Publication Date: July 2019
Revision Date: August 2020
Do new migration opportunities for rural households change the nature and extent of informal risk sharing? We experimentally document that randomly oﬀering poor rural households subsidies to migrate leads to a 40% improvement in risk sharing in their villages. Our model of endogenous migration and risk sharing shows that risky and temporary migration opportunities can induce an improvement in risk sharing enabling proﬁtable migration. Accounting for improved risk sharing, the migration experiment increased welfare by 12.9%. However, permanent declines in migration costs improve outside options for households and can lead to reductions in risk sharing. The short-run experimental results for migration subsidies can diﬀer from the longer-run impacts of a policy that permanently subsidizes migration.
Keywords: Informal Insurance, Migration, Bangladesh, RCT
JEL Classification Codes: D12, D91, D52, O12, R23