María Sáez Martí Publications

I propose a model in which workers experience fatigue over time and can restore productivity by taking breaks. Optimal schedules feature evenly spaced, full-recovery breaks; when breaks are costless, they should occur frequently, but switching costs make the optimal number finite. The model is embedded in a principal-agent framework with contractual frictions. When employers control the schedule, workers overwork; when workers self-manage, they overrest. Both lead to inefficiencies. These results shed light on the trade-offs in remote work arrangements, especially following COVID-19. The analysis highlights how control rights, incentive design, and recovery constraints interact—and why neither rigid supervision nor full autonomy guarantees efficiency.

I investigate the optimal timing and length of breaks in a model with fatigue. A break’s length determines the worker’s productivity once work is resumed. I show that all breaks should be identical, equally spaced and long enough to fully recover productivity. When taking breaks is costless, the higher the number of breaks the better. Otherwise, the optimal number is finite and those workers whose productivity falls more at the beginning of the day should take more breaks. Workaholics take their breaks too early and make them too short, from the employers’ viewpoint. The opposite is true for leisure-oriented workers.