Publication Date: February 2017
Revision Date: March 2017
Fixing a game with uncertain payoﬀs, information design identi.es the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoﬀ of an information designer. We show how this perspective uniﬁes existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many diﬀerent information structures.
Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure
JEL Classification Codes: C72, D82, D83