- Abstract
-
The neoclassical model of discrimination is reformulated as a behavioral model that replaces the disconnected agencies of the taste model with agents’ decisions to conform or not to a dominant group norm governing intergroup behavior. Decisions depend on beliefs about aggregate actions and the social benefit accruing from the endogenously determined group network approving one’s decision. Multiple equilibria describe intergroup employment patterns more empirically consistent with economies lacking effective government policies prohibiting discrimination (20th Century India and the US). Neoclassical discrimination (taste and statistical) becomes more empirically relevant where government institutions enforce non-discriminatory norms (21st Century India and the US). Unlike the neoclassical prediction of segregation without discrimination, no totally segregated equilibrium exists. Unlike the taste model where segregated groups receive identical marginal product wages, discriminatory job assignments in one norm-based equilibrium allocate high and low-skill M workers marginal productivity wages, while all m workers receive low-skill wages. Typical econometric techniques for estimating discrimination suggest current empirical models based on mean comparisons estimate group stratification, not discrimination, and likely underestimated 20th Century caste discrimination in India and discrimination of higher skilled Black and Asian American men in the US. The model applies to ethnic and sex discrimination.
- Document
Control
Number(s) - CFDP 2569
- Author(s)
- Gerald David Jaynes
- Publication Date
- October 2026
- JEL
Classification
Codes - D9, J7