Publication Date: July 2002
Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoﬀ diﬀerences and beliefs. Some “potential game” arguments (cf. Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Games. Econ. Behav. 14, 124-143) rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.
Best response equivalence; Duality; Farkas’ Lemma; Potential games
JEL Classification Codes: C72
Published in Games and Economic Behavior (November 2004), 49(2): 260-287 [DOI]