladesh “college” refers to the last two years of secondary school, equivalent to 11th and 12th grade in the United States or A-levels in the UK. “Universities” offer post-secondary Bachelors (and higher) degrees.

To construct a placebo test, we identify 16 legally established and government-approved public and private universities that had not yet enrolled any students as of 31 December 2024. See Appendix Table [A1](#) for details. To distinguish student concentration from the

presence of young people more generally, we construct a separate variable for the share of district residents aged 15-24.

District Characteristics. We compile district characteristics from census and administrative records, including adult literacy, urbanization, population density, industrial and service-sector employment, ethnic minority population, and lawyers per adult population. These variables capture dimensions along which student-dense districts differed before the uprising and which may independently shape their response to a national political shock.

Online Networks. To study how mobilization spreads beyond locations with an initial student presence, we use the Facebook Social Connectedness Index to measure social links across districts. Appendix [Figure B1](#) displays the substantial geographic variation in these ties: Panel A maps each district’s average connectedness to the rest of the country, while Panel B shows connectedness to the capital Dhaka, the important early center of student protest. We use this variation to examine whether off-campus protest is more likely to spread to districts more socially connected to places where student protest occurred in preceding weeks.

State Repression. We complement the protest data with a measure of the state’s coercive response. We count civilian fatalities in ACLED Violence Against Civilians events attributed to state security forces or political militias.

4 Empirical Analysis

Descriptive Statistics. [Online Appendix A](#) describes the main variables and their construction, and Appendix [Table B1](#) reports descriptive statistics. The average district records 0.53 protests per week, comprising 0.17 on-campus and 0.36 off-campus protests. Many district-weeks contain no protest activity, while the relatively large dispersion reflects the concentration of mobilization in particular places and periods.

4.1 Descriptive Analysis of Protest and Repression

[Exhibit 1](#) places the main elements of the episode on a common timeline. Panel A shows protest activity reported in ACLED. Following the June reinstatement of the quota system, on-campus protest rises first, increasing sharply in early July. Off-campus activity remains more limited during this initial phase but expands several weeks later and reaches its highest

level in August. The chronology points to early mobilization on university campuses that preceded a national uprising that spread beyond campuses.

Panel B shows a similar sequence in online attention. Facebook discussion of *student protest* rises sharply during the initial escalation, around the same period as the increase in on-campus activity. Discussion of protest more generally becomes more prominent thereafter, as off-campus mobilization expands. The online series follows the same progression as events on the ground, with student protest especially salient early in the movement and broader protest attention rising later.

Panel C places recorded state repression on that timeline, broken down by student-linked and on-campus fatalities versus other fatalities using the ACLED series on violence against civilians attributable to state security forces. Student and campus fatalities account for the lion’s share of all fatalities, and these increase immediately after the quota reinstatement. Appendix [Figure B2](#) Panel A uses a series of maps to depict the spatial diffusion of repression across districts as the movement expands. Panel B superimposes protests and repression on a single timeline. Protest rises sharply in July and peaks in August; fatalities attributed to state repression increase as mobilization broadens and reach their highest level around the same August peak. The timing is consistent with repression intensifying in response to an expanding protest movement rather than preceding it.

Across all descriptives, the chronology points to an initial university-centered mobilization that spreads beyond campuses and is increasingly met by state repression.

4.2 Determinants of Protest Locations

These descriptive patterns motivate our main empirical comparison. The quota reinstatement was a national event, but districts differed substantially in their pre-existing concentration of university and college students. We use this predetermined variation to ask whether protests were disproportionately concentrated in more student-dense districts after the quota trigger. We begin with the event-study specification:

$$Y_{dt} = \sum_{\tau \neq -1} \beta_{\tau} (StudentShare_d \times \mathbf{1}[t = \tau]) + X_d' \Gamma_t + \alpha_d + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{dt}. \quad (1)$$

Here, Y_{dt} is protest activity in district d and week t , and $StudentShare_d$ is the pre-trigger share of university and college students in the district population. The week immediately preceding the quota trigger is omitted. District fixed effects α_d absorb permanent differences across districts, while week fixed effects γ_t absorb national shocks common to all districts.

The term $X_d' \Gamma_t$ allows predetermined district characteristics to have different effects in each week. This adjustment matters because student concentration is not randomly dis-

tributed across space. Student-dense districts may also differ in population density, industrial structure, service employment, ethnic composition, educational attainment, or urbanization. District fixed effects remove permanent differences in these characteristics but do not account for the possibility that districts with different initial characteristics respond differently to the same national political shock. Allowing these predetermined characteristics to generate their own weekly paths reduces the extent to which such differential responses are attributed to student concentration.

We then summarize the post-trigger relationship using

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{dt} = & \beta (Student\ Share_d \times Post_t) + \delta (Youth\ Share_d \times Post_t) \\
& + \eta (Adult\ Literacy_d \times Post_t) + \kappa (Urban\ Share_d \times Post_t) \\
& + \lambda (Lawyers'\ Share_d \times Post_t) + \sigma (Placebo\ Campus_d \times Post_t) \\
& + X_d' \Gamma_t + \alpha_d + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{dt}.
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$Post_t$ equals one for the weeks after the High Court decision “quota trigger”. The coefficient β captures whether districts with larger pre-existing student shares experience larger post-trigger changes in protest. The additional interactions distinguish university concentration from other district characteristics. $YouthShare_d$ is the share of residents aged 15–24, $AdultLiteracy_d$ is the adult literacy rate, and $UrbanShare_d$ is the share of the district population living in urban areas. We also allow the pre-trigger concentration of lawyers, another organized and highly educated constituency, to have its own post-trigger response. $Placebo\ Campus_d$ is an indicator for districts where new universities were approved by government and legally established – as reported in [Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics \(2024\)](#), but not yet operational, and no students had enrolled as of 31 December 2024. X_d is a vector of other predetermined district characteristics which are interacted flexibly with week fixed effects. We also condition on permanent district differences (α_d) and common weekly shocks (γ_t).

These comparisons address three natural alternative interpretations: university-dense districts may experience more protest simply because they contain more young people, or because they contain a more educated adult population, or because universities are disproportionately located in urban areas where collective action is easier. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on these terms, districts with different student shares would not have experienced systematically different changes in protest in the absence of the quota shock for reasons unrelated to university presence. The event-study coefficients allow us to examine whether a comparable differential relationship was already present before the ruling.

4.3 Results: University Students and Protest Mobilization

Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#) reports the main estimates. Districts with larger pre-existing shares of university and college students experience larger increases in protest following the quota trigger. The coefficient for total protest is 0.368. Thus, a 10 percentage point higher pre-quota student share is associated with 0.037 additional protests per district-week, about 7 percent of the dependent-variable mean of 0.534. The corresponding increase is 0.021 for on-campus protest, about 12 percent of its mean, and 0.016 for off-campus protest, about 4 percent of its mean. The relationship is therefore strongest proportionally for activity on university campuses, but remains positive and statistically significant beyond them.

The comparison with similarly aged young people distinguishes student concentration from the broader presence of youth. The post-trigger coefficients on the share of 15–24 year olds are 0.018 for total protest, 0.029 for on-campus protest, and -0.012 for off-campus protest, all small relative to the corresponding student estimates. Equality tests reject a common coefficient for university students and youth for all three outcomes ($p < 0.01$, $p < 0.01$, and $p = 0.019$, respectively). The post-trigger relationship is therefore closely associated with university enrollment rather than with districts simply having larger youth populations.

Similarly, post-trigger coefficients on adult literacy (-0.003 , -0.007 , and 0.005) and on the urban population share (0.003 , 0.000 , and 0.003) are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The post-trigger increase is thus concentrated in districts with more university and college students, rather than those with more youth, educated adults, or urban residents. Universities were the only organized constituency that mobilized; the lawyer-share interaction is also positive across the three protest outcomes.

The negative coefficients on the locations of “placebo universities,” universities approved by the government but never opened, suggest that the heightened protest activity around university campuses is unlikely to reflect unobserved characteristics of the places where universities are located. If anything, these planned campuses tend to be situated in areas with lower protest activity. This strengthens the interpretation that the elevated protest we observe around operating universities is related to student organization and collective action, rather than to underlying characteristics of university locations.

Panel B of [Exhibit 2](#) shows an event study graph to explore the exact timing of on- and off-campus protest activities in university-dense locations. Before the quota trigger, the coefficients for both on- and off-campus protest remain relatively small, insignificant, and flat. The post-trigger response appears first on university campuses. The on-campus coefficient rises during July, with the largest point estimates around 0.8. Off-campus activity responds later, becoming largest in August, when the corresponding estimates approach 0.9. For

scale, these peak estimates imply that a 10 percentage point higher pre-quota student share is associated with roughly 0.08 additional on-campus protests and 0.09 additional off-campus protests per district-week, approximately 45 percent and 25 percent of their respective sample means. The temporal sequencing of these effects mirrors the chronology documented earlier: the relationship with student concentration emerges first around campuses and subsequently becomes more pronounced in protest activity outside them.

4.4 Results on the Diffusion of Protests

Panel A of [Exhibit 1](#) shows descriptively that on-campus protests preceded off-campus protests, but leaves open the question of whether mobilization *propagated from* university-centered protest locations to other parts of the country. To study diffusion, we combine the detailed geographic information in ACLED with district-to-district social connectedness from Facebook. We ask whether off-campus protest activity is predicted by social connectedness to locations experiencing on-campus protest in the preceding weeks, conditional on geographic distance and the district’s own recent protest activity. We estimate

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{dt} = & \sum_{i=1}^2 \delta_i \cdot \text{SCI nearest student protest}_{d,t-i} \\
& + \sum_{i=1}^2 \beta_i \cdot \text{Distance nearest student protest}_{d,t-i} \\
& + \sum_{i=1}^2 \Gamma_i Y_{d,t-i} + \alpha_d + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{dt}.
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

[Exhibit 3](#) reports the results of estimating equation 3. Social connectedness to recent on-campus protest locations predicts subsequent off-campus mobilization. In the most saturated specification controlling for the district’s own lagged protest activity and district characteristics (column 4), a one-standard-deviation increase in Facebook social connectedness to a location experiencing an on-campus protest in the preceding week is associated with 0.063 additional off-campus protests, approximately 16 percent of the sample mean of 0.386 protests per district-week. Protest appears to diffuse from campus inception points to broader society in ways that can be predicted by Facebook social connectivity data.

Interestingly, spatial distance has a positive coefficient, which implies off-campus mobilization occurred in districts that were systematically geographically farther away from the on-campus protest locations. Geographic expansion of protest was not confined to imme-

diately neighboring districts. One possible interpretation is that mobilization spread from one major city with campuses to another rather than simply radiating into nearby suburban or peri-urban areas. Major cities in Bangladesh are geographically farther away from each other.

In summary, social connections link early university-centered mobilization to subsequent off-campus protest. Protests appear to propagate through social connections across geographically distant locations rather than through spatial proximity alone.

[Figure B3](#) maps the cumulative geographic expansion of protest fortnight-by-fortnight after the quota reinstatement. Early activity is concentrated in a smaller set of cities that host major public universities, with the capital Dhaka (which is home to several major universities) as a big positive outlier. By early August many districts with second tier cities join the protest activities, and the campus protests get converted to a national-scale distributed movement within 8 weeks.

5 Robustness Checks

This section tests whether the statistical inferences we make are sensitive to the particular choices of timing, outcome definition, spatial correlation, or sample composition, and also whether there are alternative plausible explanations for our results.

5.1 Alternative Explanations

Students versus Young People. In Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#) we show that university student concentration is predictive of protests, controlling for the youth share of the population. Appendix [Table B2](#) provides a more direct comparison by explicitly constructing the share of similarly aged non-students. This requires netting out university students from the youth population and therefore imposes a somewhat sharper age correspondence than our baseline measure (yet it omits potential students who are over 24 years old). The resulting estimates are similar: the post-trigger relationship remains concentrated among university students rather than similarly aged non-students.

Appendix [Table B3](#) provides a separate age-placebo exercise using children under age 15 and adults aged 30-44. Neither group exhibits a comparable post-trigger relationship once the richer district characteristics are allowed to follow separate weekly paths. The contrast across these age groups further points to student status, rather than the district's age composition more generally, as the feature associated with the increase in protest.

Alternative Normalization. Both the student and youth shares are measured relative to total district population, which itself varies across districts in the share of older residents. Appendix [Table B4](#) rescales both measures by the district population aged 0-39, so that student concentration is expressed relative to the age range from which students are drawn rather than the full age distribution. The post-trigger student coefficient remains positive and statistically significant for total, on-campus, and off-campus protest, while the similarly aged youth share does not reproduce this pattern; equality tests reject a common coefficient for all three outcomes ($p < 0.01$).

Differential Pre-Trends. Panel B of [Exhibit 2](#) provides an initial check on differential trends before the quota trigger. The pre-period coefficients are small relative to the subsequent increase. Appendix [Figure C1](#) and Appendix [Figure C2](#) further apply the sensitivity analysis of [Rambachan and Roth \(2023\)](#), allowing post-trigger counterfactual trends to depart from exact parallel trends within bounded limits. The main conclusion remains under moderate departures from the pre-period relationship.

Differential Reporting. Because ACLED relies on reported events, a separate concern is that the protest wave increased media attention disproportionately in student-dense districts. We examine this using satellite-observed rainfall as a reporting placebo. Extreme rainfall is measured independently of news coverage, allowing us to ask whether newspapers became more likely to report unrelated local events in high-student districts after the quota trigger. Appendix [Table B5](#) provides little evidence of such a shift in either the probability of rainfall coverage or the number of articles.

5.2 Statistical Robustness

Alternative Timing. Appendix [Table C1](#) checks how sensitive our main result from [Exhibit 2](#) is to perturbations in the definition of the post-trigger period and the estimation window. The link between universities and protests remains significant when transition weeks are excluded, and also under alternative timing windows. Our choice of event timing does not appear pivotal.

Alternative Protest Measures. Our main outcome was defined as the number of protest events in levels. Appendix [Table C2](#) instead uses a binary outcome of whether any protest occurs in a district-week, while Appendix [Table C3](#) and Appendix [Table C4](#) report PPML and $\log(1 + \text{protests})$ specifications. The link between universities and protests remains substantively similar across these alternative measures.

Spatial Dependence and Inference. Protest activity may be correlated across nearby districts through common media markets, transport networks, spatial targeting of policing, or common political shocks. Appendix Table C5 reports Conley spatial standard errors across several distance thresholds (Conley, 1999). Appendix Table C6 allows for dependence along two clustering dimensions following Cameron et al. (2011), while Appendix Figure C3 and C4 report wild-cluster-bootstrap inference following MacKinnon and Webb (2018). The substantive pattern remains intact across these approaches: universities are significantly linked to protests while the general youth population is not.

Randomization Inference. Appendix Figure C5 and Appendix Figure C6 compare the observed estimates with placebo distributions generated by reassigning student exposure across districts. The observed student relationship lies well away from the placebo distribution, while the corresponding youth estimates do not exhibit the same pattern.

Influential Locations and Weeks. Another concern is that the result is driven primarily by Dhaka or another major university center. Appendix Table C7 excludes Dhaka and Narayanganj separately and jointly, while Appendix Figure C7 reports leave-one-division-out estimates. Appendix Figure C8 similarly drops one calendar week at a time; the student coefficients remain positive and broadly stable for total, on-campus, and off-campus protest, although precision varies somewhat for the latter. The university-protest relationship therefore does not appear to depend on any single major location or particular week of the movement.

Regional Shocks. In Appendix Table C8 we include division-by-week fixed effects, which compare districts within the same division in the same week and absorb regional changes in policing, transport, political conditions, or other common shocks. This provides a more local comparison of districts with different pre-existing student concentrations. The coefficients are closely comparable in magnitude and direction to our main estimates.

6 Universities and Protests in Other Times and Places

Historical Comparison. We compile event-level data from the *Mapping American Social Movements Project*'s antiwar protest maps and event descriptions to construct maps of the cumulative spread of antiwar protest in the United States from July 1967 through July 1969 in Exhibit 4, panel A. The maps tell a story analogous to Bangladesh: on-campus demonstrations remain prominent throughout the entire movement. Panel B statistically relates

protest locations to counties' pre-existing concentration of university students. Conditional on state and year fixed effects and county characteristics like populations density, schooling, and urban population share, a 10 percentage point higher college-enrollment share in 1960 is associated with 0.045 additional antiwar protests per county-year, relative to a mean of 0.02. Both on- and off-campus protest mobilization are related to college enrollment as a fraction of county population measured in 1960. The historical and political setting differs substantially from contemporary Bangladesh, but the association is consistent with the mechanism we and others (e.g. [Cantoni et al., 2019](#)) have highlighted: university campuses create networks and interactions that facilitate collective action. As in Bangladesh, not only were college town sites of the initial mobilization, even off-campus protests are predicted by college enrollment.

Cross-country analysis. To further check whether the university-protest association is limited to only a couple of specific settings, we compile cross-country panel data on political protests from ACLED, and combine it at the country-year level to data on tertiary education enrollment from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics for 226 countries over 1997-2025. [Figure B4](#) shows the distribution of the protest outcome in levels and logs. [Exhibit 5](#) panel A first shows the cross-sectional association with university enrollment and the number of political protests: countries with a higher enrollment rate experience more protest activity. But this association can be spurious given omitted variables like the level of democracy. In panel B we regress protests on university enrollment while controlling for country and year fixed effects, a democracy index, GDP levels and growth, rural population share, life expectancy, population growth, poverty, and government expenditures. We find that *within countries*, a 10 percentage point increase in the university enrollment share is associated with a 12.7% increase in political protests. This is suggestive evidence that the mechanism we highlight may be more broadly relevant.

7 Conclusion

This paper uses data from the 2024 Monsoon Revolution in Bangladesh to empirically establish that university campuses were politically consequential during a period of mass unrest. A relatively narrow grievance over public-sector employment quotas that uniquely affected university students generated a much broader political rupture after university students initially mobilized, and their protest diffused off-campus. In a country where an authoritarian figure appeared untouchable for 15 years, student protest emerged, repression intensified as the confrontation escalated, and mobilization subsequently extended beyond campuses into

a national movement that ended a 15-year autocratic regime.


Our data point specifically to the institutional concentration of college and university students rather than to youth demographics or an educated, urban populace more generally. On-campus protest precedes off-campus mobilization in both ACLED and Facebook activity, and those protests propagate off-campus to districts socially connected to locations where campus protests occurred earlier. We argue that these patterns are consistent with universities providing organizational settings in which a concentrated grievance becomes visible, coordinated, and capable of reaching populations not initially affected by it. A placebo test using new campus sites that were approved but not yet operational helps establish that the collective action of an active student population – rather than unobserved correlates of where universities happen to be – helps explain heightened protest activities near campuses.

This perspective helps explain why governments may devote substantial coercive attention to campuses even though university students constitute a relatively small share of the population. During periods of political crisis, universities may provide an institutional setting through which grievances acquire wider political reach, which makes them risky.


Exhibits

Exhibit 1: The Evolution of Political Mobilization and Repression


Panel A: Weekly On- and Off-Campus Protest Counts



Panel B: Facebook All-Protest versus Student-Protest Activity



Panel C: Monthly State Repression Fatalities




Note: This figure illustrates the chronology of the movement across protest volume, online attention, and state repression. Panel A reports weekly counts of on-campus and off-campus protests in Bangladesh from March to September 2024. Protest events are drawn from ACLED (event type: protests); an event is coded as on-campus if the actor, associated actor, or notes fields reference a university, campus, or college, and off-campus otherwise ([Raleigh et al., 2023](#)). Panel B reports the daily volume of Facebook posts referencing all protests versus posts referencing student protests specifically, normalized so that 100 corresponds to the peak day, using data from the Facebook Content Library. Panel C reports monthly state repression fatalities, defined as civilian fatalities in ACLED-coded events attributed to Bangladesh government forces (State Forces) or a political militia, split into student-linked (on-campus) and non-student-linked (off-campus) repression using ACLED's student tagging and the on-campus classification. In all three panels, the vertical line marks the June 2024 reinstatement of public-sector job quotas by the High Court.

Exhibit 2: University Students and Protest Mobilization

Panel A: Student Presence and Protest Activity

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.071)	0.210*** (0.048)	0.156** (0.063)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.049)	0.029 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.037)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.005 (0.010)	0.000 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.029*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.127)	-0.023 (0.062)	-0.185* (0.108)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Panel B: Protest Dynamics by Pre-Quota Student Share



Note: Panel A reports district-week difference-in-differences estimates of protest counts on district shares of university and college students (2023) and young adults (2022) aged 15-24 (Youth), each interacted with a post-June 5, 2024 quota-reinstatement indicator (Post). The specification also includes interactions with adult literacy, adult urban population, and lawyers per ten million adult residents; a placebo indicator equal to one for districts containing an authorized public or private university or college that had not yet enrolled any students, interacted with Post; district and week fixed effects; and baseline district characteristics (2008 election Awami League vote share, minority share, industry share, service share, and population density) interacted with week fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Panel B plots event-study coefficients from the same specification, interacting the pre-quota student share with week indicators, estimated separately for on-campus and off-campus protests; the omitted week is the one immediately preceding reinstatement, and dashed lines denote 95 percent confidence intervals. Protest events are drawn from ACLED (event type: protests) (Raleigh et al., 2023); an event is coded as on-campus if the actor, associated-actor, or notes fields reference a university, campus, or college, and off-campus otherwise.


Exhibit 3: Geographic and Social Network Diffusion from On-Campus to Off-Campus Protests

Off-Campus Protests Activity	One-Week Lag		One-Week and Two-Week Lags	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SCI nearest on-campus protest, (t-1)	0.074* (0.040)	0.068** (0.032)	0.067* (0.037)	0.063** (0.030)
SCI nearest on-campus protest, (t-2)			0.017 (0.021)	0.026 (0.020)
Distance nearest on-campus protest, (t-1)	0.188** (0.076)	0.133** (0.065)	0.154** (0.065)	0.115* (0.059)
Distance nearest on-campus protest, (t-2)			0.067 (0.043)	0.035 (0.040)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Own Protest Lags	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.386	0.386	0.386	0.386
Observations	1,408	1,408	1,408	1,408
Districts	64	64	64	64

Notes: This table reports estimates of the relationship between geographic distance and social connectedness to recent on-campus protest locations and subsequent off-campus protest activity, jointly including geographic distance and the Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI). The two main explanatory variables – *Distance nearest protest* and *SCI nearest protest* – are standardized by their standard deviations calculated on the common estimation sample. *SCI nearest protest* is the maximum SCI between district d and any district that had a student protest in the prior week; *Distance nearest protest* is the geodesic distance from district d to the nearest district with a student protest in the prior week. If an on-campus protest occurred in district d itself in the prior week (or two weeks prior, for the two-week lag), distance to the nearest student protest is coded as zero and SCI to the nearest on-campus protest is set to the median. *Own student protest* controls for the district’s own on-campus protest activity in the prior week (and two weeks prior in columns 3-4) and is included in every column. Column (1) includes the one-week lag only, without district controls; column (2) adds district controls; column (3) adds the two-week lag, without district controls; column (4) adds both the two-week lag and district controls. All four regressions are estimated on the same common sample, defined as the set of district-weeks for which both the one-week and two-week lags of both proximity measures are observable. All specifications include district and week fixed effects. District controls (columns 2 and 4) are interactions of adult literacy rate, adult urban population share, and lawyers per million adult residents with the post-quota-trigger indicator, and industry employment share interacted with week fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Exhibit 4: War in Vietnam and Protests in the United States

Panel A: Spatial Diffusion of Antiwar Protests During the Vietnam War Over Time




Panel B: University Students and Vietnam War Protest Mobilization

	(1) All Protests	(2) On-Campus Protests	(3) Off-Campus Protests
University and College Students (1960)	0.448*** (0.104)	0.252*** (0.0676)	0.196*** (0.0684)
Youth (5-20) Population Share (1950)	-0.121 (0.105)	-0.0214 (0.0274)	-0.1000 (0.0858)
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline County Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of dependent variable	0.016	0.005	0.011
Observations	21,567	21,567	21,567

Note: Panel A shows the cumulative spatial distribution of antiwar protest events in the United States during the Vietnam War at half-year intervals from July 1967 through July 1969. Event-level data are manually compiled from the Mapping American Social Movements Project's antiwar protest maps and event descriptions, geocoded to U.S. cities. Blue (red) markers denote on-campus (off-campus) protests, with marker size increasing in the cumulative number of events recorded in a city as of the indicated date; events are classified as on-campus if the documentation explicitly links the protest to student participation, student organizations, or a campus location, and off-campus otherwise. All panels share a common projection and fixed map extent; Alaska is excluded for visual clarity. Panel B reports estimates of the effect of a county's 1960 share of population enrolled in college on the annual number of antiwar protests. The sample is a county-year panel covering 1963-1969 for all 3,128 counties in the 1962 County and City Data Book, zero-filled for county-years with no recorded protest activity. All Protests is the total number of antiwar protest events. On-Campus Protests counts events explicitly linked to student participation, student organizations, or protests occurring on college campuses, while Off-Campus Protests counts all remaining protest events. The regressor of interest, University and College Students, is 1960 county college enrollment from the 1962 County and City Data Book divided by 1960 county population. Specification includes state and year fixed effects, the county youth population share, and baseline county characteristics consisting of 1960 population density, a literacy proxy (population share with 5 or more years of schooling), and urban population share. The youth population share is the 1950 share of the county population aged 5 to 20 (a cohort aged 15 to 30 by 1960). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Exhibit 5: University Enrollment and Political Protest Across Countries, 1997-2025
Panel A: Cross-Country Correlation between Enrollment and Protest



Panel B: Within-Country Estimates with Country and Year Fixed Effects

	<i>Log Number of Political Protests</i>			<i>Number of Political Protests</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
University Enrollment	2.484*** (0.462)	1.257** (0.421)	1.269** (0.448)	4.685*** (1.256)	1.722* (0.828)	2.037* (0.884)
Mean Dependent Variable	3.5	3.5	3.5	247.6	247.6	247.6
Observations	5819	5819	5819	5819	5819	5819
Num. of countries	226	226	226	226	226	226
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democracy Index	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Macro controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: The sample is a country-year panel of 226 countries over 1997-2025. University Enrollment is the gross tertiary enrollment ratio: total enrollment in tertiary education, regardless of age, relative to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to that level. Protest counts are ACLED events of type protests; enrollment and all controls are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Panel A plots each country's average log protest count against its average enrollment ratio, with Bangladesh and USA marked in red; the reported p-value is from a regression of the former on the latter. Panel B reports fixed effects estimates with the dependent variable $\log(1 + \text{protests per year})$. Enrollment enters in shares (0-1) in columns (1)-(3) and in percentage points (0-100) in columns (4)-(6), the latter for easier interpretability. All columns include country and year fixed effects. Controls are added progressively: the Democracy Index (V-Dem liberal component index) and macroeconomic controls (GDP growth, GDP per capita at PPP, government expenditure relative to GDP) in columns (2) and (5); demographic controls (rural population share, population growth, life expectancy at birth, poverty headcount at \$3.20 a day PPP, and the PPP conversion factor for private consumption) in columns (3) and (6). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Online Appendix

Appendix A. Variable Construction and Sources

A1. Protest Outcomes

Total Protests. District-level count of all ACLED protest events in a given period, constructed as the sum of on-campus and off-campus protests as defined below. The underlying data are drawn from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project ([Raleigh et al., 2023](#)), restricting the sample to Bangladesh events with `event_type` equal to protests.

On-Campus Protests. District-level count of ACLED protest events in a given period classified as student-related, based on the presence of campus- or higher-education-related keywords in the event’s actor, associated actor, or notes fields. Using event-level data from [Raleigh et al. \(2023\)](#), we restrict the sample to Bangladesh events with `event_type` equal to protests and code an event as on-campus if any of the official ACLED fields `actor1`, `actor2`, `assoc_actor_1`, `assoc_actor_2`, or `notes` contains references to universities, campuses, or colleges. Event-level records include actor identities, event type, date, location, coordinates, and source notes.

Off-Campus Protests. District-level count of ACLED protest events in a given period not classified as student-related under the keyword procedure described above. Within the set of Bangladeshi ACLED events with `event_type` equal to protests, an event is coded as off-campus if none of the official ACLED fields `actor1`, `actor2`, `assoc_actor_1`, `assoc_actor_2`, or `notes` contains references to universities, campuses, or colleges. This variable is thus constructed as the complement of the on-campus protest classification rather than as a direct ACLED-provided category ([Raleigh et al., 2023](#)).

A2. Student and Demographic Measures

Population and Enrollment Counts.

Total University and College Students. District-level count of all tertiary enrollees in 2022, comprising students in public and private colleges and in public, private, and international universities. College enrollment is drawn from Table 4.1.12 of [Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics \(2024\)](#) and summed across management types (public, private, Honors, etc) within each district. University enrollment is taken from

institution-level records in Tables 8.4–8.5.1 of the same source; each institution is manually assigned to a district before aggregating to the district level. The two components are combined to yield total district enrollment ([Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics, 2024](#), Table 4.1.12, PDF pp. 189–222; Tables 8.4–8.5.1, PDF pp. 342–348).

Total Youth. Number of residents aged 15–24 in each district, constructed from the BBS district reports by summing the 15–19 and 20–24 age groups from the district-level age-by-sex tables ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2024](#), Table 3.1.7).

Total District Population. Enumerated population of each Bangladeshi district in 2022, covering both rural and urban areas, taken from the 2022 Bangladesh Population and Housing Census ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Table P02).

Population Aged 0–14. Number of residents in each district below age 15, constructed from the BBS district reports by summing the 0–4, 5–9, and 10–14 age groups from the district-level age-by-sex tables ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2024](#), Table 3.1.7). This variable is used to obtain the population aged 15 and above as the difference between total district population and population aged 0–14.

Adult Population. Number of residents aged 15 and above in each district, constructed as the difference between total district population ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Table P02) and the population aged 0–14 ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2024](#), Table 3.1.7).

We use the counts above to create the following exposure measures used in our regressions:

Baseline Exposure Measures.

Share of University and College Students per 100 of District Population. District-level share of the population enrolled in college or university (aggregated from [Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics \(2024\)](#), as describe below), defined as Total University and College Students divided by total district population, multiplied by 100. The denominator is obtained from ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Table P02).

Share of Youth per 100 of District Population. District-level share of the population aged 15–24, defined as Total Youth divided by total district population, multiplied by 100.

Alternative Exposure Measures.

Share of University and College Students per 100 of District Young Population.

District-level share of the *young* population enrolled in college or university, defined as Total University and College Students divided by District Young Population (Aged 0-39), multiplied by 100.

Share of Youth per 100 of District Young Population. District-level share of the young population aged 15-24, defined as Total Youth divided by District Young Population (Aged 0-39), multiplied by 100.

Locations of Placebo Universities. Indicator for districts containing a legally established or government-approved public or private university that had not yet enrolled any students as of the BANBEIS Bangladesh Education Statistics 2023 report ([Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics, 2024](#), Tables 8.4–8.5.1, PDF pp. 342–348). BANBEIS marks each with an asterisk and the note “Educational activities have not started in the identified universities.” Names and locations of these institutions and the source underlying this classification are listed in Appendix Table [A1](#).

A3. Baseline District Controls

Population Density. Number of residents per square kilometer in each district, drawn from the 2022 Bangladesh Population and Housing Census district reports ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2024](#)).

Literacy Rate. Percentage of the adult population (aged 15 and above) that is literate in each district. The total counts of literate population above 15 years old are drawn from the 2022 Bangladesh Population and Housing Census district reports ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2024](#)) and then divided by adult population.

Ethnic Minority Population. Number of residents in each district belonging to a non-Bengali ethnic minority group, measured at the district level. The variable corresponds to the census category “ethnic population,” which captures non-Bengali ethnic communities, and is taken from the district-level total column of ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Table P28). When entering the analysis as a share, the district ethnic minority count is divided by total district population and multiplied by 100.

Adult Urban Population Share. Share of the adult population (aged 15 and above) residing in urban areas in each district. Total district population and total urban population are drawn from the 2022 Bangladesh Population and Housing Census ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Table P02), while district-level counts of the urban and total population aged 0-14 are taken from the BBS district reports ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2024](#), Table 3.1.7). The variable is defined as the urban population aged 15 and above – obtained by subtracting the urban population aged 0-14 from total urban population – divided by the total district population aged 15 and above, multiplied by 100.

Industrial Employment Share. Number of employed residents working in the industry sector as a share of total district population, multiplied by 100. The industrial employment count is taken from the district-level total column of the employed population by sector table, and total district population from the district population table, both from the 2022 Bangladesh Population and Housing Census ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Tables P22 and P02).

Service Employment Share. Number of employed residents working in the service sector as a share of total district population, multiplied by 100. The service employment count is taken from the district-level total column of the employed population by sector table, and total district population from the district population table, both from the 2022 Bangladesh Population and Housing Census ([Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2023](#), Tables P22 and P02).

Share of Lawyers per Adult Population. Number of lawyers enrolled with the Bangladesh Bar Council per ten million residents aged 15 and above in the district. The lawyer count is taken from the district-level Bar Council enrollment file (enrolled advocates as of 31 December 2016) in the Justice Audit Bangladesh baseline data catalog ([Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and GIZ Rule of Law Programme, 2018](#)).

Awami League Vote Share (2008 Election). District-level vote share won by the Awami League in the 2008 Jatiya Sangsad (parliamentary) election, expressed in percentage points. The measure is constructed by aggregating constituency-level candidate returns to the district: Awami League votes and total valid votes are summed across all constituencies within a district, and the ratio of the two is multiplied by 100. Constituency-level election returns are from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive ([Kollman et al., 2024](#), CLEA).

A4. Data on US War in Vietnam

Protest Mobilization. Antiwar protest events in the United States during the Vietnam War are manually compiled from the Mapping American Social Movements Project’s Vietnam War antiwar protest maps and event descriptions ([Miller, Miller](#)). The source provides the date, location, and a description of each event. Events are geocoded to U.S. cities and assigned to counties; where a city’s territory spans more than one county, it is assigned to its dominant county by population share. San Juan, Puerto Rico is not covered by the county data and is excluded. An event is classified as an On-Campus Protest if the documentation explicitly links it to student participation, student organizations, or a campus location; all remaining events are classified as Off-Campus Protests. For the regressions, events are aggregated into annual counts for each county over 1963-1969. The sample covers all 3,128 counties in the 1962 County and City Data Book, and county-years with no recorded protest activity enter as zeros.

Share of University and College Students. University and College Students is the number of county residents enrolled in college in 1960 divided by the county’s total 1960 population. Both variables come from the 1960 Census as reported in the 1962 County and City Data Book ([United States Bureau of the Census, 1992](#)). The measure is fixed at its pre-escalation level and interacted with year fixed effects in the regressions.

Share of Youth Population. The county youth population share is the 1950 share of the county population aged 5 to 20, a cohort aged roughly 15 to 30 by 1960 and therefore of protest age during 1963-1969. It is taken from the 1950 Census as reported in the 1952 County and City Data Book ([United States Bureau of the Census, 1992](#)). Because the 1952 book does not report a 5-20 age bracket directly, the share is computed as one minus the combined shares of the population under age 5 and of persons of voting age (21 and over). Counties without 1950 data, mainly in Alaska and Hawaii, are excluded from specifications that include this control.

Baseline County Controls. Baseline county characteristics are measured in 1960 and taken from the 1962 County and City Data Book ([United States Bureau of the Census, 1992](#)). They are population density (population per square mile), a literacy proxy defined as the population share with five or more years of schooling, and the urban population share. These controls are the U.S. counterparts of the population density, adult literacy, and urban population controls in the Bangladesh specification. All regressions include state and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

A5. Cross-Country Data

Protest Mobilization. Protest data come from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project ([Raleigh et al., 2023](#)). We keep all events classified under the ACLED event type “Protests” and aggregate them into annual counts for each country over 1997-2025. The dependent variable are $\log(1 + \text{protests})$ and the number of protests in levels.

University Enrollment. University Enrollment is the gross tertiary enrollment ratio from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics ([UNESCO Institute for Statistics](#), [UNESCO Institute for Statistics](#)). It is defined as total enrollment in tertiary education, regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to tertiary education. Because the numerator includes students outside the official age group, the ratio can exceed 100 percent. The variable enters as a share and in percentage points.

Democracy Index. The Democracy Index is the V-Dem liberal component index ([Coppedge et al., 2025](#)). It measures the extent to which individual and minority rights are protected against the state, through constitutional civil liberties, rule of law, judicial independence, and legislative checks on the executive. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger liberal constraints.

Macroeconomic and Demographic Controls. Macroeconomic and demographic controls come from the World Bank World Development Indicators ([World Bank](#), [World Bank](#)). The macroeconomic controls are annual GDP growth, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, and general government expenditure relative to GDP. The demographic controls are the rural population share, annual population growth, life expectancy at birth, the poverty headcount ratio at \$3.20 a day (PPP), and the PPP conversion factor for private consumption.

Table A1: Authorized Institutions Without Student Enrollment

Institution	District
Sheikh Hasina Medical University, Khulna	Khulna
Kurigram Agricultural University	Kurigram
Sunamganj Science and Technology University	Sunamganj
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Science and Technology University, Pirojpur	Pirojpur
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman University, Naogaon	Naogaon
Mujibnagar University, Meherpur	Meherpur
Rupayan A.K.M. Shamsuzzoha University	Narayanganj
Ahsania Mission University of Science and Technology	Rajshahi
Shah Makhdum Management University, Rajshahi	Rajshahi
Microland University of Science and Technology	Dhaka
Sheikh Hasina University of Science and Technology	Kishoreganj
Chattogram BGMEA University of Fashion and Technology	Chittagong
Bangladesh Army University of Science and Technology, Khulna	Khulna
Teesta University, Rangpur	Rangpur
International Islami University of Science and Technology	Dhaka
Lalon University of Science and Arts	Kushtia


Note: This table lists the sixteen institutions underlying the definition of Placebo University, drawn from the BANBEIS Bangladesh Education Statistics 2023 report ([Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics, 2024](#)). Each institution is reported with zero enrolled students and is footnoted in the underlying tables as not yet having started educational activities. District reflects the administrative location assigned to the institution.

Appendix B. Additional Figures and Tables

Figure B1: Social Connectedness Index

Panel A: Average Facebook Connectedness Index


Panel B: Facebook Connectedness to Dhaka




Note: This figure documents cross-district variation in Facebook-based social connectedness, used to capture the online social network channel through which protests may have diffused across districts. Panel A reports each district's average Social Connectedness Index (SCI) computed over all other districts, capturing overall digital integration into the national social network. Panel B shows district-level Facebook social connectedness to Dhaka, the nearest major student protest hub. Darker shades indicate stronger online social ties. The SCI is the Facebook Social Connectedness Index, which captures the relative intensity of friendship links across locations. Data are drawn from the Facebook Social Connectedness Index dataset.

Figure B2: State Repression Around the Quota Reinstatement

Panel A: Cumulative spatial diffusion of state repression




Panel B: Monthly Protests and State Repressions



Note: State repression fatalities are drawn from ACLED and defined as civilian deaths attributed to Bangladesh government forces (State Forces) or political militias. A fatality is classified as student-linked using ACLED's student-tagging and on-campus classification pipeline. Panel A plots the cumulative district-level count of state-repression fatalities of any ACLED event type (Violence against Civilians, Riots, etc.) from June 5, 2024 onward, split into student-linked (red) and non-student-linked (green) markers, with marker size scaled logarithmically. Panel B plots monthly counts of protests alongside state-repression fatalities restricted to ACLED-coded Violence against Civilians (VAC) events.


Figure B3: Cumulative Spatial Diffusion of Protest Activity Following the Quota Reinstatement




Note: This figure maps the cumulative spatial distribution of protest activity in Bangladesh following the June 5, 2024 quota reinstatement. Each panel reports cumulative counts from June 5 through the date indicated below the map. District-level markers are split into two semicircles: the left red semicircle reports On-Campus protests, while the right green semicircle reports Off-Campus protests. Marker radii are scaled using a logarithmic transformation of cumulative protest counts to improve visual readability across districts with substantially different levels of protest activity. The underlying counts include only protest events observed on or after June 5, 2024; protests occurring before the quota reinstatement date are excluded from all panels and cumulative totals.

Figure B4: Histograms of Political Protests

Panel A: Distribution of Raw Number of Political Protest Events



Panel B: Distribution of Log Number of Political Protest Events



Note: Histogram of raw numbers and Log of numbers of Political Protests. The level of observation is country-year. Political Protest events are drawn from ACLED (event type: protests) for the period of 1997-2025.

Table B1: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Outcome Variables				
	Mean	Median	SD	Min
All Protests	0.53	0.00	2.50	0.00
On-Campus Protests	0.17	0.00	1.02	0.00
Off-Campus Protests	0.36	0.00	1.71	0.00
Panel B: Explanatory Variables				
	Mean	Median	SD	Min
Share of University and College Students per 100 of District Population	3.54	3.07	1.92	2.04
Share of Youth (Age 15-24) per 100 of District Population	18.50	17.89	1.57	16.23
Share of Pupils (Age < 15) per 100 of District Population	28.75	28.66	3.17	23.04
Share of Adults (Age 30-44) per 100 of District Population	20.93	21.06	1.85	17.26
Panel C: District Characteristics				
	Mean	Median	SD	Min
Share of Literate Population per 100 of District Adult Population (Age 15+)	73.11	68.32	32.99	54.82
Share of Lawyers per 10 Million of District Adult Population (Age 15+)	32.87	25.91	28.92	5.37
Share of Urban Population per 100 of District Adult Population (Age 15+)	26.41	23.52	11.74	14.25
Share of Industry-Sector Workers per 100 of District Population	4.05	2.85	4.38	1.24
Share of Service-Sector Workers per 100 of District Population	12.68	11.34	6.43	7.51
Share of Ethnic Minority Population per 100 of District Population	2.77	0.18	10.51	0.01
Population Density per $1km^2$	1297.02	1083.50	1334.76	106.00
Awami League Vote Share (2008 Election)	0.48	0.51	0.14	0.07

Note: This table summarizes variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel A reports outcome variables measured at the district-week level. Panel B reports the explanatory demographic shares used in the main specifications. Panel C reports additional district-level demographic and structural characteristics. Panels B and C retain one observation per district. Reported summary measures include the mean, median, standard deviation, and minimum.

Table B2: Robustness Check: Youth Share Measured Net of University and College Students

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.379*** (0.098)	0.239*** (0.063)	0.141* (0.082)
Non-Student Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.049)	0.029 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.037)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.005 (0.010)	0.000 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.029*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.127)	-0.023 (0.062)	-0.185* (0.108)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Non-Student Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.016
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), using an alternative definition of the comparison group: the youth (15-24) share is replaced by the share of non-student youth, constructed as the share of residents aged 15-24 per 100 of total district population minus the share of university and college students per 100 of total district population. The student measure and all remaining variables, controls, and fixed effects are unchanged. The dependent variable is the district-week count of protests: total (column 1), on-campus (column 2), and off-campus (column 3). On-campus protests are ACLED events in which the actor, associated-actor, or notes fields reference a university, campus, or college; off-campus protests are all remaining events. On-campus protests are ACLED events in which the actor, associated-actor, or notes fields reference a university, campus, or college; off-campus protests are all remaining events. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All columns include district fixed effects, week fixed effects, and week interactions with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports a test of equality between the student share and non-student youth interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B3: Placebo of Non-Gen Z on Protests

Panel A: All Protests	Age < 15		Age 30–44	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Quota Trigger $\times$ Youth (Age < 15)	-0.121 (0.092)	-0.008 (0.016)		
Post-Quota Trigger $\times$ Adults (Age 30-44)			0.254 (0.193)	0.029 (0.028)
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.534	0.534	0.534
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664	1,664
Panel B: On-Campus Protests	Age < 15		Age 30–44	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Quota Trigger $\times$ Youth (Age < 15)	-0.058 (0.044)	-0.008 (0.012)		
Post-Quota Trigger $\times$ Adults (Age 30-44)			0.114 (0.094)	0.016 (0.021)
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.172	0.172	0.172	0.172
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664	1,664
Panel C: Off-Campus Protests	Age < 15		Age 30–44	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Quota Trigger $\times$ Youth (Age < 15)	-0.062 (0.049)	-0.000 (0.010)		
Post-Quota Trigger $\times$ Adults (Age 30-44)			0.140 (0.103)	0.013 (0.017)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.362	0.362	0.362	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reports placebo estimates using age groups that should not be directly affected by the quota trigger: children under age 15 and adults aged 30-44, each measured per 100 people of district population. Panel A reports total protests, Panel B reports on-campus protests, and Panel C reports off-campus protests. The reported coefficients correspond to interactions between the post-quota-trigger indicator and the placebo age-group shares. All specifications include district fixed effects and week fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 additionally include controls for population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, and ethnic minority share interacted with week fixed effects, and literacy, urbanization, and lawyers per capita interacted with the post-quota-trigger indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Statistical significance is denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4: Robustness Check: Student and Youth Shares Measured per Population Aged 0-39

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population Aged 0-39 (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.219*** (0.045)	0.127*** (0.031)	0.092** (0.037)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population Aged 0-39 (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.051 (0.066)	0.018 (0.032)	-0.069 (0.047)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.011 (0.011)	0.004 (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.032*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.231 (0.143)	-0.053 (0.063)	-0.178 (0.108)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), replacing the denominator of the two exposure measures: the university/college student share and the youth (15-24) share are computed per 100 residents aged 0-39 rather than per 100 of total district population. The dependent variable is the district-week count of protests: total (column 1), on-campus (column 2), and off-campus (column 3). The other regressors are the share of literate adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; the share of urban adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; and lawyers per ten million adult residents. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All columns include district and week fixed effects, as well as week interactions with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B5: Reporting Placebo: News Coverage of a Satellite-Observed Rainfall


	Rainfall Events		Extreme Rainfall Events	
	(1) Rainfall Reported	(2) Number of Articles	(3) Rainfall Reported	(4) Number of Articles
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.0070 (0.0156)	0.0652 (0.0614)	0.0168 (0.0183)	0.1077 (0.0857)
Mean Dependent Variable	0.090	0.248	0.109	0.308
Observations	455	455	312	312
Num. of clusters	64	64	64	64
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Severity Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The sample is rainfall events observed by CHIRPS satellite rainfall in the 64 districts covering the estimation frame between 1 March and 16 September 2024. Specifications (1)-(2) restrict sample to 455 district-week observations in which mean level of rainfall exceeds the district's own 95th percentile of the average precipitation level of all days (with and without rainfall) between 1 March and 16 September 2024. Specifications (3)-(4) restrict sample to 312 district-week observations in which mean level of rainfall exceeds the district's own 95th percentile of the precipitation level of rainfall days between 1 March and 16 September 2024. Rainfall Reported is one when at least one article in a fixed panel of two national dailies, The Daily Star and Prothom Alo, names the district in the week of the rainfall and does so with rainfall keywords; Number of Articles counts those articles. Rainfall related news from Prothom Alo were collected via sitemap crawling and choosing the rainfall news based on the presence of key words related to rainfall events. The Daily Star does not have a crawlable sitemap, so the rainfall related news data was collected manually by looking through the website of the magazine. Storm severity controls are the log of peak daily rainfall and the log of total rainfall over the week. Rainfall data are from CHIRPS v2.0 (Climate Hazards Center, University of California Santa Barbara), aggregated to district-week level. Students share is the share of Gen-Z students, defined as university and college students, of total district population. Post-period equals one after 5 June 2024. All specifications include district and week fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the district level.


Appendix C. Statistical Robustness Checks – Additional Figures and Tables

Figure C1: Sensitivity of Event-Study Estimates (Rambachan and Roth, 2023): On-Campus


Panel A: Baseline Event Study



Panel B: Linear Trend Adjustment




Panel C: Honest DiD Sensitivity (Periods 1-3)




Note: Panels A and B report the event-study estimates of the effect of the pre-quota district share of students on on-campus protest activity, before and after removing a linear pre-trend fitted to the pre-surge coefficients. The estimates correspond to the specification reported in column (2) of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. For this test only, the treatment date is set to the observed onset of the protest surge: July 1, 2024; omitted reference period is the week immediately preceding each surge, so that weeks between the quota reinstatement and the surge are treated as pre-treatment periods. Panel C reports the (Rambachan and Roth, 2023) sensitivity analysis for the average effect over the post-surge periods for which the baseline estimate is statistically significant; averaging over these periods, rather than testing the first post-surge coefficient alone, yields a sharper and more representative sensitivity bound for the effect actually detected in the data. The analysis imposes the relative-magnitudes restriction $\Delta^{RM}(\bar{M})$, which allows the post-treatment violation of parallel trends to be at most $\bar{M}$ times the largest violation observed across the pre-treatment periods. For each value of $\bar{M}$, the figure plots the 90% robust confidence set for this average effect, computed using the conditional least-favorable method. The interval labeled “Original” reports the conventional confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure C2: Sensitivity of Event-Study Estimates (Rambachan and Roth, 2023): Off-Campus


Panel A: Baseline Event Study



Panel B: Linear Trend Adjustment




Panel C: Honest DiD Sensitivity (Periods 2-4)




Note: Panels A and B report the event-study estimates of the effect of the pre-quota district share of students on off-campus protest activity, before and after removing a linear pre-trend fitted to the pre-surge coefficients. The estimates correspond to the specification reported in column (3) of Panel A of Exhibit 2, which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. For this test only, the treatment date is set to the observed onset of the protest surge: July 1, 2024; omitted reference period is the week immediately preceding each surge, so that weeks between the quota reinstatement and the surge are treated as pre-treatment periods. Panel C reports the (Rambachan and Roth, 2023) sensitivity analysis for the average effect over the post-surge periods for which the baseline estimate is statistically significant; averaging over these periods, rather than testing the first post-surge coefficient alone, yields a sharper and more representative sensitivity bound for the effect actually detected in the data. The analysis imposes the relative-magnitudes restriction $\Delta^{RM}(\bar{M})$, which allows the post-treatment violation of parallel trends to be at most $\bar{M}$ times the largest violation observed across the pre-treatment periods. For each value of $\bar{M}$, the figure plots the 90% robust confidence set for this average effect, computed using the conditional least-favorable method. The interval labeled “Original” reports the conventional confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure C3: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Confidence Sets: Effect of Student Population on Protest Activity


Panel A: University and College Students $\times$ Post: All Protests



Panel B: University and College Students $\times$ Post: On-Campus Protests




Panel C: University and College Students $\times$ Post: Off-Campus Protests




Note: This figure presents wild cluster bootstrap confidence sets for the coefficient on the interaction between the district-level share of University and College Students and the post-quota trigger. The estimates correspond to the specification reported in columns of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. Panels A-C report results for all protests, on-campus protests, and off-campus protests, respectively. Each panel plots the bootstrap-based p -value against the hypothesized parameter value. The horizontal dashed line marks the 5 percent significance level. Confidence sets are obtained using the wild cluster bootstrap procedure of [Cameron et al. \(2008\)](#). Inference is based on 9,999 bootstrap replications with Rademacher weights and clustering at the district level.

Figure C4: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Confidence Sets: Effect of Youth Population on Protest Activity


Panel A: Youth (15-24) $\times$ Post: All Protests



Panel B: Youth (15-24) $\times$ Post: On-Campus Protests




Panel C: Youth (15-24) $\times$ Post: Off-Campus Protests




Note: This figure presents wild cluster bootstrap confidence sets for the coefficient on the interaction between the district-level share of Youth (15-24) and the post-quota trigger. The estimates correspond to the specification reported in columns of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. Panels A-C report results for all protests, on-campus protests, and off-campus protests, respectively. Each panel plots the bootstrap-based p -value against the hypothesized parameter value. The horizontal dashed line marks the 5 percent significance level. Confidence sets are obtained using the wild cluster bootstrap procedure of [Cameron et al. \(2008\)](#). Inference is based on 9,999 bootstrap replications with Rademacher weights and clustering at the district level.

Figure C5: Permutation Inference: Estimated Effect of Student Population on Protest Activity


Panel A: All Protests



Panel B: On-Campus Protests




Panel C: Off-Campus Protests




Note: This figure presents permutation-based randomization inference for the coefficient on the interaction between the district-level share of University and College Students and the post-quota period. The estimates correspond to the specification reported in columns of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. Panels A-C report results for all protests, on-campus protests, and off-campus protests, respectively. The model is then re-estimated for each of 2,000 random assignments. Each histogram displays the resulting distribution of placebo coefficients, while the vertical line denotes the coefficient estimated using the observed district assignment. The permutation p -value is calculated as the share of placebo estimates that are at least as extreme in absolute value as the observed estimate. Standard errors in the underlying regressions are clustered at the district level. The panel-specific permutation p -values are equal to 0.0005 for each panel.

Figure C6: Permutation Inference: Estimated Effect of Youth Population on Protest Activity


Panel A: All Protests



Panel B: On-Campus Protests




Panel C: Off-Campus Protests




Note: This figure presents permutation-based randomization inference for the coefficient on the interaction between the district-level share of Youth (15-24) and the post-quota period. The estimates correspond to the specification reported in columns of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. Panels A-C report results for all protests, on-campus protests, and off-campus protests, respectively. The model is then re-estimated for each of 2,000 random assignments. Each histogram displays the resulting distribution of placebo coefficients, while the vertical line denotes the coefficient estimated using the observed district assignment. The permutation p -value is calculated as the share of placebo estimates that are at least as extreme in absolute value as the observed estimate. Standard errors in the underlying regressions are clustered at the district level. The panel-specific permutation p -values are 0.7481, 0.2189, and 0.5332 respectively.

Figure C7: Leave-One-Division-Out Robustness: University and College Students $\times$ Post


Panel A: All Protests



Panel B: On-Campus Protests




Panel C: Off-Campus Protests




Note: This figure reports leave-one-division-out estimates of the coefficient on the interaction between the district-level share of University and College Students and the post-quota-trigger indicator, corresponding to the specification in columns of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. In each iteration, all districts belonging to one division are excluded and the model is re-estimated on the remaining districts. Points denote coefficient estimates, and vertical bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure C8: Leave-One-Week-Out Robustness: University and College Students $\times$ Post


Panel A: All Protests



Panel B: On-Campus Protests



Panel C: Off-Campus Protests



Note: This figure reports leave-one-week-out estimates of the coefficient on the interaction between the district-level share of University and College Students and the post-quota-trigger indicator, corresponding to the specification in columns of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), which includes district and week fixed effects as well as interactions between predetermined district characteristics and week fixed effects. In each iteration, all district-week observations for one calendar week are excluded and the model is re-estimated on the remaining weeks. Points denote coefficient estimates, and vertical bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table C1: Robustness Check: Alternative Timing Definitions

	(1) Total Protests	(2) On-Campus	(3) Off-Campus
Panel A: Exclusion of Days Around the Ruling			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.434*** (0.086)	0.235*** (0.051)	0.199*** (0.072)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.023 (0.058)	0.033 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.043)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.275* (0.153)	-0.036 (0.068)	-0.239* (0.127)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.553	0.180	0.374
Observations	1,536	1,536	1,536
Panel B: Later Treatment Date			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.493*** (0.099)	0.249*** (0.052)	0.244*** (0.079)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.031 (0.068)	0.036 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.052)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.332* (0.179)	-0.045 (0.072)	-0.286* (0.144)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664
Panel C: Narrower Estimation Window			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.319*** (0.060)	0.221*** (0.045)	0.098*** (0.025)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.003 (0.046)	0.013 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.028)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.027 (0.094)	0.003 (0.062)	0.024 (0.056)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.567	0.200	0.367
Observations	1,024	1,024	1,024
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#) and examines whether the estimated effect of student demographic composition on protest activity is robust to alternative definitions of treatment timing. Panel A re-estimates the baseline specification excluding the first two fully post-treatment weeks following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024 (June 6-19, 2024), to verify that the result is not driven by escalation immediately after the cutoff. Panel B re-estimates the baseline specification on the full sample, redefining the post-reform period to begin June 27, 2024, so that the three weeks the baseline specification counts as post-treatment (June 6-26, 2024) are instead classified as pre-treatment. Panel C restricts the estimation sample to a narrower window around the ruling, from April 25 to August 14, 2024. All specifications include district fixed effects, week fixed effects, and interactions of week fixed effects with district characteristics (population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share). All specifications additionally control for the share of literate adults, the share of urban adults, lawyers per ten million adult residents, and placebo universities indicator each interacted with Post; coefficients on these controls are omitted from the table for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2: Robustness Check: Effect of Enrollment and Resident Youth Density on the Extensive Margin of Protest Activity

	Any Protest	Any On-Campus	Any Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.059** (0.024)	0.077*** (0.025)	0.021 (0.018)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.017 (0.015)	0.024** (0.010)	0.001 (0.013)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.053 (0.056)	0.065 (0.044)	0.020 (0.041)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	0.103	0.019	0.307
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.198	0.069	0.163
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#) and reports linear probability model estimates of the relationship between district-level demographic composition and the extensive margin of protest activity. The dependent variable is a district-week indicator equal to one if at least one protest occurred and zero otherwise: any protest (column 1), any on-campus protest (column 2), and any off-campus protest (column 3). The regressors are the 2022 share of university and college students per 100 of total district population; the share of resident Gen-Z individuals (aged 15-24) per 100 of total district population; the share of literate adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; the share of urban adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; lawyers per ten million adult residents; and the Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened indicator. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All regressors are interacted with Post. All columns include district and week fixed effects, as well as interactions of week fixed effects with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share.. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C3: Robustness Check: Effect of Enrollment and Resident Youth Density on Protest Activity (PPML Estimation)

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.105*** (0.019)	0.112*** (0.030)	0.031* (0.018)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.027** (0.011)	0.033*** (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.078 (0.053)	0.067 (0.050)	0.009 (0.038)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.114
Mean of Dependent Variable	1.534	1.172	1.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#) and reports Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimates of the relationship between district-level demographic composition and protest activity. The dependent variable is the district-week count of protests plus one: total (column 1), on-campus (column 2), and off-campus (column 3). The regressors are the 2022 share of university and college students per 100 of total district population; the share of resident Gen-Z individuals (aged 15-24) per 100 of total district population; the share of literate adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; the share of urban adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; lawyers per ten million adult residents; and the Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened indicator. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All regressors are interacted with Post. All columns include district and week fixed effects, as well as interactions of week fixed effects with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share.. The estimation sample is held fixed across all three outcomes at the intersection of samples for which this specification is estimable for each outcome. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C4: Robustness Check: Effect of Enrollment and Resident Youth Density on Protest Activity (Logarithm Transformation)

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.088*** (0.018)	0.087*** (0.026)	0.027* (0.014)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.023** (0.010)	0.023** (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.056 (0.042)	0.046 (0.038)	0.005 (0.030)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.071
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.202	0.073	0.155
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), using a log-linear specification. The dependent variable is $\ln(1 + \text{protests})$: total (column 1), on-campus (column 2), and off-campus (column 3). The regressors are the 2022 share of university and college students per 100 of total district population; the share of resident Gen-Z individuals (aged 15-24) per 100 of total district population; the share of literate adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; the share of urban adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; lawyers per ten million adult residents; and the Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened indicator. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All regressors are interacted with Post. All columns include district and week fixed effects, as well as interactions of week fixed effects with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share.. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C5: Robustness Check: Conley Spatial Correlation Adjustments

	(1) Total Protests	(2) On-Campus	(3) Off-Campus
Panel A: Radius 100 km			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.084)	0.210*** (0.042)	0.156** (0.073)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.033)	0.029 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.028)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.128)	-0.023 (0.070)	-0.185* (0.100)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.026
Panel B: Radius 200 km			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.087)	0.210*** (0.047)	0.156** (0.077)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.029)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.027)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.138)	-0.023 (0.062)	-0.185* (0.107)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.033
Panel C: Radius 300 km			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.085)	0.210*** (0.049)	0.156** (0.071)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.029)	0.029* (0.015)	-0.016 (0.026)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.133)	-0.023 (0.045)	-0.185* (0.101)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.016
Panel D: Radius 400 km			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.084)	0.210*** (0.047)	0.156** (0.070)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.032)	0.029* (0.016)	-0.016 (0.027)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.128)	-0.023 (0.046)	-0.185* (0.098)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.018
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reports robustness of the main student-share result to [Conley \(2010\)](#) spatial-correlation-adjusted standard errors. Panels A-D allow the error term of each district-week observation to be correlated with all other districts observed in the same week located within 100, 200, 300, and 400 kilometers, respectively; no correlation across weeks is assumed. All columns include district and week fixed effects and control for population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share, each interacted with the post-quota-trigger indicator; unlike columns (1), (2), and (3) of Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), these characteristics are not separately interacted with each week. All columns additionally control for the share of literate adults, the share of urban adults, and lawyers per ten million adult residents, each interacted with the post-quota-trigger indicator; coefficients on these controls are omitted from the table for brevity. Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened is the indicator, interacted with the post-quota-trigger indicator. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients, using the spatially corrected covariance matrix of the corresponding panel. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C6: Robustness Check: Effect of Enrollment and Resident Youth Density on Protest Activity (Alternative Clustering)

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.079)	0.210*** (0.054)	0.156** (0.071)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.013 (0.049)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.038)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.005 (0.010)	0.000 (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.029** (0.011)	0.013** (0.005)	0.016** (0.007)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.208 (0.143)	-0.023 (0.078)	-0.185 (0.122)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.035
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between district-level demographic composition and protest activity, identical to Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#) except that standard errors are clustered two-way, by district and by week, rather than by district alone. The dependent variable is the district-week count of protests: total (column 1), on-campus (column 2), and off-campus (column 3). The regressors are the 2022 share of university and college students per 100 of total district population; the share of resident Gen-Z individuals (aged 15-24) per 100 of total district population; the share of literate adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; the share of urban adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; lawyers per ten million adult residents; and the Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened indicator. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All columns include district fixed effects and week fixed effects, as well as week interactions with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share. Standard errors are clustered two-way by district and week. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C7: Robustness Check: Excluding Dhaka and Narayanganj

	(1) Total Protests	(2) On-Campus	(3) Off-Campus
Panel A: Excluding Dhaka			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.266*** (0.045)	0.179*** (0.060)	0.087*** (0.029)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.048*** (0.016)	0.039** (0.016)	0.008 (0.014)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.037 (0.074)	0.052 (0.062)	-0.015 (0.051)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.292	0.086	0.206
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638
Panel B: Excluding Narayanganj			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.235*** (0.067)	0.181*** (0.065)	0.054 (0.046)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.007 (0.035)	0.027 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.025)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.001 (0.097)	0.023 (0.062)	-0.022 (0.066)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.101
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.537	0.175	0.363
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638
Panel C: Excluding Dhaka and Narayanganj			
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.258*** (0.056)	0.190*** (0.066)	0.068** (0.031)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.045** (0.017)	0.042** (0.017)	0.003 (0.014)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	0.046 (0.081)	0.040 (0.062)	0.005 (0.051)
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	< 0.01	0.011	0.032
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.292	0.087	0.205
Observations	1,612	1,612	1,612
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), checking that the student-share result is not driven by Dhaka or Narayanganj. Panel A excludes Dhaka, the capital and dominant protest hub. Panel B excludes Narayanganj, which sits within the Dhaka metropolitan and industrial belt and could pick up spillover from Dhaka. Panel C excludes both districts jointly. All panels report the specification with district fixed effects, week fixed effects, and week interactions with district characteristics (population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share). All specifications additionally control for the share of literate adults, the share of urban adults, lawyers per ten million adult residents, and placebo universities indicator each interacted with Post; coefficients on these controls are omitted from the table for brevity. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the student share and young (15-24) population interaction coefficients. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C8: Robustness Check: Division-by-Week Fixed Effects

	All Protests	On-Campus	Off-Campus
	(1)	(2)	(3)
University and College Students (2023)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.366*** (0.081)	0.209*** (0.051)	0.157** (0.061)
Youth (15-24) (2022)/ (District Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.008 (0.102)	0.074 (0.059)	-0.067 (0.064)
Literate Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)
Urban Adults (15+) (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/100) $\times$ Post	0.006 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)
Lawyers (2022)/ (District Adult (15+) Population (2022)/10 ⁷) $\times$ Post	0.028*** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.004)
Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened $\times$ Post	-0.214 (0.144)	-0.021 (0.067)	-0.192* (0.112)
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Division $\times$ Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Characteristics $\times$ Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val Univ./Coll. Students = Youth	0.013	0.046	0.019
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.534	0.172	0.362
Observations	1,664	1,664	1,664

Note: This table reproduces Panel A of [Exhibit 2](#), replacing common week fixed effects with division-by-week fixed effects while retaining district fixed effects. University and College Students density is the 2022 share of Gen-Z university and college students per 100 of total district population; Non-Students Gen-Z is the share of resident Gen-Z individuals (aged 15-24) per 100 of total district population. Also included are the share of literate adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; the share of urban adults aged 15 and above per 100 of the adult district population; lawyers per ten million adult residents; and the Placebo Universities Planned but Never Opened indicator. Post refers to the post-quota-trigger indicator, equal to one following the High Court ruling of June 5, 2024. All columns include district fixed effects, division-by-week fixed effects, and week interactions with population density, industry employment share, service-sector employment share, ethnic minority share, and 2008 election Awami League vote share. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The p-value row reports the result of a test of equality between the coefficients on Univ./Coll. Students and Youth. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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