Publication Date: September 2013
Revision Date: April 2015
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game deﬁnes the set of actions, the set of payoﬀ states the payoﬀ functions and the common prior over the payoﬀ states. The information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game.
We characterize the set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub Bayes correlated equilibria.
We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual suﬀiciency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in imposing (incentive) constraints on behavior.
Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Suﬀiciency, Blackwell ordering
JEL Classification Codes: C72, D82, D83
See CFP: 1520