AIMING FOR THE GOAL:
CONTRIBUTION DYNAMICS OF CROWDFUNDING

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CONTRIBUTION DYNAMICS OF CROWDFUNDING*

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Abstract

Fundraising campaigns draw support from a wide pool of contributors. Some contributors are interested in private rewards offered in exchange for contributions (buyers), whereas others are publicly-minded and value success (donors). Buyers face a coordination problem because of the positive externalities of campaign success. A leadership donor who strategically times contributions can promote coordination by dynamically signaling his valuation. The ability to signal increases the probability of success and benefits all participants relative to the donor valuation being known. We validate our modeling assumptions and theoretical predictions using Kickstarter data.

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1 Introduction

Contribution games typically feature positive externalities that result in free-riding and miscoordination. These forces can lead to underprovision, which has been widely studied in the context of public goods. Although free-riding may be alleviated by providing contributors with private benefits, miscoordination may persist due to uncertainty about total contributions. To address this uncertainty, capital campaigns for nonprofits—including museums and universities—and for-profits, such as innovative startups, often draw from a wide pool of potential contributors. Some participants may contribute simply because the fundraising purpose is aligned with their values, whereas others may be interested in private rewards offered in exchange for a contribution. While seeking pledges from different types of participants naturally expands the contribution base, we show that the interaction between differently motivated participants gives rise to new economic trade-offs that can affect the success of campaigns.

We study the role of a publicly-motivated leadership donor in coordinating contributions by privately-motivated buyers. We introduce a dynamic contribution game with a fundraising goal that must be achieved by a deadline. Randomly arriving buyers seek a private reward in exchange for a contribution, and one long-lived donor values the public benefits. Buyers face a coordination problem as contributions are costly and aggregate demand is uncertain. Because the donor’s valuation is private information, he can shape buyer beliefs about success with strategically timed donations. We make four key contributions. First, we show that the donor’s ability to signal his valuation alleviates the coordination problem. We provide bounds on the effect of dynamic signaling on the probability of success and establish that making the donor’s valuation public would result in the lowest probability of success. Second, we illustrate a trade-off between maximizing the donor’s and buyers’ payoffs. The donor prefers the equilibrium that maximizes the probability of success. However, this equilibrium exacerbates buyers’ contribution risks, so buyers prefer an equilibrium with an intermediate probability of success. Third, we derive testable implications and show that our model is empirically relevant for reward-based crowdfunding.
campaigns. Using novel data from the platform Kickstarter, we provide empirical evidence of the two different contribution incentives and show that our model predictions fit the data well. Finally, we show that our results extend to a broad class of fundraising models and campaign designs.

In our baseline model buyers make a one-shot decision upon arrival to either pledge to obtain a reward (or product) of known value for a fixed price or choose an outside option. Consumption is non-rivalrous but excludable. The representative long-lived donor can contribute throughout the campaign. If the campaign is successful, buyers who pledged support pay the price and receive the reward. The donor receives a payoff equal to his valuation for the campaign less donations made. If the campaign fails, donations are returned, and buyers receive their pledges back but bear an opportunity cost.

We first characterize outcomes of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that maximize the probability of success. We show that these outcomes can be attained by Markov equilibria with an intuitive structure where the donor must contribute above a state-dependent threshold in order to keep buyers engaged. The threshold depends on cumulative pledges and the time remaining until the deadline. We call such equilibria pooling-threshold (PT) equilibria. Because the donor is benevolent and will donate up to his valuation if necessary, maximizing success reduces to incentivizing buyers to pledge whenever possible. The success-maximizing equilibrium involves donation thresholds that make buyers just indifferent between pledging or not. Donating less than the threshold causes buyers to stop pledging. Donating more than the threshold squanders funds that can potentially be used to induce later-arriving buyers to pledge.

We construct the state-dependent donation threshold by induction on the number of additional buyers necessary to achieve the goal if no more donations are made. The donation threshold decreases after a purchase but increases if no buyer arrives in any given period. If the donor cannot meet the donation threshold, the campaign fails. To establish that this equilibrium maximizes the probability of success, we recast and relax the problem to a dynamic information design problem and then show that the solution can be attained by
the constructed PT equilibrium. The key insight of the characterization is that it suffices to consider reduced histories that ignore donation amounts and only keep track of whether a donation incentivizes the next potential buyer to pledge or not. The control variables in this information design problem are the probabilities of reaching these reduced histories subject to martingale constraints and buyer participation constraints.

We then construct the unique equilibrium that minimizes the probability of success among all PBE. While this may seem like an unnatural benchmark, we show that this equilibrium coincides with buyers acting as if the donor’s valuation was public information—the no-signaling case. The success-minimizing equilibrium is a PT equilibrium that entails the highest possible donation threshold where buyers contribute even if they believe no additional donations will be made.

After bounding the effects of signaling on the probability of success, we investigate which equilibria are preferred by campaign participants. We show that participants prefer different equilibria. The success-maximizing equilibrium is preferred by the donor as he cannot benefit from lowering donations at the expense of a lower probability of success. However, the success-maximizing equilibrium exacerbates the uncertainty that buyers face because the donor does not internalize buyers’ opportunity costs of pledging. Instead, buyers prefer equilibria (which may not be unique) that result in intermediate probabilities of success, strictly between the success-maximizing and success-minimizing equilibria. Buyer-preferred equilibria involve the donor providing some coordination benefits through dynamic signaling, however, our analysis highlights that participants disagree on “how much” signaling a campaign should allow.

Our theoretical insights are robust to a number of important extensions that capture fundraising beyond crowdfunding. For example, our analysis remains unchanged if the all-or-nothing campaign structure is replaced with buyers/the donor simply receiving higher payoffs if the campaign succeeds. That is, our framework accommodates general capital campaigns where contributions are not returned if the goal is not reached by the deadline (e.g., a museum or university gala, or a political campaign). Although we consider a single
long-lived donor in our formal analysis, that assumption too can be relaxed. With several donors who observe each others valuation, the success-maximizing equilibrium with several donors yields the same probability of success as one in which there is a single donor whose valuation is the sum of the valuations of all donors. The success-minimizing equilibrium may, however, be subject to free-riding among donors. Our substantive results also apply to settings with time-varying arrivals, time-varying outside options, and to campaign designs that return excess donations for successful campaigns. We also examine a setting where buyers engage in social learning. This environment may be applicable to crowdfunding campaigns of highly innovative products. We show via an example that when buyers receive private signals about unknown campaign quality and can learn from contributions of other buyers, donations still shape buyers’ beliefs, but donations also cause buyers to receive a weaker signal of quality. This may reduce the donor’s effectiveness.

We also discuss aspects of campaign design. Because the success-maximizing PBE solves a general information design problem, it follows that no other mechanism involving donations, posted prices, and observable contribution histories can achieve a higher probability of success. For example, the probability of success is lower when we allow the donor to contribute only at the beginning or at the end of a campaign. However, changing the information participants have access to can fundamentally change outcomes. For example, we show that restricting the visibility of buyer contribution histories can increase or decrease participant payoffs and the probability of success.

Finally, we test our theory with data from the largest reward-based crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter. On this platform, entrepreneurs launch campaigns to raise funds in exchange for rewards. The platform allows for both donations and pledges for rewards (purchases). We discuss other campaign features and why these campaigns map well to our theoretical model. Our data cover all campaigns launched on Kickstarter between March 2017 and September 2018 and distinguish buyer pledges from donations at 12-hour frequencies. Our summary analysis establishes that donations are an important fundraising source for campaigns—they constitute 28% of all funds raised on Kickstarter.
We validate our modeling assumptions by showing that pledges are consistent with the two distinct contribution incentives of our model. For example, we show that while purchases occur throughout time, donations decline toward zero after a campaign succeeds. Also consistent with our model, early-finishing campaigns are driven almost exclusively by buyers when donations are unnecessary for success. We derive a rich set of predictions based on our equilibrium characterization and empirically test these predictions. For example, consistent with all PT equilibria, we show that initial donations are higher when the probability of success is lower. Using a survival model, we show that donations are most likely to occur after time intervals of no buyer activity—when the value of dynamic signaling is greatest. In general, donations become increasingly important for campaigns that succeed closer to the deadline. We estimate that 72% of the campaigns that succeed at the deadline would have failed absent donations. We present a simple analysis that shows most campaigns are inconsistent with success-minimizing equilibria which suggests that the Kickstarter platform design actually facilitates dynamic signaling that is core to our study.

1.1 Related Literature

Our setting entails positive externalities as in public goods games (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Admati and Perry, 1991; Fershtman and Nitzan, 1991; Varian, 1994), but participants receive private benefits and are therefore not subject to free-riding incentives.\(^1\) We study contribution dynamics in a similar setting to Alaei et al. (2016) where participants face a coordination problem.\(^2\) However, we add a publicly-motivated donor who can coordinate privately-motivated contributors.\(^3\) Hence, our work is substantively related to Andreoni (1998) who shows how leadership givers can help to overcome the free-riding incentive when there are increasing returns at low levels of provisions, while we show how a donor

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\(^1\)See also, Marx and Matthews (2000); Campbell et al. (2014); Cvitanić and Georgiadis (2016); Bonatti and Hörner (2011); Sahm (2020); Ellman and Fabi (2022b).

\(^2\)Ellman and Fabi (2022a) also study contribution dynamics when bidding costs are private information.

\(^3\)See also Liu (2018); Chakraborty et al. (2023); Chemla and Tinn (2020); Chakraborty and Swinney (2020).
can provide coordination benefits by dynamically signaling his valuation.

Our results on donor-incentivizing mechanisms complement recent work examining optimal mechanism design in crowdfunding, including Strausz (2017), who finds the optimal mechanism in the presence of moral hazard of buyers, Ellman and Hurkens (2019b), who find the optimal mechanism with price discrimination, and Chang (2020), who studies two funding mechanisms when the quality of the project is unknown. Our work suggests that allowing donors to continuously contribute to signal their valuation may benefit all participants and increases the probability of success.

We contribute to a broad literature on dynamic signaling. Unlike classic dynamic signaling environments, including Noldeke and Van Damme (1990) and Swinkels (1999), in our setting investments/contributions are not wasteful. Instead, they are welfare enhancing. Our model of dynamic signaling relates to work on reputation, contests, and lemons markets that also characterize equilibria with belief thresholds that guarantee participation (Bar-Isaac, 2003; Daley and Green, 2012; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2012; Kolb, 2019; Gryglewicz and Kolb, 2022). Our work is most similar technically to Ely and Szydlowski (2020) who study an information design problem of a principal who has private information about the difficulty of a task and where the information design problem entails a threshold strategy to ensure agent participation. Instead, we analyze a game in which the donor is a player instead of a principal. For the characterization of the donor-preferred equilibrium, we solve an information design problem similar to Ely and Szydlowski (2020), but with multiple agents who face coordination problems themselves. As a result, our donation thresholds also depend on a stochastically changing state of the game as in Gryglewicz and Kolb (2022). Our work leverages techniques, such as optimizing over beliefs rather than strategies, that are used in the literature on dynamic information design and mechanism design with limited commitment (e.g., Doval and Ely, 2020; Doval and Skreta, 2022). Our approach can be applied to dynamic signaling games to characterize optimal equilibria, by solving a relaxed information design problem subject to participation constraints.

Ellman and Hurkens (2019a) relax the ex-post individual rationality constraint. Belavina et al. (2020) further distinguish between funds misappropriation and performance opacity.
Finally, we provide new empirical insights on reward-based crowdfunding campaigns using granular collected data that connects to a broad literature on the impacts of crowdfunding on innovation (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Lee and Persson, 2016; Sorenson et al., 2016; Grüner and Siemroth, 2019). Our findings complement experimental work on how contributions affect campaign success (Van de Rijt et al., 2014) and confirm that some participants have pro-social incentives (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018; Dai and Zhang, 2019). These incentives extend to other settings, including equity crowdfunding (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2015). Our analysis showcases how donations in crowdfunding affect future contributions, relating to work on how seed money affects subsequent contributions for capital campaigns (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains the model description. The equilibrium analysis follows in Section 3. We discuss modeling extensions and aspects of campaign design in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our empirical analysis.

### 2 Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding

**Crowdfunding campaign.** We consider a fundraising campaign that seeks to raise a goal amount $G > 0$ by a deadline $T > 0$. If the goal is reached by the deadline, contributors receive a reward, e.g., a product. Obtaining a reward requires a pledge at a price $p > 0$. Donations are also accepted. Time is divided into periods of length $\Delta$. Let $T^\Delta := \{\Delta, 2\Delta, \ldots, T\}$ denote the set of periods. For any period $t \in T^\Delta$, there is a corresponding time remaining $u := T - t \in U^\Delta \equiv \{T - \Delta, \ldots, \Delta, 0\}$.

**Players and payoffs.** There are two types of contributors, randomly-arriving buyers (she), and a single, representative long-lived donor (he). In every period, a buyer arrives with probability $\Delta \lambda \in (0, 1)$. Upon arrival, she makes a one-shot decision to either pledge to pay $p$ to buy the product if the campaign is successful, or to choose an outside option of value $v_0 > 0$. All buyers have the same valuation $v > 0$ for the product. If a buyer pledges and the campaign is successful, she receives utility $v - p > v_0$. If the campaign fails, she
pays nothing and receives utility 0. The outside option $v_0$ can be interpreted as the value of a short-lived purchasing opportunity, an inspection cost, a transaction cost of pledging, or a disappointment cost of not receiving a product if buyers are loss-averse.

The long-lived donor values a successful campaign at $w \geq 0$ and has put aside that amount for potential contributions. We refer to $w$ as the donor’s valuation. If the campaign is successful, the donor’s payoff is $w - D_T$, where $D_T$ is the total donation contributed to the campaign. If the campaign fails, all donations are returned, and the donor receives a utility of 0. Hence, a donor will never donate more than $w$. Buyers do not observe $w$. They only know that it is drawn from a distribution on $[0, \infty)$, with a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing cumulative distribution function (cdf) $F_0$. Denote $f_0 := F'_0$. Whereas $w$ denotes the realized donor’s valuation, we use an upper-case $W$ to denote the random variable.

Figure 1: Timing of the game

Timing, histories, and strategies. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the game. Within a period, if a buyer arrives, she decides whether to pledge $p$ or not. Then, the donor decides whether and how much to donate. The donor is also allowed to donate at the start of the game, at time $t = 0$. We denote cumulative pledges and cumulative donations up to and including period $t$ by $N_t$ and $D_t$, respectively. Initially, $N_0 := 0$. The final revenue of the campaign is equal to $R_T = D_T + N_T p$. A successful campaign is one in which $R_T \geq G$. 

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The history of a buyer who arrives in period $t$ is given by

$$h_t^{B,\Delta} = \prod_{s \in T^\Delta, s \leq t} (N_{s-\Delta}, D_{s-\Delta}) \in \mathcal{H}_t^{B,\Delta},$$

where $\mathcal{H}_t^{B,\Delta}$ is the set of period-$t$ buyer histories.\footnote{We assume that buyers do not observe arrivals, but only purchases. Arrivals are not payoff relevant, so the Markov equilibria we characterize later are also equilibria in a game where arrivals are observed.} A donor history in period $t$ also includes the purchase, if any, in period $t$. That is,

$$h_t^{D,\Delta} = \left( \prod_{s \in T^\Delta, s \leq t} (N_{s-\Delta}, D_{s-\Delta}), N_t \right) \in \mathcal{H}_t^{D,\Delta},$$

where $\mathcal{H}_t^{D,\Delta}$ is the set of period-$t$ donor histories. A strategy of a period-$t$ buyer is a mapping $\tilde{b}_t^{\Delta}: \mathcal{H}_t^{B,\Delta} \rightarrow [0,1]$, where $\tilde{b}_t^{\Delta}(h_t^{B,\Delta})$ is the probability of a buyer pledging at history $h_t^{B,\Delta}$. We denote the collection of all buyer strategies by $\tilde{b}^{\Delta} : (\tilde{b}_t^{\Delta})_{t}$. The donor strategy is a mapping $\tilde{D}_t^{\Delta}: \bigcup_{t \in T^\Delta} \mathcal{H}_t^{D,\Delta} \times [0, \infty) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where $\tilde{D}_t^{\Delta}(h_t^{D,\Delta}; w) = D_t$ such that $D_t \geq D_{t-\Delta}$ represents cumulative donations after the donation decision at history $h_t^{D,\Delta}$.\footnote{Formally, we allow for mixed strategies. In that case, $\tilde{D}_t^{\Delta}(h_t^{D,\Delta}; w)$ denotes the random variable that describes the mixed strategy at the corresponding history.} Buyer beliefs, $\tilde{F}_t^{\Delta}: \bigcup_{t \in T^\Delta} \mathcal{H}_t^{B,\Delta} \rightarrow [0, \infty)^{\mathbb{R}}$, map each buyer history $h_t^{B,\Delta}$ to a cdf $\tilde{F}_{t}^{\Delta}(; h_t^{B,\Delta})$.

**Solution concept.** A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is given by an assessment $(\tilde{b}^{\Delta}, \tilde{D}_t^{\Delta}, \tilde{F}_t^{\Delta})$, or a tuple of strategies and beliefs, such that

i) the donor strategy $\tilde{D}_t^{\Delta}$ maximizes the donor’s expected payoff at any donor history $h_t^{D,\Delta}$ given buyer strategies and beliefs;

ii) each period-$t$ buyer strategy $\tilde{b}_t^{\Delta}$ maximizes the expected payoff of the buyer at any history $h_t^{B,\Delta}$, given buyer beliefs, the donor strategy, and other buyer strategies;

iii) buyer beliefs about $W$, $\tilde{F}_t^{\Delta}(; h_t^{B,\Delta})$, are derived from all strategies according to Bayes’ Rule whenever possible.

An equilibrium outcome is given by a sequence of cumulative contributions $((N_t, D_t))_{t \in T}$. 
The distribution of buyer arrivals, the donor’s valuation distribution, and an assessment \((\tilde{b}, \tilde{D}, \tilde{F})\) induce a probability measure \(P\) governing the outcomes of the game.

**Payoff-relevant state and Markov equilibria.** All players’ payoffs only depend on the cumulative number of purchases and the cumulative donation amount. Therefore, we define the payoff-relevant state to be

\[
\mathbf{x} := (N, D, u) \in \mathbb{X}^\Delta := \mathbb{N} \times [0, \infty) \times U^\Delta,
\]

or equal to \((N_{t-\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta}, T - t)\) for a buyer, and \((N_t, D_{t-\Delta}, T - t)\) for a donor, in period \(t\).

Donor strategies, buyer strategies, and buyer beliefs are said to be *Markovian* if they only depend on the state, both on and off equilibrium path. These objects are represented by \(D^\Delta : \mathbb{X}^\Delta \times [0, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}\), \(b^\Delta : \mathbb{X}^\Delta \to [0, 1]\), and \(F^\Delta : \mathbb{X}^\Delta \to \mathbb{R}^R\), respectively. We call PBEs in Markovian strategies and beliefs *Markov equilibria*, described by a Markovian assessment \((b^\Delta, D^\Delta_+, F^\Delta)\).

### 3 Characterization of Equilibrium Outcomes

In this section, we characterize PBE of the game and bound the effects of dynamic signaling on the probability of success. We then establish which PBE are preferred by the donor and buyers. Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix. The Online Appendix contains technical convergence results.

#### 3.1 Preliminaries

Given a Markovian assessment \((b^\Delta, D^\Delta_+, F^\Delta)\), for any state \(\mathbf{x} = (N, D, u)\), let \(\pi^\Delta(\mathbf{x})\) denote the induced probability of reaching the goal from the perspective of the \(N + 1\)st buyer if she pledges in state \(\mathbf{x}\). Upon arrival, a buyer in state \(\mathbf{x}\) is willing to pledge if and only if the
expected utility of pledging is greater than the utility of the outside option. That is,

\[ \pi^\Delta(x) \cdot (v - p) \geq v_0. \]  

(Buyer-PC)

The probability of success \( \pi^\Delta(\cdot) \) is determined by the assessment \((b^\Delta, D^\Delta_+, F^\Delta)\) and two sources of uncertainty. First, buyers are uncertain about the donor’s valuation \( w \) and update their beliefs based on the observed state \( x \). Second, there is uncertainty about the number of future buyer arrivals. We define an active campaign as one in which beliefs are sufficiently high to incentivize pledging.

**Definition 1.** For a given assessment \((b^\Delta, D^\Delta_+, F^\Delta)\), we call a campaign active in state \( x \) if and only if \( \pi^\Delta(x) \geq \frac{v}{v - p} \).

### 3.2 Pooling-Threshold Equilibrium Structure

One of our key insights is to show that the equilibrium outcomes that minimize/maximize the probability of success can be attained by Markov equilibria in which the donor strategies have an intuitive structure. In these equilibria, cumulative donations are kept above a state-dependent threshold as long as the donor has not exhausted his funds \( w \).

**Definition 2.** We call a Markovian donor strategy \( D^\Delta_+ \) a pooling-threshold (PT) strategy if for any \( N \) and \( u \), there is a donation threshold \( D^\Delta_+(N, u) \geq 0 \), with \( D^\Delta_+(N, 0) = G - Np \), such that

\[ D^\Delta_+(x; w) = \max \left\{ D , D^\Delta_+(N, u) \right\}, \forall w \geq D^\Delta_+(N, u), \]

and \( D^\Delta_+(x; w) = \max\{w, D\} \), otherwise.

Given a PT donor strategy, donations serve to signal the donor’s valuation to buyers. If the signal is sufficiently positive, buyers are optimistic that the campaign will ultimately succeed, despite the uncertainty in total contributions. For any given history, there is a corresponding “donation threshold” so that if the donor donates more than the threshold, a buyer who arrives at the next instant will believe that the goal will be met with a high
probability. In the Markov equilibria we construct, the threshold is such that buyers believe that the probability of success exceeds \( \frac{u - p}{v - p} \), so that they are willing to pledge. That is, buyers pledge if and only if cumulative donations exceed the donation threshold of the donor in the preceding period,

\[
b^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1 \iff D \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta).
\]

(PT-buyer)

Additionally, for the Markov equilibria that we construct, the donation threshold \( D^\Delta(N, u) \) is decreasing in both \( N \) and \( u \). That is, fewer donations are required to keep the campaign active when more buyers have pledged and more time remains until the deadline. As a result, these equilibria can be supported by buyer beliefs that are truncations of the prior distribution \( F_0 \) when \( D \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) \). PT beliefs are equal to

\[
F^\Delta(w; x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{F_0(w) - F_0(D)}{1 - F_0(D)} \cdot 1(w \geq D) & \text{if } D \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) \\
1(w \geq D) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

(PT-belief)

As soon as cumulative donations fall below \( D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) \), buyers believe that the donor has exhausted the amount that he is willing to contribute and \( w = D \).\footnote{Many other buyer belief systems can sustain a PBE in which the donor plays a PT strategy. Technically, the beliefs chosen here violate the “cannot signal what you do not know” condition off equilibrium path as introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), in the sense that early buyer purchases can affect the beliefs of later buyers independently of the donor’s actions. We could recover the “cannot signal what you do not know” condition without altering anything qualitatively, by imposing that for any off-path history \( h_{B, \Delta} \) such that there exists a \( s \leq t \) with \( D_s < D^\Delta(N, T-s) \), we have \( F(w; h_{B, \Delta}) = 1(w \geq \min(D_s \mid D_s < D^\Delta(N, T-s), s \leq t)) \). Instead of allowing such non-Markovian off-path beliefs, we choose the Markovian on- and off-path beliefs given in Equation PT-belief for their clean structure.}

We define a PT assessment (a tuple of buyer strategy, donor strategy and beliefs) as follows:

**Definition 3.** An assessment \((b^\Delta, D^\Delta, F^\Delta)\) is a *pooling-threshold (PT) assessment* if \( D^\Delta \) is a PT strategy with a donation threshold \( D^\Delta(N, u) \in [0, G - (N + 1)p) \), if Equation PT-buyer and Equation PT-belief are satisfied, and if the following conditions hold:
i) Weak monotonicity in $u$ and strong monotonicity in $N$, i.e.,

$$D^\Delta_s(N, u) \geq D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u - \Delta) \geq D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u);$$

ii) Strict monotonicity in $N$, i.e., $D^\Delta_s(N, u) > D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u)$ if $D^\Delta_s(N, u) > 0$;

iii) No donation threshold after success, i.e., $D^\Delta_s(N, u) = 0$ for $(N + 1)p \geq G$.

Condition (i) in Definition 3 imposes that the donation threshold is weakly decreasing in $u$, but also that if there is a pledge in period $u - \Delta$, then the donation threshold for the next period $D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u - \Delta)$ does not increase. Monotonicity in $N$ is stronger than the monotonicity in $u$. Condition (ii) simply imposes strict monotonicity of $D^\Delta_s$ in $N$, and Condition (iii) requires that $D^\Delta_s$ drops to zero if buyers alone raise the goal amount.

Because the donation threshold is decreasing in $N$ and $u$, once a campaign reaches a state in which it is not active, it can never be active again. This allows us to define cut-off times (CT) such that given realized donor valuation $w$ and the number of additional buyers $j$ needed for success, the campaign will fail unless the next buyer arrives before the cut-off time $u = \xi^\Delta_j(w)$. Let $M(D) = \lceil \frac{G - D}{p} \rceil$ denote the total number of buyers needed for success given total donations $D$, if no further donations are made. Then, for $j \leq M(w)$,

$$\xi^\Delta_j(w) := \min \left\{ u \in \mathbb{U}^\Delta : \pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, u) \geq \frac{v_0}{v - p} \right\};$$

(CT)

where we set $\xi^\Delta_j(w) = T$ if $\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, u) < \frac{v_0}{v - p}$ for all $u \in \mathbb{U}^\Delta$. Monotonicity of $D^\Delta_s$ guarantees that $\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, u) \geq \frac{v_0}{v - p}$ for $u \geq \xi^\Delta_j(w)$. Therefore, given state $x$ with $N = M(w) - j$, a donor with valuation $w$ is not able to satisfy Equation Buyer-PC if and only if $u < \xi^\Delta_j(w)$. Buyers will pledge in equilibrium if and only if they arrive before the specified cutoff times. If they arrive too late, the donor will “run out of funds” because he would need to donate more than $w$ to keep the campaign active. Ex-ante, there is an information asymmetry between donor and buyers about $\xi^\Delta_j(w)$, but once period $\xi^\Delta_j(w)$ is reached, the asymmetry is resolved.
Figure 2: Sample equilibrium path given donor wealth $w$ such that $M(w) = 5$

![Equilibrium Path Diagram]

The first line shows the cut-off times $\xi_j(w)$ by which the $M(w) - j + 1$-th buyer must arrive in order for the campaign to stay alive. The second line depicts realizations of buyer arrivals (by blue dots) at $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_5$ for a campaign with deadline $T$. The second arrival $\tau_2$ does not occur “in time,” i.e., before time $T - \xi_4(w)$. The donor runs out of funds and the campaign fails at $T - \xi_4(w)$.

Figure 2 illustrates the structure of Markov equilibria in which the donor plays a PT strategy, which we refer to as pooling-threshold (PT) equilibria. The $\tau$s denote buyer arrival times where we have taken the limit as $\Delta \to 0$. More formally, if the arrival process of buyers is $(A_t)_{t \leq T}$, the arrival time of the $n$th buyer is $\tau_n \equiv \inf\{t \geq 0 | A_t \geq n\}$. We have chosen $w$ such that $M(w) = 5$ buyers are needed for success. The horizontal axis marks time as well as the cut-off times $\xi_j(w)$. The $N$-th buyer must arrive at least $\xi_{M(w) - N + 1}(w)$ time before the deadline in order to be willing to pledge. If the $N$-th buyer arrives after that instant, the expected utility from pledging for this buyer (and subsequent buyers) drops below the utility from the outside option $v_0$ and the campaign fails.

Given the realized arrival process and donor valuation in Figure 2, the donor contributes along the donation threshold through the first buyer arrival time $\tau_1$. He does so to ensure that the first buyer pledges. Because the first buyer contributes, the donation threshold drops—the next arriving buyer is confident that the campaign will succeed—and therefore, the donor stops donating for a period of time. Then, donations again follow the donation threshold to keep the campaign active. Note that the second buyer arrives after the cut-off time $\xi_4(w)$. At $\xi_4(w)$, the donor has run out of funds to incentivize buyers, i.e., $D_t = w$. As a result, all buyers after $\tau_2$ choose the outside option and the campaign fails.
dashed orange lines after $\xi_4(w)$ mark the donation thresholds if all buyers had bought. The threshold would have dropped had these buyers pledged.

When we construct PT equilibria, we define a donation threshold $D^\Delta(N, u)$, and then show that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied. We show in the appendix that for any PT assessment, beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule and donors are best-responding to the buyer strategy. Hence, for any specific equilibrium, it only remains to show that buyers are best-responding as well.

3.3 Success-Maximizing Equilibrium

We start with the construction of a PBE that maximizes the probability of success. Because the donor is willing to donate up to his valuation if necessary, maximizing the probability of success boils down to providing buyers with incentives to pledge whenever possible. In a success-maximizing equilibrium, even relatively low cumulative donations are a sufficiently strong signal to buyers. As a result, even a donor with a relatively low valuation can keep the campaign active.

A PT strategy with a minimal donation threshold that can support an equilibrium can generate such optimistic beliefs. We calculate a minimum donation threshold for any given history and show that at this threshold, buyers are exactly indifferent between pledging or not. The donor should never donate more than this threshold because the threshold will increase in the future if buyers do not pledge. Therefore, it is prudent to hold back funds in order to potentially induce later buyers to pledge. As a result, all donors with a valuation greater than the threshold indeed pool and donate just enough to meet the threshold. The following proposition summarizes key properties of this equilibrium. We also show that as $\Delta \to 0$, any sequence of such PT equilibria converges to a unique limit. For discrete $\Delta$, multiple PT equilibria may attain the maximum probability of success.

Proposition 1 (Success-Maximizing Equilibrium).

i) Given any $\Delta > 0$, there exists a success-maximizing PBE that is a PT equilibrium;
ii) Any sequence of these PT equilibria \( \{(b^\Delta, D^\Delta_+, F^\Delta)\} \) converges to a unique limit \((b, D_+, F)\) as \( \Delta \to 0 \). The donor’s limiting PT strategy admits a donation threshold 
\( D_+(N, u) = D(N, u) \) where \( D(N, u) = 0 \) if \( \pi(N, 0, u) > \frac{v_0}{v-p} \), and otherwise, the next buyer is made indifferent such that

\[
\pi(N, D(N, u), u) = \frac{v_0}{v-p},
\]

where \( \pi := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi^\Delta \) (the limit being uniform in \( D \)). Given a wealth realization \( w \) and cumulative purchases \( N \) with \( M(w) - N = j > 1 \), the campaign fails in the limit at

\[
\xi_j(w) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \xi^\Delta_j(w)
\]

satisfying

\[
\pi(M(w) - j, w, \xi_j(w)) = \frac{v_0}{v-p}.
\]

If \( j \leq 1 \), the campaign never fails.

The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we construct a PT equilibrium for fixed \( \Delta \) that satisfies analogous discrete-time properties described in Proposition 1. Second, we take the limit as \( \Delta \to 0 \). Finally, we establish that the constructed PBE maximizes the probability of success.

The construction of the PT equilibrium uses the insights provided in Section 3.2. We cannot directly define a donation threshold for every state of the game such that buyers are just indifferent between pledging or not pledging because such a condition is endogenous to all participant strategies. Instead, we use an induction in the number of buyers needed to reach the goal if no additional donations are made, \( j = M(D) - N \). Within each induction step in \( j \), we construct equilibrium objects \( D^\Delta_+(N, u), \pi^\Delta(N, D, u) \), and \( \xi^\Delta_j(w) \).

To find a success-maximizing PBE, we only need to find a PBE that maximizes buyer pledges. The exact donation amounts do not matter, as long as they incentivize pledging. We are able to consider “reduced histories” which ignore the precise donation amounts and instead only keep track whether or not a donation keeps the campaign active. We recast the problem by directly choosing probabilities of reaching each reduced history subject
to a martingale constraint and a buyer participation constraint. We show that the PBE constructed in the first step indeed achieves the value of this relaxed problem.

3.4 Success-Minimizing Equilibrium—No Signaling Benchmark

In the unique success-minimizing equilibrium, the ability of the donor to signal his value does not facilitate coordination between buyers. However, it also does not add inefficient uncertainty about the donor’s valuation either, because in equilibrium, buyers contribute as if they knew the donor’s valuation. Formally, the donor plays a PT strategy with a donation threshold that is so high that buyers act as if no more donations will be made. To define this threshold, we start by considering the case in which \( w \) is known to be zero, that is, \( F(w) = 1( w \geq 0 ) \). We define the cut-off times \( \xi^\Delta_j(w) \) of the constructed equilibrium in Proposition 1 for \( w = 0 \), given by Equation CT in the definition below.

**Definition 4.** If there is no donor, i.e., \( w \equiv 0 \), we denote the cut-off times \( \xi^\Delta_j(0) \) from Proposition 1 by \( \xi^\Delta_j \). Furthermore, \( \xi_j := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \xi^\Delta_j \).

Using Definition 4, we can define \( D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) := \max\{G - (j - 1)p - Np, 0\} \) for \( u \in [\xi^\Delta_j, \xi^\Delta_{j-1}] \) and in the limit \( \Delta \to 0 \),

\[
D(N, u) := \max\{G - (j - 1)p - Np, 0\} \text{ for } u \in [\xi_j, \xi_{j-1}].
\]

This is the maximum donation threshold that can arise in a PBE. Indeed, in any PBE, the donor would not contribute if total revenue already exceeds \( G - (j - 1)p \) at \( u \in [\xi^\Delta_{j-1}, \xi^\Delta_j] \) since all future buyers will pledge. Note that given this threshold, as \( \Delta \to 0 \), donors always donate exactly \( p \) in order to “compensate” for the absence of a buyer arrival.

In Proposition 2 below, we show that a success-minimizing PBE can be achieved by a PT equilibrium, in which the donation threshold is exactly this maximal possible equilibrium donation threshold \( D \). Note that unlike in the success-maximizing equilibrium of Proposition 1, now when a buyer pledges, she has a strict incentive to do so.
Proposition 2 (Success-minimizing Equilibrium).

i) Given any $\Delta > 0$, there exists a unique success-minimizing PBE that is a PT equilibrium.

ii) Any sequence of such PT equilibria $\{(b^\Delta, D^\Delta, F^\Delta)\}_\Delta$ converges to a unique limit $(b, D^*, F)$ as $\Delta \to 0$. The donor’s limiting PT strategy has a donation threshold $D^*_N(N, u) = \overline{D}(N, u)$ given by $(\overline{D})$.

To prove Proposition 2, we show that the PT assessment with donation threshold $\overline{D}$ is indeed an equilibrium by backward induction in time. Second, to show that the equilibrium minimizes the probability of success, we show that in any PBE, buyers contribute in all states in which they contribute according to this PT equilibrium.

Note that if buyers pledge according to the donation threshold $\overline{D}$, they would pledge even if they were sure that no additional donor contributions will be made. Therefore, buyers contribute as if the donor’s valuation is equal to the current level of cumulative donations. As a result, the donor does not coordinate buyers and is instead simply decreasing the goal amount from $G$ to $G - w$.

3.5 Donor- and Buyer-Preferred Equilibria

Now that we have characterized the equilibria that maximize and minimize the probability of success, we investigate which equilibria are preferred by the donor and by buyers. Recall that the donor values success, but also wants to minimize cumulative donations. If the donor could be refunded excess donations at the end of the campaign (we consider this extension in Section 4), then it immediately follows that the donor wants to simply maximize the probability of success. In this case, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is the donor’s preferred equilibrium. When this is not possible, one might conjecture that the donor “over-donates” in the success-maximizing equilibrium, and can benefit from reducing donations at the expense of a lower success probability. We show that this is not the case because early-arriving buyers can always be induced to pledge with fewer cumulative donations than
later-arriving buyers. As a result, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is also donor-preferred.

**Proposition 3 (Donor-Preferred Equilibrium).** The success-maximizing PT equilibrium outcome constructed in Proposition 1 is also optimal for the donor.

The key step to proving Proposition 3 is to show that if there is a donor-preferred equilibrium, then there must be a donor-preferred equilibrium in which after any history, the donor donates either nothing or just enough to induce the next buyer to pledge. The donor’s problem then reduces to one in which he chooses probabilities over the same reduced histories (as in the proof of Proposition 1) and minimal donation thresholds that satisfy a donor incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, the donor is intuitively solving two problems: he is minimizing his cumulative donations necessary for the campaign to succeed while simultaneously maximizing the probability of success.

It is not the case that buyers prefer the success-maximizing equilibrium. Moreover, buyers also do not prefer the success-minimizing equilibrium since they do benefit from the donor coordinating campaign pledges. Instead, buyers prefer equilibria with an intermediate probability of success, strictly between the success-maximizing and success-minimizing probability. Note that we do not fully characterize buyer-preferred equilibria due to the pledging externalities on past and future buyers that makes it beyond the scope of this paper.

**Proposition 4 (Buyer-Preferred Equilibrium).** For sufficiently small $\Delta$, any PT equilibrium preferred by buyers yields a probability of success strictly between the success-maximizing one in Proposition 1 and the success-minimizing one in Proposition 2.

The success-maximizing equilibrium is not buyer-preferred because it does not internalize buyers’ opportunity costs of pledging. In order to see why, consider a situation when the first buyer arrives late in the game and the success-maximizing donation threshold $D_a(0, u)$ can be met by the donor. In this case, there is no externality of pledging on past buyers (there were none) and only a small potential externality on future buyers (they
are unlikely to arrive). At $D^\Delta(0, u)$, the buyer is just indifferent between pledging or not—so she will pledge. If the donor is actually nearly out of funds, the probability of failure is high and pledging would be a mistake. However, with a slightly higher threshold the buyer would be able to screen out donor types who are nearly out of funds, and benefit from taking the outside option. Essentially, the success-maximizing equilibrium can facilitate buyers being “tricked” into supporting a campaign that will fail.

The success-minimizing equilibrium is also not buyer-preferred because buyers benefit from some dynamic signaling. In order to see why, recall that in the success-minimizing equilibrium, buyers contribute as if they knew the donor valuation $w$. Consider a realization of donor valuation $w = G - p - \epsilon$ with small $\epsilon > 0$. Then, the campaign requires two buyers to succeed. The first buyer contributes if $(v - p)(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^u) - v_0 \geq 0$, but total buyer surplus is maximized if she considers

$$
(v - p)(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^u) - v_0 + (v - p - v_0)\lambda u \geq 0.
$$

Hence, incentivizing the first buyer to contribute beyond $\bar{\xi}^\Delta(G - 2p)$ increases overall buyer surplus. This can be achieved by lowering the donation threshold $D^\Delta(0, u) = G - p$ on $u \in [\bar{u}, \bar{\xi}^\Delta(G - 2p))$ by $\epsilon$ if $\bar{u}$ solves the above inequality with equality. We show formally that this lower donation threshold defines a PT equilibrium that buyers prefer over the success-minimizing equilibrium.

On the one hand, our analysis highlights that because campaign participants have different preferences, they also prefer different equilibria. On the other hand, because buyers do not prefer the success-minimizing equilibrium, it follows that buyers benefit from “some” signaling. That is, all campaign participants benefit from the coordination made possible by dynamic signaling, it is just that the donor and buyers disagree on how much signaling an equilibrium should allow.
4 Extensions and Campaign Design

We show that our baseline model is robust to a number of modeling extensions and discuss alternative campaign designs. Proofs for this section can be found in the Online Appendix.

4.1 Fundraising Campaigns Without All-or-Nothing Design

Our baseline model studies an all-or-nothing campaign design which is widely used in reward-based crowdfunding. However, it is isomorphic to a model for general fundraising campaigns with a deadline where buyers and the donor receive “a utility boost” if the campaign reaches a benchmark goal. This makes our results applicable to a wide range of fundraising campaigns, including non-profit capital campaigns. For example, a university might sell tickets to attend a fundraising gala to “buyers,” and a leadership donor may contribute to the campaign leading up to the event. Similarly, political campaigns hold fundraising events with a goal and deadline. Funds are raised from ticket sales, and donations are also accepted (Snowball, 2021).

Formally, consider a buyer who can pay price $p$ in exchange for a guaranteed utility $v_L$, but if the campaign reaches the goal, buyers receive utility $v_H > v_L$. Similarly, we assume that the donor’s payoff is $\bar{w}R_T + wI(R_T \geq G)$, where $w$ is private information, $\bar{w} \in (0,1)$ is publicly known, and $R_T$ denotes total funds raised. A general fundraising model with these adjusted preferences is isomorphic to our baseline model if $v_H - v_L \geq v_0 - v_L + p$ as a buyer’s participation constraint can be written as

$$v_H \pi(N, D, u) + v_L(1 - \pi(N, D, u)) - p \geq v_0 \iff (v_H - v_L)\pi(N, D, u) \geq v_0 - v_L + p,$$

and if the difference in the marginal utility of donations across donor types remains as in our baseline model. The donor also does not wish to donate after the campaign succeeds because $\bar{w} < 1$. As a result, Propositions 1-4 hold, and signaling can promote coordination analogously.
4.2 Multiple Donors

Our baseline model considers a single representative donor. This assumption can be relaxed. We argue that the success-maximizing equilibrium with several donors, with known values among donors, coincides with the success-maximizing equilibrium of the baseline model. That is, despite the incentive to free ride, the success-maximizing equilibrium can be supported in this extension.\(^8\)

To see this, assume that there are two long-lived donors with valuations \(w_1, w_2\) such that \(w := w_1 + w_2\) is distributed according to \(F_0\). We consider the same timing as the baseline model but allow both donors to simultaneously donate at the end of each period. First, note that with multiple donors, the probability of success cannot be higher than in a success-maximizing equilibrium with a single donor with wealth \(w\). Proposition 1 generalizes where the two donors play the following equilibrium strategies. The first donor plays a PT strategy with the success-maximizing donation threshold of Proposition 1 and the second donor does not donate until the donation threshold reaches \(w_1\). It follows that buyer beliefs and strategies are as in the baseline success-maximizing equilibrium. Moreover, donors cannot profitably deviate given the other donor’s strategy. A deviation below the PT threshold would cause the next buyer to not contribute, and a deviation above the PT threshold would lead to over-contributing along the lines of Proposition 1. By similar logic, we can extend this idea to an arbitrary number of donors such that the sum of their valuations equals \(w\).

However, the success-minimizing equilibrium can result in a lower probability of success compared to the baseline model because of free-riding. To see this, consider a two-period version of our model and assume that \(2p < w_1 < G < w_1 + w_2\). Both donors know that the campaign will fail if both do not contribute. Hence, if a single donor does not contribute, it is optimal for the other donor to not donate. So, there is an equilibrium in which no one donates and the campaign fails with probability one.\(^9\)

\(^8\)If donors did not observe each others’ valuations, free-riding may lower the probability of success.
\(^9\)We may also ask what happens if buyers are allowed to contribute in excess of \(p\), given that higher contributions increase the probability of success and thereby the overall value of pledging \(\pi(N, D, u)(v − p)\).
4.3 Campaign Creator as the Donor and Returning Excess Donations

We do not refer to the donor as the campaign creator because in our empirical application, crowdfunding platforms do not allow individuals to contribute to their own campaign. We can accommodate a donor contributing to his own campaign and being refunded excess donations at the deadline. All of our analysis (Propositions 1-4) remains unchanged.\(^\text{10}\) The reason is that the probability of success and buyers’ outcomes remains unchanged in our baseline model if excess donations are returned to the donor at the end of a successful campaign. The donor will play the same strategy in all discussed PT equilibria, but will receive back excess donations at the deadline. Thus, all participants’ equilibrium strategies are unaffected and only the expected payoff of the donor is higher if donations are returned at the deadline.\(^\text{11}\)

4.4 Time-Varying Arrivals and Outside Options

Time-varying arrival rates and outside options are relevant for empirical applications. For example, to attract more participants, crowdfunding platforms promote campaigns that were recently launched and are nearing the deadline. Accommodating time-varying arrivals is straightforward—we just need to replace \(\lambda\) with \(\lambda_t\) when we calculate the probability of success and adjust the limiting outcomes accordingly. This extension does require that \(\lambda_t\) is smooth.

Another natural extension is a time-varying outside option. For example, crowdfunding platforms can place a credit card authorization when an individual pledges support, and we expect that buyers have lower opportunity costs closer to the deadline. Our analysis generalizes in a straightforward way to a time-dependent outside option. However, the value the

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\(^{10}\) We maintain the assumption that the donor faces a budget constraint of \(w\). If the donor can donate more than his valuation, the donor might have an incentive to do so if excess funds are returned.  

\(^{11}\) There may be additional equilibria in this game, but the bounds on the probability of success remain unchanged.
outside option cannot decrease too quickly because otherwise an inactive campaign can become active again at a later point in time. As a result, the cutoff times \( \xi_j^T(w) \) we construct may not exist, which significantly complicates equilibrium construction.

### 4.5 Social Learning

Our model can also be adapted to situations where buyers engage in social learning, e.g., buyers learn about reward quality from other buyers’ pledges. We consider an extension where buyer valuations are \( vq \), where \( v \) is deterministic, and \( q \in \{0, 1\} \) is the unknown quality of the reward. Each buyer receives an independent signal about quality \( s \in \{0, 1\} \) that is equal to 1 with certainty if \( q = 1 \) and with a probability less than one if \( q = 0 \). Thus, buyers who see \( s = 0 \) learn with certainty that \( q = 0 \) and do not pledge. The participation constraint of buyers who receive a positive signal \( s = 1 \) can be written as

\[
\mathbb{P}(N_T p + D_T \geq G) \cdot \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[(vq - p) \cdot 1(N_T p + D_T \geq G)]}{\mathbb{P}(N_T p + D_T \geq G)} - p \right) \geq v_0.
\]

Buyers care about their valuation conditional on success rather than a deterministic value \( v \) when making their pledging decisions. This expected valuation conditional on success is higher if success requires more buyers with positive signals to pledge. Therefore, donations can lower this expected valuation, conditional on success.

We make this intuition more concrete by characterizing the success-maximizing equilibrium of a two-period version of the above game in Section B.1 in the Online Appendix. The example shows that the marginal impact of donations on the left-hand-side of the buyer PC constraint—representing the value of pledging—is lower if the quality is uncertain, and that donations can even decrease this valuation. We show that a PT equilibrium can be constructed analogously to the construction in Proposition 1 if there is not too much uncertainty about quality.
4.6 Optimal Donation Mechanism and Alternative Campaign Designs

In our model, the donor is allowed to contribute continuously before the deadline. We argue that this mechanism is optimal in a large class of mechanisms. Note that the relaxed problem in the proof of Proposition 1 does not take into account donor incentives. The choice variable of the optimization problem is a state-contingent allocation rule for any realized \( w \) that determines whether a buyer takes the outside option or pledges, and the objective is to maximize the probability of success subject to buyer participation. As a result, this relaxed problem can also be viewed as a restricted mechanism design problem that maximizes the probability of success.

Specifically, we can consider a class of direct “donor-incentivizing mechanisms” defined as follows. Let an allocation be a sequence \( (a_t)_{t \in T} \in \{0, 1\}^T \) that determines whether a period-\( t \) buyer (if she arrives) takes the outside option \( (a_t = 0) \) or stays in the game \( (a_t = 1) \), and an allocation \( \bar{a} \) that determines whether the campaign is successful. An allocation is feasible if, given the realized arrival process \( A_t \), \( \bar{a} = 1 \) only if \( \sum_t (A_t - A_{t-\Delta})a_t p + D_T \geq G \).

For simplicity, consider direct mechanisms where the donor sends a message \( m \in [0, \infty) \) about his type, and a buyer in period \( t \) can decide whether to participate in the mechanism or not. Then, a direct, donor-incentivizing mechanism is given by a message strategy of the donor, a participation strategy of buyers, an allocation mapping that maps messages and participation decisions to feasible allocations, and a donor transfer \( D \in [0, \infty) \). We consider a restricted class of mechanisms because we do not allow for transfers between buyers. Then, it follows that the relaxed problem in the proof of Proposition 1 is a relaxed problem of the mechanism design problem that finds the success-maximizing, donor-incentivizing mechanism. An example of a simple donor-incentivizing mechanism is one that allows donations just at the beginning or at the end of the campaign. The above argument shows that collecting donations and pledges sequentially must yield a lower probability of success.

We also consider how the information available to participants more generally could affect campaign success. Perhaps the most natural benchmark is an environment in which all buyers have symmetric information, which reduces the campaign to a simultaneous-
move contribution game. We show that in a “no-information” campaign where both buyers and the donor receive no interim information, the probability of success for a campaign can be higher or lower compared to our benchmark model. The reason is that in this environment, either all buyers pledge or no buyers pledge, depending on the parameters of the game.

5 Empirical Application to Reward-based Crowdfunding

We consider an empirical application of our theory to reward-based crowdfunding campaigns with two objectives in mind. First, we provide empirical evidence that our modeling assumptions are empirically relevant for crowdfunding campaigns. Second, we derive testable predictions of arbitrary PT equilibria, including the outcomes characterized in Propositions 1 and 2, and show that these predictions fit the data well. Our approach to model testing allows us to remain agnostic about which equilibrium a given campaign follows. Therefore, we do not impose an equilibrium selection mechanism as commonly used in empirical studies with multiple known equilibria. However, we do conduct a simple analysis that suggests most campaigns do not follow success-minimizing equilibrium outcomes.

5.1 Reward-Based Crowdfunding Platforms

Reward-Based crowdfunding platforms allow entrepreneurs to raise funds for projects before production occurs. The largest reward-based crowdfunding platform is Kickstarter, followed by Indiegogo. Many region-specific platforms, such as Startnext (German-speaking countries) and Wishberry (India), offer similar services and features. The core design features of these platforms match our modeling framework. In a typical campaign, an entrepreneur specifies a funding goal \((G)\), a funding deadline \((T)\), and prices for rewards \((p)\). Individuals can pledge to buy at a particular reward level or donate any amount and
receive no reward in return.\textsuperscript{12} Entrepreneurs may offer different versions of the reward or may offer quantity discounts. Like our theoretical model, we abstract away from price discrimination in our empirical analysis. Most platforms use an all-or-nothing model, which means that transactions are realized if and only if the funding goal is reached by the deadline. Platforms limit the length of a campaign. For example, Kickstarter limits campaigns to at most 60 days. Most campaigns last 30 days. Once a campaign goes live, the core features cannot be changed.\textsuperscript{13} Consistent with our model, we analyze campaigns through the fundraising deadline and do not study subsequent events, such as the reward (product) becoming a mass-market product (e.g., Peleton, Oculus VR, Brooklinen, etc.).

\subsection*{5.2 Data Sample Construction}

We use novel Kickstarter data for campaigns launched between March 2017 to September 2018. We observe pledges separately from donations at 12-hour frequencies.\textsuperscript{14} In total, the sample contains almost two million observations.\textsuperscript{15}

We separate buyer pledges from donor contributions by processing the web page source code and estimating unobserved quantities. We directly observe pledges for each reward level (buyer pledges) as well as total revenues, inclusive of donations and shipping costs. On Kickstarter, shipping costs are included in the progress towards the goal but are not included in the reward prices listed on the platform. This means that we observe both

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}Individuals can also purchase the reward and contribute in excess of the reward amount. Some entrepreneurs request that buyers pledge in excess of the posted price if they are interested in obtaining additional product features—called “add-ons” or “optional buys.” Other campaigns have “stretch goals,” which means that the entrepreneur informally adjusts the goal, and if met, adjusts the final product. Since these instances affect our interpretation of a donation, we remove any campaign in our sample that includes words related to add-ons, optional buys, and stretch goals.
\item \textsuperscript{13}For example, $G$, $T$ and $p$ are fixed. The entrepreneur can take the campaign to a draft mode in order to edit the text, but this does not pause the stopwatch to the deadline. Entrepreneurs can post updates, and backers can post comments during and after the campaign.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018) identify “family” contributions using last name matching based on self-selected usernames that were visible before 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{15}We collected the data by monitoring all campaign web pages.
\end{itemize}
left-hand-side variables individually in the following equation,

\[ \text{Total Revenue}_t - \text{Buyer Revenue}_t = \text{Donor Revenue}_t + \text{Shipping Costs}_t, \]

but we only observe the sum of the right-hand-side variables. In order to recover donations, we estimate shipping costs. We do so by collecting shipping costs for every campaign-reward-country combination and then assigning a shipping cost to every observed pledge. In total, we collect over 516,000 shipping quotes. The most frequently observed shipping options are free shipping, single-rate shipping, or worldwide shipping with region-specific or country-specific prices. Our approach allows us to bound the importance of donations on the platform. We complete our analyses under three shipping-cost assignments: (i) least-expensive shipping, (ii) assuming all buyers are located in the United States, and (iii) most-expensive shipping. Specifications (i) and (iii) provide lower and upper bounds on revenues coming from donations. We use (ii) as our main specification because most campaigns originate in the U.S. We report results from the other specifications in Online Appendix C.2. Since donations are positive contributions to campaigns, we also incorporate the constraint \( \text{Shipping Costs}_t \leq \text{Total Revenue}_t - \text{Buyer Revenue}_t \).

We define a buyer to be an individual who pledges for any reward, however, some rewards may better be classified as a donation. For example, if the lowest reward is a thank-you card, but the main reward is a novel product, the lowest reward may be better treated as a donation. Another example may be the existence of an expensive option that includes the main reward but also allows the buyer to meet with the entrepreneur. We repeat all of our analyses treating the most-expensive, the least-expensive rewards, or both the least- and most-expensive rewards as donations in Online Appendix C.2. All of our main findings hold regardless of the specification choice. Although Kickstarter allows individuals to pledge for a reward and contribute more than the reward amount (simultaneously pledge and donate), our collected data is not at the individual level and therefore, we do not observe this level of detail.\(^{16}\) As a result, we maintain the assumption of our model that buyers do

\(^{16}\)Observing a buyer simultaneously pledge and donate would only be discernible if data were collected at
not donate. We also assume that buyers do not revisit their pledging decisions later on.\footnote{We observe very few instances where progress toward the goal is non-monontonic (389 observations out of 1,966,378). Note that because we also observe the total number of contributors, by subtracting off the number of individuals who pledged for a reward, we obtain a lower bound on the number of donors that contributed. This is a lower bound because a buyer can also donate.}

## 5.3 Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 30,610 campaigns in our cleaned sample.\footnote{We winsorize the sample by dropping the bottom 0.5% and the top 0.5% of campaigns in terms of the goal amount. This removes campaigns with low $1 goals and campaigns with several million dollar goals (one in the billions). These extreme values impact some means, such as average goal, but medians are unchanged. In addition, we drop campaigns that were removed by the creator, campaigns under copyright dispute, and campaigns with optional add-ons.} Just over one-half of campaigns succeed. We report sample averages for unsuccessful (Uns.) and successful (Suc.) campaigns separately. There is a positive correlation between campaign length and goal (corr. coef. = .16). The average goal amount is $15,400; the median goal amount is $5,800. Unsuccessful campaigns tend to have higher goals and more revenues coming from donations than successful campaigns. Campaigns typically offer several reward levels. Although campaign creators can assign capacity limits to rewards, these limits are typically not binding.\footnote{Successful campaigns have more reward levels. We find that 65% of buckets do not have a capacity limit, and only 17% of rewards with capacity limits ever sell out.} Contributions tend to be infrequent. The median number of both pledges and donations each period is zero, with means of 1.1 and 0.1, respectively.

Our analysis establishes that donations are a key component of campaign revenues. We estimate that donations constitute 28\% of total revenue raised on Kickstarter (with bounds of 25\% to 30\%, depending on how we compute shipping costs). Consistent with our model, donations tend to be small, with an average of $25. The average reward price is over four times greater.

We report additional campaign outcome summaries in Figure 3. In panel (a), we report revenue relative to goal ($R/G$) at the end of the campaign. There is considerable bunching at zero and one. Most campaigns receive little support or raise exactly the goal amount. There is a thin and long tail beyond $R/G = 2$ that is not shown. In panel (b), we plot the sufficiently high-frequency.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Data Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (All)</th>
<th>Mean (Uns.)</th>
<th>Mean (Suc.)</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>5th %</th>
<th>95th %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Length</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal ($)</td>
<td>15326.0</td>
<td>21355.0</td>
<td>9340.1</td>
<td>5785.9</td>
<td>350.0</td>
<td>58062.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Rewards</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Revenue (per period)</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer Revenue (per period)</td>
<td>167.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>329.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>561.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Donations at Deadline</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Statistics are calculated for the 30,610 campaigns included in the sample after data cleaning. A period is twelve hours. Means are computed for all campaigns (All) - unsuccessful campaigns (Uns.) and successful campaigns (Suc.).

Figure 3: Frequency Histograms of Final Revenue and Success Time

(a) Final Revenue / Goal

(b) Success Time

Note: (a) Total campaign revenue is the sum of donations, purchases, and shipping costs. The fraction is defined as total revenue at the deadline divided by the campaign goal. (b) For 30-day campaigns only. Period $t = 0$ corresponds to the first day of the campaign, and $t = 30$ corresponds to the time at which the campaign ends.
5.4 Validating Modeling Assumptions

Before testing theoretical predictions, we use the data to validate some of our modeling choices. One of our central assumptions is that contributors have distinct incentives: the donor contributes solely to increase the probability of success, and buyers are motivated by obtaining private rewards. The presence of contributors with different incentives suggests participants should have differential reactions to a campaign succeeding. More precisely, donations should stop after a campaign reaches success, but buyer pledging should continue. We provide empirical support for these pledging incentives in Figure 4. The bar plot shows average donor and buyer revenue flows three days before and three days after campaign success times. As confirmed in our summary analysis, buyer revenues constitute a larger percentage of campaign revenue than donations. However, whereas both buyer and donor pledges are positive before success, Figure 4 shows that only donor contributions drop significantly toward zero after success. We estimate that donations drop by 72% after reaching success, whereas buyer contributions drop by only 33%.

Figure 4: Purchases and Donations Around Success Time

Note: The success time is the closest time after the campaign reaches its funding goal for 30 day campaigns. Pre means within the 3 days before the goal is reached; Post means within the 3 days after to the goal being reached. This plot includes the subset of campaigns in which the success time is greater than 3 and less than 27 (N=3,372).

Another salient feature of the data that suggests different contribution incentives is the strong relationship between the relative importance of donations versus purchases and success times. At the aggregate level, campaigns that succeed close to campaign launch receive lower total donations than those that complete close to the deadline. To test this hypothe-
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Early-, Middle- and Late-Finishing Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Early</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Late</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal ($)</td>
<td>2288.6</td>
<td>4000.0</td>
<td>6000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Rewards</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Price</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td>183.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/G</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/R(%)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/G(%)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Projects</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>3093</td>
<td>2061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Categories</td>
<td>Theater</td>
<td>Theater</td>
<td>Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Film &amp; Video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Games</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Summary statistics for successful campaigns partitioned by success time. Only 30-day campaigns are included. Early finishers complete within three days. Late finishers complete in the last three days. All other campaigns are included in the middle category. Medians reported.

sis, we partition the sample according to success times using three groupings: those with success time in the first three days (*early finishers*), those with success time in days 3-27 (*middle finishers*), and those with success time in the last three days before the deadline (*late finishers*). We provide descriptive statistics in Table 2. We find that there are stark differences between early-finishing and late-finishing campaigns that suggests differential roles of individuals who pledge versus those who donate. For example, the relative contribution of donations increases in success time: 5%, 14%, 33% for early-, middle-, and late-finishers, respectively.

In Figure 5, we plot contribution flows from buyers (panel a) and donors (panel b) for early-, middle- and late-finishing campaigns. Panel (a) confirms that purchase activity occurs through time, regardless of when a campaign succeeds. The increased pledge rate at the beginning and end of campaigns is consistent with the time-varying arrival rate model extension in Section 4. In practice, this influx of pledges is likely due to Kickstarter advertising recently launched campaigns or campaigns nearing completion. Panel (b) shows a different pattern for donations. Although donations also occur throughout time, the only spike in donations occurs at the end for campaigns that succeed close to the deadline. This
represents a significant spike in terms of total revenue contribution (over 3% of campaign revenue). While purchases exceed donations by a six-to-one margin for early-finishing campaigns, donations constitute more than half of revenue raised close to the deadline for late-finishing campaigns.

Figure 5: Contributions of Buyers and Donors over Time for Successful Campaigns

(a) Purchases

(b) Donations

Note: Percentage of revenue is defined as the amount of purchases (donations) in a period, divided by the total amount of revenue (donations plus purchases) at the deadline for early-, middle-, and late-finishing campaigns.

5.5 Testing Predictions on Contribution Dynamics

Given the empirical support for contributions with different underlying incentives, we next turn to formally testing our model’s predictions. Before stating the testable implications, we introduce a few additional definitions. Denote the event of the campaign succeeding exactly at $t$ by

$$\mathcal{S}_t = \left\{ N_{t-\Delta}p + D_{t-\Delta} < G \text{ and } N_t p + D_t \geq G \right\}. $$

and let $\mathcal{S} = \bigcup_{t \in [0, T]} \mathcal{S}_t$. The success time is given by

$$\tau = \inf\{ t \geq 0 \mid N_t p + D_t \geq G \}. $$
The failure time of a campaign in a PT equilibrium is given by

\[ t := \inf \left\{ t \geq 0 \mid \pi(N_t, D_t, T - t) < \frac{v_0}{v - p} \right\}. \]

With these definitions, Proposition 5 below details testable predictions on donation dynamics of PT equilibria. After stating the proposition, we state whether each prediction is specific to our model and then provide supporting empirical evidence. All proofs are in the Online Appendix.

**Proposition 5 (Donation Dynamics in Pooling Threshold Equilibria).** All PT equilibria satisfy the following properties:

i) Campaigns that succeed at the deadline would fail without a donation and raise exactly the goal with high probability. Formally, \( P(N_T p + D_{T-\Delta} < G | \mathcal{F}_T) < 1 - \Delta \lambda \) and \( P(D_T = G - N_T p | \mathcal{F}_T) \geq 1 - \Delta \lambda \).

ii) Campaigns that succeed before the deadline succeed due to a buyer pledge. Formally, \( P(D_{\tau-\Delta} + N_{\tau} p \geq G) = 1 \) if \( \tau < T \);

iii) Donations drop to zero after a buyer pledges. Formally, \( D_{\Delta}^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) \geq D_{\Delta}^\Delta(N + 1, u) \);

iv) The initial donation level \( D_{\Delta}^\Delta(0, T) \) is increasing in \( G \) and decreasing in \( T \). Formally, for any PT equilibrium with goal \( G \) (deadline \( T \)), there exists a PT equilibrium for the game with goal \( G' < G \) (with deadline \( T' < T \)) with higher (lower) \( D_{\Delta}^\Delta(0, T) \).

v) Conditional on failing, campaigns with larger donor valuations fail later. Formally, given donor realizations \( w > w' \), if a campaign is unsuccessful for both \( w \) and \( w' \), and given the same buyer arrival realization, then the failure time \( t \) is larger for \( w \) than for \( w' \).

vi) In success-minimizing PT equilibria, all donations are at least \( p \).

**Empirical Evidence (Proposition 5).**
i) The proposition states that the contributions that cause a campaign to succeed at the deadline must come from donations. This is a consequence of the donor valuing success and the probability of a buyer arrival in the last period being small. We test this statement in the data, by considering all campaigns that succeed at the deadline, subtracting any last-minute donations, and then checking if $R_f > G$. We find that 72% of campaigns would have failed. Overall, campaigns that succeed in the last twelve hours before the deadline raise on average 1.04 of the goal.

ii) A particular consequence of the PT equilibrium structure is that the donor always wants to donate just enough to ensure that the next buyer pledges. Hence, a donor will never donate to bring cumulative donations beyond $G - (N + 1)p$. To test that buyers cause campaigns to succeed before the deadline, we simply calculate the percentage of revenue coming from buyers in the period in which a campaign succeeds. Figure 6-(a) presents a histogram of the results. For the median successful campaign, the percentage of revenues from buyers is 94%.

![Figure 6: Buyer Contributions at Success Time and Donation Hazard](image)

(a) Percent of Revenue from Buyers at Success Time
(b) Donation Hazard Function

Notes: (a) Histogram of the fraction of revenue from buyers in the period in which a campaign succeeds. Selected campaigns finish at least one day before the deadline. (b) Hazard rate model of donations (indicator) on the number of periods since the last purchase.

iii) This property is particular to our equilibrium. In PT equilibria, any purchase causes a strictly positive drop in the donation threshold, which means that the donor can stop
contributing for a period of time. We find that the data is consistent with this prediction. Figure 6-(b) shows the results of a hazard rate model of the occurrence of a donation as a function of the number of periods since the last buyer pledge. The plot shows that the probability of no donation straight after a purchase is high. The probability of no donation is decreasing with time elapsed since the last purchase. We find that the probability of donation rises significantly after five or so days of no buyer activity.

iv) Another feature of PT equilibria is that for some campaign parameter values, the donor may need to signal his valuation and donate a positive amount at the start to ensure that the campaign does not fail right away, i.e., $D^*_t(0, T) > 0$. This initial donation threshold is increasing in $G$ and decreasing in $T$, as a higher goal and a lower deadline make success less likely. We estimate quantile regressions to investigate the distribution of the initial donations as a function of campaign length and goal. Figure 7-(a) shows results of the quantile regression predictions of the initial donation divided by the goal as a function of project length (polynomial of degree three). Figure 7-(b) shows results of the quantile regression of the initial donation as a function of the goal amount (polynomial of degree three). The plots confirm that the proportion of the campaign goal met by an initial donation decreases with the length of the campaign and increases with the goal amount. Interestingly, the observed spike at the start of the campaign is reminiscent of the role played by “seed money” at the start of charitable fund-raising campaigns (Andreoni, 1998).

v) The predicted positive relationship between when a campaign fails and the donor’s valuation is also a specific artefact of our equilibrium. It arises exactly because donors with high valuations pool with donors of lower valuations, saving their funds to induce later buyers to buy. In effect, the behavior of donors of high and low valuations look similar except that donors with higher valuations can keep campaigns active for longer.

To test this prediction, we need to infer failure times of campaigns using a logistic regression of the form

$$1 \{ \text{reaches success} \}_j = x_{j,t} \beta + \epsilon_{j,t},$$
where the outcome variable is an indicator function of the campaign outcome (success/failure). Included in $x_{j,t}$ are the interactions of the state of the campaign ($R/G$), an indicator for success, and the time index $t$. See Figure 15 in the Online Appendix for more details. This simple prediction model produces an out-of-sample prediction accuracy of 90%. We use the model to infer the realized failure time $\tau$ for each failed campaign, and then simply correlate cumulative donations for failed projects with the estimated failure time. We find the correlation is 0.10, meaning projects with larger donations fail closer to the deadline. This relationship is also significant ($t = 8.0$).

vi) As we stated in Section 3.4, given the success-minimizing donation threshold, in discrete time $\Delta$, donors donate at least $p$ in order to “compensate” for the absence of a buyer arrival. We conduct a simple analysis that shows most campaigns do not follow success-minimizing equilibrium outcomes. We calculate the average donation level for each campaign as cumulative donations (excluding the last period), divided by the number of donors

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20Alternatively, we could have derived $\tau$ by looking at the last contribution—which should be a donation. However, Kickstarter promotes projects near the deadline driving some last-minute contributions. This approach therefore implies that campaign failure times commonly occur at the deadline even though our reduced-form model predicts that failure occurred much earlier.
observed. We label this average as $\mu^D_j$. We also calculate the backer-weighted reward price for each campaign, which we denote as $\mu^B_j$. Finally, we verify if $\mu^D_j \geq \mu^B_j$ which must be satisfied in success-minimizing equilibria. We find that only 33% of campaigns satisfy this inequality, so at most a third of campaigns are consistent with a success-minimizing equilibrium outcome. This result is robust to conducting the analysis at the 12-hour interval level as well. Therefore, our analysis suggests that Kickstarter facilitates dynamic signaling.

Finally, we verify two general properties of PT equilibria. Interestingly, while the properties in Proposition 6 are very intuitive, they are inconsistent with our model of social learning.

**Proposition 6 (General Properties of Pooling Threshold Equilibria).** *In all PT equilibria, the ex-ante probability of success is higher if the time horizon is longer and if the goal amount is smaller.*

**Empirical Evidence (Proposition 6).**

The ideal experiment to measure the impact of $G$ and $T$ on success probability would be to exogenously vary $G$ and $T$ individually for many identical campaigns. Clearly this is infeasible, however, we are able to measure “repeated campaigns” using creator identifiers. We map each campaign to its creator and then select creators who launched multiple campaigns in the same category. Using string matching techniques (Levenshtein distance), we identify repeated campaigns. These are instances in which the entrepreneur’s first campaign failed, but the entrepreneur relaunched the campaign. We do not condition on success for the relaunched campaign. We use string matching techniques because the title of the campaign may change over launches. We then compare differences in goal and length for these repeated campaigns and find evidence that supports the proposition. Among successful campaigns, we find that entrepreneurs decrease the goal amount (by median decrease of $5,000; significant). Among unsuccessful repeated campaigns, we find the goal amount decreases by $3,500 (median). We do not find strong evidence that length is adjusted. The
median change for successful campaigns is zero days added, and the mean change is 0.3 days and insignificant.\textsuperscript{21}

6 Conclusion

We introduce a dynamic contribution game where randomly arriving buyers receive a reward in exchange for a contribution, and a long-lived donor values the public benefits while seeking to minimize total contributions required for the campaign to succeed. Two forms of uncertainty affect the ability for participants to coordinate their actions: uncertainty in arrivals and uncertainty in the donor's valuation. We show that allowing the donor to dynamically signal his valuation by strategically timing contributions benefits all participants as it facilitates coordination. The success-maximizing equilibrium maximizes ex-ante donor payoffs, but exacerbates uncertainty borne by buyers. As a result, campaign participants prefer different equilibria. Buyers prefer equilibria strictly in-between the success-maximizing equilibrium and the success-minimizing equilibrium. The latter corresponds to outcomes where dynamic signaling is not possible. We show that our baseline model is robust to a number of extensions that capture features of general fundraising campaigns. Finally, we empirically validate our model using data from Kickstarter. We find evidence that supports there are two distinct contribution incentives and that our equilibrium predictions fit the data well. The coordinating role of the donor can be relevant for fundraising campaigns more broadly.

References

Admati, Anat R and Motty Perry, “Joint projects without commitment,” The Review of

\textsuperscript{21}To perform this analysis, we supplement our data with publicly available Kaggle data to extend the time horizon of our analysis (https://www.kaggle.com/kemical/kickstarter-projects). We find that 40% of repeated campaigns succeed using the Levenshtein distance threshold at 99%. This finding is robust to the threshold of the string matching technique as well as the string matching technique itself. Here, we use the partial ratio statistic calculated using the package fuzzywuzzy and set a threshold to 99%. The pairwise test statistics are 0.11 and −3.64 with p-values equal to 0.92 and 0.001, respectively for length and goal for successful campaigns. We also find insignificant effects on length and goal change for repeated campaigns that fail a second time.


Appendix

A Proofs

A.1 General properties of PT assessments and PT equilibria

A.1.1 Properties of PT assessments

In this section, we present some properties of PT assessments and the induced probability of success $\pi^\Lambda(N, D, u)$ that we will use for the construction of PT equilibria.

Lemma 1. Given a PT assessment with donation threshold $D^\Lambda(N, u)$, if the campaign reaches a state $(N, D, u)$ with $D < D^\Lambda(N, u + \Delta)$, it has failed with probability one.

Proof. Assume that a state $(N_t, D_t, T - (t + \Delta))$ with $D_t < D^\Lambda(N_t, T - t)$ is reached. Then $D_t = w$, because the donor is playing a PT strategy and $w < D^\Lambda(N_t, T - t')$ for all $t' \geq t$ by Condition i) in Definition 3 of PT assessments. Thus, $N_t = N_t$ for all $t' > t$, given the buyer strategy in Equation PT-buyer. All in all, $(N_t, D_t) = (N_t, w)$ for all $t' > t$, where $N_t p + w < N_t p + D^\Lambda(N_t, T - t) < N_t p + G - (N_t + 1) p < G$. This concludes the proof. ■

Lemma 1 implies that beliefs in a PT assessment are consistent and that the induced probability of success $\pi^\Lambda$ can be written in a recursive manner as we show in the following lemma. We also derive some other properties of $\pi^\Lambda$. For the proof, we use that for a PT assessment, cumulative donations at time $t$ must satisfy

$$D_t = \max_{t' \leq t} \min\{D^\Lambda(N_t, T - t'), w\}. \quad (1)$$

Lemma 2. A PT assessment $(b^\Lambda, D^\Lambda, F^\Lambda)$ with donation threshold $D^\Lambda(N, u)$ satisfies the following properties:

i) Beliefs $F^\Lambda$ are consistent with the strategies $b^\Lambda, D^\Lambda$;

ii) The induced probability $\pi^\Lambda(N, D, u)$ satisfies the following:
• $N + 1 \geq M(D)$ if and only if $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1$;

• If $N + 1 < M(D)$ and $D \geq D^\Delta_*(N, u + \Delta)$, then

$$
\pi^\Delta(N, D, 0) = \frac{1 - F_0(G - p(N + 1))}{1 - F_0(D)},
$$

and for $u > 0$,

$$
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E}^{\delta_i} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{i-1} \Delta \lambda \right. \left. \pi^\Delta \left( N + 1, \max\{D, D^\Delta_*(N + 1, u - (i-1)\Delta)\}, u - i\Delta \right) 1(W \geq D^\Delta_*(N + 1, u - (i-1)\Delta)) \Big| W \geq D \right];
$$

• If $N + 1 < M(D)$ and $D < D^\Delta_*(N, u + \Delta)$, $\pi^\Delta(N, D, 0) = 0$, and for $u > 0$,

$$
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{P}(D \geq \max_{N < N' \leq M(D)} D^\Delta_*(N', T - \tau^u_{N'-N})), \tag{2}
$$

where $\tau^u_n > T - u$ is the time of the $n$-th arrival after time $t = T - u$.\(^{22}\)

iii) $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)$ is continuous and strictly increasing in $D$ for $G - (N + 1)p \geq D \geq D^\Delta_*(N, u + \Delta)$, and $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)$ is weakly increasing in $D$ otherwise;

iv) $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) \leq \pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u - \Delta) \leq \pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u)$, and $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)$ is strictly increasing in $N, u$, if $0 < \pi^\Delta(N, D, u) < 1$.

Proof. i) Consider a buyer in an on-path state $(N, D, u)$. By (1) this state is reached with zero probability by donors with $w < D$, and if $D < D^\Delta_*(N, u + \Delta)$, then $D = w$. Further, if $D \geq D^\Delta_*(N, u + \Delta)$, any donor with $w \geq D$ must have followed the same donation strategy on any equilibrium path history that led to $(N, D, u)$. Hence, by Bayes’ rule, the distribution

\(^{22}\)Note that $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)$ is defined even if the corresponding purchase is not consistent with the buyer strategy. If $D < D^\Delta_*(N, u + \Delta)$ and the buyer pledges, this deviation is not observed by a buyer in period $u' < u$. Thus, she pledges if $D \geq D^\Delta_*(N + 1, u' + \Delta)$. The probability is with respect to the random arrival time $\tau^u_{N'-N}$.\(^{22}\)
of donor types in a state \((N, D, u)\) is a truncation of \(F_0\) at \(D\).

ii) For \(N + 1 \geq M(D)\), \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1\) as the goal is reached if the \((N + 1)\)th buyer pledges. For \(N + 1 < M(D)\), absent additional donations, at least one more buyer must arrive to reach the goal \(G\) after the \((N + 1)\)th buyer pledges because \(D^*_u(N, u) < G - (N + 1)p\), so \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) < 1\). The probability of success must satisfy the following recursive property: First, \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, 0) = \frac{1 - f_0(G - (N + 1)p)}{1 - f_0(D)} \mathbb{1}(D \geq D^*_u(N, \Delta))\), given \(F^\Delta\) defined in Equation PT-belief. For \(u > 0\) and \(D \geq D^*_u(N, u + \Delta)\),

\[
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E}^f_0\left[\sum_{i=1}^{i - \Delta} (1 - \Delta)_{i-1} \Delta \frac{\pi^\Delta \left[ N + 1, \max\{D, D^*_u(N + 1, u - (i - 1)\Delta)\}, u - i\Delta \right]}{\text{probability of success if the } N + 2\text{nd buyer pledges at } u - i\Delta} \mathbb{1}\left( W \geq D^*_u(N + 1, u - (i - 1)\Delta) \right) \mathbb{1}(W \geq D) \text{ beliefs are truncation of } F_0 \text{ at } D \right],
\]

because by Lemma 1 the campaign fails with probability one if \(W < D^*_u(N + 1, u - (i - 1)\Delta)\).

For \(D < D^*_u(N, u + \Delta)\), the buyer believes that \(W = D\) with probability one. Hence, in the last period (\(u = 0\)), the campaign cannot succeed since \(D^*_u(N, u + \Delta) < G - (N + 1)p\) even if the \(N + 1\)th buyer pledges. If \(u > 0\) and the \(N + 1\)th buyer pledges, then a subsequent buyer arriving in state \((N', D, u')\) with \(N' \geq N + 1\) and \(u' < u\) pledges if \(D \geq D^*_u(N', u' + \Delta)\).

iii) We first show that \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\) is strictly increasing and continuous in \(D\) for \(D^*_u(N, u + \Delta) \leq D \leq G - (N + 1)p\) by induction in \(u\).

**Induction start** \((u = 0)\): \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, 0) = \frac{1 - f_0(G - (N + 1)p)}{1 - f_0(D)} \mathbb{1}(D \geq D^*_u(N, \Delta))\) is continuous and strictly increasing in \(D\) for \(D^*_u(N, \Delta) \leq D \leq G - (N + 1)p\).

**Induction hypothesis for** \(u\): \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\) is continuous and strictly increasing in \(D\) for \(D^*_u(N, u + \Delta) \leq D \leq G - (N + 1)p\).
**Induction step** \((u \rightarrow u+\Delta)\): For \(D^\Delta_s(N, u + 2\Delta) \leq D \leq G - (N + 1)p\) we have by ii)

\[
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u + \Delta) = \\
\sum_{i=1}^{\Delta} \frac{(1 - \Delta \lambda)^{i-1} \Delta \lambda \pi^\Delta(N + 1, \max\{D, D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u + \Delta - (i-1)\Delta)\}, u + \Delta - i\Delta) \cdot 1 - F_0(D)}{1 - F_0(D)}
\]

which is continuous in \(D\) by the induction hypothesis because \(D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u + \Delta - (i-1)\Delta) \leq \max\{D, D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u + \Delta - (i-1)\Delta)\} \leq G - (N + 1)p\) and also strictly increasing because

\[
\frac{1 - F_0(\max\{D, D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u + \Delta - (i-1)\Delta)\})}{1 - F_0(D)} = 1\text{ if } D \geq D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u + \Delta - (i-1)\Delta) \text{ and } \frac{1}{1 - F_0(D)} \text{ is strictly increasing in } D.
\]

Finally, if \(D > G - (N + 1)p\), then \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1\), and if \(D < D^\Delta_s(N, u + \Delta)\), then it follows that \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\) is weakly increasing in \(D\) directly from (2).

iv) By Condition i) in Definition 3 of PT assessments, \(D^\Delta_s(N, u) \geq D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u - \Delta) \geq D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u)\). Hence, a donor \(w\), who can incentivize the next buyer to pledge in a state \((N, D, u)\), can incentivize the next buyer to pledge in state \((N + 1, D, u - \Delta)\) in the next period. Thus, more future buyers are incentivized to pledge after state \((N + 1, D, u - \Delta)\) than after \((N, D, u)\), so \(\pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u - \Delta) \geq \pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\). Similarly, a donor \(w\), who can incentivize the next buyer to pledge in a state \((N + 1, D, u - \Delta)\), can incentivize the next buyer to pledge in state \((N + 1, D, u)\) in the period before. Thus, more future buyers are incentivized to pledge after state \((N + 1, D, u)\) than after \((N + 1, D, u - \Delta)\), so \(\pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u) \geq \pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u - \Delta)\).

Next, we show by induction in \(N\) that if \(0 < \pi^\Delta(N, D, u) < 1\), then \(\pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u) > \pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\). To this end, note that for \(N + 1 < M(D)\) and \(D \geq D^\Delta_s(N, u + \Delta)\) we can write by ii) for \(u > 0\)

\[
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E}\left[\Delta \lambda \pi^\Delta(N + 1, \max\{D, D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u)\}, u - \Delta) + \right. \left. (1 - \Delta \lambda) \pi^\Delta(N, \max\{D, D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u)\}, u - \Delta) \right] \\
\frac{1}{W \geq D^\Delta_s(N + 1, u) \left| W \geq D\right.}
\]
because if no buyer arrives in period \(u - \Delta\), then the probability of success is as if the buyer in period \(u\) arrived a period later, but with a new donation threshold, i.e., it is \(\pi^\Delta(N, \max\{D, D^\Delta(N + 1, u)\}, u - \Delta)\).

**Induction start** \((N = M(D) - 1)\): \(\pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u) = 1 > \pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\).

**Induction hypothesis for** \(N < M(D) - 1\): Assume \(\pi^\Delta(N + 1, D, u) > \pi^\Delta(N, D, u)\) if \(0 < \pi^\Delta(N, D, u) < 1\).

**Induction step** \((N \mapsto N - 1)\): Let \(0 < \pi^\Delta(N - 1, D, u) < 1\). If \(D \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)\), then

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) &= \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\Delta \lambda \pi^\Delta(N + 1, \max\{D, D^\Delta(N + 1, u)\}, u - \Delta) + \pi^\Delta(N, D, u - \Delta)\right)\right] \\
&> \pi^\Delta(N, D, u - \Delta) \text{ by induction hypothesis and monotonicity in } D \\
&> (1 - \Delta \lambda) \pi^\Delta(N, \max\{D, D^\Delta(N, u)\}, u - \Delta) \mathbb{P}(W \geq D^\Delta(N + 1, u)|W \geq D) \geq \pi^\Delta(N - 1, D, u)
\end{align*}
\]

(3)

because \(\mathbb{P}(W \geq D^\Delta(N, u)|W \geq D) = 1\) for \(D \geq D^\Delta(N, u)\). If \(D < D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)\), then for \(\pi^\Delta(N - 1, D, u) > 0\),

\[
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{P}(D \geq \max_{N < N' \leq M(D)} D^\Delta(N', T - \tau^u_{N'-N})) > \pi^\Delta(N - 1, D, u).
\]

\[
< \max_{N - 1 < N' \leq M(D)} D^\Delta(N', T - \tau^u_{N'-N+1})
\]

Finally, we consider strict monotonicity in \(u\). Consider \(N + 1 < M(D)\). If \(D \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)\), then (3) implies \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) > \pi^\Delta(N, D, u - \Delta)\), where we use the strict monotonicity of \(\pi^\Delta\) in \(N\). If \(D < D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)\), then since \(\tau^u_{N'-N}\) and \(\tau^u_{N'-N+1}\) are equally
distributed by the Markov property, and since \( D^\Delta(N, u) \) is decreasing \( u \) for \( D^\Delta(N, u) > 0 \),

\[
P(D \geq \max_{N < N' \leq M(D)} D^\Delta(N', T - \tau_{N'-N}^u)) > P(D \geq \max_{N < N' \leq M(D)} D^\Delta(N', T - \tau_{N'-N}^{u-\Delta})).
\]

Hence, \( \pi^\Delta(N, D, u) > \pi^\Delta(N, D, u - \Delta) \) as long as \( \pi^\Delta(N, D, u) \in (0, 1) \). ■

For the construction of the donation thresholds, it is useful to consider the auxiliary probability of success in a state \((N, D, u)\) if the buyer believed that donor wealth is distributed according to \( F_0 \) truncated at \( D \) for all \( D \):

\[
\tilde{\pi}^\Delta(N, D, u) := \sum_{i=1}^\Delta (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{i-1} \Delta \lambda \frac{1 - F_0(\max\{D, D^\Delta(N+1, u-(i-1)\Delta)\})}{1 - F_0(D)} \pi^\Delta(N + 1, \max\{D, D^\Delta(N + 1, u -(i-1)\Delta)\}, u - i \Delta).
\]

(4)

The following is a corollary of Lemma 2. We use it in the proof of Proposition 1 to define the donation threshold \( D(N, u) \).

**Corollary 1.** The auxiliary probability of success \( \tilde{\pi}^\Delta(N, D, u) \) is continuous and (strictly) increasing in \( D \) (as long as \( \tilde{\pi}^\Delta(N, D, u) \in (0, 1) \)).

Finally, in any PT assessment, it is clear that the specified play for the donor at \( u = 0 \) is optimal. Below, we show that in fact the donor strategy specified in any PT assessment is a best response to the specified buyer strategy.

**Lemma 3.** For any PT assessment with donation threshold \( D^\Delta(N, u) \), the donor PT strategy is a best response to the buyer strategy.

**Proof.** We argue by backwards induction in \( t \).

**Induction start** \((t = T)\): First, consider histories in the last period \( h_T^D \Delta \) with cumulative contributions \( N_T \) and \( D_{T-\Delta} \). Ignoring the constraint imposed by previous donations, the donor would want to donate \( \min\{w, G - N_T p\} \), since he would want to give just enough for the campaign to succeed without exceeding his valuation. However, the donor cannot take out funds. Thus, a cumulative donation of \( \max\{D_{T-\Delta}, \min\{w, G - N_T p\}\} \) is a best
response. Hence, in all histories that correspond to a state \((N, D, 0)\), a Markov strategy of 
\[D_+^\Delta(h_s^{D,\Delta}; w) = D_s^\Delta(N_t, D_{T-\Delta}, 0; w) = \max\{D_{T-\Delta}, \min\{w, G - N_T p\}\} \] is optimal.

**Induction hypothesis for** \(s \geq t\): Next, we assume that for all \(s \geq t\) and all \(h_s^{D,\Delta}\) with corresponding cumulative contributions \(N_s\) and \(D_{s-\Delta}\), the donor payoff is maximized by 
\[D_+^\Delta(h_s^{D,\Delta}; w) = D_s^\Delta(N_s, D_{s-\Delta}, T-s; w) = \max\{D_{s-\Delta}, \min\{w, D_s^\Delta(N_s, T-s)\}\}.\]

**Induction step** \((t \rightarrow t-\Delta)\): Consider an arbitrary donor strategy \(D_+^\Delta\) where for all \(s \geq t\), 
\[D_+^\Delta(h_s^{D,\Delta}; w) = D_s^\Delta(N_s, D_{s-\Delta}, T-s; w) = \max\{D_{s-\Delta}, \min\{w, D_s^\Delta(N_s, T-s)\}\}.\] Consider an on-path history \(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}\) with corresponding cumulative contributions \(N_{t-\Delta}, D_{t-2\Delta}\) and a donor valuation \(w \geq \max\{D_{t-2\Delta}, D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\}\) such that

\[D_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, w) < D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta)).\]

According to the PT assessment, if a buyer arrives in period \(t\), the buyer does not pledge. Since \(D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta)) < D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, u)\) for all \(u < T-(t-\Delta)\), the donor needs to donate at least \(D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\) in order to make a future buyer pledge and to prevent the campaign from failing. Furthermore, \(D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, u) > D_s^\Delta(N', u)\) for all \(N' > N_{t-\Delta}\). Hence, a donor with valuation \(w\) is strictly better off by donating \(D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\) after history \(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}\), so an optimal donor strategy must be to give at least \(D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\). Similarly, monotonicity of \(D_s^\Delta\) in \(N, u\) implies that it cannot be optimal that the donor gives more than \(\max\{D_{t-2\Delta}, D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\}\). If \(w < \max\{D_{t-2\Delta}, D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\}\), the campaign succeeds with probability zero as cumulative donations are below \(w\). Thus, a best-response donor strategy is given by

\[D_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, w) = \max\{D_{t-2\Delta}, \min\{w, D_s^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T-(t-\Delta))\}\}.\]
A.1.2 Properties of PT equilibria

Recall that a PT equilibrium is a PT assessment \((b^\Delta, D^\Delta, F^\Delta)\) such that given the induced probability of success \(\pi^\Delta(x)\) we have buyer optimality: \(\pi(x) > \frac{v_0}{v-p} \Rightarrow b^\Delta(x) = 1\) and \(\pi(x) < \frac{v_0}{v-p} \Rightarrow b^\Delta(x) = 0\). Donor-optimality is guaranteed automatically by Lemma 3. The buyer optimality condition allows us to define cutoff times \(\xi_j^\Delta(w)\) as in Equation CT for each \(j, w\) with \(j \leq M(w)\). We can show that \(\xi_j^\Delta(w)\) is monotone in \(j\).

**Lemma 4.** In any PT equilibrium, the cutoff time \(\xi_j^\Delta(w)\) is strictly increasing in \(j\).

**Proof.** By Lemma 2 iv), we have for \(j' > j\), that if \(\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j', w, u) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p}\), then \(\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, u - \Delta) \geq \pi^\Delta(M(w) - j', w, u) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p}\), so

\[
\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, \xi_{j'}^\Delta(w) - \Delta) \geq \pi^\Delta(M(w) - j', w, u) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p}.
\]

Hence, \(\xi_j^\Delta(w) \leq \xi_{j'}^\Delta(w) - \Delta < \xi_j^\Delta(w)\).

As a result, in a PT equilibrium, after \(\xi_j^\Delta(w)\) is reached, no buyer pledges, i.e.,

\[
\begin{cases} 
\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, u) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p} \text{ for } u \geq \xi_j^\Delta(w) \\
\pi^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, u) < \frac{v_0}{v-p} \text{ for } u < \xi_j^\Delta(w)
\end{cases}
\]  
(5)

or put differently, \(w \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) \iff u \geq \xi^\Delta_{M(w) - N}(w)\). This allows us to re-write the probability of success in a different way. For \(N < M(D) - 1\) and \(u > 0\), the probability of success is given by

\[
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{F}^\Delta} \left[ \max\{u - \xi^\Delta_{2i+1}(w)\}/\Delta, 0 \right] 
\sum_{i=1}^{\max\{u - \xi^\Delta_{2i+1}(w)\}/\Delta} (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{i-1} \Delta \lambda 
\pi^\Delta(N + 1, \max\{D, D^\Delta(N + 1, u - \Delta(i - 1))\}, u - \Delta i) \right] W \geq D,
\]  
(6)

if \(D \geq D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)\). If \(D < D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)\), \(\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) < \frac{v_0}{v-p}\).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 (Success-Maximizing Equilibrium)

In Subsection A.2.1, we first construct a PT equilibrium. Subsection A.2.2 states that the
degree of these equilibria as $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ exists and is as specified in Proposition 1, while the proofs
are in the Online Appendix. Finally, in Subsection A.2.3, we show that for any $\Delta > 0$, the
constructed equilibrium maximizes the probability of success and that the outcomes of any
sequence of success-maximizing PBE converge to the same limit.

A.2.1 Construction of a PT equilibrium

The following lemma implies Proposition 1 i). It specifies a PT equilibrium with a donation
threshold that makes the next buyer just indifferent between pledging and not.

Lemma 5 (Success-maximizing equilibrium). Given any $\Delta > 0$, there exists a PT equilib-
rium $(b_D, D\Delta, F\Delta)$ with donation threshold $D\Delta(N, u)$ and induced probability of success
$\pi\Delta(x)$, $x \in X\Delta$ such that for $u > 0$

$$
\begin{align*}
D\Delta(N, u) &= 0 & \text{if } \pi\Delta(N, 0, u - \Delta) > \frac{v_0}{p - v}, \\
\pi\Delta(N, D\Delta(N, u), u - \Delta) &= \frac{v_0}{p - v} & \text{if } \pi\Delta(N, 0, u - \Delta) \leq \frac{v_0}{p - v}.
\end{align*}
$$

We denote the corresponding probability of success from the buyer’s perspective in
state $N, D, u$ if the buyer contributes by $\pi(N, D, u)$.

Proof. We construct the equilibrium strategies and beliefs for every state $(N, D, u)$ by in-
duction in $j = M(D) - N$. In order to define the donation threshold $D(N, u)$ such that
buyers are indifferent between buying and not, we need to know the probability of success
$\pi\Delta(N, D, u)$ induced by the assessment for arbitrary $D$. We tackle this issue by con-
structing a sequence of PT assessments $(b_D, D\Delta, F\Delta)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, M_0 = M(0)$ such that
$(b_D, D\Delta, F\Delta)$ is a PBE and satisfies the properties in Lemma 5. We start with an arbitrary
PT assessment $(b_D, D\Delta, F\Delta)$. We then assume that for each $1 \leq j' \leq j - 1$ there is a PT
assessment $(b_D, D\Delta, F\Delta)$ such that in states $(N, D, u)$ with $M(D) - N \leq j'$ buyer strate-
gies are optimal, i.e., in the continuation games after such states, the assessment specifies
a PBE. Donor strategies are automatically optimal in a PT assessment by Lemma 3. Then, in the induction step \( j - 1 \mapsto j \), we construct a PT assessment \((b_j^\lambda, D_{+,j}^\lambda, F_j^\lambda)\) such that for states \((N, D, u)\) with \(M(D) - N \leq j\), buyer strategies are optimal, and

\[
\begin{align*}
  b_j^\lambda(N, D, u) &= b_{j-1}^\lambda(N, D, u), \\
  D_{+,j}^\lambda(N, D, u) &= D_{+,j-1}^\lambda(N, D, u), \\
  F_j^\lambda(N, D, u) &= F_{j-1}^\lambda(N, D, u),
\end{align*}
\]

for all states \((N, D, u)\) with \(M(D) - N \leq j - 1\), which implies that for the corresponding probabilities of success we have

\[
\pi_j^\lambda(N, D, u) = \pi_{j-1}^\lambda(N, D, u) \text{ for } M(D) - N \leq j - 1.
\]

Figure 8 depicts pairs of \((N, D)\) such that \(j = M(D) - N\) for \(j = 0, 2, 3\) and the shaded region including the orange line captures all \(j \leq 1\), which is our induction start for the equilibrium construction. The induction ends at \(j = M_0\), when the entire state space is covered. Importantly, if the game is in state \((N, D, u)\), then \(N\) and \(D\) only increase in the continuation game, i.e., \(j\) is decreasing over time.

While we denote by \(D_{+,j}^\lambda(N, u)\) the donation threshold corresponding to \((b_j^\lambda, D_{+,j}^\lambda, F_j^\lambda)\), we also construct \(\xi_j^\lambda(\cdot)\) and parts of the threshold function \(D^\lambda(N, u)\) in each step. In particular, in step \(j\), we define \(D^\lambda(N, u)\) for \((N, u)\) such that \(N = M_0 - j\), or such that \(N < M_0 - j\) and \(u \leq \xi_j^\lambda(G - (N + j)p)\). After the last step \((j = M_0)\), \(D^\lambda(N, u)\) is defined for all \(N\) and \(u\) and \(D^\lambda(N, u) = D_{+,M_0}^\lambda(N, u)\). Figure 9 illustrates this construction schematically. For a cleaner illustration that avoids drawing step functions, we assume \(\Delta \to 0\) in this figure.

Finally, Table 3 summarizes the relevant notation.

(a) Induction start \((j \leq 1 \iff D \geq G - (N + 1)p)\): We set \((b_1^\lambda, D_{+,1}^\lambda, F_1^\lambda)\) to be an arbitrary PT assessment (which trivially exists). Further, for \(j \leq 1\), we set \(\xi_j^\lambda(w) := 0\) for all \(w\) which is consistent with Equation CT. We also set \(D(N, u) := 0\) for \(N \geq M_0 - 1\). Finally, consider states \((N, D, u)\) with \(M(D) - N \leq 1\). The probability of success is \(\pi_1^\lambda(N, D, u) = 1\), so it is a best response for buyers to pledge. Trivially, \(\pi_1^\lambda(N, D, u)\) is weakly increasing in \(N, D, u\).
Figure 8: Schematic illustration of induction in $j = M(D) - N$

Table 3: List of Notation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(b^\Delta_j, D^\Delta_j, F^\Delta_j)$</td>
<td>assessment in the $j$-th induction step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_j^\Delta(w)$</td>
<td>time threshold defined for all $w$ in the $j$-th induction step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D^\Delta_j(N, u)$</td>
<td>donation threshold corresponding to $(b^\Delta_j, D^\Delta_j, F^\Delta_j)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\underline{D}^\Delta(N, u)$</td>
<td>donation threshold that is defined inductively for $N = M_0 - j$, and $N &lt; M_0 - j$ and $u \leq \xi_j^\Delta(G - (N + j)p)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for $D \geq G - (N + 1)p$.

(b) Induction hypothesis ($j' \leq j - 1$): For the induction hypothesis, we suppose that we have constructed PT assessments $(b^\Delta_{j'}, D^\Delta_{j'}, F^\Delta_{j'})$ with a donation threshold $D^\Delta_{s,j'}(N, u)$ for $j' = 1, \ldots, j - 1$ with the following properties:

i) Time threshold $\xi_j^\Delta(w)$: For $w < G - (j' - 1)p$, we define $\xi_j^\Delta(w)$ by (5). For $w \geq G - (j' - 1)p$, we set $\xi_j^\Delta(w) = 0$. $\xi_j^\Delta(w) > \xi_{j'-1}^\Delta(w)$ if $\xi_j^\Delta(w) > 0$.

ii) Donation threshold $\underline{D}^\Delta(N, u)$: $\underline{D}^\Delta(N, u)$ is defined for $(N, u)$ such that either $N \geq M_0 - (j - 1)$, or such that $N < M_0 - (j - 1)$ and $u \leq \xi_j^\Delta(G - (N + j - 1)p)$. For $(N, u)$ with
Figure 9: Schematic illustration of construction of $D^\Delta(N, u)$ and $\xi_j(D)$ (for small $\Delta$)

\[ \begin{align*}
N &\leq M_0 - j' \quad \text{and} \quad u \leq \xi_j(G - (N + j')p) \\
\pi_j^\Delta(N, D^\Delta(N, u), u - \Delta) &= \frac{v_0}{v - p}. \quad (7)
\end{align*} \]

Note that in that case, $D^\Delta(N, u) < G - (N + 1)p$. For $N = M_0 - j'$, $u > \xi_j(0)$, $D^\Delta(N, u) = 0$. $D^\Delta(N, u)$ is strictly decreasing in $N, u$ when it satisfies (7).

In Figure 10, the blue step functions represent the portion of $D^\Delta$ at $N$ and $N + 1$ that are defined in the induction hypothesis, and black dotted lines show the corresponding $\xi_{j-1}(G - (N + j - 1)p)$ and $\xi_j(G - (N + 1 + j - 1)p) = \xi_{j-1}(G - (N + j)p)$.

iii) **PT assessment:** $(b_{j'}^\Delta, D_{x,j'}^\Delta, F_{j'}^\Delta)$ are PT assessments (as in Definition 3) with dona-
Figure 10: Schematic illustration of construction of $D^\Delta(N, u)$ for $N$ and $N + 1$ (discrete time)

Notes: The figure depicts the donation thresholds for cumulative purchases $N$ and $N + 1$ with $N < M_0 - j$. In step $j - 1$ only the blue portion of $D^\Delta$ is constructed, while in step $j$ the orange portion is added. For example, we construct $D^\Delta(N + 1, u)$ for $u \leq \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(G -(N + j - 1)p)$ in step $j - 1$ and extend it to $u \leq \xi_j^\Delta(G -(N + j)p)$ in step $j$. With $D \geq G -(N + j)p$, and $N + 1$ purchases, the campaign is active until $\xi_j^\Delta(G -(N + j)p) + \Delta$ or longer, even if no additional donations are being made (shaded area). For such states, strategies of the assessment $(b^\Delta_{j-1}, D^\Delta_{j-1}, F^\Delta_{j-1})$ are not optimal and $\pi^\Delta_{j-1}$ might not be increasing and continuous in $D$. We only assume $\pi_j^\Delta \geq 0$. Hence, the donation threshold cannot be constructed for $(N+1, u)$ with $u > \xi^\Delta_{j-1}(G -(N + j)p)$ in step $j - 1$.

(iv) Probability of success: For all $N \geq M(D) - j'$, $\pi^\Delta_{j'}(N, D, u)$ satisfies (6) if $D \geq D^\Delta_{*, j'}(N, u + \Delta)$ and $\pi^\Delta_{j'}(N, D, u) < \frac{v_0}{v - p}$ if $D < D^\Delta_{*, j'}(N, u + \Delta)$.
Note that by monotonicity of $\pi_{j}^{\Delta}(N, D, u)$ in $N, u$ (Lemma 2 iii),

$$\pi_{j}^{\Delta}(N, D, u) \geq \frac{\nu_{0}}{\nu - p} \quad \text{for } u > \xi_{j}^{\Delta}(G -(N + j')p), D > G -(N + j')p.$$  

This is illustrated in Figure 10 in the shaded area. Similarly, it implies that $u \leq \xi_{j}^{\Delta}(D) \iff D < D_{s,j}^{\Delta}((M(D) - j', u + \Delta) = D_{s,j}^{\Delta}(M(D) - j', u + \Delta)$.

v) **Best response:** For the PT assessments $(b_{j}^{\Delta}, D_{s,j}^{\Delta}, F_{j}^{\Delta})$, buyers best respond by pledging if and only if $D \geq D_{s,j}^{\Delta}(N, u + \Delta)$ in states all $(N, D, u)$ with $N \geq M(D) - j$.

(c) **Induction step** $(j - 1 \rightarrow j, j \geq 2)$: In this step, we assume the induction hypothesis (b) and construct a PT assessment $(b_{j}^{\Delta}, D_{s,j}^{\Delta}, F_{j}^{\Delta})$ such that the same statements are true for states $(N, D, u)$ with $N = M(D) - j$, i.e., $G -(N + j)p \leq D < G -(N + (j - 1))p$.

i) **Time threshold** $\xi_{j}^{\Delta}(w)$: First, note that for $w \geq G -(N + j)p$, there is a $j' \leq j - 1$ such that $M(w) - j' = N + 1$. Then, we know by the induction hypothesis that

$$\begin{cases} 
\text{for } u' < \xi_{j}^{\Delta}(w): & w < D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u') = D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u') \\
\text{for } \xi_{j}^{\Delta}(w) \leq u' \leq \xi_{j-1}^{\Delta}(G -(N + j)p): & w \geq D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u') = D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u') \\
\text{for } u' > \xi_{j-1}^{\Delta}(G -(N + j)p) & w \geq D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, \xi_{j-1}^{\Delta}(G -(N + j)p)) > D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u')
\end{cases}$$

Hence,

$$w \geq D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u') \iff u' \geq \xi_{j}^{\Delta}(w).$$

Therefore, letting $\bar{\pi}_{j-1}^{\Delta}(N, D, u)$ be the auxiliary probability corresponding to the assessment $(b_{j-1}^{\Delta}, D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}, F_{j-1}^{\Delta})$ as defined in Equation 4, we can write

$$\bar{\pi}_{j-1}^{\Delta}(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E}^{\bar{h}_{i}} \max\{u - \xi_{j}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u - \Delta(i - 1)), u - \Delta i\} \left| W \geq D \right\}$$

Next, note that the above also implies that for $u - i\Delta < \xi_{j-1}^{\Delta}(D)$, then $D < D_{s,j-1}^{\Delta}(N + 1, u -$
(i-1)\Delta = D^\Delta(N+1, u-(i-1)\Delta) and for \( u-i\Delta \geq \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D) \), \( D \geq D_{s,j-1}^\Delta(N+1, u-(i-1)\Delta) \). Hence,

\[
\tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E} f_i \left[ \max\{u\xi_{j-1}^\Delta(W)-[N+1](W)\}/\Delta, 0\} \sum_{i=1}^{\max\{u\xi_{j-1}^\Delta(W)-[N+1](W)\}/\Delta, 0} (1-\Delta \lambda)^{i-1}\Delta \lambda \left( \pi_{j-1}^\Delta(N+1, D, u-\Delta i)\mathbb{I}(u-\Delta i \geq \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D)) + \frac{\lambda_i}{v-p}(u-\Delta i < \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D)) \right) |W \geq D \right].
\]

Note that this expression only depends on \( \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(\cdot) \), \( j' \leq j-1 \), and \( \pi_{j-1}^\Delta(N+1, D, u') \) where \( M(D)-(N+1) \leq j - 1 \), which are defined in the induction hypothesis. Since \( \pi_{j-1}(N, D, u) \) is strictly increasing in \( u \) and \( \pi_{j-1}^\Delta(N+1, D, u-\Delta i) \geq \frac{i0}{v-p} \) for \( u-\Delta i \geq \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D) \), \( \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}(N, D, u) < 1 \) is strictly increasing in \( u \). Hence, for any \( j \leq M(D) \) there is a unique \( \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(\cdot) \) so that

\[
\begin{cases}
\tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) \geq \frac{i0}{v-p} \text{ for } u \geq \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D) \\
\tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) < \frac{i0}{v-p} \text{ for } u < \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D)
\end{cases}
\]

Recall that \( \pi_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) = \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) \) for \( D \geq D_{s,j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), u+\Delta) \), and by the induction hypothesis, \( \pi_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) < \frac{i0}{v-p} \) and \( \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) < \frac{i0}{v-p} \) for \( D < D_{s,j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), u+\Delta) \). Hence, \( \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D) \) satisfies

\[
\begin{cases}
\pi_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) \geq \frac{i0}{v-p} \text{ for } u \geq \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D) \\
\pi_{j-1}^\Delta(M(D)-(j-1), D, u) < \frac{i0}{v-p} \text{ for } u < \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(D)
\end{cases}
\]

and we have \( \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(w) > \xi_{j-1}^\Delta(\cdot) \) if \( \xi_{j}^\Delta(\cdot) > 0 \).

ii) **Donation threshold** \( D^\Delta(N, u) \): Since \( (b_{j-1}^\Delta, D_{s,j-1}^\Delta, F_{j-1}^\Delta) \) is a PT assessment by the induction hypothesis, \( \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(N, D, u) \) is strictly increasing in \( D \) by Corollary 1. For such \( (N, u) \), we define \( D^\Delta(N, u+\Delta) \) to be the unique value satisfying

\[
\pi_{j-1}^\Delta(N, D^\Delta(N, u+\Delta), u) = \frac{v_0}{v-p},
\]

which must also be satisfied for \( u \leq \xi_{j}^\Delta(G-(N+j')p), N \leq M_0-j', j' \leq j-1 \) by the induction hypothesis ii). Since \( \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta \) is increasing in \( N, D \) and \( u \), \( D^\Delta \) is decreasing in \( N \)
and \( u \). Further, for \( N = M_0 - j \), we set \( D_\Delta(N, u + \Delta) = 0 \) for \( u > \xi_j^\Delta(0) \).

iii) **PT assessment:** We set

\[
D_{\Delta,j}(N, u) := D_\Delta(N, u) \quad \text{for } u \leq \xi_j^\Delta(G - (N + j)p), \text{ and}
\]

\[
\text{for } N = M_0 - j, \quad u > \xi_j^\Delta(0),
\]

and otherwise, define \( D_{\Delta,j}(N, u) \) arbitrarily so that it is overall decreasing in \( N \) and \( u \). This defines a PT assessment \( (b_j^\Delta, D_{+,j}^\Delta, F_j^\Delta) \). Note that \( (b_j^\Delta, D_{+,j}^\Delta, F_j^\Delta) = (b_{j-1}^\Delta, D_{+,j-1}^\Delta, F_{j-1}^\Delta) \) for states \( (N, D, u) \) with \( M(D) - N \leq j - 1 \) because for all such states \( D_{\Delta,j-1}(N, u) = D_{\Delta,j}(N, u) \).

iv) **Probability of success:** The corresponding probability of success has the following properties:

- \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) = \pi_{j-1}^\Delta(N, D, u) \) for all states \((N, D, u)\) with \( M(D) - N \leq j - 1 \) by definition of the corresponding donation thresholds because \((b_j^\Delta, D_{+,j}^\Delta, F_j^\Delta) = (b_{j-1}^\Delta, D_{+,j-1}^\Delta, F_{j-1}^\Delta)\) for these states and all states \((N', D', u')\) with \( N' \geq N, D' \geq D \) that can be reached in a continuation game, as they satisfy \( M(D') - N' \leq j - 1 \).

- For \( D \geq D_{\Delta,j}(N, u + \Delta) \), \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) = \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(N, D, u) \) by Lemma 2 ii), and for \( D < D_{\Delta,j}(N, u + \Delta) \), \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) < \frac{\xi_j^\Delta}{v - p} \) and \( \tilde{\pi}_{j-1}^\Delta(N, D, u) < \frac{\xi_{j-1}^\Delta}{v - p} \) by monotonicity of the probabilities in \( D \). Hence, \( \xi_j^\Delta(D) \) satisfies (5). Further, this implies that \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) \) is strictly increasing in \( u \) for \( D \geq D_{\Delta,j}(N, u + \Delta) \), \( N + 1 < M(D) \). Otherwise, \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1 \) or \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) \) is given by (2) which is strictly increasing in \( u \) or equal to zero.

v) **Best response:** It is immediate from the construction and because \( \pi_j^\Delta \) is increasing in \( D \), that for all \((N, D, u)\) with \( N \geq M(D) - j \), \( \pi_j^\Delta(N, D, u) \geq \frac{\xi_j^\Delta}{v - p} \) if and only if \( D \geq D_{\Delta,j}(N, u + \Delta) \).

### A.2.2 Limit as \( \Delta \to 0 \)

The following lemma implies Proposition 1 ii):
Lemma 6 (Success-maximizing equilibrium limit). i) The point-wise limit of the donation threshold \(D(N,u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta(N,\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \rceil \Delta)\) exists, where \(\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \rceil \Delta\) is the smallest multiple of \(\Delta\) that is larger than \(u\). Further, for any \(x = (N,D,u)\) the following point-wise limits exist:

\[
\begin{align*}
 b(x) &:= \lim_{\Delta \to 0} b^\Delta(N,D,\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \rceil \Delta), & D_+(x;w) &:= \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta(N,D,\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \rceil \Delta; w), \\
 \xi_j(w) &:= \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \xi_j^\Delta(w), & F(w;x) &:= \lim_{\Delta \to 0} F^\Delta\left(w;(N,D,\left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta)\right)
\end{align*}
\]

Finally,

\[
\pi(N,D,u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi^\Delta(N,D,\left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta) \text{ uniform in } u \text{ and } D.
\]

ii) Proposition 1 ii) holds for this limit.

The proof of this lemma is in the Online Appendix.

A.2.3 Optimality of constructed equilibrium

Proof Outline: Next, we show that the equilibrium constructed in Section A.2.1 maximizes the probability of success and that for any success-maximizing sequence of PT equilibria, the outcome converges point-wise to the same limit as specified in Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in four steps. In Step 1, we formulate a relaxed version of the success maximization problem. In Step 2, we solve the relaxed problem. In Step 3 we show that the outcome of the solution is attained by the equilibrium constructed Section A.2.1. In Step 4 we show convergence as \(\Delta \to 0\).

The key idea of the proof stems from the observation that the donor will always donate enough to reach the goal at the deadline if needed and feasible. Hence, to maximize the probability of success, the exact amount the donor donates during the campaign before the deadline is not important as long as buyers keep pledging. To find the PBE outcomes that maximize the probability of success, we consider reduced histories that ignore donation amounts and only keep track of whether a donation incentivizes the next potential buyer to pledge or not. This idea allows us to recast the success maximization problem into one
in which we choose probabilities of reaching these reduced histories, rather than choosing over the set of PBEs.

**Proof:**

**Step 1: The relaxed success-maximization problem**

Consider a particular assessment \((\tilde{D}_{t}, \tilde{b}_{t}, \tilde{F}_{t})\). Given this assessment, any buyer history \(h_{t}^{B,\Delta} = \prod_{s \in T, s \leq t} (N_{s-\Delta}, D_{s-\Delta})\) corresponds to a reduced buyer history

\[
\tilde{h}_{t}^{B} := \prod_{s \in T, s \leq t} (N_{s-\Delta}, b_{s-\Delta}), \quad \text{where} \quad b_{s-\Delta} := \tilde{b}_{\Delta} \left( \prod_{s' \leq s} (N_{s'-\Delta}, D_{s'-\Delta}) \right),
\]

so that instead of the donation \(D_{s-\Delta}\), the history records the probability \(b_{s-\Delta} \in [0, 1]\) with which a buyer arriving in period \(s\) pledges on observing cumulative donation amount \(D_{s-\Delta}\), and the entire history of donations and pledges. We omit the \(\Delta\)-superscripts for the reduced histories to simplify notation. Let \(R_{\tilde{b}_{\Delta}}\) be the mapping so that

\[
R_{\tilde{b}_{\Delta}} : h_{t}^{B,\Delta} \mapsto \tilde{h}_{t}^{B}
\]

as defined above. We will use this mapping in the proof of Proposition 3.

In a platform-optimal equilibrium, the buyer always pledges when she is indifferent between pledging and not pledging, so henceforth we assume \(b_{s-\Delta} \in \{0, 1\}\). Let the set of such reduced buyer histories in period \(t\) be \(\tilde{H}^{B}_{t}\). Further, let us denote the corresponding set of reduced donor histories in period \(t\) by

\[
\tilde{H}^{D}_{t} := \left\{ \tilde{h}_{t}^{D} = (\tilde{h}_{t}^{B}, N_{t}) \left| \tilde{h}_{t}^{B} \in \tilde{H}_{t}^{B}, \ N_{t} \in \{N_{t-\Delta}, N_{t-\Delta} + 1\} \right. \right\}.
\]

The assessment, the arrival process and distributions of donor valuation define a probability measure \(P\) on the space of outcomes \(\prod_{t \in T} (N_{t}, D_{t})\) and hence on \(\tilde{H}^{B}_{t}\) and \(\tilde{H}^{D}_{t}\). Given this probability space, we define the following probabilities:

i) \(\kappa(\tilde{h}_{t}^{B}; w)\) is the probability that \(\tilde{h}_{t}^{B} \in \tilde{H}^{B}_{t}\) is reached if the donor’s valuation is \(w\);
ii) \( \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) \) is the probability that \( \tilde{h}_t^D \in \tilde{H}_t^D \) is reached if the donor’s valuation is \( w \).

Figure 11: Transitions between reduced histories

Note that this implies that for each \( w \) and \( t \in T^\Delta \), we have

\[
\sum_{\tilde{h}_t^D \in \tilde{H}_t^D} \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) = \sum_{\tilde{h}_t^D \in \tilde{H}_t^D} \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) = \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1; w) + \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 0; w),
\]

and in particular

\[
\kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1; w) \leq \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) \quad \text{for all} \quad \tilde{h}_t^D \in \tilde{H}_t^D.
\]

Further, the following inter-temporal link between reduced histories must hold,

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1, N_t + 1; w) &= \Delta \lambda \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1; w) \quad \text{for all} \quad \tilde{h}_t^D \in \tilde{H}_t^D. \\
\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1, N_t; w) &= (1 - \Delta \lambda) \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1; w) \\
\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D, 0, N_t; w) &= \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) - \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1; w)
\end{align*}
\]

The reduced histories and probabilities are illustrated in Figure 11. The probabilities of
reaching buyer histories after which a buyer pledges uniquely determines all other probabilities, so we define

\[ \mathcal{H}_t^1 := \left\{ \tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta} \in \mathcal{H}_{t-\Delta}^D \right\} \subset \mathcal{H}_{t}^B. \]

Formally, \( \mathbb{P}(0; w) = 1 \) and the sequence \( \kappa_\Delta(0; w) := \left( \left( \kappa(h_i^B; w) \right)_{h_i^D \in \mathcal{H}_i^D} \right)_{i \geq \Delta} \) uniquely define \( \left( \left( \mathbb{P}(h_i^D; w) \right)_{h_i^D \in \mathcal{H}_i^D} \right)_{i \geq 0} \) and \( \left( \left( \kappa(h_i^D, 0; w) \right)_{h_i^D \in \mathcal{H}_i^D} \right)_{i \geq 0} \). Thus, \( \left( \kappa_\Delta(0; w) \right)_{w \in [0, \infty)} \) determines the outcome of the game and will be the choice variable in the relaxed problem. In order to be able to formulate buyer IC constraints after reaching an arbitrary donor history \( \tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta} \), we define \textit{continuation donor histories} at times \( t' \geq t \) by

\[ \mathcal{H}_{t'}^D (\tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta}) := \left\{ \tilde{h}^D_{t'} \in \mathcal{H}_{t'}^D : \text{the first entries of } \tilde{h}^D_{t'} \text{ are } \tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta} \right\}. \]

The problem to maximize the probability of success can be written as

\[
\max_{\left( \kappa_\Delta(0; w) \right)_{w \in [0, \infty)}} \sum_{\tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta} \in \mathcal{H}_{t-\Delta}^D} \Delta \lambda \mathbb{E}^F \left[ \kappa(\tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta}, 1; W) \mathbb{1} \left( G - (N_{t-\Delta} + 1)p \leq W \right) \right] + \\
(1 - \Delta \lambda) \mathbb{E}^F \left[ \kappa(\tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta}, 1; W) \mathbb{1} \left( G - N_{t-\Delta}p \leq W \right) \right] + \\
\mathbb{E}^F \left[ \left( \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta}; W) - \kappa(\tilde{h}^D_{t-\Delta}, 1; W) \mathbb{1} \left( G - N_{t-\Delta}p \leq W \right) \right) \mathbb{1} \left( G - N_{t-\Delta}p \leq W \right) \right],
\]

subject to \( \mathbb{P}(0; w) = 1 \), Equation \( \mathbb{P}_t \), Equation \( \mathbb{P} - t \), and for all \( \tilde{h}^D_t \in \mathcal{H}_{t}^D, t \in T^\Delta, N_t \in \mathbb{N}, w \in [0, \infty) \),

\[
\int_{\mathbb{R}} q_{t+\Delta}(\tilde{h}^D_t, 1, N_t - N_{t-\Delta} + 1; W) \mathbb{d} F_0(W) \geq \frac{\nu_0}{\nu - p}, \quad \text{(Buyer IC)}
\]

where the unconditional probability of success if a period-\( t \) buyer pledges after history \( \tilde{h}^D_t \)
is given by

\[
q_{t+\Delta}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w) = \sum_{\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta} \in \mathcal{H}^{D}(h^{D}_{t\Delta})} \Delta \lambda \kappa(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}, 1; w) \mathbb{1}\left(G - (N_{t\Delta} + 1)p \leq w\right) + (1-\Delta \lambda) \kappa(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}, 1; w) \mathbb{1}\left(G - N_{t\Delta}p \leq w\right) + \mathbb{1}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w) - \kappa(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}, 1; w)\right] \mathbb{1}\left(G - N_{t\Delta}p \leq w\right).
\]

This is a relaxed problem because the vectors \((\kappa_{\Delta}(0; w))_{w \in [0, \infty)}\) that satisfy the above constraints do not necessarily correspond to a PBE. Further, we are ignoring donor incentives by considering reduced histories.

Finally, note that for a PT equilibrium, it must be that for any buyer history \((\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}, 1) \in \mathcal{H}^{1}_{t}\) there exists \(\tilde{D}^{*}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w} \geq 0\) such that

\[
\kappa(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}, 1; w) = \begin{cases} 
\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w) & \text{for } w \geq \tilde{D}^{*}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w} \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \quad \text{(PT-\kappa)}
\]

**Step 2: Solution to the relaxed problem**

In the following, we show any solution satisfies Equation PT-\kappa. Such \(\kappa_{\Delta}\) with \(\tilde{D}^{*}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w} = \mathcal{W}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w}\) where

\[
\mathcal{W}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w} := \min\{w|(\text{Buyer IC}) \text{ is satisfied for } \kappa(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}, 1; w) = \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\mathbb{1}(w \geq w)\}
\]

is always a solution. We set \(\mathcal{W}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w} = \infty\) if the set on the right-hand side is empty. Further, to establish uniqueness in the limit \(\Delta \rightarrow 0\), we show that for any solution satisfying Equation PT-\kappa it must be that

\[
\tilde{D}^{*}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w} \in \left[\mathcal{W}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w}, \max\left\{G - \left(N_{t\Delta} + \frac{T -(t-\Delta)}{\Delta}\right)p, \mathcal{W}\left[\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{t\Delta}; w)\right]_{w}\right\}\right], \quad (\tilde{D}^{*-\text{Region}})
\]
where \( G - \left( N_{i-\Delta} + \frac{T-\bar{t}+\Delta}{\bar{t}} \right) p \) is the amount that the donor needs to donate even if a buyer arrives and pledges in every future period. Note that as \( \Delta \to 0 \), \( G - \left( N_{i} + \frac{T-\bar{t}}{\bar{t}} \right) p \to -\infty \).

We show that the solution must satisfy Equation PT-\( \kappa \) with \((\bar{D}^*\text{-Region})\) by contradiction. Consider an arbitrary solution \( \kappa^*_\Delta \) and corresponding \( \mathbb{P}^* \) such that there is at least one history in which it does not satisfy Equation PT-\( \kappa \) with \((\bar{D}^*\text{-Region})\). Consider the latest period \( \bar{t} \) in time after which Equation PT-\( \kappa \) with \((\bar{D}^*\text{-Region})\) is satisfied for all histories, and consider a period \( \bar{t} - \Delta \) history \( \hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta} \) such that \( \kappa(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w) \) does not satisfy Equation PT-\( \kappa \) with \((\bar{D}^*\text{-Region})\). Then, the probability of success conditional on reaching history \( \hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}} = (\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1) \) given by \( \frac{q(h^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, N_{\bar{t}-\Delta}+1; 0)}{\kappa(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w)} \) is increasing in \( w \) and independent of the choice of \( \kappa(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w) \). Let

\[
c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}) := \int \kappa(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; W) \, d F_0(W).
\]

We now construct a \( \kappa'_\Delta \) such that the objective function is higher than with \( \kappa^*_\Delta \), while keeping \( \int \kappa'(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; W) \, d F_0(W) \leq c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}) \) in all histories. To this end, let \( W_c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}) \) be the uniquely defined by\(^{23}\)

\[
\int_{W_c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta})}^{\infty} \mathbb{P}^*(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}; W) \, d F_0(W) = c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}).
\]

Since \( \frac{q(h^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, N_{\bar{t}-\Delta}+1; 0)}{\kappa(h^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w)} \) is increasing in \( w \), \( \kappa(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w) = \mathbb{P}^*(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}; w) 1(w \geq W_c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta})) \) satisfies Equation Buyer IC. We set \( \kappa'(\hat{h}^D_{t}; w) := \kappa'(\hat{h}^D_{t}; w) \) for all histories \( \hat{h}^D_t \) at \( t < \bar{t} - \Delta \) and all histories \( \hat{h}^D_t \notin \tilde{H}^D_t(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}), t \geq \bar{t} - \Delta \). Further, let

\[
\kappa'(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w) := \begin{cases} \mathbb{P}^*(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}; w) & \text{for } w \geq W_c(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}
\]

and for histories \( \hat{h}_t \in \tilde{H}^D_t(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}) \) where \( t > \bar{t} - \Delta \), we set \( \kappa'(\hat{h}^D_t; w) := \mathbb{P}^*(\hat{h}^D_t; w) \frac{\kappa'(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w)}{\mathbb{P}^*(\hat{h}^D_{\bar{t}-\Delta}, 1; w)} \) so that all constraints remain satisfied and the transition probabilities remain unchanged.

\(^{23}\)Uniqueness follows because for all \( t \geq \bar{t} \), \( \kappa(\hat{h}^D_t, 1; w) \) satisfies Equation PT-\( \kappa \).
Figure 12: Schematic illustration of transition probabilities

**Step 3: Implementation by equilibrium**

Finally, we show that the optimal solution is achieved by the PBE constructed in Proposition 1. To this end, it is useful to write the probability of success for donor type $w$ after a
history \( \tilde{h}_{t-\Delta} \) recursively as a function of \( \kappa_t(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w) \) and \( \Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w) > 0 \):

\[
\Pi_{t-\Delta}(\kappa_t(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w), \Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w); w) = \\
\frac{\Delta\lambda}{\Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w)} \Pi_t(\kappa_{t+\Delta}(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}, 1, N_{t-\Delta} + 1; w), \Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}, 1, N_{t-\Delta} + 1; w); w)
\]

\[
+ (1 - \Delta\lambda) \frac{\Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w)}{\Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w)} \Pi_t(\kappa_{t+\Delta}(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}, 1, N_{t-\Delta}; w), \Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}, 1, N_{t-\Delta}; w); w)
\]

\[
(W-\Pi)
\]

and for \( \Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w) = 0 \), we set \( \Pi_{t-\Delta}(\kappa_t(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w), \Pr(\tilde{h}_{t-\Delta}; w); w) = 0 \) without loss. Then, we can write the Buyer IC constraint as follows:

\[
\frac{\text{prob. of reaching } \tilde{h}_t^B}{\kappa(\tilde{h}_t^B; W) \Pi_t(\kappa_{t+\Delta}(\tilde{h}_t^B, N_{t-\Delta} + 1; W), \Pr(\tilde{h}_t^B, W); W) \ d F_0(W)} \geq \frac{v_0}{v - p}. \quad \text{(Buyer IC')}
\]

Consider the PT equilibrium \((D_+^\Delta, b^\Delta, (F^\Delta(\cdot|x))_x)\) from the proof of Proposition 1. This assessment induces a probability measure \( \mathbb{P} \) on outcomes and a corresponding systems of probabilities \( \kappa(\tilde{h}_t^D, 1; w) \) and \( \Pr(\tilde{h}_t^D; w) \) over reduced histories, as defined in the Step 1. Consider any on-path buyer history in the last period \( h_t^{B,\Delta} = \prod_{s \in \mathbb{T}, s \leq t} (N_{s-\Delta}, D_{s-\Delta}) \). The PBE specifies that buyers pledge if and only if the probability of success is at least \( \frac{v_0}{v - p} \). In addition, in the preceding period, unless success is already guaranteed, donors with \( w \geq D_+^\Delta(N_{T-\Delta}, \Delta) \) donate max\( \{D_{T-2\Delta}, D_+^\Delta(N_{T-\Delta}, \Delta)\} \). This makes the next buyer just indifferent between buying and not buying if such a donation amount exists and \( D_+^\Delta(N_{T-\Delta}, \Delta) = W \) otherwise. Therefore, for any on-path history \( h_{T-\Delta}^{D,\Delta} = \prod_{s \in \mathbb{T}, s \leq T-\Delta} (N_{T-\Delta}, D_{s-\Delta}, N_{T-\Delta}) \), the

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induced probabilities over reduced histories satisfy

\[ \kappa(\tilde{h}^{D}_{T-\Delta}, 1; w) = \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{T-\Delta}; w) \text{ if and only if } w \geq D^{\Delta}(N_{T-\Delta}, \Delta). \]

Notice that since \( D^{\Delta}(N_{T-\Delta}, \Delta) \) is calculated using the indifference condition for buyers, \( \pi^{\Delta}(N, D, u) \) is increasing in \( D \), and \( F^{\Delta} \) is a truncation given by Equation PT-belief, this \( D^{\Delta}(N_{T-\Delta}, \Delta) \) is exactly \( W(\mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}^{D}_{T-\Delta}; w))_{w}, N_{T-\Delta}) \) defined in Equation \( W \) in the solution to the relaxed problem when we write the expression for the indifference condition as in Equation Buyer IC'. Analogous arguments apply to any history \( h^{D,\Delta} \).

Therefore, the PBE assessment from the proof of Proposition 1 induces exactly \( (\kappa^{*}(0; w))_{w} \) and it achieves the optimum in the relaxed problem. Hence, \( (\kappa^{*}(0; w))_{w} \) is platform-optimal in the full class of PBEs.

**Step 4: Uniqueness of limits**

We have shown in **Step 2** that solutions to the reduced problem satisfy Equation PT-\( \kappa \) with Equation \( \tilde{D}^{\Delta} \)-Region. Now, for a given \( t \) if \( \Delta \) is sufficiently small, then \( G - (N + \frac{T-t}{\Delta})p < 0 \), so any sequence of outcomes converges point-wise to the equilibrium outcome attained by the Markov equilibrium constructed in **Step 1**.

**A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 (Success-Minimizing Equilibrium)**

We first show in Section A.3.1, we characterize a PT equilibrium for each \( \Delta \). In Section A.3.2, we show that the limit of these equilibria as \( \Delta \to 0 \) exists, and is as specified in Proposition 2. Section A.3.3 establishes that this PBE minimizes the probability of success.

**A.3.1 Characterization of PT equilibrium**

**Lemma 7** (Success-minimizing equilibrium). *Given any \( \Delta > 0 \), a PT assessment \( (b^{\Delta}, D^{\Delta}_+, F^{\Delta}) \) with donation threshold \( D^{\Delta}(N, u) \in [0, G - (N + 1)p] \) constitutes a PT equilibrium.*

We denote the corresponding probability of success from the buyer’s perspective in
state $N, D, u$ if the buyer contributes by $\pi(N, D, u)$.

**Proof.** Note that the donation threshold is well-defined in Section 3.4 (unlike in the construction of the success-maximizing equilibrium): $\overline{D}^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) := \max\{G - (j - 1)p - Np, 0\}$ for $u \in (\overline{\xi}_{j-1}^\Delta, \overline{\xi}_j^\Delta]$. This defines strategies and beliefs of the PT assessment. It is immediate that $\overline{D}^\Delta(N, u)$ is strictly decreasing in $N$ and $u$ as long as $\overline{D}^\Delta(N, u) > 0$, weakly decreasing otherwise, $\overline{D}^\Delta(N, u) \in [0, G - (N + 1)p]$, and $\overline{D}^\Delta(N, u) = 0$ for $(N + 1)p \geq G$.

It only remains to show that the buyer strategies are optimal in every state $(N, D, u)$, since the donor is best responding by Lemma 3. We show this by induction in $j = M(D) - N$ and for each $j$ by backward-induction in $u$.

**(a) Induction start** ($j \leq 1 \Leftrightarrow D \geq G - (N + 1)p$): For $N \geq M(D) - 1$, the campaign is either already successful, or a buyer can complete the campaign. Hence $\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1$ and $b^\Delta(N, D, u) = 1$ for all $u \in \mathbb{U}^\Delta$, and $D \in [0, \overline{W}]$ in any equilibrium. Note that $\xi_1^\Delta = 0$ and $D^\Delta(N, D, u; w) = D$.

**(b) Induction hypothesis** ($j' \leq j - 1$): Assume that we have shown that the above strategy profiles are best responses for buyers for all states $(N, D, u)$ with $N = M(D) - j'$ with $j' \leq j - 1$.

**(c) Induction step** ($j - 1 \rightarrow j$, $j \geq 2$): Consider a buyer in state $(N, D, u)$ with $N = M(D) - j$. If $D < \overline{D}^\Delta(N, u + \Delta)$, then $u < \overline{\xi}_j^\Delta$, and the belief system dictates that a buyer assigns a probability of success equal to

$$
\pi^\Delta(M(D) - j, D, u) = \Pr(\tau_1^u \leq T - \overline{\xi}_{j-1}^\Delta, \ldots, \tau_{j-2}^u \leq T - \overline{\xi}_{2}^\Delta, \tau_{j-1}^u \leq T) < \frac{\nu_0}{\nu - p},
$$

where $\tau_i^u$ is the arrival time of the $i$-th buyer after period $u$. The inequality follows directly from the definition of $\overline{\xi}_j^\Delta$. Hence, $b^\Delta(M(D) - j, D, u) = 0$ is optimal for the buyer.
If $D \geq \bar{D}(N, u + \Delta)$, then $u \geq \xi_j^\Delta$; by the induction hypothesis, we have

$$
\pi^\Delta(N, D, u) = \mathbb{E}^b_h \left[ \max_{i=1}^{\max\{u - \bar{\bar{\Delta}}^M(N, u + \Delta)(W)/\Delta, 0\}} (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{i-1} \Delta \lambda \right]
\pi^\Delta(N + 1, \max\{D, \bar{D}^\Delta(N + 1, u - \Delta(i - 1)), u - \Delta i\}|W \geq D)
> \mathbb{P}(\tau^u_1 \leq T - \bar{\bar{\xi}}^\Delta_j, \ldots, \tau^u_{j-2} \leq T - \bar{\bar{\bar{\xi}}}^\Delta_2, \tau^u_{j-1} \leq T) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p},
$$

where the last inequality follows because $u \geq \bar{\bar{\xi}}^\Delta_j$ and the definition of $\bar{\bar{\xi}}^\Delta_j$ via Proposition 1. Hence, indeed $b^\Delta(M(D) - j, D, u) = 1$. ■

**A.3.2 Limit as $\Delta \to 0$**

We know from Proposition 1 that the point-wise limits $\bar{\bar{\xi}}_j := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \bar{\bar{\xi}}^\Delta_j$ and

$$
\bar{D}(N, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \bar{D}^\Delta(N, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor) = \max\{G - (j - 1)p - Np, 0\} \text{ for } u \in (\bar{\bar{\xi}}_j, \bar{\bar{\xi}}_{j-1}]
$$

exist. This implies that the point-wise limits $D^\Delta(N, D, u; w) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta(N, D, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor; w)$, $b^\Delta(N, D, u) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} b^\Delta(N, D, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor)$, and $F(w; (N, D, u)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} F^\Delta(w; (N, D, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor))$ exist. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2 ii).

**A.3.3 Minimization of probability of success**

Next, we show that the equilibrium just constructed minimizes the probability of success in the class of PBE. To this end, we consider an arbitrary PBE $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$. We show by backward induction in $t$ that for any buyer history $h^\mu_i = \prod_{s \in \mathbb{T}^\Delta, s \leq t} (N_{s-\Delta}, D_{s-\Delta})$ an equilibrium buyer history must satisfy

$$D_{t-\Delta} > \bar{D}^\Delta(N_{t-\Delta}, T - (t - \Delta)) \Rightarrow \tilde{b}^\Delta(h^\mu_i) = 1. \quad (10)
$$

**a) Induction start** ($t = T$): $\bar{D}^\Delta(N, \Delta) = G - (N - 1)p$, so Equation 10 is satisfied for any PBE.
(b) **Induction hypothesis** \( (s \geq t) \): Assume that Equation 10 is satisfied for any history \( h^B_{t} \) with \( s \geq t \).

(c) **Induction step** \( (t \rightsquigarrow t - \Delta) \): For an arbitrary history \( h^B_{t} \), from a buyer’s perspective in period \( t - \Delta \), the probability of success after a contribution is bounded from below by \( \bar{\pi}(N_{t-2\Delta}, D_{t-2\Delta}, T - (t - \Delta)) \) by the induction hypothesis. Thus, the buyer must contribute if \( \bar{\pi}(N_{t-2\Delta}, D_{t-2\Delta}, T - (t - \Delta)) \geq \frac{v_0}{v - p} \). Since for the constructed PT equilibrium,

\[
D > \bar{D}^\Delta(N, T - 2t) \implies \bar{\pi}(N, D, T - (t - \Delta)) \geq \frac{v_0}{v - p},
\]

we have \( D_{t-2\Delta} > \bar{D}^\Delta(N_{t-2\Delta}, T - (t - 2\Delta)) \implies \bar{b}^\Delta(h^B_{t-\Delta}) = 1 \).

Finally, if Equation 10 is satisfied, then the probability of success in the PBE must be at least as in the constructed PT equilibrium, since buyers contribute whenever they contribute in the PT equilibrium and the donor contributes up to his wealth at the deadline in any PBE whenever necessary for success.

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 3 (Donor-Preferred Equilibrium)

**Proof Outline:** Given any assessment, we use the same class of reduced histories and systems of probabilities \( \kappa(h^B_t; w) \) and \( \mathbb{P}(h^D_t, N_t; w) \), as in the proof of Proposition 1. Just as in the equilibrium that maximizes the probability of success, in a donor-preferred equilibrium, the buyer always pledges when she is indifferent between pledging and not pledging, so we can assume that \( b_s \in \{0, 1\} \) for all histories. The induced probability measure \( \mathbb{P} \) allows us to define \( (\kappa_\Delta(0; w))_w \), which determines the outcome of the game, except for the donation amount.

The proof proceeds in four steps. **Step 1** establishes that donor-preferred equilibrium outcomes can be attained by PBE in a smaller class of assessments. In **Step 2**, we formulate a relaxed donor problem (analogously to Proposition 1). In **Step 3**, we solve the donor’s problem and show that the success-maximizing solution also corresponds to a solution of the donor’s problem. We also prove that all solutions that are PT equilibria converge to the
same limit as $\Delta \to 0$. Finally, in Step 4, we verify that the donor strategy constructed in Step 3 of the proof of Proposition 1 is consistent with the donor-preferred solution.

**Proof:**

**Step 1: Limiting the class of assessments**

To find a donor-preferred equilibrium, we first show (in Lemmata 8 and 9 below) that donor-preferred equilibrium outcomes can be attained by PBE in a smaller class of assessments. First, at histories at which buyers are induced to buy, all donor types that donate positive amounts make the same cumulative donation. Second, if a donor does not incentivize buying, he donates nothing. Within the class of assessments satisfying these two properties, the mapping from reduced histories to donations becomes unique, a fact we use when we formulate the donor’s maximization problem.

**Lemma 8.** For any donor-preferred PBE $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}^\Delta_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$, there exists a donor-preferred PBE $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}^\Delta_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$ such that

i) both assessments generate the same probability measures $(\kappa_\Delta(0; w))_w$.

ii) for each $h_{i,t-\Delta}$, there exists a $D_*(h_{i,t-\Delta}) \in \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$
\hat{D}^\Delta_+(h_{i,t-\Delta}; w) = \begin{cases}
\tilde{D}_*(h_{i,t-\Delta}; w) & \text{if } \tilde{b}^\Delta(h_{i,t-\Delta}, \tilde{D}^\Delta_*(h_{i,t-\Delta}; w)) = 0 \\
D_*(h_{i,t-\Delta}) & \text{if } \tilde{b}^\Delta(h_{i,t-\Delta}, \tilde{D}^\Delta_*(h_{i,t-\Delta}; w)) = 1
\end{cases},
$$

and

$$
\hat{b}^\Delta(h_{i,t-\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta}) = \begin{cases}
1 & \text{if } D_{t-\Delta} = D_*(h_{i,t-\Delta}) \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}.
$$

**Proof of Lemma 8.** Given a donor-preferred PBE $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}^\Delta_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$, define

$$D_*(h_{i,t}^{D,\Delta}) := \inf \{ \tilde{D}^\Delta_+(h_{i,t}^{D,\Delta}; w) \mid \tilde{b}^\Delta(h_{i,t}^{D,\Delta}, \tilde{D}^\Delta_*(h_{i,t}^{D,\Delta}; w)) = 1 \},$$

which is the smallest donation amount that incentivizes buying at a history $h_{i,t}^{D,\Delta}$. Donating this amount is feasible for all donor types $w \geq D_*(h_{i,t}^{D,\Delta})$. Moreover, it is consistent with
play on equilibrium path. In particular, donating this amount is feasible for all types that incentivize buying after $h_t^{D,\Delta}$ in $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$.

Then, define a new assessment $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$ where $\hat{b}^\Delta$ and $\hat{D}_+$ are given by Equa-
tion 11. On equilibrium path, $\hat{F}(w; h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$ is derived by Bayes’ rule. Off path, if $D_{t-\Delta} > D_s(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta})$, then let $\hat{F}(w; h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$ be such that it is optimal for the buyer not to buy (e.g. $\hat{F}(w; h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta}) = \delta(w = 0)$), and let $\hat{F}(w; h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta}) = \hat{F}(w; h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$ otherwise.

Note that the strategies are such that $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$ and $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$ result in the same probability measures $(\kappa_\Delta(0; w))_w$, i.e., the same purchasing outcome after any realization of arrivals and donor type. The donation amount with $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$ is by definition weakly lower after any arrival and donor type realization. Hence, if $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$ is a PBE, then it must be donor-preferred. It remains to be shown that $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$ is a PBE.

First, consider donor incentives. Given a PBE $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$, a donor type $w$ with $\tilde{b}^\Delta(h_t^{D,\Delta}, \tilde{D}_+(h_t^{D,\Delta}; w)) = 0$ does not find it profitable to incentivize buying after a history $h_t^{D,\Delta}$. Buying can be incentivized by donations of at least $D_s(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta})$. Hence, also with assessment $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$, deviating to incentivize buying cannot be profitable. For a donor type $w$ with $\tilde{b}^\Delta(h_t^{D,\Delta}, \tilde{D}_+(h_t^{D,\Delta}; w)) = 1$, it is optimal to donate in the PBE $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$. Given the assessment $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$, the donor can donate weakly less and still incentivize buying, but the donor has a larger set of feasible donations in any future period. Thus, no donor type has an incentive to deviate given the assessment $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$.

Next, consider buyer incentives. Buyers at a history $(h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$ where $D_{t-\Delta} < D_s(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta})$ have identical beliefs about donor types in both assessments, and the purchasing outcome is also identical as argued above. Hence, the probability of success is the same across assessments and a buyer with such a history must prefer not to buy given the assessment $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$ because $(\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+, \hat{F}^\Delta)$ is a PBE. Buyers at a history $(h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$, where $D_{t-\Delta} = D_s(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta})$, believe that they face donor types that they would face if they played a PBE $(\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+, \tilde{F}^\Delta)$, and if they were at any of the histories $(h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$ after which a buyer buys. Hence, buyers must prefer to buy at a history $(h_t^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})$, where $D_{t-\Delta} = D_s(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta})$, 72.
given the assessment \((\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+^\Delta, \hat{F}^\Delta)\). A history \((h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})\) with \(D_{t-\Delta} > D_*(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta})\) is now off equilibrium path for assessment \((\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+^\Delta, \hat{F}^\Delta)\), and we assumed that \(\hat{F}\) is such that the buyer does not wish to buy in this case.

It follows that \((\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+^\Delta, \hat{F}^\Delta)\) is a PBE.

Hence, to find a donor-preferred equilibrium, it suffices to restrict attention to assessments \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\) such that for any \(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}\), there exists a \(D_*(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}) \in \mathbb{R}\) with

\[
\tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}; w) = D_*(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}), \quad \text{whenever } \tilde{b}^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}; w)) = 1,
\]

and \(\tilde{b}^\Delta\) as is defined in Equation 11. Indeed, the success-maximizing equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is in this class.

**Lemma 9.** For any donor-preferred PBE \((\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+^\Delta, \hat{F}^\Delta)\) for which the donor strategy satisfies Equation 12 and buyer strategy Equation 11, there exists a donor-preferred PBE \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\) so that

i) both assessments generate the same probability measures \((\kappa_\Delta(0; w))_w\),

ii) \(\hat{b}^\Delta = \tilde{b}^\Delta\) and for each \(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}\),

\[
\tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}; w) = \begin{cases} 
D_{t-\Delta} & \text{if } \tilde{b}^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}; w)) = 0 \\
\tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}; w) & \text{if } \tilde{b}^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}; w)) = 1
\end{cases}.
\]

**Proof of Lemma 9.** Given the donor-preferred PBE \((\hat{b}^\Delta, \hat{D}_+^\Delta, \hat{F}^\Delta)\) satisfying Equation 12, let \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\) be given by Equation 13, \(\tilde{b}^\Delta = \tilde{b}^\Delta\), and \(\hat{F}^\Delta(w; h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta}) = \hat{F}^\Delta(w; h_{t-\Delta}^{D,\Delta}, D_{t-\Delta})\) off path. Then, it follows immediately that the two assessments generate the same outcomes and hence, the same probability measures \((\kappa_\Delta(0; w))_w\). It remains to show that \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\) constitutes a PBE. The donor does not have a profitable deviation after histories after which the buyer is incentivized to buy as the donor plays exactly
the same strategy as in \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\). Whenever the donor does not incentivize buying, the donor cannot have a profitable deviation since incentivizing buying is not profitable for \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\), and moreover, \(\tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_t^D; w) = D_{t-\Delta} \leq \tilde{D}_+^\Delta(h_t^D; w)\) implies that every donor type \(w\) has a weakly larger set of feasible donations in the future under \(\tilde{D}_+^\Delta\) than under \(\tilde{D}_+^\Delta\). Each buyer is also best-responding as she buys after the same histories in both assessments, and whenever she does not buy, her belief is a mixture of beliefs after histories after which she did not buy in \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\).

Hence, in the following, we restrict attention to assessments \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\) that satisfy Equation 13 and Equation 12. The donor strategy in such assessments only depends on the reduced history \(\mathcal{R}_{b^\Delta}(h_t^D; \Delta)\), so we can define \(\mathcal{D}(\tilde{h}_t^D; \Delta) := D_{\Delta} h_t^D\) for \(\tilde{h}_t^D = \mathcal{R}_{b^\Delta}(h_t^D; \Delta)\). Indeed, the platform-optimal equilibrium from Proposition 1 satisfies Equation 13.

**Step 2: Relaxed donor problem.**

Consider an arbitrary assessment \((\tilde{b}^\Delta, \tilde{D}_+^\Delta, \tilde{F}^\Delta)\) that satisfies Equation 13. Recall that, analogously to Proposition 1, we can define reduced histories, systems of probabilities \(\kappa(\tilde{h}_t^B; \Delta, w), \mathbb{P}(\tilde{h}_t^D, N_t; w)\), the mapping \(\mathcal{R}_{b^\Delta}\) that maps general histories to the corresponding reduced history, and \(\mathcal{D}(\tilde{h}_t^D; \Delta)\) the corresponding donation threshold for reduced history \(\tilde{h}_t^D\). In order to formulate the donor’s payoff, we write for \(t' \leq t\) that \(\tilde{h}_t^D \subseteq \bar{h}_t^D\) if \(\tilde{h}_t^D\) is a sub-history that leads to \(\bar{h}_t^D\). Then, let

\[
\mathcal{G}(\bar{h}_t^D) := \max_{\tilde{h}_t^D \subseteq \bar{h}_t^D, \; t' \leq t \; b_{t'} = 1} \mathcal{D}(\tilde{h}_t^D)
\]

be the cumulative donations after period \(t\) if the donor follows a donation strategy as specified in Equation 13, so that he donates in all periods \(t'\) in which the reduced history \(\tilde{h}_t^D\) dictates that \(b_{t'} = 1\).
The donor’s problem can be written as

\[
\max_{\mathbf{h}^{\Delta}(0; \omega), \omega, (\varphi(h_i^D)) \in \mathbb{R}^P_t, \mathbb{R}^\Delta_t} \sum_{h_i^{\Delta} \in S_i^{\Delta}(h_i^D)} \Delta \lambda \mathbb{E}^R \left[ \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w) \mathbb{I} \left( G - (N_{\Delta} + 1)p \leq W \right) \left( W - h_i^{\Delta} \right) \right] +
\]

\[
(1 - \Delta \lambda) \mathbb{E}^R \left[ \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w) \mathbb{I} \left( G - N_{\Delta}p \leq W \right) \left( W - h_i^{\Delta} \right) \right] +
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}^R \left[ \left( \mathbb{P}(h_i^{\Delta}; w) - \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w) \right) \mathbb{I} \left( G - N_{\Delta}p \leq W \right) \left( W - h_i^{\Delta} \right) \right],
\]

subject to \( \mathbb{P}(0; w) = 1 \), Equation \( \mathbb{P} \), Equation \( \mathbb{P} - t \), and for all \( h_i^D \in \mathcal{H}_i^D, t \in \mathbb{T}, N_t \in \mathbb{N}, w \in [0, \infty) \) Equation Buyer IC, and given

\[
d_t(h_i^D; w) := \sum_{h_i^{\Delta} \in S_i^{\Delta}(h_i^D)} \Delta \lambda \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w) \mathbb{I} \left( G - (N_{\Delta} + 1)p \leq w \right) \left( w - h_i^{\Delta} \right) +
\]

\[
(1 - \Delta \lambda) \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w) \mathbb{I} \left( G - N_{\Delta}p \leq w \right) \left( w - h_i^{\Delta} \right) +
\]

\[
(\mathbb{P}(h_i^{\Delta}; w) - \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w)) \mathbb{I} \left( G - N_{\Delta}p \leq w \right) \left( w - h_i^{\Delta} \right),
\]

we can formulate a donor incentive compatibility constraint for all \( h_i^{\Delta} \in \mathcal{H}_i^D \)

\[
d_t(h_i^{\Delta}, 0, N_{\Delta}; w)) < \Delta \lambda d_t(h_i^{\Delta}, 1, N_{\Delta} + 1; w)) + (1 - \Delta \lambda) d_t(h_i^{\Delta}, 1, N_{\Delta}; w)) \Rightarrow \kappa(h_i^{\Delta}, 1; w) = \mathbb{P}(h_i^{\Delta}; w).
\]

(Donor IC)

This donor IC constraint puts a lower bound on donations as it imposes that the donor must donate whenever it is optimal to do so, but does not impose that the donor does not donate if it is optimal not to donate. Hence, this donor problem is a relaxed maximization problem.

We denote a solution to the above problem by \( \kappa^{**} \) and \( \left( (\varphi(h_i^D, 1))_{h_i^D \in \mathcal{H}_i^D} \right)_{t \geq 0} \). Recall that the solution that we presented to the platform’s relaxed problem was denoted \( \kappa^* \).

**Step 3: Solution to the relaxed problem**

Next, we show the following two statements:

i) Any solution of this relaxed problem must satisfy in Equation PT-\( \kappa \) with Equation \( \bar{D}^\Delta \)-Region;
ii) $\kappa_\Delta$ as in Equation PT-$\kappa$ with $\tilde{D}^\ast((\mathbb{P}(\hat{h}_i^D; w))_w, N_i) = \underline{W}((\mathbb{P}(\hat{h}_i^D; w))_w)$ is a solution.

Given these two statements, it follows immediately that in the limit as $\Delta \to 0$, the outcome is unique by the proof of Proposition 1.

Analogously to the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the solution must satisfy Equation PT-$\kappa$ with ($\tilde{D}^\ast$-Region) by contradiction. Consider an arbitrary solution $\kappa^\ast_\Delta$, corresponding $\mathbb{P}^{\ast\ast}$ and $\{(\mathbb{P}(\hat{h}_i^D, 1))_{\hat{h}_i^D \in X^D_i} \}_{i \geq 0}$ that does not satisfy Equation PT-$\kappa$ with ($\tilde{D}^\ast$-Region). Consider the latest period $\tilde{t}$ in time after which Equation PT-$\kappa$ with ($\tilde{D}^\ast$-Region) is satisfied for all histories, and consider a period $\tilde{t} - \Delta$ history $\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}$ such that $\kappa^\ast(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; w)$ does not satisfy Equation PT-$\kappa$ with ($\tilde{D}^\ast$-Region). Then, the probability of success conditional on reaching history $\hat{h}_i^D = (\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1)$ given by $\frac{q(\hat{h}_i^D, 1, N_i + 1; w)}{\kappa(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; w)}$ is increasing in $w$ and independent of the choice of $\kappa(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; w)$. We can also again define $c(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}) := \int \kappa^\ast(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; W) d F_0(W)$. Note that by Equation Donor IC, it must be for $t \geq \tilde{t}$, $\tilde{D}^{\ast\ast}(\hat{h}_i^D) = \underline{W}((\mathbb{P}(\hat{h}_i^D; w))_w)$.

Further, by Equation Donor IC,

$$\tilde{D}^{\ast\ast}(\hat{h}_i^D) = \min \{ \tilde{D}^\ast(\hat{h}_i^D) \mid d_{\hat{h}_i^D}(\hat{h}_i^D, 0, N_i; w) \geq \Delta \lambda d_{i + \Delta}(\hat{h}_i^D, 1, N_i + 1; w) + (1 - \Delta \lambda) d_i(\hat{h}_i^D, 1, N_i; w) \}$$

for all $w$ such that $\kappa(\hat{h}_i^D, 1; w) < \mathbb{P}(\hat{h}_i^D; w)$.

We now construct a $\kappa'_\Delta$ such that the donor’s objective function is higher than with $\kappa^\ast_\Delta$, while keeping $\int \kappa'(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; W) d F_0(W) \leq c(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta})$ in all histories. Analogously to Proposition 1, we can uniquely define $\underline{W}_c(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta})$ by

$$\int \underline{W}_c(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}; W) d F_0(W) = c(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}).$$

Since $\frac{q(\hat{h}_i^D, 1, N_i + 1; w)}{\kappa(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; w)}$ is increasing in $w$, $\kappa(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}, 1; w) = \mathbb{P}^{\ast\ast}(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}; w) 1(w \geq \underline{W}_c(\hat{h}_{\tilde{t} - \Delta}))$ satisfies Equation Buyer IC. We set $\kappa'(\hat{h}_i^D; w) := \kappa^\ast(\hat{h}_i^D; w)$ for all histories $\hat{h}_i^D$ at $t < \tilde{t} - \Delta$.
and all histories $\hat{h}_t^D \notin \tilde{H}(\tilde{h}_t^{i-\Delta})$, $t \geq \tilde{i} - \Delta$. Further, let

$$\kappa'(\tilde{h}_t^{i-\Delta}, 1; w) := \begin{cases} \mathbb{P}^*(\hat{h}_t^{i-\Delta}; w) & \text{for } w \geq W_c(\hat{h}_t^{i-\Delta}) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and for histories $\hat{h}_t \in \tilde{H}(\tilde{h}_t^{i-\Delta})$ where $t > \tilde{i} - \Delta$, we set $\kappa'(\hat{h}_t^D; w) := \mathbb{P}(\hat{h}_t^D; w)_{\tilde{F}(\tilde{h}_t^{i-\Delta}; w)}$ so that all constraints remain satisfied and the transition probabilities remain unchanged. Further, the lowest donation amount by Equation Donor IC is then

$$\tilde{D}'(\tilde{h}_t^D) = W_c(\hat{h}_t^{i-\Delta}).$$

In the objective function, this $\kappa'$ achieves states with higher $N_{T-\Delta}$ more frequently and $\tilde{D}'(\tilde{h}_t^D) < \tilde{D}^*(\hat{h}_t^D)$, so $\kappa'$ yields strictly higher donor payoffs than $\kappa^{**}$. Thus, any solution $\kappa^*_\Delta$ must satisfy Equation PT-$\kappa$ with $\tilde{D}^*$-Region almost surely.

**Step 4: Implementation by equilibrium**

We have already shown in Proposition 1 that $(\kappa^*_\Delta(0; w))_w$ is induced by the constructed assessment and established that the wealth threshold $D^\Delta(N, u)$ corresponds to $W(\tilde{h}_t^D)$ if there is a history $h_t^{D,\Delta}$ with $R_{b\Delta}(h_t^{D,\Delta}) = \tilde{h}_t^D$ and $u = T - t$, $N_t = N$. This concludes the proof.

### A.5 Proof of Proposition 4 (Buyer-Preferred Equilibrium)

Finding an equilibrium that maximizes the sum of buyer surplus is a complex problem since each buyer’s decision has externalities both on past buyers who have pledged already, and future buyers. We separately construct for sufficiently small period length $\Delta$ a PT equilibrium that yields higher buyer surplus than the success-maximizing and one that yields higher surplus than the success-minimizing equilibrium outcomes.

We start with the construction of a PT equilibrium with higher buyer surplus than the success-minimizing equilibrium. First, note that if the realized donor valuation was known
to be \( w \in [G-2p, G-p) \), then the campaign requires exactly two buyer pledges to succeed. Since the second buyer can always lead the campaign to succeed, the first buyer pledges if and only if \( (v - p)(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta}) = v_0 \). Conditional on such a \( W \), buyer surplus is maximized if the first buyer pledges if

\[
(v - p)(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta}) - v_0 + (v - p - v_0)\lambda u \geq 0 \quad \iff \quad \frac{(1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta}}{1 + \lambda u} \leq 1 - \frac{v_0}{v - p}
\]

because the expected number of arrivals in \( u \) periods is \( \frac{u}{\lambda} \Delta \lambda \). Denote the smallest \( u \in \mathbb{U}^\Delta \) such that the above inequality is satisfied \( \bar{u} \), i.e., the inequality is equivalent to \( u \geq \bar{u} \) (noting that \( \frac{(1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta}}{1 + \lambda u} \) is decreasing in \( u \)). Note that \( \xi_2^\Delta (G-2p) > \bar{u} \) because \( \xi_2^\Delta (G-2p) \) solves \( (v - p)(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta}) = v_0 \). We define a donation threshold \( \bar{D}_\epsilon^\Delta \) as follows:

- \( \bar{D}_\epsilon^\Delta (N, u) := \bar{D}^\Delta (N, u) \) for \( N > 0 \), and for \( N = 0 \) with \( u \in [0, \bar{u}) \cup [\xi_2^\Delta (G-2p), \infty) \),
- \( \bar{D}_\epsilon^\Delta (0, u) := \bar{D}^\Delta (0, u) - \epsilon = G - p - \epsilon \) for \( u \in [\bar{u}, \xi_2^\Delta (G-2p)] \).

Consider a sufficiently small \( \Delta > 0 \). Then, the PT assessment with donation threshold \( \bar{D}_\epsilon^\Delta (N, u) \) for small \( \epsilon > 0 \) still defines an equilibrium: All buyers’ incentives to pledge except the ones for a first buyer arriving at \( u \in [\bar{u}, \xi_2^\Delta (G-2p)] \) do not change. If the first buyer arrives at \( u \in [\bar{u}, \xi_2^\Delta (G-2p)] \), and the donor has wealth \( W \geq G - p - \epsilon \), then the donor can contribute \( G - p - \epsilon = \bar{D}_\epsilon^\Delta (0, u) - \epsilon \) and incentivize the buyer to pledge. Indeed the probability of success is simply a truncation of \( F_0 \) at \( G - p - \epsilon \) which is close to 1 for small \( \epsilon \), so

\[
(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta}) + (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{u/\Delta} \frac{1 - F_0(G - p)}{1 - F_0(G - p - \epsilon)} \geq v_0.
\]

If the donor has valuation \( W < G - p - \epsilon \), then the first buyer does not want to contribute as she knows that \( W < G - p \), by definition of \( \xi_2^\Delta (G - p) > \xi_2^\Delta (G-2p) \). Furthermore, by definition of \( \bar{u} \), this PT equilibrium makes buyers collectively better off.
Next, we construct a PT equilibrium with higher buyer surplus than the success-maximizing equilibrium. We define a donation threshold $D^\Delta_{\epsilon, \delta}$ for small $\epsilon > 0$, $\delta > \Delta$ as follows:

- $D^\Delta_{\epsilon, \delta}(N, u) := D^\Delta(N, u)$ for $N > 0$ and $(N, u) = (0, u)$ with $u \geq \delta$, and
- $D^\Delta_{\epsilon, \delta}(0, u) := D^\Delta(0, u) + \epsilon$ for $u < \delta$.

This defines a PT equilibrium because the incentive to pledge only changes if the first buyer arrives in $[0, \delta)$ and if the donor valuation is in $W \in [D^\Delta(0, u), D^\Delta(0, u) + \epsilon)$. The probability of success in the success-maximizing equilibrium satisfies

$$\pi^\Delta(0, D^\Delta(0, u), u) = \frac{v_0}{v - p},$$

so if buyers knew $W \in [D^\Delta(0, u), D^\Delta(0, u) + \epsilon)$, then the probability of success is smaller than $\frac{v_0}{v - p}$ for sufficiently small $\epsilon$, so it is optimal for the buyer not to pledge. If $W \geq D^\Delta(0, u) + \epsilon$, the donor can keep incentivizing buyers to pledge in states $(0, u), u < \delta$.

Furthermore, the equilibrium outcome of this PT equilibrium yields higher buyer surplus than the success-maximizing equilibrium since if $W \in [D^\Delta(0, u), D^\Delta(0, u) + \epsilon), N = 0$ and $u < \delta$, then contributing creates collective buyer surplus of less than

$$(v - p)(1 - (1 - \Delta \lambda)^{\delta/\Delta}) + (v - p)\lambda \delta \xrightarrow{\Delta \to 0} (v - p)(1 - e^{-\lambda \delta} + \lambda \delta)$$

and not contributing a surplus of $v_0(1 + \lambda \delta)$. Hence, for $\delta$ sufficiently small (and $\Delta$ sufficiently small), there is a PT equilibrium with higher buyer surplus than the surplus-maximizing equilibrium.
Aiming for the Goal: Online Appendix

B Proof of Lemma 6

(a) Induction start ($j \leq 1 \iff D \geq G - (N + 1)p$): For $j \leq 1$ and $x = (N, D, u)$ with $M(D) - N \leq 1$, it is immediate that the point-wise limits in (8) exist and are given by

$$b(x) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} b^{\Delta}(N, D, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\Delta) \equiv 1 \quad D_{+}(x; w) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^{\Delta}(N, D, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\Delta; w) = D$$

$$\xi_{j}(w) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \xi^{\Delta}_{j}(w) \equiv 0 \quad F(w; x) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} F^{\Delta}

\left(w; (N, D, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\Delta)\right) = \frac{f_{0}(w) - f_{0}(D)}{1 - f_{0}(D)} 1(\Delta \geq D),$$

where $\left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\Delta$ is the smallest multiple of $\Delta$ that is larger than $u$. Further, $\pi(x) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi^{\Delta}(N, D, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\Delta) = 1$ uniformly in $D \geq G - (N + 1)p$ and $u$.

(b) Induction hypothesis ($j - 1$): We assume that the point-wise limits (8) exist for all $x = (N, D, u)$ with $N \geq M(D) - (j - 1)$ and $j' \leq j - 1$, where for $w < G - p$:

$$\pi(M(w) - j', w, \xi_{j}(w)) = \frac{v_{0}}{v - p}.$$

Further, assume that the point-wise limit $D(N, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^{\Delta}(N, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\Delta)$ exists for $u \leq \xi_{j-1}(G - (N + j - 1)p)$. If $\pi(N, 0, u) < \frac{v_{0}}{v - p}$, then $D$ is strictly decreasing in $N$ and $u$, and

$$\pi(N, D(N, u), u) = \frac{v_{0}}{v - p}.$$  

Further, the uniform limit in $D \geq G - (N + j - 1)p$ and $u$, $\pi(N, D, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi^{\Delta}(N, D, u)$, exists and is equal to

$$\mathbb{E}^{\hat{h}} \left[ \max\{u - \xi_{M(W) - (N + 1)}(W)\} \right] \left[ \lambda e^{-\lambda s} \pi \left( N + 1, \max\{D, D(N + 1, u - s]\}, u - s \right) d s \mid W \geq d \right].$$  

Finally, $\pi(N, D, u)$ is strictly increasing in $N, D, u$. 

1
(c) **Induction step** \((j−1 \rightarrow j, j ≥ 2)\): Consider a state \((N, D, u)\) with \(N ≥ M(D)− j\), i.e.,

\[ G−(N + j)p ≤ D. \]

L.1) **Uniform convergence (in** \(D\) **and** \(u\)) of \(\tilde{\pi}^{\Delta}(N, D, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor)\) for \(D ≥ G−(N + j)p\):

Recall that the auxiliary probability of success is given by

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \mathbb{E}^{F_0} \left[ \max \left\{ \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor − \frac{\xi_{j-1}(D)}{\Delta} + \frac{1}{\nu−p} \left( \frac{\Delta}{\nu} − 1 \right) \right\} \mathbb{I}(\Delta \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor − 1) \geq \frac{\xi_j(D)}{\Delta} \mathbb{I}(\Delta \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor − 1) \right| W ≥ D \right],
\]

where \(j := M(D)− N ≤ j\). The uniform convergence of \(\pi^{\Delta}(N + 1, D, u')\) in \(D\) (by the induction hypothesis) and the Arzelà-Ascoli Theorem imply that the family of functions \(D ↦ \pi^{\Delta}(N + 1, D, u)\) is equicontinuous with respect to \(\Delta\). Hence, we may replace \(\pi^{\Delta}\) by \(\pi\). Finally, because \(\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \xi_j^{\Delta}(w) = \xi_j(w)\), the dominated convergence theorem allows us to conclude that

\[
\tilde{\pi}_j(N, D, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \tilde{\pi}^{\Delta}(N, D, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor) = \mathbb{E}^{F_0} \left[ \int_0^{\max\left\{ u−\xi_{N+1}(W)−(W), 0 \right\}} e^{-\lambda s} \mathbb{I}(u−s ≥ \xi_j(D)) + \frac{1}{\nu−p} \mathbb{I}(u−s < \xi_j(D)) \right] ds \bigg| W ≥ D \bigg].
\]

Note that \(\tilde{\pi}^{\Delta}(N, D, \left\lfloor \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rfloor)\) indeed converges uniformly in \(D ≥ G−(N + j)p\) for fixed \(u\) because the sum is bounded by one, \(F_0\) is (uniformly) continuous on \([0, G]\), and \(F_0(G) < 1\). Then, since

\[
\pi(\underbrace{M(D)−(j−1)}_{N+1}, D, \xi_{j−1}(D)) = \frac{\nu_0}{\nu−p},
\]

for \(u' < \xi_j(D)\), \(D < D(N + 1, u')\) \(\pi(N + 1, D(N + 1, u'), u') = \frac{\nu_0}{\nu−p}\) and for \(u' ≥ \)

2
Point-wise convergence of $\xi_{j-1}(D)$, $D \geq D(N + 1, u')$. Hence, we have:

\[
\hat{\pi}(N, D, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \hat{\pi}^\Delta(N, D, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta) = \mathbb{E}_W^{D_0} \left[ \sum_{v=0}^{\max\{u - \xi_M[w] - (N + 1)[w], 0\}} \lambda e^{-\lambda v} \right].
\]

(15)

L.2) Continuity and strict monotonicity of $\hat{\pi}$ in $D \geq G - (N + j)p$ and $u$: First, $\hat{\pi}(N, D, u)$ is continuous in $D$ and $u$ because $\xi_j(N + 1, D, u)$ is continuous in $D$ and $u$, $D(N + 1, u)$ is continuous in $u$ by the induction hypothesis and because $F_0$ is continuous.

Furthermore, $\hat{\pi}_j(N, D, u)$ is strictly increasing in $D \geq G - (N + j)p$ because $\hat{\pi}(N + 1, D, u)$ is weakly increasing in $D$ by the induction hypothesis and $\frac{1}{1 - F_0[D]}$ is strictly increasing.

Now the integrand is strictly positive as long as $u > \xi_{M(w)} - (N + 1)(w)$. Hence, $\hat{\pi}(N, D, u)$ is strictly increasing in $u > \xi_{M(w)} - (N + 1)(w)$ because $\hat{\pi}_j(N + 1, D, u)$ is weakly increasing in $u$ by the induction hypothesis and because $u - \xi_{M(w)} - (N + 1)(w)$ is strictly increasing in $u$.

L.3) Point-wise convergence of $D^\Delta(N, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta)$ and $D^\Delta_{+j}(N, D, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta; W)$: First, note that if $\hat{\pi}^\Delta_j(N, 0, \left\lceil \frac{v}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta) \geq \frac{v}{v - p}$ then $\hat{\pi}_j(N, 0, u) \geq \frac{v}{v - p}$ and hence, $D(N, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta(N, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta) = 0$. If $\hat{\pi}^\Delta_j(N, 0, u) < \frac{v}{v - p}$, then $\hat{\pi}(N, 0, u) \leq \frac{v}{v - p}$. Then, since $\hat{\pi}(N, D, u)$ is continuous and strictly increasing in $D$, there is a unique solution $D'(N, u)$ to

$$\hat{\pi}_j(N, D'(N, u), u) = \frac{v}{v - p}.$$  

Since $\hat{\pi}^\Delta(N, D, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta)$ converges uniformly, we have $D(N, u) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta(N, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta) = D'(N, u)$. It follows immediately that for all $u > 0$,

\[
D_+(N, D, u; w) := \lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta_{+j}(N, D, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta; w) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \min\left\{ \max\{D, D^\Delta(N, \left\lceil \frac{u}{\Delta} \right\rceil \Delta)\}, w \right\} = \min\{\max\{D, D(N, u)\}, w\}.
\]
L.4) **Point-wise convergence of** $b_j^\Delta(N,D,\left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right])$: Note that $b_j^\Delta(N,D,\left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]) = 1$ if $D \geq D^\Delta\left(N,\left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right] + 1\right)$ and $b_j^\Delta(N,D,\left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right] + 1) = 0$ otherwise. Since $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} D^\Delta\left(N,\left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right] + 1\right) = D(N,u)$, $b_j^\Delta(N,D,u)$ converges point-wise to

$$\lim_{\Delta \to 0} b_j^\Delta(N,D,u) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } D \geq D(M(D) - (j-1), u) \\ 0 & \text{if } D < D(M(D) - (j-1), u) \end{cases}.$$ 

L.5) **Point-wise convergence of** $\xi^\Delta_j(w)$ and $\pi(M(w) - j', w, \xi_j(w)) = \frac{v_0}{v-p}$: If $\tilde{\pi}^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, 0) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p}$, then it follows immediately that $\xi^\Delta_j(w) = 0$. If $\tilde{\pi}^\Delta(M(w) - j, w, 0) < \frac{v_0}{v-p}$, it follows that $\xi^\Delta_j(w) > 0$ and

$$\begin{cases} \tilde{\pi}^\Delta(M(w) - j, W, \xi^\Delta_j(w)) \geq \frac{v_0}{v-p} \\ \tilde{\pi}^\Delta(M(w) - j, W, \xi^\Delta_j(w) - \Delta) < \frac{v_0}{v-p}. \end{cases}$$

Furthermore, since $\tilde{\pi}(M(w) - j, w, u)$ is continuous and strictly increasing in $u$ for $u \geq \xi_{j-1}(W)$ and weakly increasing for $u < \xi_{j-1}(W)$, there is a unique solution $\xi'(w)$ to

$$\tilde{\pi}(M(w) - j, W, \xi'(w)) = \frac{v_0}{v-p}.$$ 

Hence, as $\Delta \to 0$, it must be that $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \xi^\Delta_j(w) = \xi'(w)$.

L.6) **Point-wise convergence of** $F^\Delta\left(w;\left[M(D) - j, D, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\right]\right)$: It follows immediately from point-wise convergence of $D^\Delta(M(D) - j, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right])$ that

$$F(w;(M(D) - j, D, u)) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} F^\Delta\left(w;\left[M(D) - j, D, \left[\frac{u}{\Delta}\right]\right]\right) = \begin{cases} \frac{R_i(w) - R_i(D)}{1 - R_i(D)} \mathbb{1}(w \geq D) & \text{if } D \geq D(M(D) - j, u) \\ \mathbb{1}(w \geq D) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$ 

L.7) $\pi(N,D,u)$ is strictly increasing in $N$, $D$, and $u$, as long as $G - (N+1)p > D \geq$
By Definition 3, $D(N, u) \geq D(N + 1, u - \Delta) \geq D(N + 1, u)$ and $D(N, u) \geq D(N = 1, u)$. An analogous argument to Lemma 2 iii) and iv) implies monotonicity in $N, D, u$.

L.8) $D(N, u)$ is strictly decreasing in $N$ and $u$, as long as $\pi(N, 0, u) < \frac{v_0}{v - p}$: Strict monotonicity of $D(N, u)$ in $N$ and $u$ follows from the strict monotonicity properties in $N, D,$ and $u$ of $\tilde{\pi}(N, D, u)$ and because $\tilde{\pi}(N, D, u) = \frac{v_0}{v - p}$ for $\pi(N, 0, u) < \frac{v_0}{v - p}$.

L.9) $\xi_j(w)$ is strictly increasing in $j$ as long as $\xi_j(w) > 0$.

Since $\pi(N + 1, w, \xi_{j-1} w) = \frac{v_0}{v - p}$ and $\pi(N, D, u)$ is strictly increasing in $N$, $\xi_j(w) > \xi_{j-1}(w)$.

**B.1 Social Learning**

A widely-mentioned benefit of crowdfunding is that it enables potential buyers to learn about product quality from the behavior of other buyers. In this section, we illustrate how social learning interacts with the signaling incentive of the donor by presenting a 2-period example. We highlight two insights. First, in the presence of social learning the donor is less effective in solving the coordination problem. Second, with social learning, a higher goal can yield a higher probability of success.

Let $q \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the unknown quality of the product. All players (the donor and buyers) share the prior that $q = 1$ with probability $\mu_0 \in (0, 1)$. We view $q$ as the inherent quality of the product or an unknown common value component of demand. In order to keep the example simple, we assume that the quality of the product only affects buyers’ payoffs but not the donor’s payoff. Buyers value a product of quality $q$ at $v(q) = v \cdot q$. So, if a buyer pledges, she gets payoff $vq - p$ if the campaign is successful and zero otherwise. If she does not pledge, she receives the outside option $v_0$. As before, the donor values a successful campaign at $w \sim F_0$. He receives a payoff $w - D_T$ if the campaign succeeds, and zero otherwise. In the following, we set $v = 3$, $p = 1$, $v_0 = 1$ and $1 - F_0(0.5) = 0.3$. For simplicity let us define $\phi := \frac{\mu_0}{1 - \mu_0}$. 

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In every period $t = 1, 2$, a buyer arrives with probability $\Delta\lambda = 0.9$. On arrival, each buyer privately observes a signal $s \in \{0, 1\}$. For simplicity, we consider a “bad news” signal process: A buyer who receives a bad signal $s = 0$ knows with certainty that quality is low ($q = 0$). Specifically, we set $\Pr(s = 1|q = 1) = 1$ and $\Pr(s = 1|q = 0) = 0.5$.

First, we consider $G = 1.5$, so that the campaign is successful if at least two buyers pledge or if one buyer pledges and the donor valuation $w$ is greater or equal to 0.5.\(^{24}\) A buyer in period $t = 2$ can socially learn only if period-1 buyer’s strategy is to pledge if $s = 1$ and not to pledge if $s = 0$. In that case, the posterior belief of a period-2 buyer if period-1 buyer has pledged is by Bayes’ rule

$$
\mu_2(1) = \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \cdot 0.25} = \frac{4}{4 + \phi^{-1}}
$$

and if no pledge occurred in period 1, it is

$$
\mu_2(0) = \frac{\mu_0 \cdot 0.1}{\mu_0 \cdot 0.1 + (1 - \mu_0)(0.1 + 0.9 \cdot 0.5) \cdot 0.5} = \frac{4}{4 + 11\phi^{-1}}.
$$

Let us assume that $\phi$ is such that $3\mu_2(1) \geq p + v_0 = 2$, so that the second buyer with a positive signal always pledges after a pledge in the first period. Let us further assume that $3\mu_2(0) < 2$, so that the second buyer never pledges if no pledge occurred in the first period. Hence, $2 \geq \phi^{-1} > 2/11$.

In the first period, a buyer with a positive signal pledges if she believes that given cumulative donations $D$, the donor valuations are distributed according to $w \sim F(\cdot|D)$ if

$$
\frac{4}{4 + 2\phi^{-1}} (0.9 + 0.1(1 - F(0.5|D)))(3 - 1) - \frac{2\phi^{-1}}{4 + 2\phi^{-1}} (0.45 + 0.55(1 - F(0.5|D))) \geq 1
$$

The left-hand side is decreasing in $1 - F(0.5|D)$ if $\phi^{-1} > 8/11$. Furthermore, let

$$
\phi^{-1} \leq \frac{2((0.9 + 0.1(1 - F_0(0.5))2 - 1)}{0.45 + 0.55(1 - F_0(0.5)) + 1} \approx 1.07
$$

\(^{24}\)The campaign can also succeed if no buyer pledges and the donor valuation exceeds the goal amount, but this case is irrelevant for strategic pledging incentives of buyers.
to make it worthwhile for the buyer to pledge absent donations. Hence, e.g., for $\phi^{-1} = 0.8 > 8/11$, in the success-maximizing equilibrium the donor optimally donates nothing until the deadline. The campaign succeeds if either $w > 1.5$ or if two buyers with a high signal realization arrive.

If the scope of social learning is small, e.g. $\phi^{-1} = 0.5 < 8/11$, then a PT equilibrium in which the donor donates just enough to make the next buyer buy exists. Hence, our analysis is robust to some amount of social learning.

The example highlights several new forces: First, increasing donations is less effective in increasing the probability of success because it also increases the probability of buying the product when the quality is actually low. Second, the benefit from pledging might even be decreasing in cumulative donations.

Finally, consider the same game with a goal amount $G = 1$. Then, a single buyer can guarantee success of the campaign. The first buyer with a positive signal does not want to pledge if

$$\frac{1}{1 + \phi^{-0.5}} v - p < v_0 \iff 1 < \phi^{-1}$$

i.e., for example if $\phi^{-1} = 1.1$. In that case, the second buyer will also not buy and the campaign fails with probability one. Hence, a lower goal amount can decrease the probability of success.

### B.2 Proof of Proposition 5 (Donation Dynamics of PT Equilibria)

i) **Claim:** $\mathbb{P}(N_T p + D_{T-\Delta} < G | \mathcal{S}_T) > 1 - \Delta \lambda$ and $\mathbb{P}(D_T = G - N_T p | \mathcal{S}_T) \geq 1 - \Delta \lambda$.

If the campaign has not succeeded by the beginning of the last period, then $D_{T-\Delta} + N_{T-\Delta} p < G$. Then, it can only be that $N_T p + D_{T-\Delta} \geq G$ if a consumer arrives in the last period which occurs with probability $\Delta \lambda$. Even if a consumer arrives, the campaign remains unsuccessful without a donation. If $N_T p + D_{T-\Delta} < G$, then the donor donates exactly such that $D_{T} = G - N_T p$ if his valuation $w$ is large enough. If
\( w \) is smaller, the campaign fails.

ii) **Claim:** \( \mathbb{P}(D_{\tau - \Delta} < G - N; p) = 1 \) if \( \tau < T \).

In any PT equilibrium with donation threshold \( D^\Delta \), the donor never donates more than \( \max\{D, D^\Delta(N, u)\} \) at \( u > \Delta \), where \( D^\Delta(N, u) < G - (N + 1)p \). Thus, if the campaign succeeds for \( u > \Delta \), it must be due to a purchase.

iii) **Claim:** \( D^\Delta(N, u + \Delta) \geq D^\Delta(N + 1, u) \)

This is simply Condition i) in Definition 3 of PT assessments.

iv) **Claim:** For any PT equilibrium with goal \( G \) (deadline \( T \)), there exists a PT equilibrium for the game with goal \( G' < G \) (with deadline \( T' < T \)) with higher (lower) \( D^\Delta(0, T) \).

First, note that a donation threshold can be constructed independent of \( T \), where \( T \) does not affect incentives—only the time remaining is relevant. Hence, monotonicity of a PT threshold \( D^\Delta(N, u) \) in \( u \) implies that \( D^\Delta(0, T) \) is weakly decreasing in \( T \), and for a PT equilibrium with time horizon \( T' < T \), the same donation threshold defines a PT equilibrium where \( D^\Delta(0, T') \geq D^\Delta(0, T) \).

Next, consider a PT equilibrium of a game with goal \( G \) with donation threshold \( D^\Delta(N, u) \). Then, for a contribution game with goal \( G' = G - np - \epsilon < G \), \( \epsilon < p \), we can define a PT equilibrium donation threshold \( D^\Delta'(N, u) = D^\Delta'(N + n, u) \) which maintains equilibrium conditions. Since \( D^\Delta(N, u) \) is decreasing in \( N \), \( D^\Delta'(0, T) < D^\Delta(0, T) \).

v) **Claim:** Given donor realizations \( w > w' \), if a campaign is unsuccessful for both \( w \) and \( w' \), then the failure time \( \iota \) is larger for \( w \) than for \( w' \).

We can write the failure time of a campaign in a PT equilibrium as \( \iota = \min_j \{ \tau_j \geq 0 \mid W < D^\Delta(j, T - \tau_j) \} \). Hence, it follows immediately that a donor with valuation \( w \) fails later than a donor with valuation \( w' \).
vi) **Claim:** In success-minimizing PT equilibria, all donations are at least $p$.

This follows immediately from the definition of the success-minimizing threshold $\overline{D}(N, u)$ in Section 3.4.

### B.3 Proof of Proposition 6 (General Properties of PT Equilibria)

Consider a contribution game with goal $G$ and deadline $T$ and a PT equilibrium of the game. Using the same argument to Proposition 5 iv), we can find a PT equilibrium donation threshold for a contribution game with goal $G' < G$ (deadline $T' < T$). Then, given the same realization of arrivals and donor’s valuation, the campaign will always succeed in the PT equilibrium with goal $G'$ (deadline $T'$) when it succeeds with goal $G$ (deadline $T$). Thus, the probability of success is higher (lower) in a campaign with goal $G'$ (deadline $T'$).
C Data Appendix

C.1 Additional Tables and Figures

In Figure 13 we show Kickstarter promotions through “A Project We Love.” This is a label attached by Kickstarter to select campaigns. In the left panel, we show when the labels are applied. In the right panel, we show purchasing rates for campaigns that receive the label early, receive the label at some point before the deadline, and never receive the label. Campaigns that receive the label early on have the highest purchases. They also have a significant spike of purchases early on, which helps drive the initial spike in purchases observed in Figure 5.

Figure 13: Projects We Love, Timing and Buyer Contributions

(a) Timing

- Frequency
- Percent of Time Remaining (u)

(b) Buyer Contributions

- Not Loved
- Project We Love
- Project We Love - Early

Projects We Love is a designation assigned to campaigns by Kickstarter staff. These campaigns may be featured on the site homepage as well as advertised in emails. The left panel (a) presents a histogram of when the designation is applied, as a function of time remaining in the campaign. The right panel (b) presents average buyer revenue for three scenarios: (1) campaigns that never receive the designation, (2) campaigns that receive the designation after 10% of time has elapsed and (3) campaigns that receive the designation within the first 10% of time.

Table 4 presents the same summary statistics for the top four categories, as measured by the number of campaigns: design, film and video, music, and technology. The table shows there is rich heterogeneity in the types of campaigns and that donations are important across diverse categories. For example, music campaigns are twice as likely to succeed as technology campaigns. Music campaigns have one-fourth the average goal amount of technology campaigns. The table also shows that donations constitute at least 17% of total
Table 4: Top Category Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Film &amp; Video</th>
<th>Music</th>
<th>Technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Length</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
<td>(11.6)</td>
<td>(11.4)</td>
<td>(11.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal ($)</td>
<td>18973.5</td>
<td>16309.6</td>
<td>8400.8</td>
<td>34590.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29630.1)</td>
<td>(31955.2)</td>
<td>(17855.0)</td>
<td>(52438.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Rewards</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.1)</td>
<td>(5.7)</td>
<td>(6.0)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Revenue (per period)</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(379.8)</td>
<td>(325.4)</td>
<td>(179.0)</td>
<td>(364.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer Revenue (per period)</td>
<td>400.5</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>305.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2767.8)</td>
<td>(451.4)</td>
<td>(310.8)</td>
<td>(2107.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Donations at Deadline</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.6)</td>
<td>(29.8)</td>
<td>(29.4)</td>
<td>(33.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Donations of Goal</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(69.1)</td>
<td>(49.1)</td>
<td>(121.6)</td>
<td>(39.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Successful</td>
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<td>63.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Projects</td>
<td>4232</td>
<td>3280</td>
<td>3016</td>
<td>3168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Summary statistics for the top four Kickstarter categories, based on the number of campaigns within a category. Standard deviation reported in parentheses.

revenue for all four categories. Design has the lowest percentage of revenue from donations across all categories in the data. The categories with the highest fraction of donations are dance and journalism—with donations between 47-51% of total revenue.

To show that the changing composition of contributors is omnipresent, we investigate the percentage of campaigns that receive purchases and donations over time. Figure 14 plots the percentage of campaigns that see purchases or donations over time, for early-, middle-, and late finishers, and unsuccessful campaigns. In the bottom panels, we plot the percentages weighted by within campaign buyer/donor revenues. For example, if the early finishers contained a single campaign that experienced donations every period, the line would be horizontal at 100%. However, if total donations equaled $100 and $99 of
These figures show the percentage of campaigns that have donations or purchases over time, for 30 day campaigns. 30 denotes the campaign deadline. Four lines are shown: early finishers, middle finishers, late finishers and unsuccessful campaigns. The bottom panels are weighted by within-campaign revenue. For example, if a campaign receives donations every period, the top donation graph for this single campaign would be a horizontal line at 100. However, if 90% of donations in terms of dollars occur in the first period, the weighted graph would place 90% of the campaign weight at the first period with the remaining 10% allocated to the donations for the remaining periods.

Those donations occurred in the last period, the line would be close to zero except for the last period, where it would be close to 100%. Collectively, the figure shows that most campaigns receive purchases every period, but weighted by revenues, unsuccessful campaigns receive purchases mostly at the beginning of the campaign. The same pattern is true for donations, except that donations are less frequent than purchases. The bottom right graph shows the significance of donations for both late-finishing and unsuccessful campaigns.

We use the LASSO model to examine campaign probability of success. In Figure 15-(a), we plot the predicted probability of success for projects that end up failing. More
Figure 15: Logistic Regression: Probability of Success for Campaigns that Eventually Failed

Notes: (a) The probability of success for failed campaigns over time. Plotted is the mean project, the median campaign, and the 90th percentile of projects. The results suggest that more than half of projects have lower probability of success at the start. (b) A histogram of the last time a campaign had a probability of success greater than 10%. This shows that campaigns fail throughout time, with a large mass at the end. Patterns are similar for 5% as well as 1%. Campaigns are rounded to three-day bins.

than half of the campaigns fail early on, and the probability of success decreases over time for campaigns that start out with a positive probability of success. Figure 15-(b) shows a histogram of the last time in which unsuccessful campaigns had a probability of success greater than 10% (results robust to alternative thresholds). In our model, campaigns fail depending on the realization of arrivals and the realization of $W$. Hence, realizations can cause death to occur at any point in time. Note that Figure 15-(b) does not include campaigns that fail at $u = T$. Our analysis suggests campaigns that never had a significant chance to succeed represent 54% of all failed campaigns.

C.2 Bounding Donations

Our definition of a donation comes from contributors entering an amount in the donation box, or from contributors paying more than the reward price. However, some rewards may be better interpreted as donations. Examples include a low priced reward that approximates a thank-you, or an expensive reward that includes the product but also includes special recognition. The bias is in only one direction: we are possibly understating the magnitude
of donations on the platform. This is not a problem, per se, but we would like to investigate what role this plays in our results.

Given the number of projects and buckets per project, manually assigning a reward or part of a reward as a donation is infeasible. There are over 500,000 rewards in the data. Instead, we perform the following analyses. First, we assume the least expensive bucket represents a donation. Next, we assume the most expensive bucket represents a donation. Finally, we assume both the least and most expensive buckets constitute donations.

We reprocess the data and repeat the analyses. For brevity, we only show one result and describe the others. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show a comparison of the raw data with the three robustness exercises, replicating the analysis of Figure 5—purchase and donation revenue, as percentage, over time for early, middle, and late completing campaigns. The figure shows an intuitive result: as reward purchases are assigned as donations, the amount of revenue attributed to donations increases. However, the figure also shows that qualitatively, our key finding remains—donations spike at the deadline for late-completing campaigns. There are no noticeable spikes in donations for early- or middle-finishing campaigns. Our other empirical results are also qualitatively unaltered.

Figure 16: Robustness to Buyer Contributions over Time for Early-Middle-Late Campaigns

Note: Replication of Figure 5(b) using different definitions of donation. The left panel donates the origin version. Next, we assign the lowest priced bucket as donation. The following assigns the highest priced bucket to donations. Finally, the last panel moves both the lowest- and highest-priced buckets to donations.
Figure 17: Robustness to Donor Contributions over Time for Early-Middle-Late Campaigns

We also conduct robustness to our calculation of shipping costs. This is important because donations are determined after subtracting off shipping costs. If we understate shipping costs, we overstate donations. We reprocess all the data assuming all purchases are made from the country with the lowest, and then most expensive, shipping costs. Figure 18 recreates Figure 14, showing buyer and donor purchases for US, min-cost, and max-cost shipping, and confirms that our results are robust to the various estimates of shipping costs. We bound donations at the deadline to be between 25% and 30% under min- and max-cost shipping. In our baseline results, we estimate this to be 28.0%.
Figure 18: Robustness: Percentage of Projects that Receive Purchases/Donations over Time

These figures show the percentage of projects that have donations or purchases over time, for 30 day projects. 30 denotes the campaign deadline. Four lines are shown: early finishers, middle finishers, late finishers and unsuccessful campaigns. The weighted panels are weighted by within-project revenue.