Robust Mechanism Design

May 14-15, 2004

8:45 Breakfast
9:30 Stephen Morris (Yale University), Introductory Talk
11:00 Aviad Heifetz (Tel Aviv University), “On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design” (with Zvika Neeman, Boston University)
    Discussant: Phil Reny (Chicago University)
12:45 Lunch
2:00 Sergio Parreiras (University of North Carolina), “Correlated Information, Mechanism Design and Informational Rents
    Discussant: Zvika Neeman (Boston University)
3:15 Dirk Bergemann (Yale University), “Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces” (with Stephen Morris, Yale University)
    Discussant: Robert Serranno (Brown University)
5:00 Kim Sau Chung (Northwestern University) “Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms” (with Jeff Ely, Boston University)
    Discussant: Tim van Zandt (INSEAD)
7:00 Cocktails and Dinner at the Omni (Invitation only)
8:00 Breakfast
8:45 Andrew Goldberg (Microsoft Research) “Competitive Auctions” (Items 1, 3–6) (with Jason Hartline, Microsoft Research)
    Discussant: Muhamet Yildiz (Yale University)
10:00 Emre Ozdenoren (University of Michigan) “Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity” (with Subir Bose, University of Texas, Austin and Andreas Pape, University of Michigan)
    Discussant: Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)
11:30 Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania) “Implementation with Interdependent Valuations” (with Rich McLean, Rutgers University)
    Discussant: John Ledyard (CalTech)
12:45 Lunch
2:00 Jason Hartline (Microsoft Research) “Collusion Resistant Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Agents” (with Andrew Goldberg, Microsoft Research)
    Discussant: Sandeep Baliga (Northwestern University)
3:15 Luca Rigotti (Duke University) “Uncertainty in Mechanism Design” (with Pino Lopomo, Duke University) and Chris Shannon, UCLA Berkeley)
    Discussant: Dino Gerardi (Yale University)
6:00 Dinner at Bentara (Invitation only)