Workshop on Complexity in Economic Theory

September 12-14, 2003

9:30 Yishay Mansour (Tel-Aviv University), “Tutorial: Computational Complexity”
12:00 Lunch
1:30 Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania), “Complexity vs. Accuracy: A Complex Trade-off” AND “The Complexity of Contracts”
3:00 Craig Tovey (Georgia Tech), “A Positive and a Negative Application of Complexity to Voting Theory”
4:00 Joseph Halpern (Cornell), “Rational Secret Sharing and Multi-Party Function Evaluation”
9:30 Yishay Mansour (Tel-Aviv University), “Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria in Load Balancing”
11:00 Rahul Savani (LSE), “Long Lemke–Howson Paths”
12:00 Lunch
1:30 Sham Kakade (Penn), “Graphical Economics”
3:00 Christian Shelton (Stanford), “Compact Structured Game Representations”
4:00 Bernhard von Stengel (LSE), “Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria”
9:30 Moshe Tenneholtz (Technion), “Bundling Equilibrium: Economic Efficiency vs. Communication Efficiency in the VCG Mechanisms”
11:00 Ilya Segal (Stanford), “The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules”
12:00 Lunch
1:30 Joan Feigenbaum (Yale), “Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Interdomain Routing”
3:00 Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University), “Automated Mechanism Design”
4:00 Christos Papadimitriou (Berkeley), “Complexity Aspects of Game Theory”