Publication Date: February 2017
Revision Date: March 2018
Given a game with uncertain payoﬀs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many diﬀerent information structures.
We provide an introduction into the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.
Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure
JEL Classification Codes: C72, D82, D83