Publication Date: October 2011
Revision Date: July 2015
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually allocate their private goods among consumption, investment in production and maintenance of a depreciating public facility. The public facility is ﬁnanced either by voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC) or taxes. We ﬁnd that rates of taxation chosen by majority vote remain at an intermediate level, converging neither to zero nor to 100%, and the experimental economies sustain public goods at levels between the ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon optima. This contrasts with a rapid decline of public goods under voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC). Both the payoﬀ eﬀiciency and production of private goods are higher when taxes are set endogenously instead of being ﬁxed at the optimum level. When subjects choose between VAC and taxation, 23 out of 24 majority votes favor taxation.
Public goods, Experiment, Voting, Taxation, Evolution of institutions
JEL Classification Codes: C72, C91, C92, G10