CFDP 2020

Team Production, Endogenous Learning about Abilities and Career Concerns


Publication Date: August 2015

Pages: 40


This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members’ effort and ability. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates’ performances in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market’s assessments, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.


Career concerns, Team incentives, Incentives to help, Incentives to sabotage

JEL Classification Codes:  D83, J24, M54