Managing Strategic Buyers*

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November 17, 2008

Abstract

We consider the problem of a monopolist with an object to sell before some deadline, facing \( n \) buyers with independent private values. The monopolist posts prices but has no commitment power. We show that the monopolist can always secure at least the larger of the static monopoly profit and the revenue from a Dutch auction with a zero reserve price. When there are only a few buyers, her profits are higher than this bound, and she essentially posts unacceptable prices up to the very end, at which point prices collapse to a “reservation price” that exceeds marginal cost. When there are many buyers, the seller abandons this reservation price in order to more effectively screen buyers. Her optimal policy then replicates a Dutch auction, with prices decreasing continuously over time. With more units to sell, prices jump up after each sale.

*We thank Bruno Biais, Jeroen Swinkels and Rakesh Vohra for useful comments, and thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.
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Managing Strategic Buyers

1 Introduction

1.1 Revenue Management

The revenue management literature addresses the pricing of goods sharing three essential characteristics: (i) there is fixed quantity of resource for sale, (ii) the resource is perishable (i.e., there is a time after which it is valueless), and (iii) consumers have heterogeneous valuations. Revenue management is practiced in a variety of industries, including airlines, apparel, electricity, hotels, packaged vacations, pipelines, rental cars, and shipping.

The buyers in a standard revenue management model arrive sequentially and are perfectly impatient. Each buyer must be served immediately or forever lost, and the only relevant price from a buyer’s point of view is the current one. In contrast, this paper examines revenue management with strategic buyers. Who hasn’t wondered whether an airline ticket would be cheaper or more expensive tomorrow? How often must a retailer wonder whether she should purchase her winter line of clothing now, or wait in hopes of a better price?

This paper considers a monopolist with a single unit for sale, facing a fixed, known number of strategic buyers whose private valuations are drawn independently (and for several results, uniformly) from the unit interval. The seller can set a price in each of a finite number of instants. If the price is accepted by at least one buyer, the game ends, and otherwise the game continues until the next instant (if there is one). There is a terminal date after which the good has no value, if unsold. The seller cannot make commitments, in the sense that her sequence of prices must be sequentially rational. Nonetheless, the impending end of the game can effectively provide some commitment power. If there is only one instant, for example, then the seller has just one chance to set a price, which will be the static monopoly price. Our interest, however, concerns the case in which the time between successive offers, \( \Delta \), is very small: we believe that setting and reacting to prices takes time, but perhaps not very much time, and so follow the durable-goods literature in considering the limit \( \Delta \to 0 \).

It is often argued that the problem of revenue management with strategic buyers is equivalent to that of a durable-goods monopolist. Our first set of results, in Section 4,

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1See Talluri and van Ryzin [25] for an introduction to revenue management, and Gershkov and Moldovanu [14] for an extension to heterogeneous objects.

2Sequential arrivals play virtually no role with strategic buyers other than to complicate the calculations, and so we simply assume that the buyers are all present from the beginning. Similarly, discounting plays little substantive role once we have a finite horizon, and so we retain the standard revenue-management assumption of no discounting.

3Talluri and van Ryzin [25, p. 365], for example, contend that customers of seemingly perishable revenue-managed goods are unlikely to buy more than one unit during the life cycle of the product, making the product effectively infinitely lived. In addition, customers for such goods are exhausted over time. Most
shows that conclusions from the durable-goods literature definitely do not apply to revenue management. In particular, unlike a durable goods monopolist, a revenue-managing seller’s expected payoff does not tend to zero as price-revision opportunities become more frequent. Instead, the seller can always guarantee at least the static monopoly payoff. To see why, notice that a seller with \( k \) opportunities to revise prices must necessarily get a payoff at least as large as a seller with \( k - 1 \) such opportunities, since by charging a price above the choke price at the first opportunity, she can be sure that no consumer will accept it (independently of her continuation strategy), and hence that her overall payoff is at least as large as her continuation payoff. Iterating this argument, the seller’s payoff must be at least as large as her payoff with only a single opportunity to set prices, and hence at least as large as the static monopoly payoff.\(^4\)

Section 4 also provides an alternative lower bound—the seller earns at least as much as she would in an optimal auction with zero reserve price. This would be immediate if the seller could commit to a sequence of prices that finely partitions the range of buyers’ valuations. Indeed, this is the kind of strategy described by Wilson [26] in the case of a finite number of buyer valuations \( v_1 < v_2 < \cdots < v_n \) (see also Harris and Raviv [16]). This strategy consists of charging, with \( k \) instants to go, a price \( p_k \) for which a buyer with value \( v_k \) is indifferent between buying and delaying for one instant, so that it is optimal for the strategic buyer to behave myopically. However, not only might this strategy fail to be sequentially rational, but now the simple iterative logic applied in the previous argument breaks down. To see why, suppose the payoff with \( k - 1 \) types to go is at least as large as the payoff from the “Wilson” strategy. This says very little about the sequence of prices the seller will actually post. Therefore, when considering the seller’s outlook with one more pricing opportunity, and one more type \( v_k > v_{k-1} \), it is unclear whether the price that would make this higher type indifferent between accepting or not is at least as large as the price specified by the “Wilson” strategy. Nonetheless, we can prove this is the case, and doing so is the key to our result.

These results provide some information on payoffs but say little about the prices that are charged. Does the seller allow prices to drop to marginal cost, as in the case of a durable-goods monopoly or a zero-reserve-price auction, or does the seller effectively adopt a higher reservation price? Section 5 shows that the range of prices that are posted depends on the number of buyers. As long as there are at least two buyers, all prices are “serious,” that is, they are accepted with positive probability. If the buyers are sufficiently numerous, the seller

\(^4\)Notice that it does not suffice to simply exhibit a pricing strategy that, if followed, would yield the static monopoly payoff—such as sitting on the choke price until the last pricing opportunity. This strategy will typically fail to be sequentially rational.
sets a sequence of descending prices whose limiting value approaches zero as the number of
remaining instants grows large.\textsuperscript{5} In this case, the seller’s payoff is exactly equal to that of an
optimal auction with zero reserve price. The seller here has no difficulty “committing” to a
sequence of arbitrarily small price increments that allow perfect price discrimination, but is
unable to maintain a positive reserve price.

In contrast, if buyers are scarce, the seller sets a descending sequence of prices whose
limiting value is positive, effectively committing to a positive reserve price. However, the
cost of doing so is that sequential rationality compels the seller to lower prices in lumpy
chunks, imperfectly discriminating between buyers of different valuations. The result is a
payoff higher than that of a zero-reserve-price optimal auction, but not as high as the seller
could earn if she could shed the shackles of sequential rationality and simply commit to a
sequence of prices.

This provides a description of the \textit{values} of the prices that the seller posts, but does not
address the \textit{timing} of these offers. For example, does the price drop to marginal cost (with
many buyers) or to its terminal value (with few buyers) “in the twinkling of an eye,” as in
the Coase conjecture? Our last set of results, in Section 6, describes the price trajectory.
We study the limiting price path (as the length $\Delta$ of a pricing interval goes to zero), as
a function over $[0, 1]$, the normalized horizon. With few buyers, this limit is quite simple:
the price equals the choke price, except at the very end. That is, prices do collapse in the
twinkling of an eye, but only as time expires, and not to marginal cost. With many buyers,
prices come down to marginal cost, but they do so continuously over time. In the case of the
uniform distribution, this limiting price path is a power function of the remaining time. As a
benchmark, we show that the optimal price path with commitment is also a power function,
but this function involves higher prices and does not end up at marginal cost.

Section 6 also describes the extension of our analysis to the case of multiple objects
for sale. Here, declining prices designed to screen buyers are punctuated by price jumps
whenever an object is sold. We find that closed-form solutions become elusive as we move
beyond the case of a single object, just as the calculations can be tedious for the single-unit
case.

As a technical aside, it is worth pointing out that these limiting results could not have
been obtained if the analysis had been carried out in continuous time directly. This is not only
because the limiting paths are ill-defined with few buyers, but also because, in continuous
time, all price trajectories that are continuous, decreasing and onto are revenue-equivalent,
and the analysis could not distinguish among these. To put it differently, time would lose
its meaning in that case.

\textsuperscript{5}In the case of the uniform distribution, assumed here, the minimum number of buyers turn out to be
six.
1.2 The Literature

There are four related bodies of work. First, as we have noted, a large revenue management literature (e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin [25]) has examined the case of a seller who faces sequentially-arriving buyers. The standard assumption in this literature is that the buyers are myopic, i.e., they base their decision on a comparison of the prevailing price with their valuation. This removes all consideration of whether selling to all or some of the current marginal buyers has any effect on next period’s optimal price, a consideration that will play a prominent role in our analysis. In contrast, our buyers remain until the good is sold and are fully strategic, constantly trading off buying the good today or waiting for a chance to buy later at a lower price. As Besanko and Winston [4] argue, mistakenly treating forward-looking customers as myopic may have an important impact on revenue (in their example, the seller’s profit is more than halved as a consequence). Aviv and Pazgal [3] consider a model with scarce supply, forward-looking consumers, and a seller who cannot commit, but attention is restricted to two periods.

Second, the difficulties faced by a seller who cannot make commitments lies at the center of the durable-goods monopoly problem (e.g., Ausubel and Deneckere [2] and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson [15]). The durable-good setting differs from ours in its infinite horizon and, more importantly, in the fact that there are as many goods as buyers, with discounting rather than scarcity providing the driving force to make agreements. In our model with a finite horizon and no discounting, the seller can always do at least as well as waiting until the final period and setting the monopoly price, immediately generating considerably more commitment power than that enjoyed by a typical durable-goods monopolist. The scarcity of the good in our setting changes the issues surrounding price discrimination, with the impetus for buying early at a high price now arising out of the fear that another agent will snatch the good in the meantime, rather than discounting.

The central dilemma facing a durable-goods monopolist is the inability to commit to not lowering future prices. The seller would like buyers to purchase at the static monopoly price now, on the strength of the promise that no lower price will be forthcoming, but faces an irresistible temptation to lower prices once she has the chance. A similar phenomenon arises in the example we present in Section 2, in that a seller facing two or three buyers would

\[\text{\footnotesize 6}\] Several papers in this literature take into account the seller’s limited capacity, providing an analysis of how the option value of postponing a sale to myopic consumers affects optimal pricing (e.g., Bitran and Mondschein [5] and Gallego and van Ryzin [13]).

\[\text{\footnotesize 7}\] Kahn [17] introduces an element of scarcity within a period by examining a durable-goods monopolist with increasing costs, showing that this allows the seller to escape the zero-profit conclusion of the Coase conjecture. Similarly, a sufficiently small capacity constraint (a stylized form of increased costs) introduces scarcity within a period and allows positive profits. McAfee and Wiseman [21] show that capacity constraints have this effect even if the seller can choose to increase the capacity constraint in any period at a nominal cost. Cho [9] examines an alternative source of commitment, arising out of the assumption that the good deteriorates while held by the seller.
like to sell to type-\(v_3\) buyers first, promising to then set price \(v_2\). Unfortunately, once the \(v_3\)'s (if any) have purchased, the seller finds it optimal to set price \(v_1\) rather than \(v_2\). Unlike in the durable-goods monopoly, however, this feature is not intrinsic to our problem. Cases can arise (cf. our Supplementary Appendix) in which the seller’s difficulty is that she would prefer that future prices be much lower (and hence future demand brisk, in order to make current buyers more anxious to buy), but cannot commit to lowering them.

Third, our seller can be viewed as conducting a Dutch auction without commitment. McAfee and Vincent [20] and Skreta [24] examine a seller who conducts a sequence of auctions and a sequence of optimal mechanisms, respectively. As in our case, scarcity is of paramount importance. McAfee and Vincent examine an infinite horizon with discounting, focusing attention on the sequence of reserve prices set by the seller. As agents become more patient (or equivalently as the time between auctions decreases), the seller’s revenue converges to that of an optimal auction with a zero reserve price. The infinite horizon thus effectively precludes commitment to a reserve price. Skreta concentrates on a two-period model with discounting, finding that if buyers are symmetric, then it is optimal for the seller to conduct an auction in each period, with a reserve price that decreases across periods.

The most important difference between our analysis and that of McAfee and Vincent [20] or Skreta [24] is that the latter papers allow their sellers to commit to a mechanism within each period. Especially when allowing direct mechanisms, this makes it quite difficult to tell just what commitment power is allowed the seller. We typically interpret direct mechanisms not as literal descriptions of the interaction between seller and buyers, but as a way of analyzing an underlying indirect mechanism. Depending on the nature of the latter, allowing the seller to commit to a direct mechanism in each period may invest her with enormous commitment powers. For example, in the limit as the discount factor gets large, the sequential mechanisms problem become trivial—the seller should simply wait until the last period and implement an optimal mechanism. In contrast, our results remain robust to the introduction of discounting. As a result, we consider it important to take an indirect-mechanism approach that is specific about the actions available to the seller in each period. We must expect the results to be sensitive to the particular indirect mechanism chosen, of course, as repeated bargaining may give a different result than repeated price-posting, but we see no other way of examining commitment.\(^8\)

Finally, we postpone until Section 6.3 a discussion of how our work is related to Bulow and Klemperer [7].

\(^8\)For example, McAdams and Schwarz [19] examine the case of a single seller facing multiple buyers over an infinite horizon, where delay is costly for the seller but not the buyers. The buyers make offers for the object in each period while the seller decides only whether to accept an offer or proceed to the next period. They find that the seller fares worse than she would in an optimal auction unless her cost of delay is very high (allowing commitment to a first-price auction in the first period) or very low (allowing an English auction to be run over a sequence of periods).
2 An Example

This section illustrates our results with a simple example. Consider the seller of a single good facing buyers whose valuations are drawn from the set \( \{v_0, v_1, v_2, v_3\} \) with respective probabilities \( \{\rho_0, \rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3\} \), where

\[
\begin{align*}
v_3 &= 1.000 & \rho_3 &= 0.09 \\
v_2 &= 0.520 & \rho_2 &= 0.09 \\
v_1 &= 0.333 & \rho_1 &= 0.09 \\
v_0 &= 0 & \rho_0 &= 0.73
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

The seller’s payoff is the transfer she receives from the buyers (i.e., the good is valueless to the seller) while a buyer’s payoff is the difference between his valuation (if he receives the good) and the amount he pays the seller. Suppose further there are three periods. In each period, the seller names a price and the buyers then simultaneously accept or reject. The game ends with the good being allocated equiprobably among those accepting if there are any (with the winning buyer paying the posted price), and the process otherwise continues to the next period (if there is one). There is no discounting.

One buyer: Static monopoly. Suppose first there is only one buyer. One possibility for the seller is to set the price equal to \( v_3 \) in each period, i.e., to set the price sequence \((v_3, v_3, v_3)\), allowing the seller to sell the object at price \( v_3 \) if the buyer is type \( v_3 \) (making the innocuous assumption that indifferent buyers accept), with the object remaining unsold otherwise. Alternatively, the seller could set price sequence \((v_3, v_3, v_2)\) (or an equivalent sequence, such as \((v_3, v_2, v_2)\)), selling at price \( v_2 \) if the buyer is either type \( v_2 \) or \( v_3 \). Finally, the buyer might set the price sequence \((v_1, v_1, v_1)\) (or any of a number of equivalents, such as \((v_3, v_2, v_1)\)) and sell to the buyer at price \( v_1 \) no matter what the buyer’s type. Letting \( \pi_1(p, q, r) \) be the payoff from naming the price sequence \((p, q, r)\) when there is one buyer, the payoffs from these three price sequences are (with the inequality following from (1))

\[
\pi_1(v_2, v_2, v_2) = (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1))v_2 > \begin{cases} 
\pi_1(v_3, v_3, v_3) = (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2))v_3 \\
\pi_1(v_1, v_1, v_1) = (1 - \rho_0)v_1
\end{cases}
\]

9With only three possible nonzero valuations, additional periods are of no value to the seller.
10There are many other price sequences that also allow the seller to sell at price \( v_3 \), in which the last price equals \( v_3 \), and all previous prices are at least as high and rejected for sure.
11The seller might hope that a type \( v_3 \) buyer would accept one of the initial \( v_3 \) prices (or some such initial price higher than \( v_2 \)), with the seller then lowering the price to \( v_2 \) if the buyer rejects in order to sell at \( v_2 \) if the buyer is type \( v_2 \), but this is impossible with a single buyer. Anticipating the subsequently lower price, a buyer of type \( v_3 \) would simply wait for price \( v_2 \).
12Again, the fact that there is only one buyer ensures that attempts to charge higher prices to higher-type buyers would simply prompt the buyer to wait until price \( v_1 \) appears.
The seller should accordingly set price sequence \((v_2, v_2, v_2)\). The seller is effectively a static monopoly in this case, and the corresponding monopoly price is \(v_2\).

**Two buyers: Optimal reserve price.** Suppose now there are two buyers. We can calculate

\[
\pi_2(v_2, v_3, v_3) = (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^2)v_3 > \begin{cases} 
\pi_2(v_2, v_2, v_2) = (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^2)v_2 \\
\pi_2(v_2, v_1, v_1) = (1 - \rho_0^2)v_1
\end{cases},
\]

and hence the price path \((v_2, v_2, v_2)\) is now dominated by \((v_3, v_3, v_3)\) (and many other equivalent price paths). Equivalently, the static monopoly price is now \(v_3\) rather than \(v_2\). This reflects two straightforward and general results—the static monopoly price increases in the number of buyers, and the seller can always earn at least the static monopoly payoff. The finite horizon thus brings considerable commitment power.

Can the seller do better than \(\pi_2(v_3, v_3, v_3)\)? Perhaps. Because there are two buyers, the seller can now practice price discrimination. A buyer may purchase at a relatively high price, even knowing that the next price will be lower, if it is more likely that the buyer will obtain the good at the higher price. We see here the important role played by scarcity (in contrast to the standard Coase-conjecture formulation where the seller has as many goods as there are buyers).

One possibility is to set price \(v_3\) in the first period, rejected by all buyers, then a price \(p_3 \in (v_2, v_3)\) in the second period that is accepted by buyers of valuation \(v_3\), and then to set price \(v_2\) in the last period if \(p_3\) draws no acceptances. Why would a buyer accept \(p_3\) rather than waiting for \(v_2\)? Because only one buyer can receive the object. A buyer accepting price \(p_3\) faces competition only if the other buyer also has valuation \(v_3\), while waiting for price \(v_2\) raises the risk not only that a \(v_3\) competitor will grab the good, but that one will have to compete with a \(v_2\) competitor. There is then a price \(p_3 \in (v_2, v_3)\) which \(v_3\) buyers will accept. What makes us think this strategy is better than simply setting price \(v_3\)? We can do the relevant calculations (reproduced in the Supplementary Appendix), but can also appeal to another familiar result. The optimal reserve price in an auction is independent of the number of bidders (Krishna [18, pp. 25–26]). The reserve price is \(v_2\) with only 1 bidder, and hence the optimal strategy with any number of bidders involves a pricing sequence culminating in \(v_2\).

There is only one difficulty with the preceding paragraph’s argument. Because the seller cannot commit to subsequent prices, the presumption that the seller can set the sequence of prices \((v_3, p_3, v_2)\) requires that once the rejection of \(p_3\) has revealed there are no \(v_3\) buyers, price \(v_2\) (rather than \(v_1\)) is optimal. The sequential rationality condition is

\[
\left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^2\right)v_2 \geq \left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^2\right)v_1, \quad (2)
\]

13 We use \(p_j\) to denote a price accepted by buyer types \(v_j\) and above.
which fails (given (1)). Should the seller screen out the $v_3$ buyers in the penultimate period, her last move would be to set price $v_1$ rather than $v_2$.

All is not lost. The seller can set a price $p'_3 > p_3$ in the penultimate period, in response to which the $v_3$ buyers mix, some accepting and some rejecting. The possibility that a $v_3$ buyer has rejected $p'_3$ ensures that there are more buyers in the last period willing to pay price $v_2$ than would otherwise be the case, and the $v_3$ rejection probability in the penultimate period can be set so that the counterpart of (2) holds with equality in the final period, allowing the seller to rationally set price $v_2$.\footnote{Notice that $p'_3 > p_3$, because a rejecting buyer faces stiffer competition in the final period under price sequence $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$, making rejecting less attractive.}

Is this an optimal strategy for the seller? There are two obvious alternatives (as well as some other strategies that are easily shown to be suboptimal). The seller could still insist on price $v_3$ by choosing the price path $(v_3, v_3, v_3)$. The result that the optimal reserve price in an optimal auction is independent of the number of buyers does not tell us that pricing sequence $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$ dominates $(v_3, v_3, v_3)$, since we lack the ability to commit to the optimal sequence of prices $((v_3, p_3, v_2))$ on which this result rests. However, one can calculate that $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$ is indeed superior to $(v_3, v_3, v_3)$. Alternatively, the seller may choose a strategy $(p''_3, p''_2, v_1)$, inducing all of the $v_3$ buyers to accept in the first period, then all of the $v_2$ buyers in the second period, and finally all of the $v_1$ buyers in the final period.\footnote{Why doesn’t this conflict with our contention that the seller cannot commit to price $v_2$ once she has learned there are no $v_3$ buyers? Because the price $p''_3$ in this case fails short of $v_2$ and occurs in the penultimate period (rather than equalling $v_2$ and being set in the final period), and is chosen to make a buyer of type $v_2$ just indifferent between accepting $p''_3$ and rejecting to take his chances on getting the good at price $v_1$.} Once again, we can calculate that price path $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$ is superior.

With two buyers, the seller thus chooses prices $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$. In weighing the choice between $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$ and $(p''_3, p''_2, v_1)$, the seller faces a trade-off. The price sequence $(p''_3, p''_2, v_1)$ takes the seller below the optimal reserve price, diminishing her payoff in the process. On the other hand, it allows her to more precisely discriminate between buyer types $v_2$ and $v_3$ (than does $(v_3, p'_3, v_2)$), since all the $v_3$ buyers are induced to buy at price $p''_3$ rather than some slipping through the first screen to be lumped with the $v_2$ buyers. With two buyers, this trade-off between maintaining a reservation price and being able to more finely discriminate between buyers is resolved in terms of the former.

\section*{Three buyers: Price discrimination.}

Now let us go one more step to consider the case of three buyers. The static monopoly price is still $v_3$ (as expected, since the static monopoly price can only increase in the number of bidders), and the price sequence $(v_3, v_3, v_3)$ gives this payoff. The optimal reserve price remains $v_2$, ensuring that the price sequence $(v_3, p_3, v_2)$, with $p_3$ set so that all type-$v_3$ buyers attempt to purchase at $p_3$, is superior to $(v_3, v_3, v_2)$. However, reproducing the counterpart of (2) for three buyers shows that we again have a commitment problem. The price $v_2$ is no longer optimal once buyers of type $v_3$ have been
screened out, ensuring that \((v_3, p_3, v_2)\) is not feasible for a seller without commitment power. The seller has two remaining choices. She can set the price sequence \((v_3, p'_3, v_2)\), with \(p'_3\) calculated so that buyers of type \(v_3\) purchase with just the right probability required to make price \(v_2\) optimal should \(p'_3\) be rejected.\(^{16}\) This sequence preserves the optimal reserve price but lumps some \(v_3\) buyers together with \(v_2\) buyers. Alternatively, the seller can set prices \((p''_3, p''_2, v_1)\), with all buyers of type \(v_3\) purchasing at price \(p''_3\), sacrificing the reserve price in order to perfectly screen \(v_2\) and \(v_3\) buyers. Calculations analogous to those for the two-buyer case show that price schedule \((p''_3, p''_2, v_1)\) yields a higher payoff than does either \((v_3, p'_3, v_2)\) or \((v_3, v_3, v_3)\). When \(n = 3\), higher buyer types are more likely, making it less likely that the reserve price is relevant and more important to finely screen high-type buyers. These contending forces thus now tip in favor of better price discrimination and hence price sequence \((p''_3, p''_2, v_1)\).

Our general model allows a continuum of possible buyer valuations. The seller will attempt to screen these buyers as finely as possible by setting each period’s price lower than its predecessor. If the terminal price is allowed to approach zero (as the length or a pricing period decreases, and hence the price sequence lengthens), these prices can be set arbitrarily close together, allowing very fine price discrimination among the buyers at the cost of surrendering on the reserve price. If the terminal price is positive, there is necessarily some lumpiness in the price discrimination—the final period poses a monopoly pricing problem leading to a terminal price that is necessarily bounded below the penultimate price (if the former is positive), with similar calculations applying to preceding periods. A positive reserve price is thus purchased only at the cost of lumpy price discrimination. Reserve prices are relatively important when there are few buyers and price discrimination relatively important when there are many buyers, leading to our results.

3 The Model

We consider a dynamic game between a single seller, with one unit for sale, and \(n\) buyers. The seller has a unit interval of time in which to sell the good, after which it is valueless. The seller can post a price at each time \(\{\Delta, 2\Delta, \ldots, 1\}\) (restricting attention throughout to values of \(\Delta\) that divide 1 without remainder). We can thus think of the seller as facing a finite horizon of length \(T_\Delta = \frac{1}{\Delta}\). Since our arguments will typically involve solving backwards from the final period and the number of periods will vary with \(\Delta\), we find it convenient to let \(t = 1, \ldots, T_\Delta\) index the number of remaining periods, so that \(T_\Delta\) is the first and 1 the last period. At each period \(t\), the seller posts a price \(p_t \in \mathbb{R}\). After observing the price, buyers

\(^{16}\)The price \(p'_3\) required to induce some type-\(v_3\) buyers to purchase at price \(p'_3\) and some to wait for price \(v_2\) will be different when there are only two buyers and when there are three (as will prices \(p''_3\) and \(p''_2\)), though we do not distinguish them with our notation.
simultaneously and independently accept or reject. If the price is accepted by at least one buyer, the game ends with a transaction at this posted price between the seller and a buyer randomly selected from among the accepting buyers. If the offer is rejected, the game moves on to the next period.\footnote{An outcome of the game is a vector \((v, t, p_t, i), \ i = 1, \ldots, n, \) or \((v, 0, \varnothing);\) with the interpretation that the realized profile of valuations is \(v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)\) and the price \(p_t\) is accepted in period \(t\) by buyer \(i\) if the outcome is \((v, t, p_t, i),\) and that no buyer ever accepts in case \((v, 0, \varnothing).\)
}

Each buyer has a private valuation \(v\), independently drawn from a cumulative distribution \(F\) on \([0, 1]\) and constant throughout the game. A buyer of valuation \(v\) who receives the object at price \(p\) garners payoff \(v - p\). The seller has a zero reservation value, with her payoff being the price at which she sells the good. There is no discounting.\footnote{The seller’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over outcomes is simply \(p_t\) if the outcome is \((v, t, p_t, i),\) and zero otherwise. Buyer \(i\)’s utility is \(v_i - p_t\) if the outcome is \((v, t, p_t, i)\) and zero otherwise. We define the players’ expected utilities over lotteries of outcomes in the standard fashion.}

A nontrivial history \(h^t \in H^t\) is a sequence \((p_{T^t}, \ldots, p_{t+1})\) of prices that were posted by the seller and rejected by all buyers (we set \(H^{T^t} = \varnothing\)). A behavior strategy for the seller is a finite sequence \(\{\sigma^t_S\}_{t=1}^{T^t}\), where \(\sigma^t_S\) is a probability transition from \(H^t\) into \(\mathbb{R}\), mapping the history of prices \(h^t\) into a probability distribution over prices. A behavior strategy for buyer \(i\) is a finite sequence \(\{\sigma^t_i\}_{t=1}^{T^t}\), where \(\sigma^t_i\) is a probability transition from \([0, 1] \times H^t \times \mathbb{R}\) into \(\{0, 1\}\), mapping buyer \(i\)’s type, the history of prices, and the current price into a probability of acceptance.\footnote{That is, for each \(h^t \in H^t, \sigma^t_S(h^t)\) is a probability distribution over \(\mathbb{R}\), and the probability \(\sigma^t_S(\cdot)[A]\) assigned to any Borel set \(A \subset \mathbb{R}\) is a measurable function of \(h^t\), and similarly for \(\sigma^t_i\).}

Given a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium,\footnote{The generalization of Fudenberg and Tirole’s [12, Definition 8.2]) definition to our infinite game is immediate.} we call the seller’s price serious if it is accepted by some buyer with positive probability, and losing otherwise. Clearly, the specification of losing prices in an equilibrium is to a large extent arbitrary. Therefore, statements about uniqueness are understood to be made up to the specification of the losing prices.

As a useful benchmark, let \(\pi_D(n)\) denote the expected revenue from an optimal (Dutch) auction with \(n\) bidders and a zero reserve price. This is also the equilibrium revenue of the seller in the continuous-time, infinite-horizon game considered by Bulow and Klemperer [7], in which the seller has no commitment power.

## 4 Lower Bounds on Payoffs

Our first result establishes that the ability to revise prices more rapidly cannot harm the seller. This result is nearly trivial, but already shows that our seller confronts a quite different situation than that facing a durable-goods monopolist. The durable-goods monopolist would dearly love to have only one chance to set a price, and sees her payoffs dwindle away to zero
as price-revision opportunities become more frequent. Our seller can only welcome more rapid price revisions.

Let \( \pi(\Delta) \) denote the sellers’s payoff from a given perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with \( n \) buyers and period length \( \Delta \). Let \( \pi(\Delta) \) (resp. \( \pi(\Delta') \)) denote the infimum (resp., supremum) of this payoff over all equilibria. Notice that \( \pi(1) = \pi(2) = \pi(n) \) is the static monopoly payoff with \( n \) buyers, being uniquely defined by

\[
\pi(1) = \max_{p \in [0,1]} p(1 - (F(p))^n). \tag{3}
\]

**Proposition 1.** If \( \Delta < \Delta' \) and hence \( T_\Delta > T_{\Delta'} \), then

\[
\pi(\Delta) \geq \pi(\Delta'), \quad \text{and} \quad \pi(\Delta) \geq \pi(\Delta').
\]

In particular, \( \pi(\Delta) \geq \pi(1) \). The opportunity to revise prices more quickly increases what the seller can guarantee, and the seller can always do at least as well as the static monopoly payoff.

Every equilibrium thus gives the seller a payoff higher than that of a static monopoly, and if it is unique for all \( \Delta \), the equilibrium in a game with more rapid price revision gives at least as high a payoff as the equilibrium in a game with more sluggish price revision. The result follows immediately (and hence its proof is omitted) from noting that a seller facing \( k \) remaining periods can always set a price of 1 and thereafter duplicate the equilibrium behavior of a seller facing \( k - 1 \) remaining periods. This ensures that an additional period can only increase the seller’s payoff (if the equilibrium is unique). Coupling this with the observation that the seller necessarily earns the static monopoly payoff if there is only a single remaining period gives the result.

Let us now make the common assumption that the distribution of buyer types \( F \) has a differentiable density \( f \). Under the additional assumption that \( f' \leq 0 \), we can impose an alternative lower bound on the seller’s payoff, this time in the limit as pricing periods grow arbitrarily short. This restriction on the density is not universal, but is compatible with many commonly used distributions, including the work-horse uniform distribution, and is also consistent with the assumption of increasing virtual valuations. The Appendix proves:

**Proposition 2.** If \( F \) has differentiable density \( f \) with \( f' \leq 0 \), then

\[
\pi(n) \equiv \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi(\Delta) \geq \pi(\Delta'),
\]

i.e., the seller can always achieve at least the payoffs of an optimal auction with zero reserve price.

Obviously, Proposition 1 gives that the limit is well-defined and that \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi(\Delta) \geq \pi(1) \). Which of these two lower bounds—the static monopoly profit of Proposition 1 or
the zero-reserve-price optimal auction from Proposition 2—is more stringent depends on the number of buyers and the distribution of their valuations. If \( f \) is uniform, for example, then the static monopoly payoff is larger when there is only one buyer (\( \frac{1}{4} \) rather than 0) or two buyers (\( \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}} \) rather than \( \frac{1}{3} \)), but otherwise the zero-reserve-price optimal auction gives a higher payoff.

The proof of Proposition 2 (in the Appendix) proceeds in two steps. First, we suppose the seller could space her prices uniformly throughout the unit interval, i.e., could set prices \((1 - \Delta, 1 - 2\Delta, \ldots, \Delta, 0)\). It follows from Athey [1, Theorem 6, proof] that the seller’s payoff will then approach that of the optimal zero-reserve-price Dutch auction as \( \Delta \) gets small and hence the grid of prices becomes quite dense.

It may appear that this first step already gives the desired result, but we must next deal with the fact that such a sequence of prices may not be sequentially rational. Moreover, sequential rationality is difficult to characterize because at each stage of the auction, the seller’s optimal action depends upon the buyers’ behavior, which in turn depends upon the continuation equilibrium, about which we know very little. The proof exploits the following insight, formalized in Lemma 1 below: Given any remaining interval of possible buyer types \([0, v]\), there is no incentive-compatible mechanism (and hence no continuation equilibrium) that gives a buyer of type \( v \) a higher payoff than a zero-reserve-price Dutch auction. Bearing this in mind, suppose the seller is in the middle of a sequence of prices and considering her next move. She could always set a new price \( \Delta \) lower than her previous one. It would be easy to identify the buyers that will accept this price if the seller would continue shaving her price by \( \Delta \) each period. She might not choose to do so, of course, but Lemma 1 ensures that if the seller contemplates doing anything else, then the marginal buyer will have an even bleaker future, and hence will be all the more willing to accept the current price. This in turn ensures that in every period, the seller can garner an incremental payoff at least as high as she could from cutting prices by \( \Delta \) each period, and hence can altogether ensure a payoff approaching (as \( \Delta \to 0 \)) the payoff of an optimal auction with zero reserve price.

The lemma behind this argument is:

**Lemma 1.** If \( F \) has differentiable density \( f \) with \( f' \leq 0 \), then an efficient auction maximizes the expected utility of the highest type buyer (i.e., a buyer with valuation 1) among all feasible and incentive-compatible mechanisms.

It is then immediate that if the game reaches a period with remaining buyer types \([0, v]\), then continuing with an efficient auction maximizes (over the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms) the payoff of buyer type \( v \).

This lemma is the only place in the proof of Proposition 2 we use the assumption that \( f' \leq 0 \). The argument for the lemma begins with Myerson’s [22] characterization of incentive compatibility. Myerson shows that in any incentive compatible mechanism, the payoff of the highest-type buyer is given by \( \int_0^1 q(v)dv \), where \( q(v) \) is the probability that a buyer of type
v is allocated the object (conditional on being of type v). Then how do we raise the highest-type buyer’s payoff? By setting every buyers’ probability of receiving the object as high as possible, with incentive compatibility ensuring that this spills over into a higher payoff for the highest type. Unfortunately, there are feasibility constraints on the extent to which buyers can be promised the object—they cannot all receive it with probability one. The most effective way to boost the overall acceptance probability \( \int_0^1 q(v)dv \) without running afoul of these constraints is to make \( q(v) \) high when \( f(v) \) is small, effectively making promises that affect incentive compatibility, thereby increasing the highest type’s payoff, but that are unlikely to have to be kept, thus also preserving feasibility. When \( f' < 0 \), this means that we should make \( q(v) \) large when \( v \) is large, doing our utmost to award the object to a high-valuation buyer. But nothing does this more effectively than an efficient auction, opening the door to the result.

Lemma 1 does not hold without the assumption that \( f' < 0 \). Suppose, for example, that the cumulative distribution function of bidder valuations is given by \( F(v) = (e^v - 1)/(e - 1) \), with support \([0, 1]\), and with two bidders. We have \( f' > 0 \) in this case, though this distribution satisfies the assumption of increasing virtual valuation. The utility of the highest type in the efficient auction is \( (e - 2)/(e - 1) \approx 0.4 \), which is less than what he gets if the good is just given away, namely \( (1/2) \). Hence, it is not the case that the efficient auction maximizes the payoff of the highest type buyer, over the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms.

With a bit more structure, we can obtain a result that is again intuitive but nonetheless requires proof:

**Corollary 1.** Suppose \( F \) has differentiable density \( f \) with \( f' \leq 0 \) and the virtual valuation \( v - \frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)} \) is increasing in \( v \). Then more buyers are better for the seller: for every \( n \),

\[
\Pi_{n+1} \geq \Pi_n = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \Pi_{\Delta}(n). \tag{21}
\]

**Proof.** Bulow and Klemperer [8] show that under these assumptions, the payoff from a zero-reserve-price English auction with \( n + 1 \) bidders exceeds the payoff from an optimal mechanism with \( n \) bidders. Since the former is a lower bound on \( \Pi_{\Delta}(n + 1) \) for \( \Delta \) small enough (Proposition 2) and the latter by definition an upper bound on \( \Pi_{\Delta}(n) \), the result follows.

5 Price Discrimination vs. Reserve Prices

Section 4 provides lower bounds on the seller’s payoff, in the process clearly showing that we are not dealing with a durable-goods monopolist. We now ask when and how the seller

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21The stronger statement that more buyers is better for the seller for a fixed \( \Delta \) holds when \( F \) is uniform.
can do better than an optimal auction with zero reserve price.

5.1 One Buyer

We warm up by confirming that when there is only one buyer, the argument developed in the example of Section 2 is general—the seller is effectively a static monopolist.

It follows from Samuelson [23] that among all mechanisms, the optimal ones are equivalent to having the seller make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. As the seller can always do so by posting a price of 1 in every period but the last, every equilibrium must then yield this maximal payoff to the seller. In particular, in every equilibrium, she must charge the optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer (say $p^*$) on the equilibrium path at some point. Since all buyers with values above $p^*$ must accept it, no lower price can ever be assigned positive probability, while all higher offers must always be rejected with probability one. Observe now that, if the buyer accepted with positive probability a price (namely, $p^*$) before the last period, then any subsequent optimal take-it-or-leave-it price would be strictly lower (reflecting the adverse information about the buyer’s valuation conveyed by a rejection), and therefore the buyer would not have been willing to accept the earlier price. Therefore, all prices but that posted in the last period must be losing prices, and the price in the last period must be $p^*$.

To summarize, with $n = 1$ and for any $\Delta$, all equilibria are such that all equilibrium prices are at least $p^*$, and the last one is $p^*$. All prices are rejected except the last one, which is accepted by buyer of type $v$ if and only if $v \geq p^*$. Hence, when $n = 1$, a deadline is an effective way for the seller to commit. Independently of the period length, she does as well as in the optimal mechanism.

5.2 Many Buyers

We now turn to the more interesting case $n > 1$ of multiple buyers. This poses a considerably more formidable technical challenge, forcing us to restrict attention to the case in which buyers’ values are uniformly distributed.\(^{22}\)

Let $p_{\Delta t}$ denote the equilibrium price set by the seller when there are $t$ periods to go (including the current one), given period length $\Delta$. Let $v_{\Delta t} \in [0, 1]$ denote the valuation of the “critical” buyer, who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in period $t$, given $p_{\Delta t}$.\(^{23}\) (Set $v_{\Delta t} = 1$ if every buyer rejects, and $v_{\Delta t} = 0$ if every buyer accepts.)

\(^{22}\)A similar but more involved analysis applies to distributions of the form $F(v) = v^\alpha$. Moving beyond this class of distributions, with its convenient scaling property, would engender significant complications.

\(^{23}\)If type $v_{\Delta t}$ is indifferent between accepting and rejecting price $p_{\Delta t}$, then it must be that higher types accept and lower types reject. This skimming property holds despite the absence of discounting because there are more buyers than objects (it is here that we use the fact that $n > 1$) and an acceptance ends the game.
Proposition 3. Let buyers’ values be uniformly distributed. For any period length $\Delta$ and number of buyers $n > 1$, the equilibrium is unique. The sequences $\{p_{\Delta t}\}_{t=1}^{T_\Delta}$ of equilibrium prices and $\{v_{\Delta t}\}_{t=1}^{T_\Delta}$ of equilibrium critical buyer valuations take values in $(0, 1)$ and are strictly increasing in $t$ (decreasing over time). Further:

(3.1) For $n < 6$, $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} > 0$ and $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi_\Delta(n) > \pi^D(n)$.

(3.2) For $n \geq 6$, $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} = 0$ and $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \pi_\Delta(n) = \pi^D(n)$.

(3.3) $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1}$ is decreasing in $n$.

The proof is involved, and is postponed to the Appendix. This proposition tells us that the seller’s limiting price and payoff depend on the number of buyers. The larger is the number of buyers, the lower does the seller allow the ultimate price to drop (Proposition 3.3). If there are more than six buyers (for the case of a uniform distribution of buyer values), then the seller’s payoff matches that of a continuous-time, infinite-horizon auction and her asking price approaches zero (Proposition 3.2). In this case the seller’s lack of commitment power poses no difficulties in discriminating between buyers, but she abandons all hope of maintaining a reservation price. With five or fewer buyers, the finite horizon allows the seller to commit to a positive reservation price, no matter how long the horizon, reflected in a payoff higher than that of the continuous-time, infinite-horizon auction and a limiting price (equal to $v_{\Delta 1}$) larger than zero (Proposition 3.1).

What lies behind these results? Sequential rationality forces the seller to set a series of prices that decline over time, in each period skimming off an upper interval of high-valuation buyers. As $\Delta$ shrinks and price-revision opportunities come more frequently, the seller sets a higher and higher initial price $p_{\Delta T_\Delta}$, using her frequent price revisions to skim off smaller intervals in each period and hence more effectively price discriminate among the buyers. If $p_{\Delta T_\Delta}$ increases sufficiently rapidly as $\Delta$ shrinks, the higher starting price and smaller skimming intervals will counteract the more frequent price revisions and the terminal price $p_{\Delta 1}$ will never fall to zero—the seller commits to a reserve price. If $p_{\Delta T_\Delta}$ increases more slowly as $\Delta$ shrinks, the more frequent price revisions will more than make up for the higher initial price and smaller intervals, and $p_{\Delta 1}$ will approach zero—no commitment.

Which is optimal? At one extreme, with only one buyer, the seller finds it optimal to commit by setting a serious price $p_{\Delta 1}$ (equal to the static monopoly price) only in the last period, no matter how many previous prices she can set. Suppose there are more buyers and the seller chooses a price path culminating in $p_{\Delta 1} = v_{\Delta 1} > 0$. This path has the advantage (over a smaller terminal price) of increasing revenue whenever the highest and second-highest buyer valuations straddle $v_{\Delta 1}$. This benefit, overwhelming for small $n$, evaporates as the number of buyers gets large—a static monopolist owning one unit sets a price at which she is arbitrarily likely to sell as the number of buyers gets arbitrarily large. Setting $p_{\Delta 1} > 0$ has the cost that the seller loses if all valuations fall short of $p_{\Delta 1}$, but this cost also evaporates as
the number of buyers grows. Finally, fixing $p_{\Delta_1} = v_{\Delta_1} > 0$ (along with sequential rationality) fixes $v_{\Delta_2} > v_{\Delta_1}$ and $v_{\Delta_3} > v_{\Delta_2}$ and so on, imposing constraints on the seller’s prices that impede her ability to discriminate among buyers of higher valuations. This cost goes to zero relatively slowly in the number of buyers, ensuring that the seller prefers to abandon the attempt to commit and to let $p_{\Delta_1}$ and $v_{\Delta_1}$ approach zero when there are enough buyers.

6 Pricing Dynamics

We are interested here in characterizing the timing of the seller’s prices. We study the limiting path of prices and indifferent types, as the period length $\Delta$ goes to zero. To this end, we assume throughout that the buyers’ valuations are drawn uniformly from the unit interval.

6.1 The Benchmark: Commitment

We first consider the case in which the monopolist can commit to prices. Let $v_{\Delta t}$ denote the indifferent type of buyer with $t$ instants to go. Given any period length $\Delta$ and given the sequence of indifferent types $\{v_{\Delta T}, \ldots, v_{\Delta 1}\}$ maximizing the payoff of a seller with commitment, define the step function

$$v_{\Delta}(x) = v_{\Delta t} \text{ for all } x \in \left[\frac{t-1}{T}, \frac{t}{T}\right), \quad v_{\Delta}(1) = 1,$$

where, in keeping with our use of $t$ to identify the number of remaining pricing opportunities, we think of $x$ as the time remaining before hitting the terminal horizon. Our purpose is to prove that the (continuous extension of the) limit

$$v(x) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta}(x) \quad (4)$$

exists, and determine this limit, as well as the corresponding limit $p(x)$ of the analogously defined price function $p_{\Delta}(x)$. Clearly, with only one buyer, only the last posted price matters, and we accordingly assume $n > 1$.

**Proposition 4.** Let buyers’ values be uniformly distributed and $n \geq 2$. The limiting function $v$ (cf. (4)) describing the path of indifferent buyers induced by a seller who can commit to prices is well-defined, and equal to

$$v(x) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \left( 2^{\frac{2n+1}{n+1}} - 1 \right) x + 1 \right)^{\frac{2n+1}{n+1}}, \quad (5)$$

while the corresponding price function is given by

$$p(x) = \frac{(n-1)v(x)^n + 2^n}{nv(x)^{n-1}}. \quad (6)$$
The limiting indifferent buyer’s type $v(x)$ and the seller’s price $p(x)$ thus both decline as the terminal point approaches ($x$ decreases). As expected, $v(1) = 1$ and $v(0) = 1/2$, so that the seller begins (at $x = 1$) slicing off the highest-type buyers, moving downward to a valuation of $1/2$ (at $x = 0$). The function $v$ is concave in $x$ (it is affine in $x$ for $n = 2$), so that the seller runs through buyers more rapidly as time goes on, and is increasing in $n$. Prices are also increasing in $n$, and of course increasing in $x$—prices decline over time—but they are not concave in $x$. Rather, they are convex for $x$ low enough, and concave for high enough values of $x$ (this higher interval being empty if and only if $n \leq 3$). Prices decrease relatively slowly at the beginning and end of the interval, progressing somewhat more rapidly in the middle.

6.2 Noncommitment

We now turn to the non-commitment case, and define the limiting functions $v(x)$ and $p(x)$ exactly as before, but without commitment and hence with a sequence of indifferent types $\{v_{\Delta T}, \ldots, v_{\Delta 1}\}$ maximizing the payoff of a seller without commitment.

Proposition 5. Let buyers’ values be uniformly distributed.

[5.1] For $n \geq 6$, the limiting function $v$ describing the path of indifferent buyers induced by a seller who cannot commit to prices is well-defined, and equal to

$$v(x) = x^{\frac{3}{n+1}},$$

while the corresponding price function is given by

$$p(x) = \frac{n-1}{n} x^{\frac{3}{n+1}}.$$

[5.2] For $n \leq 5$, the functions $v$ and $p$ both converge to $v(x) = 1$ and $p(x) = 1$ on $[0, 1)$. Hence, losing prices are set and no sales made throughout the interval, with all trade collapsing into the last instant.

When $n < 6$ (and in the limit as $\Delta$ gets small), all of the action occurs at the very end of the horizon. The seller sets the choke price until the last instant, at which point the price $p$ and the marginal buyer $v$ cascade in chunks to nonzero terminal values. For larger values of $n$, marginal valuations and prices both decline as time passes ($v$ and $p$ both increase in $x$). Both functions are concave, so that the seller moves through buyers and prices more rapidly as the endpoint approaches. Marginal valuations and prices are both increasing in the number of buyers, and both are smaller than their counterparts without commitment.

Figure 1 illustrates these results. While Proposition 5 calculates the type of the marginal buyer and the price as a function of the time remaining, we make Figure 1 more intuitive by translating these into functions that give marginal valuations and prices as a function
of the *time that has elapsed*. Notice that the function $v$ initially picks out marginal buyers whose types are arbitrarily close to 1, while the prices that make these buyers indifferent are quite a bit lower. Notice also that there is some arbitrariness in the price path under noncommitment and few buyers. The price over the interval $[0, 1)$ must be high enough that there are no sales, and many price paths will have this effect.

![Graphs showing marginal valuations and prices as a function of time](image)

Figure 1. Limiting (as $\Delta \to 0$) marginal valuations $v$ and prices $p$, as a function of the time that has elapsed.
Combining (7)–(8), we find that when \( n \geq 6 \), a buyer of valuation \( v \) purchases the object (if a competitor does not snatch it first) at price\(^{24}\)

\[
p(v) = \frac{n - 1}{n} v.
\]

The price is thus a linear function of the buyer’s valuation. As the number of buyers increases, the seller gains from the fact that the likelihood of a high-valuation buyer increases, but also from the fact that increased competition among buyers pushes each buyer to pay a price closer to his valuation.

### 6.3 Multiple units

Prices in our model invariably decline over time. It is not too hard to think of circumstances in which the successive prices named by a seller increase rather than decrease. Who hasn’t at some point delayed buying a plane ticket, only to find the price higher than it was?

The obvious setting for price to increase is a model with more than one unit for sale. Letting \( k \) be the number of units, we assume \( n \geq k + 5 \), which suffices to ensure that the seller’s price eventually declines to zero. Let \( p_{kn}(v) \) be the price paid by a buyer of valuation \( v \), in the limiting case of arbitrarily short time periods, when there are \( k \) objects and \( n \) buyers. Let \( \pi_{kn} \) be the seller’s payoff when selling \( k \) objects to \( n \) buyers. Arguments analogous to those of the case \( k = 1 \) give\(^{25}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{kn}(v) &= \frac{n - k}{n} v \quad \text{(9)} \\
\pi_{kn} &= \frac{k(n - k)}{n + 1}. \quad \text{(10)}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{24}\)As a check on this result, we can then calculate that the seller’s expected payoff when facing \( n \) buyers is

\[
\int_0^1 p(v)nv^{n-1}dv = \int_0^1 (n-1)v^n dv = \frac{n-1}{n+1} = \pi^D(n),
\]

in keeping with Proposition 3.2. In this calculation, \( p(v) \) is the price paid by a buyer of type \( v \) and \( nv^{n-1} \) is the density of the highest bidders’ valuation, obtained by noting there are \( n \) candidates for the highest bidder and for each valuation \( v \) the probability that it is higher than the other valuations is \( v^{n-1} \).

\(^{25}\)The derivations are much more complicated with multiple objects and do not yield closed-form solutions for the functions \( v(x) \) and \( p(x) \). The Supplementary Appendix sketches the arguments. To provide some insight into these functions, one can verify both that \( \pi_{kn} \) is the expected value of a \( k + 1 \)st price auction with \( n \) bidders, and that \( \pi_{kn} \) and \( p_{kn} \) satisfy the recursion

\[
\pi_{kn} = \int_0^1 n v^{n-1} [p_{kn}(v) + v \pi_{k-1,n-1}] dv,
\]

where \( v \pi_{k-1,n-1} \) is the continuation value of selling \( k - 1 \) objects to \( n - 1 \) buyers with valuations distributed on \( [0,v] \).
A buyer of valuation $v$ thus pays more for the object when facing more competitors, but pays less when there are more objects for sale. The seller’s payoff is increasing in the number of buyers, and is increasing in the number of objects as long as there are at least twice as many buyers as objects. If the seller has too many objects for sale, she would be better off destroying some of them before offering the remainder for sale to the buyers. Notice that the seller could do just as well by withholding the surplus objects from the market, but would then face an irresistible urge to sell the reserved objects once her intended sales quota had been met. Destroying the objects beforehand provides the requisite commitment to limit sales.

Suppose now that the seller begins with $k$ objects and $n$ buyers, and consider the limiting case of vanishingly small period lengths $\Delta$. The price drops until some buyer of type $v$ buys the first object at price $\frac{n-k}{n}v$. At this point, the price jumps upward to $\frac{(n-1)-(k-1)}{n-1} = \frac{n-k}{n-1}v$, as the seller now continues with the optimal strategy given one less object and one less buyer, with the remaining buyers’ valuations distributed on $[0,v]$. The price continues to fall until another buyer of type $v'$ purchases at $\frac{n-k}{n-1}v'$, at which point the price jumps to $\frac{n-k}{n-2}$. This continues until a single object is left, to be eventually sold to a buyer of type $v''$ at price $\frac{n-k}{n-(k-1)}v''$.

Figure 2 illustrates these dynamics. The seller begins with two objects and lets the price fall, decreasing the indifferent buyer type, until the first purchase occurs. The price now jumps upward as the seller switches to the appropriate single-object price path, while the identity of the indifferent buyer continues to decline from the valuation of the buyer who purchased.

![Figure 2: Prices and marginal valuations for $n = 7$ (with a sale at time $t = .6$)](image_url)
The price jumps in this progression are reminiscent of the frenzies in Bulow and Klemperer [7]. Each sale in their model raises the possibility of a frenzy, in which additional buyers purchase at the price of the most recent sale, or even a price increase, in the event that more buyers than there are remaining objects attempt to purchase at the most recent sale price. The revenue earned by our seller (for sufficiently large $n$) matches that of Bulow and Klemperer’s. Bulow and Klemperer work directly in continuous time and impose conditions directly on the path of prices set by the seller, including that price must decline continuously to zero in the absence of a sale, that a sale must be followed by repeated opportunities for additional buyers to purchase at the sale price, and that the price must jump upward if these opportunities for additional purchases lead to excess demand for the good. The result is one of the many continuous-time price paths that maximize the seller’s revenue. Our analysis begins in discrete time and places no restrictions beyond sequential rationality on the seller’s prices, in the process selecting one of the optimal continuous-time price paths as the limit of the optimal pricing scheme with very short, discrete pricing periods.

7 Discussion

More buyers or more prices? Section 2 illustrated our results via an example with a discrete set of buyer valuations, while our analysis is conducted for the case of a continuum of valuations. Connecting these two requires us to recognize an order-of-limits question. In particular, the essence of the example is that the seller is unable to commit to price $v_2$ in a final period, after having screened out type $v_3$ buyers. With two buyers, the seller optimally resolved this conflict by holding the line at a reserve price of 2 while imperfectly screening buyers, while with three buyers the seller sacrifices the reserve price in order to more effectively screen.

If the number of buyers were sufficiently large, the seller in our example could commit to setting price $v_2$ after having learned that there are no $v_3$ buyers.\footnote{A sufficiently large $n$ will reverse the inequality in (2).} This phenomenon is general. For any valuation drawn from a finite set, there is a sufficiently large number of buyers for which that allocation will be the static monopoly price, conditional on having learned there are no higher-valuation buyers. Hence, numerous buyers banish commitment problems.

How do we reconcile this with our observation that commitment problems are pervasive with a continuum of valuations, no matter how numerous the buyers? The closer are the valuations in the previous paragraph’s finite set, the larger the number of buyers required to make commitment feasible. Suppose then we think of a series of finite models to which we add every more possible buyer valuations and ever more buyers. If the number of buyers grows rapidly relative to the set of valuations, then commitment problems will vanish. If the set of possible valuations grows rapidly relative to the number of buyers, we obtain our model
in which commitment problems are endemic. Which is the relevant case? This may depend on the setting, though some intuition can be gained by asking whether sellers are more likely to fret over having too few buyers, or over having too few possible buyer valuations.

**Generalizations.** We have already mentioned that our results would survive the introduction of sufficiently mild discounting. In addition, it would make for more difficult computations but raise no new conceptual issues to expand the analysis to the class of “scalable” distributions of buyer values $F(v) = v^\alpha$ (cf. footnote 22).

What is the difficulty in extending the analysis beyond the set of scalable distributions? The proof of Proposition 3 adduces an induction argument, asking how the seller’s behavior changes as the number of periods increases. After formulating the problem, the first observation is that every additional period translates into another uniquely defined, nontrivial price offer on the part of the seller. We show that this is the case by considering the first- and second-order conditions for the seller’s maximization problem of choosing a price in the first period, finding that the solution is interior. When the distribution of buyer types is uniform, we can obtain a recursive but explicit characterization of the seller’s maximization problem that can be differentiated to obtain the required result. Without a scalable distribution, we could at best hope to replace this step with an envelope argument. The argument is straightforward to write and appears to work flawlessly, until we ask how we can be assured we have the requisite absolute continuity to appeal to the envelope theorem. Once we recognize such difficulties, there appears to be little hope for general or analytical solutions for more general cases. Observe that, compared to the literature on durable goods, there is an additional state variable in our environment, namely the number of periods to go.

**Unknown number of buyers.** We have assumed that our seller knows how many buyers she faces. What if this is not the case? The obvious alternative is to consider a model in which the number of sellers is determined by a Poisson process.\(^{27}\) In this case, the seller’s optimal strategy always entails a positive terminal price. As the price falls without a purchase in our model, the seller draws the inference that all of the buyers happen to have low valuations, while remaining convinced of the number of buyers. The importance of price discrimination remains unaltered, and (when there are sufficiently many buyers) the seller’s decision to sacrifice the reserve price in the interests of price discrimination remains unaltered.

As the price falls without a purchase in a model with a Poisson-distributed number of buyers, the seller draws the inference not only that the buyers have low valuations, but also that there are simply not many buyers there. Eventually, the seller becomes very pessimistic about the number of buyers, and a reasoning analogous to the one applying to the case of a

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\(^{27}\)The Poisson process allows especially convenient calculations, allowing the problem to take on a recursive structure much like that induced by the uniform distribution of valuations in our fixed-number-of-buyers model.
low, but known number of buyers implies here as well that the optimal continuation path of play entails a positive terminal price.

A Appendix: Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 2

For any \( v \in (0,1] \), let \( R^K_v \) denote the lowest revenue among all equilibria of a Dutch auction in which the \( K \) prices \( \{v_k/K, k = 0, \ldots, K - 1\} \) are quoted in descending order, with \( n \) buyers whose valuations are independently drawn from the distribution \( F(\cdot)/F(v) \) on \( [0, v] \). (If multiple bidders accept the same price, the unit is randomly allocated among them.)

Observe that, fixing \( v \), as \( K \to \infty \), the revenue and buyers’ strategies in this \( K \)-price Dutch auction converge to the revenue \( R^D_v \) and equilibrium strategies of the standard Dutch auction with no reserve price.\(^{28}\)

Given \( v \) and \( K \), let \( v^K_{vk} \) denote the buyer type that is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the price \( vk/K \). Convergence implies that for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), there exists \( K_\varepsilon \) such that for all \( K > K_\varepsilon \) and all \( k = 0, \ldots, K \), we have

\[
| R^K_v - R^D_v | < \varepsilon \tag{11}
\]
\[
| vk/K - p^D(v^K_{vk}) | < \varepsilon, \tag{12}
\]

where \( p^D(v^K_{vk}) \) is the price at which \( v^K_{vk} \) is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in the standard Dutch auction. Further, since \( R^K_v \) is a continuous function of \( v \) with \( R^K_0 = R^D_0 = 0 \), we may choose \( K_\varepsilon \) independently of \( v \).

Let \( R^T_v \) denote the lowest revenue among all equilibria in our pricing game with \( T \) periods to go, and residual demand on \( [0, v] \) with distribution \( F(\cdot)/F(v) \). Since \( R^T_v \) is increasing in \( T \) (since waiting one more period is always an option), \( R_v = \lim_{T \to \infty} R^T_v \) is well-defined.

Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that \( R^D_v - R_1 > 2\varepsilon \). Then because \( R^D_v \) and \( R_v \) are continuous functions of \( v \) with \( R^D_0 = R_0 = 0 \), (11) ensures that we can find an infinite sequence of values of \( K \geq K_\varepsilon \), with a corresponding value \( v^K_{1k} \), for some \( k = 1, \ldots, K \), such that

\[
R_{v_1k} < R^K_{v_{1k}} - \varepsilon \quad \text{and} \quad R_{v_1,k-1} > R^K_{v_{1,k-1}} - \varepsilon. \tag{13}
\]

Since both revenues are less than \( \varepsilon \) when \( v \leq \varepsilon \), we have \( v^K_{1k} \geq \varepsilon \). (We can always ensure that both inequalities are strict, at least for a subsequence of the original sequence, by

\(^{28}\)This follows from Athey [1, Theorem 6, proof]: incentive compatibility implies that equilibrium strategies are increasing in types, so that any sequence of such strategies, indexed by \( K \), must have a convergent subsequence, and its limit must be an equilibrium of the standard Dutch auction. But the latter admits a unique equilibrium.
considering a slightly lower or larger value of \( \varepsilon \) if need be.) Pick some \( K \geq K_{\varepsilon} \). Given this \( K \) and corresponding \( v_{i,k}^K \), (13) ensures that we can pick \( T \) large enough so that
\[
R_{v_{i,k}^K}^T < R_{v_{i,k}^K}^T - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad R_{v_{i,k-1}^K}^{T-1} \geq R_{v_{i,k-1}^K}^{T-1} - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}.
\] (14)

Observe that a strategy available to the seller, given \( v_{i,k}^K \) and \( T \) periods to go, is to offer the price that makes type \( v_{i,k-1}^K \) indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Lemma 1 below shows that this price is at least as large as the corresponding price in the standard Dutch auction (since his utility is lower in the continuation than it would be in the standard Dutch auction). That is (using \( K \geq K_{\varepsilon} \) and (12) as well as the second inequality in (14) for the second inequality below),
\[
R_{v_{i,k}^K}^T \geq (1 - F_n(v_{i,k-1}^K))p^n(v_{i,k}^K) + F_n(v_{i,k-1}^K)R_{v_{i,k-1}^K}^{T-1} \\
\geq (1 - F_n(v_{i,k-1}^K))(k/K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}) + F_n(v_{i,k-1}^K)(R_{v_{i,k-1}^K}^{T-1} - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}) = R_{v_{i,k}^K} - \frac{\varepsilon}{2},
\]
contradicting the first inequality in (14).

A.2 Proof of Lemma 1

Let \( q : [0,1] \rightarrow [0,1] \) be a measurable function representing the allocation from some incentive-compatible mechanism, so that \( q(v) \) can be interpreted as the probability that a buyer of valuation \( v \) receives the object. From Border [6], we know that feasibility requires
\[
\forall v : \int_v^1 q(s) f(s) ds \leq \frac{1 - F(v)^n}{n},
\]
or equivalently,
\[
\forall v : \int_v^1 (q(s) - F(s)^{n-1}) f(s) ds \leq 0.
\]

From Myerson [22], the expected utility of the highest type given \( q \) can be written as \( \int_0^1 q(s) ds \), and so the difference between his expected utility given \( q \) and given the efficient auction is then
\[
\int_0^1 (q(s) - F(s)^{n-1}) ds \leq 0.
\]

Let \( \theta(s) = q(s) - F(s)^{n-1} \) and consider then the problem
\[
\max_{\theta} \int_0^1 \theta(s) ds \quad \text{such that} \quad \forall v : \int_v^1 \theta(s) f(s) ds \leq 0.
\]
Our task is to show that \( \theta(s) = q(s) - F(s)^{n-1} \equiv 0 \) solves this problem.

Because \( \theta \) is measurable, it can be approximated by step functions, and so we are led to consider the discrete problem, for \( K \in \mathbb{N} \), and some nonincreasing positive sequence \( \{f_k : k = 0, \ldots, K\} \),

\[
\max_{\{a_k\}_{k=0}^K} \sum_{k=0}^K a_k \quad \text{such that} \quad \forall j = 0, \ldots, K : \sum_{k=j}^K a_k f_k \leq 0.
\]

We claim that \( a_k = 0 \ \forall k \) is a solution to this program. Suppose that \( \{a_k : k = 0, \ldots, K\} \) is a solution, and that for some \( j \), \( \sum_{k=j}^K a_k f_k < 0 \). Then we may as well assume that \( a_{j-1} = 0 \). If indeed \( a_{j-1} > 0 \), then by increasing \( a_j \) and lowering \( a_{j-1} \) by some small \( \varepsilon > 0 \), all the constraints remain satisfied, and the objective function cannot decrease. By induction, we may as well assume that \( a_k = 0 \) for all \( k = 0, \ldots, j-1 \). This, however, implies that \( \sum_{k=0}^K a_k f_k < 0 \), which is impossible at an optimum, as it would then be feasible to increase \( a_0 \) and so increase the objective without violating the constraints. It follows that, at any optimum \( \sum_{k=j}^K a_k f_k = 0 \) for all \( j \), and so setting \( a_k = 0 \) for all \( k \) is a solution to the finite program. It follows that setting \( \theta = 0 \) is a solution to the infinite program, so that the efficient auction maximizes the highest type’s expected utility.

\[\blacksquare\]

A.3 Proof of Proposition 3

The proof is organized in three steps. Step 1 fixes \( \Delta \) (and hence the number of periods \( T_\Delta \)) and uses an induction argument on the number of remaining periods to show that, with \( t \) periods to go and beliefs about buyers’ types that are uniform over \([0, v_{t+1}]\),

(i) the equilibrium is unique,

(ii) the seller’s payoff equals \( \mu_t v_{t+1} \) for some \( \mu_t \) that is independent of \( v_{t+1} \), and

(iii) the period-\( t \) price is such that buyers accept if and only if their evaluation exceeds that of an indifferent type \( v_t \) given by some \( \gamma_t v_{t+1} \), where \( \gamma_t \in (0,1) \) is independent of \( v_{t+1} \).

To show this, we use the seller’s first-order conditions to determine a recursion (and initial values) that characterize the sequences \( \gamma_t \) and \( \mu_t \). We show that these define a unique sequence, with the property that \( \gamma_t < 1 \) for all \( t \). We then show that these values achieve a maximum of the seller’s objective function.

Step 2 studies the sequence \( v_t \), leading to a characterization of the limiting price \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} \) and payoff \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \mu_{T_\Delta} \), giving statements (3.1) and (3.2) of Proposition 3. Step 3 establishes that the terminal price \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} \) is decreasing in \( n \).
A.3.1 Step 1: The Induction Argument

A.3.1a The Last Period

We fix a value of $\Delta$ throughout this subsection, and suppress the corresponding notation. Consider the last period ($t = 1$) and let the seller’s posterior belief be that the buyers’ valuations are uniformly distributed on $[0, v_2]$. Then the seller chooses $p_1 = v_1$ to maximize

$$\left(1 - \left(\frac{v_1}{v_2}\right)^n\right)v_1 = \left(1 - \left(\frac{v_1}{v_2}\right)^n\right)\frac{v_1}{v_2} v_2,$$

so indeed $v_1 = \gamma_1 v_2$ is linear in $v_2$, where $\gamma_1$ maximizes

$$\left(1 - \gamma_1^n\right)\gamma_1,$$

and hence $\gamma_1 = (n + 1)^{-1/n}$.

The value of the problem, $V_1(v_2)$, is then

$$V_1(v_1) = \mu_1 v_2,$$

where $\mu_1 = \frac{n}{n + 1} \gamma_1$,

and so $V_1$ is indeed linear in $v_2$ as well. This solution is obviously unique.

A.3.1b The Induction Step

Now fix $t$ and assume that for any $\tau < t$ periods to go, and for every uniform distribution of buyer valuations on $[0, v_{\tau+1}]$, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by values $\mu_{\tau}$ and $\gamma_{\tau} < 1$ such that the seller sets a price accepted by all buyers with types above $\gamma_{\tau} v_{\tau+1}$, for an expected continuation revenue of $\mu_{\tau} v_{\tau+1}$. Consider the game with $t$ periods to go, and beliefs that are uniform over $[0, v_{t+1}]$.

The buyer’s indifference condition. To characterize the buyers’ reaction to the seller’s prices, suppose that type $v_t$ is indifferent between accepting price $p_t$ and rejecting in order to accept $p_{t-1}$. If buyer $v_t$ accepts, his payoff is

$$\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \frac{1}{j + 1} \binom{n - 1}{j} \left(1 - \left(\frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}}\right)\right)^j \left(\frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}}\right)^{n-1-j} (v_t - p_t) = \frac{1 - (v_t/v_{t+1})^n}{n (1 - (v_t/v_{t+1}))} (v_t - p_t).$$

The first term in the summation is the probability that he is awarded the good if $j$ other buyers accept the posted price, the binomial expression is the probability that $j$ such buyers accept this price, and $v_t - p_t$ is the resulting payoff. By waiting one more period instead, buyer $v_t$ gets

$$\left(\frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}}\right)^{n-1} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \frac{1}{j + 1} \binom{n - 1}{j} \left(1 - \left(\frac{v_{t-1}}{v_t}\right)\right)^j \left(\frac{v_{t-1}}{v_t}\right)^{n-1-j} (v_t - p_{t-1})$$

$$= \left(\frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}}\right)^{n-1} \frac{1 - (v_{t-1}/v_t)^n}{n (1 - (v_{t-1}/v_t))} (v_t - p_{t-1}).$$
Letting $\gamma_t = v_t/v_{t+1}$, and setting these expressions equal, we obtain the indifference condition

$$\frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_t - p_t) = \gamma_t^{n-1} \frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_t - p_{t-1}).$$

Hence

$$\frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_t - p_t) = \gamma_t^{n-1} \frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_t - v_{t-1}) + \gamma_t^{n-1} \frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_{t-1} - p_{t-1})$$

$$= \gamma_t^{n-1} \frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (1 - \gamma_{t-1}) v_t + \gamma_t^{n-1} \left[ \frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) \right]$$

$$= \gamma_t^{n-1} (1 - \gamma_{t-1}) v_t + \gamma_t^{n-1} \gamma_{t-1}^{n-1} (1 - \gamma_{t-2}) v_{t-1} + \cdots.$$ 

That is,

$$\frac{1 - \gamma_t^n}{1 - \gamma_t} (v_t - p_t) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} (1 - \gamma_{t\tau}^n) \left( \prod_{l=\tau+1}^{t} \gamma_l^{n-1} \right) v_{\tau+1}. \quad (15)$$

The seller’s maximization problem. The seller’s value $V_{t+1}$ in period $t$ is given by

$$V_{t+1}(v_{t+1}) = \max_{v_t} \left[ \left( 1 - \left( \frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}} \right)^n \right) p_t + \left( \frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}} \right)^n V_t(v_t) \right]$$

where $p_t$ is given by (15). We can use (15) to rewrite this as

$$V_{t+1}(v_{t+1}) = \max_{v_t} \left[ (1 - \gamma_t^n) (p_t - v_t) + (1 - \gamma_t^n) v_t + \gamma_t^n V_t(v_t) \right]$$

$$= \max_{v_t} \left[ - (1 - \gamma_t) \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} (1 - \gamma_{t\tau}^n) \left( \prod_{l=\tau+1}^{t} \gamma_l^{n-1} \right) v_{\tau+1} + (1 - \gamma_t^n) v_t + \gamma_t^n V_t(v_t) \right].$$

Dividing by $v_{t+1}$, we have

$$\frac{V_{t+1}(v_{t+1})}{v_{t+1}} = \max_{v_t} \left[ - (1 - \gamma_t) \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} (1 - \gamma_{t\tau}^n) \left( \prod_{l=\tau+1}^{t} \gamma_l^{n-1} \right) \frac{v_{\tau+1}}{v_{t+1}} + (1 - \gamma_t^n) \frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}} + \gamma_t^n \mu_{t-1} \frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}} \right]$$

$$= \max_{v_t} \left[ - (1 - \gamma_t) \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} (1 - \gamma_{t\tau}^n) \left( \prod_{l=\tau+1}^{t} \gamma_l^n \right) + \gamma_t (1 - \gamma_t^n) + \gamma_t^{n+1} \mu_{t-1} \right]$$

$$= \max_{v_t} \left[ - (1 - \gamma_t) \left( \gamma_t^n - \prod_{\tau=1}^{t} \gamma_{t\tau}^n \right) + \gamma_t (1 - \gamma_t^n) + \gamma_t^{n+1} \mu_{t-1} \right]$$

$$= \max_{v_t} \left[ (1 - \gamma_t) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t} \gamma_{t\tau}^n + \gamma_t (1 - \gamma_t^{n-1}) + \gamma_t^{n+1} \mu_{t-1} \right], \quad (16)$$

which is an expression that is independent of $v_{t+1}$, and we may thus define $\mu_t = \frac{V_{t+1}(v_{t+1})}{v_{t+1}}$. 

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The seller’s maximization. The first and second derivatives of the seller’s objective (16) are
\[(n\gamma_t^{n-1} - (n + 1)\gamma_t^n) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \gamma_{\tau}^{n} + 1 - n\gamma_t^{n-1} + (n + 1)\gamma_t^n \mu_{t-1}\] (17)
and
\[((n - 1)n\gamma_t^{n-2} - n(n + 1)\gamma_t^{-1}) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \gamma_{\tau}^{n} - (n - 1)n\gamma_t^{n-2} + n(n + 1)\gamma_t^{-1}\mu_{t-1},\]
respectively. The second derivative can be rewritten as
\[\frac{n}{\gamma_t} \left((n\gamma_t^{-1} - (n + 1)\gamma_t^n) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \gamma_{\tau}^{n} - n\gamma_t^{n-1} + (n + 1)\gamma_t^n \mu_{t-1}\right) - n\gamma_t^{n-2} \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \gamma_{\tau}^{n} + n\gamma_t^{n-2}.\]
When the first derivative equals zero, the terms in parentheses in this second derivative equal negative one, giving a second derivative of
\[n(-\gamma_t^{-1} - \gamma_t^{n-2} \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \gamma_{\tau}^{n} + \gamma_t^{n-2}),\]
which is negative if \(\gamma_t \in (0, 1]\). Hence, whenever the first derivative has an interior solution, the second (evaluated at that solution) is negative. This in turn ensures that if the first-order condition induced by (17) has an interior solution, that solution is unique and is a global maximizer.

Uniqueness. We must now show that the first-order condition induced by (17) has a unique, interior solution. Hence, we must show that (17) determines a sequence \(\{\gamma_t\}\) with each \(\gamma_t \in (0, 1]\). Let \(\rho_t = \prod_{\tau=1}^{t} \gamma_{\tau}\), so \(\gamma_t = \rho_t/\rho_{t-1}\). We can then rewrite the first-order condition (17) as
\[(n + 1) \left(\rho_{t-1}^n - \mu_{t-1}\right) \left(\frac{\rho_t}{\rho_{t-1}}\right)^n + n \left(1 - \rho_{t-1}^n\right) \left(\frac{\rho_t}{\rho_{t-1}}\right)^{n-1} = 1.\] (18)
We can rewrite the seller’s maximization problem given by (16) to get
\[\mu_t = \left(1 - \frac{\rho_t}{\rho_{t-1}}\right) \rho_t^n + \frac{\rho_t}{\rho_{t-1}} \left(1 - (\frac{\rho_t}{\rho_{t-1}})^{n-1}\right) + (\frac{\rho_t}{\rho_{t-1}})^n \mu_{t-1},\]
or
\[\frac{\mu_t}{\rho_t^{n+1}} = \frac{1}{\rho_t} - \frac{1}{\rho_{t-1}} + \frac{1}{\rho_t \rho_{t-1}} \left(\frac{1}{\rho_t^{n-1}} - \frac{1}{\rho_{t-1}^{n-1}}\right) + \frac{\mu_{t-1}}{\rho_{t-1}^{n+1}}.\]
that is,
\[ \frac{\mu_t}{\rho_t^{n+1}} - \frac{1}{\rho_t} = \frac{1}{\rho_t \rho_{t-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\rho_t^{n-1}} - \frac{1}{\rho_{t-1}^{n-1}} \right) + \frac{\mu_t}{\rho_t^{n+1}} - \frac{1}{\rho_t}. \]  
(19)

Now let \( q_t = \rho_t^{-1} \) and \( \xi_t = \mu_t q_t^{n+1} - q_t \). Then we can rewrite (18) and (19) as
\[ (n+1) \xi_{t-1} = n (q_{t-1}^n - 1) q_t - q_t^n q_{t-1} \]  
(20)
and
\[ \xi_t = \xi_{t-1} + q_t q_{t-1} (q_t^{n-1} - q_{t-1}^{n-1}). \]  
(21)

We then combine (20) and (21) to get
\[ n (q_t^n - 1) q_{t+1} - q_{t+1}^n q_t = n (q_t^{n-1} - 1) q_t - q_t^n q_{t-1} + (n+1) q_t q_{t-1} (q_t^{n-1} - q_{t-1}^{n-1}) \]
or rearranging,
\[ q_{t+1}^n - n \frac{q_t^n - 1}{q_t} q_{t+1} + n (q_t^{n-1} q_{t-1} - 1) - q_{t-1}^n = 0, \]  
(22)
which holds for \( t \geq 1 \) provided we adopt the convention \( q_0 = 1 \) and recall that \( q_t = (n + 1)^{1/n} \).

Observe now that the sequence \( \{ q_t \} \) is in \((0, 1)\) if and only if the sequence \( \{ q_t \} \) is strictly increasing. The following lemma establishes that this is the case:

**Lemma 2.** Consider the polynomial \( P \) defined by
\[ P(x) = x^n - n \frac{q_t^n - 1}{q_t} x + n (q_t^{n-1} q_{t-1} - 1) - q_{t-1}^n. \]  
(23)

For each \( q_{t-1} < q_t \) with \( q_t > 1 \), \( P \) admits a unique real root strictly larger than \( q_t \).

**Proof.** Assume throughout that \( q_{t-1} < q_t \). The polynomial \( P \) has two real roots if \( n \) is even, and three if \( n \) is odd. To see this, observe that for \( n \) even, it is a convex function that is negative for \( x = q_t \), since
\[ P(q_t) = q_t^n - n \frac{q_t^n - 1}{q_t} q_t + n (q_t^{n-1} q_{t-1} - 1) - q_{t-1}^n \leq 0 \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow q_t^n - q_{t-1}^n \leq n q_t^{n-1} (q_t - q_{t-1}), \]
which is the case since the function \( x \mapsto x^n \) is convex for \( n \geq 2 \). Observe that this also establishes that \( P \) admits a real root larger than \( q_t \). If \( n \) is odd, then \( P \) is concave on \( \mathbb{R}_- \) and convex on \( \mathbb{R}_+ \). Further, \( P(0) = n (q_t^{n-1} q_{t-1} - 1) - q_{t-1}^n \geq 0 \), and (as noted) \( P(q_t) \leq 0 \).
So, in all cases, \( P \) uniquely admits a real root \( x \) that is strictly larger than \( q_t \). \( \square \)

This establishes the desired properties (i)–(iii), completing the first step of the proof.
A.3.2 Step 2: Characterizing $v_t$

We now investigate the sequence of indifferent buyers $\{v_t\}$, leading to the demonstration of Proposition 3.1 and 3.2. The heart of the argument is contained in the following three lemmas. Let $x(q_t, q_{t-1})$ denote the unique root larger than $q_t$ solving (23).

**Lemma 3.**

(3.1) The root $x(q_t, q_{t-1})$ is contained in $(q_t, q_t + (q_t - q_{t-1}))$.

(3.2) For $q_{t-1} < q_t$, $x(q_t, q_{t-1})$ is strictly decreasing in $q_{t-1}$, and holding $q_t/q_{t-1}$ fixed, the ratio $x(q_t, q_{t-1})/q_t$ is an increasing function of $q_t$.

Recall that $q_t = \frac{u_t}{n}$. Hence, Lemma 3.1 indicates that as the seller moves up the interval of possible buyer valuations (i.e., moves earlier in the sequence of periods $(T_\Delta, T_\Delta - 1, \ldots, 1)$), she slices off smaller and smaller intervals of buyer valuations to which to sell: $v_t - v_{t-1}$ is decreasing in $t$. Intuitively, the seller discriminates more finely among higher-valuation buyers. Lemma 3.2 assembles some technical results to be used in proving Lemma 4.

**Proof.** For (3.1), let $q_{t-1} = q(1 - \alpha)$, for some $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $q \geq 1$, $q_t = q$ and consider $P(q(1 + \alpha))$. Now,

$$P(q(1 + \alpha)) = (1 + \alpha)^n q^n - (1 - \alpha)nq^n + n\alpha(1 - 2q^n) > 0,$$

because

$$(1 + \alpha)^n - (1 - \alpha)^n > 2n\alpha,$$

as the left-hand side is convex in $\alpha$ with derivative equal to $2n$ at $\alpha = 0$. Therefore, it must be that $q(1 + \alpha) > x$ and so $x - q_t \leq q_t - q_{t-1}$.

The first part of (3.2) is immediate, since $dP/dq_{t-1} > 0$. As for the second part, observe that we can rewrite (22) as

$$r_t^n - r_{t-1}^{-n} - n(r_t - r_{t-1}^{-1}) - \frac{n}{q_t^n}(1 - r_t) = 0,$$

where $r_t = q_{t+1}/q_t$ for all $t$. Fixing $r_{t-1}$, it follows that $r_t$ is increasing in $q_t$, since the left-hand side is increasing in $r_t$ (note that $r_t > 1$) and decreasing in $q_t$. \hfill \Box

**Lemma 4.** Consider a sequence $u_t$ with $q_0 = u_0$, $q_1 \geq u_1$, and for every $t \geq 2$, $u_{t+1} \leq x(u_t, u_{t-1})$. Then $q_t \geq u_t$ for all $t$.

**Proof.** The proof is by induction on $t$. Observe that, for $t = 1$, by construction both $q_1 \geq u_1$ and $q_1/q_0 \geq u_1/u_0$. Assume now that, for some $t \geq 1$, both $q_{\tau} \geq u_{\tau}$ and $q_{\tau}/q_{\tau-1} \geq u_{\tau}/u_{\tau-1}$ for all $\tau \leq t$. It follows that

$$\frac{q_{t+1}}{q_t} = \frac{x(q_t, q_{t-1})}{q_t} \geq \frac{x(u_t, \frac{u_t}{q_{t-1}})}{u_t} \geq \frac{x(u_t, u_{t-1})}{u_t} \geq \frac{u_{t+1}}{u_t}.$$
The first inequality follows from the second part of Lemma 3.2, given that \( u_t \leq q_t \). The second inequality follows from the facts that \( \frac{u}{q} q_{t-1} \leq u_{t-1} \) (by the induction hypothesis) and \( x(q_t, q_{t-1}) \) is decreasing in its second argument (the first part of Lemma 3.2). The final inequality follows the fact that \( x(u_t, u_{t-1}) \) is an upper bound on \( u_{t+1} \). Since \( q_0 = u_0 \), the conclusion that \( q_{t+1} \geq u_{t+1} \) follows from this inequality and the induction hypothesis.

**Lemma 5.** Consider the sequence \( \{u_t\}_{t=0}^\infty \) defined by \( u_t = (1 + n(t - 1)t/2)^{1/n} \), for all \( t \geq 0 \). The sequence \( u_t \) diverges and, for all \( t \geq 1 \) and all \( n \geq 6 \), \( u_t \leq q_t \).

*Proof.* Divergence is immediate from the definition of \( u_t \). We can calculate that \( u_0 = 1 = q_0 \) and \( u_1 = 1 < (n + 1)^{1/2} = q_1 \). The result then follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that, every \( t \geq 2 \), \( u_{t+1} \leq x(u_t, u_{t-1}) \). This last inequality is established via a tedious calculation. Details are presented in the Supplementary Appendix.

Establishing statements (3.1) and (3.2) of Proposition 3 is now straightforward. Recall that, in an optimal auction with zero reserve price, the expected revenue is given by

\[
\pi_n^D = \frac{n - 1}{n + 1}.
\]

This value is therefore an upper bound on the expected revenue that the seller can hope for in the dynamic game as \( \Delta \to 0 \), if \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} = 0 \), or equivalently \( \lim_{t \to \infty} q_t = \infty \). For \( n \geq 6 \), it follows from Lemma 4 that \( \lim_{t \to \infty} q_t = \infty \) and hence \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} = 0 \). The best the seller can hope for, as \( \Delta \to 0 \), is therefore \( \pi_n^D \). Because \( q_t - q_{t-1} \) is decreasing in \( t \) (Lemma 3.1), it is bounded, and therefore \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \max_{t \leq T} v_{\Delta t} - v_{\Delta t-1} = 0 \), and so also \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \max_{t \leq T} \mu_{\Delta t} - \mu_{\Delta t-1} = 0 \), where \( \mu_{\Delta t} \) is the price charged with \( t \) periods to go in the game with period \( \Delta \) and hence \( T_{\Delta} \) stages. It then follows from Proposition 1 in Chwe [10] that the expected revenue converges to \( \pi_n^D \). This gives the second conclusion of Proposition 3.

What if \( n < 6 \)? We can explicitly compute the first terms of \( \mu_t \) for \( n \in \{2, \ldots, 5\} \), and observe that \( \mu_t > \pi_n^D \) for \( t = 1 \) if \( n = 2, 3, t = 4 \) if \( n = 4, \) and \( t = 36 \) if \( n = 5 \). Since one feasible strategy for the seller is to set \( p_r = 1 \) until period \( t = 1 \) if \( n = 2, 3, t = 4 \) if \( n = 4, \) or \( t = 36 \) if \( n = 5 \) and then obtain value \( \mu_t \), the seller’s optimal strategy must give a payoff exceeding \( \pi_n^D \), and hence \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \mu_{T_{\Delta}} > \pi_n^D \). The preceding argument establishes that a necessary condition for such a limiting payoff is that \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} > 0 \). This establishes the first part of Proposition 3.

**A.3.3 Step 3: Declining Terminal Prices**

We prove here that \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} \) is decreasing in \( n \). In particular, \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} \) is then lower than the last price quoted in an optimal auction with commitment, as the reserve price
(which is the limit of the lowest price in the dynamic game with commitment) equals 1/2, which is $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1}$ when $n = 1$.

The result is proved in several steps. First, recall that $v_1 = \gamma_1 v_2$, where $\gamma_1 = (n + 1)^{-n}$. Now consider the following auction, parameterized by $v$. First, the auctioneer continuously lowers the price until the indifferent type is $v$. At this stage, if the unit is still not accepted, he offers the price $w = \gamma_1 v$, i.e., the monopoly price on the residual demand. If it is also rejected, the auction is over. We may compute the revenue from such an auction by first computing the probability $q(x)$ that a buyer of type $x$ wins the object. This equals 0 if $x < w$, $(v^n - w^n)/(n(v - w))$ if $x \in [w, v)$, and $x^{n-1}$ for $x \geq v$. The price that type $x$ accepts is as usual $p(x) = q(x) - \int_0^x q(t) dt / q(x)$, and expected revenue $R_n(w)$, which equals $\int_0^1 p(x) dF^n(x)$, is then

$$R_n(w) = \frac{n - 1}{n + 1} - (n((n + 1)^{1/n} - 1)w - 1)w^n,$$

which is a function of $w$ that is increasing up to $((n + 1)^{1+1/n} - n - 1)^{-1}$, and then decreasing.

Consider $n = 2, \ldots, 5$. We first claim that, given $w = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1}$, the revenue $R_n(w)$ exceeds the limiting revenue from the equilibrium of the dynamic game (as $\Delta \to 0$). Indeed, consider the two allocations corresponding to each mechanism, the auction described above, and the allocation from the limit. In both cases, buyers’ types below $w$ do not get the unit; types in $[w, v)$ get it only if there is no type above $v$, with the same probability in both cases ($v = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 2}$, since the price in the last period is the monopoly price on the residual demand). So the difference originates from types above $v$. However, for such types, the auction described above achieves an efficient allocation, while this is not necessarily true in the other case. Since with a uniform distribution, the virtual valuation is strictly increasing in types, it follows that $R_n(w)$ exceeds the revenue from the limit of the dynamic game, and hence from the dynamic game, independently of the length of the horizon (since the seller’s payoff increases with $T$).

By considering the first terms of the sequences $\mu_t$ (recall that it is a non-decreasing sequence) we obtain that $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \mu_{T\Delta} > 4/10$ for $n = 2$, $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \mu_{T\Delta} > .515$ for $n = 3$, and $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \mu_{T\Delta} > .6019$ for $n = 4$. Yet $R_n(w)$ exceeds those values only if $w > 4/10$ (for $n = 2$), $w > .32$ (for $n = 3$) and $w > .24$ (for $n = 4$). Since the sequence $1/q_t$ is decreasing, with $\lim_{t \to \infty} 1/q_t = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1}$, it is now easy to verify that, after computing the first few terms, $\lim_{t \to \infty} 1/q_t$ is less than $.4$ for $n = 3$, less than $.32$ for $n = 4$ and less than $.2$ for $n = 5$. It follows that $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1}$ is decreasing in $n$ for $n = 2, 3, 4, 5$. Since this limit is 0 for $n \geq 6$, the same holds for all $n \geq 2$, and clearly also the conclusion also holds for $n = 1$ vs $n = 2$ (in the latter case, the only price accepted with positive probability is 1/2, while in the latter case, by computing the first few terms, it is verified that $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_{\Delta 1} < 1/2$.)

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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4

A.4.1 The Seller’s Payoff with Commitment

We first express the seller’s payoff in terms of the indifferent buyers’ valuations. Fix a period length $\Delta$ and hence number of periods $T$, and then suppress $\Delta$ in the notation. The seller’s payoff with commitment can be written as

$$\Pi = (1 - v^n_T) p_T + (v^n_T - v^n_{T-1}) p_{T-1} + \cdots + (v^n_2 - v^n_1) p_1,$$

(24)

where

$$\frac{v^n_{t+1} - v^n_t}{v_{t+1} - v_t} (v_t - p_t) = \frac{v^n_t - v^n_{t-1}}{v_t - v_{t-1}} (v_t - p_{t-1})
= v^n_t - v^n_{t-1} + \frac{v^n_t - v^n_{t-1}}{v_t - v_{t-1}} (v_{t-1} - p_{t-1})
= v^n_t - v^n_{t-2} + \frac{v^n_{t-1} - v^n_{t-2}}{v_{t-1} - v_{t-2}} (v_{t-2} - p_{t-2})
\cdots
= v^n_t - v^n_1,$$

so that

$$(v^n_{t+1} - v^n_t) p_t = (v^n_{t+1} - v^n_t) v_t - (v_{t+1} - v_t) (v^n_t - v^n_1).$$

(25)

Substituting (25) into (24), we have

$$\Pi = (1 - v^n_T) v_T + (v^n_T - v^n_{T-1}) v_{T-1} + \cdots + (v^n_2 - v^n_1) v_1
- (1 - v_T) (v^n_T - v^n_1) - (v_T - v_{T-1}) (v^n_{T-1} - v^n_1) - \cdots - (v_3 - v_2) (v^n_2 - v^n_1)
= v_T - (1 - v_{T-1}) v^n_T - (v_T - v_{T-2}) v^n_{T-1} - \cdots - (v_3 - v_1) v^n_2 + (1 - v_2 - v_1) v^n_1.$$

We can think of the seller as choosing the identities of the indifferent buyers in order to maximize this payoff. Taking derivatives with respect to these valuations (and setting $v_{T+1} = 1$), we obtain the first-order conditions

$$n v^n_{t-1} = \frac{v^n_{t+1} - v^n_t}{v_{t+1} - v_t} (t = 2, \ldots, T),$$

(26)

$$n v^n_1 (1 - v_2 - v_1) = v^n_2 - v^n_1.$$

(27)

The first formula can be re-written as

$$\sigma^n_t - n \sigma_t = \sigma^n_{t-1} - n \sigma^n_{t-1},$$

where $\sigma_t = v_{t+1}/v_t$.  

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A.4.2 Two Preliminary Inequalities

This section collects two useful technical results.

**Lemma 6.** Let $h(x) = x^n - nx$. Then, for $n \geq 2$,

$$\frac{h(2-x) - h(x)}{x+1} \geq 0, \quad (x \in [0,1]), \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{h^{-1} \circ h(x) - 1}{x-1} = -1,$$

where $h^{-1}$ is the inverse of $h : [0, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}$.

**Proof.** Because the function $y \mapsto y^n$ is convex,

$$(1 + y)^n - (1 - y)^n \geq 2ny$$

for $y \in [0,1]$, so that, for $x = 1 - y$,

$$(2 - x)^n - n(2 - x) \geq x^n - nx,$$

i.e. $h(2-x) \geq h(x)$. Now, observe that the limit is simply the derivative of $h^{-1} \circ h(x)$ at 1. Because $h'(1) = 0$,

$$h(1 - \varepsilon) - h(1) = \frac{h''(1)}{2} \varepsilon^2 + o(\varepsilon^3), \quad h(1 + \delta) - h(1) = \frac{h''(1)}{2} \delta^2 + o(\delta^3),$$

and so, if $h(1 - \varepsilon) = h(1 + \delta) \to h(1)$, it follows that $\varepsilon/\delta \to 1$, so that $(h^{-1} \circ h)'(1) = 1$. \qed

**Lemma 7.** For all $n \geq 2$, there exists $K$ such that, for all $t \geq 1$,

$$h \left( \left( 1 + \frac{1}{t+K} \right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}} \right) \geq h \left( \left( 1 + \frac{1}{t+1+K} \right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}} \right).$$

**Proof.** For $n = 2$, it is easy to verify that the two sides are equal, independently of the value of $K$. Consider $n > 2$. Taking a Taylor expansion, we have that

$$h \left( (1 + y)^{-\frac{3}{n+1}} \right) - h \left( \frac{3n(n-1)(n-2)(2n-1)}{5} y^5 + o(y^6), \right.$$

so that there exists $\bar{y}$ such that, for all $y \in [0, \bar{y}]$,

$$h \left( (1 + y)^{-\frac{3}{n+1}} \right) \geq h \left( \left( 1 + \frac{y}{1+y} \right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}} \right).$$

Letting $K = \bar{y}^{-1} - 1$, the result follows. \qed
A.4.3 Properties of the Commitment Solution

We now use these inequalities to characterize the sequence \( \{v_t\}_{t=1}^\infty \) of indifferent buyer types.\(^{29}\) Fix \( v_1 \in (0, 1) \) and \( \sigma_1 > 1 \) and consider the sequence \( \{v_t\}_{t=1}^\infty \) defined by \( v_1, \sigma_1 \) and

\[
\sigma_t^n - n\sigma_t = \sigma_{t-1}^{-n} - n\sigma_{t-1}^{-1}, \text{ i.e. } h(\sigma_t) = h(\sigma_{t-1}^{-1}),
\]

for \( h(x) = x^n - nx \). Observe that, since \( h \) is decreasing on \([0, 1]\), and increasing on \([1, \infty)\), \( \sigma_t \geq 1 \) for all \( t \). Further, because \( h(x) \geq h(x^{-1}) \) for all \( x \geq 1 \), it is strictly decreasing in \( t \), with limit given by 1.

**Lemma 8.** 1. For all \( n \), the sequence \( \{v_t\} \) is concave, with

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{v_{t+1} - v_t}{v_t - v_{t-1}} = 1.
\]

2. For all \( n \), there exists \( K \) such that

\[
\sigma_t \geq \left( 1 + \frac{1}{t + K} \right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}}.
\]

3. For all \( n \), and \( m \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{v_{mt}}{v_t} \geq m^{\frac{1}{n+1}}.
\]

We use Lemma 8.2 in the proof of Lemma 8.3, and use Lemmas 8.1 and Lemma 8.3 in Section A.4.3.

**Proof.** First, observe that

\[
v_{t+1} - v_t \leq v_t - v_{t-1} \Leftrightarrow \sigma_t \leq 2 - \sigma_{t-1}^{-1}
\]

for \( \sigma_t = v_{t+1}/v_t \). Now

\[
h(\sigma_t) = h(\sigma_{t-1}^{-1}) \leq h(2 - \sigma_{t-1}^{-1}),
\]

where the last inequality follows from (28), given that \( \sigma_{t-1}^{-1} \leq 1 \). Since \( h \) is increasing for \( x \geq 1 \), and both \( \sigma_t \) and \( 2 - \sigma_{t-1}^{-1} \geq 1 \), it follows that indeed \( \sigma_t \leq 2 - \sigma_{t-1}^{-1} \), so that the sequence \( v_t \) is concave. Further, since

\[
\frac{v_{t+1} - v_t}{v_t - v_{t-1}} = \frac{\sigma_t - 1}{1 - \sigma_{t-1}^{-1}} = \frac{h^{-1} \circ h(\sigma_{t-1}^{-1}) - 1}{1 - \sigma_{t-1}^{-1}},
\]

\(^{29}\)For a fixed \( \Delta \), on the first \( T_\Delta \) terms in the infinite sequence we study will be relevant, but the entire infinite sequence will come into play as \( \Delta \to 0 \).
and \( \lim t \sigma_t = 1 \), it follows from \( \lim_{x \uparrow 1} (h^{-1} \circ h(x) - 1) / (1 - x) = 1 \) that \( \lim_t (v_{t+1} - v_t) / (v_t - v_{t-1}) = 1 \).

Given \( \sigma_1 \), fix \( K \) such that both \( \sigma_1 \geq (1 + \frac{1}{1+K})^{\frac{3}{n+1}} \) and (29) is satisfied. Let

\[
\nu_t = \left(1 + \frac{1}{t+K}\right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}}.
\]

By induction, we show that \( \sigma_t \geq \nu_t \). By definition of \( K \), \( \sigma_1 \geq \nu_1 \). Suppose now that \( \sigma_{t-1} \geq \nu_{t-1} \). Since \( h \) is decreasing on \([0, 1]\), and given (29),

\[
h(\sigma_t) = h\left(\sigma_{t-1}^{-1}\right) \geq h\left(\nu_{t-1}^{-1}\right) \geq h(\nu_t),
\]

and since \( h \) is increasing on \([1, \infty)\),

\[
\sigma_t \geq \nu_t.
\]

Observe that

\[
\frac{v_{mt}}{v_t} = \prod_{r=t}^{mt-1} \sigma_r \geq \prod_{r=t}^{mt-1} \nu_r = \left(\frac{mt + K}{t+K}\right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}},
\]

so that

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{v_{mt}}{v_t} \geq m^{\frac{3}{n+1}}.
\]

Lemma 8 tells us about the sequence \( \{v_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \) given a value \( v_1 \). We must next identify the appropriate value \( v_1 \). One strategy available to the seller is to set a price with \( t \) periods to go equal to \( \frac{1+t/T}{2} \), causing \( v_1 \) to converge to \( \frac{1}{2} \) as \( \Delta \) gets small (and hence \( T_\Delta \) large). It follows from standard results (Athey [1]) that her revenue then converges to the revenue of the optimal auction. Conversely, her revenue converges to the revenue of the optimal auction only if \( p_1 = v_1 \) converges to \( 1/2 \) as \( \Delta \) gets small, allowing us to take \( v_1 = \frac{1}{2} \). It follows from the first order conditions (26)–(27) that \( v_2 \) then converges to \( v_1 \), so that asymptotically the entire sequence \( \{v_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \) is contained with \([0, 1]\).

A.4.3. The Limit \( \Delta \to 0 \)

We now consider the limit \( \Delta \to 0 \). Consider the sequence of functions \( v_\Delta(x) \) on \([0, 1]\) defined as follows. For any period length \( \Delta \), define the step function

\[
v_\Delta(x) = v_{\Delta t} \text{ for all } x \in \left[\frac{t-1}{T_\Delta}, \frac{t}{T_\Delta}\right], \quad v_\Delta(1) = 1.
\]

Pick a subsequence of functions \( \{v_\Delta(x)\} \) that converges on the rationals, to some limit function. Because each sequence is non-decreasing, so must be the limit, and let \( x \mapsto v(x) \)
denote the right-continuous extension of this limit. Since the sequence \( \{v_t\} \) is concave (Lemma 8.1), the function \( v \) must be concave, and it is therefore continuous on \((0, 1)\), and admits left- and right-derivatives everywhere on \((0, 1)\).

Because the sequence \( \sigma_t \) defined by a value of \( \sigma_1 \) and the recursion \( h(\sigma_t) = h(\sigma_{t-1}) \) is increasing in \( \sigma_1 \), and given that \( v_{T\Delta} = 1 \), it follows that the value of \( \sigma_1 \) solving the commitment problem for fixed \( v_1 \) is decreasing in \( v_1 \). Since \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} v_1 = 1/2 \), \( \sigma_1 \) is bounded above in \( \Delta \), so that, since for a fixed \( \sigma_1 \),

\[
\frac{v_{t+1} - v_t}{v_t - v_{t-1}} = 1,
\]

it follows also that, for all values \( k > 0 \) such that \( kT \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{v_{kT+1} - v_{kT}}{v_{kT} - v_{kT-1}} = 1.
\]

It follows that the left- and right derivatives of \( v \) agree everywhere, so that \( v \) is differentiable on \((0, 1)\). Therefore, considering the equation

\[
n v (x)^{n-1} (v (x + \delta) - v (x - \delta)) = (v (x + \delta)^n - v (x - \delta)^n),
\]

we might use a Taylor expansion to the third degree as \( \delta \to 0 \), to obtain

\[
n (n-1) v (x)^{n-3} v' (x) \left[ v (x) v'' (x) + \frac{(n-2)}{3} v' (x)^2 \right] \delta^3 + o (\delta^4).
\]

Because \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{v_{n+1}}{v_t} \geq m^{\frac{3}{n+1}} \) for all \( m \) (Lemma 8.3), \( v' (x) > 0 \). Hence it must be that

\[
v (x) v'' (x) + \frac{(n-2)}{3} v' (x)^2 = 0.
\]

This differential equation has as general solution

\[
v (x) = K_1 (x + K_2)^{\frac{2}{n+1}},
\]

for constants \( K_1, K_2 \), and our boundary conditions \( v (1) = 1/2, v (1) = 1 \) allow us to identify these constants, giving (5):

\[
v (x) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \left( \frac{2^{n+1} - 1}{x + 1} \right) \right)^{\frac{3}{n+1}}.
\]

Since

\[
\frac{v_{t+1} - v_t}{v_{t+1} - v_t} (v_t - p_t) = v_t^n - v_1^n,
\]

and \( \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{v(x+\varepsilon) - v(x)^n}{v(x+\varepsilon) - v(x)} = nv(x)^{n-1} \), it follows that \( nv(x)^{n-1} (v(x) - p(x)) = v(x)^n - v(0)^n \), and the expression (6) for \( p(x) \) follows. \( \blacksquare \)
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5

Our characterization of the non-commitment solution builds on our proof of Proposition 3. We first derive an asymptotic estimate of the sequence $q_t/q_{t+1}$ (introduced in the proof of Proposition 3 just before equation (20)). The polynomial (22) that defines $q_t$ can be rewritten as

$$q_t^n - q_t^{n-1} = \frac{n}{q_t} (q_t^n (q_{t+1} - q_t) - (q_{t+1} - q_t)).$$

Since the sequence $q_t$ diverges, we may ignore the second term from the right-hand side, and so, defining $s_t = q_t/q_{t+1}$ (i.e., in terms of the notation of Section A.3.2, $s_t = r^{-1}_t$), we have, for large $t$,

$$s_t^n - s_t^{n-1} - n(s_t^{n-1} - s_t^n) \approx 0.$$

As we also know that $s_t \to 1$, we let $s_t = 1 - \varepsilon_t$, and, so using Taylor expansions to the third order,

$$3\varepsilon_t^2 + (n + 4)\varepsilon_t^3 - 3\varepsilon_{t-1}^2 + (n - 2)\varepsilon_{t-1}^3 \approx 0.$$

Since $\varepsilon_t \to 0$, this implies that $\lambda_t \equiv \varepsilon_t / \varepsilon_{t-1} \to 1$. Rewriting this equation, we have

$$3(\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_{t-1})(1 + \lambda_t)\varepsilon_{t-1} + ((n + 4)\lambda_t^2 + (n - 2)\lambda_t^{-1})\varepsilon_t\varepsilon_{t-1} = 0,$$

so, approximately,

$$\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_{t-1} + \frac{n + 1}{3}\varepsilon_{t-1}\varepsilon_t = 0.$$

If we let $\mu_t = (n + 1)\varepsilon_t/3$, this gives

$$\mu_{t-1} - \mu_t = \mu_t\mu_{t-1},$$

or

$$1/\mu_t - 1/\mu_{t-1} = 1,$$

so we obtain that $\mu_t = (t + C)^{-1}$, for a constant $C$ (possibly infinite). That is, for large $t$, either $\varepsilon_t = 0$ or $\varepsilon_t = \frac{3}{n+1}t^{-1}$. However, recall that we already know (cf. Lemma 4) that

$$\frac{q_t}{q_{t+1}} \leq \frac{u_t}{u_{t+1}} = \left(1 - \frac{nt}{1 + \frac{nt(t+1)}{2}}\right)^{1/n} < 1 - \frac{n}{t},$$

and so the possibility that $\varepsilon_t = 0$ could be ruled out. We conclude that $s_t = 1 - \frac{3}{(n+1)t}$ asymptotically.\(^{30}\)

\(^{30}\)Observe that we made approximations sequentially in the process of deriving this solution. If we plug in our solution into the recursion involving $s_t$ and $s_{t-1}$, we find that the second approximation is of the order $o(t^{-3})$, and the term that was ignored in the initial polynomial is of the same order, so the order of approximations is irrelevant. Also, observe that, since the term that is being ignored is of order $o(t^{-3})$, yet the slope of the function $s_t \mapsto s_t^n - s_{t-1}^n - n(s_t^{n-1} - s_{t-1}^{n-1})$ at 1 is equal to $o(t^{-1})$, the impact of the approximation is of the order $o(t^{-2})$, so that even the cumulative impact of the approximations is negligible, justifying the approximation.
It also follows that
\[
\lim_{q_t \to q_t+1} \frac{q_t - q_{t-1}}{q_t - q_{t-1}} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{s_t - 1}{1 - s_{t-1}} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{t}{t - 1} = 1.
\]
Therefore, if we define, as in the case with commitment, the sequence of functions \(v_\Delta(x)\) on \([0, 1]\) as the step function
\[
v_\Delta(x) = v_t \text{ for all } x \in \left[\frac{t - 1}{T_\Delta}, \frac{t}{T_\Delta}\right], \quad v_\Delta(1) = 1,
\]
and, following what has been done with commitment, we pick a subsequence of functions \(\{v^\Delta(x)\}\) that converges on the rationals, to some limit function (which, because each sequence is non-decreasing, is non-decreasing as well, as well as concave since the sequence \(q_t\) is), and we let \(x \mapsto v(x)\) denote the right-continuous extension of this limit, it follows that the left- and right-derivatives coincide everywhere on \((0, 1)\). Now,
\[
v'(x) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{v_{t+1} - v_t}{\Delta} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{T q_t - q_{t-1}}{q_T} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{T}{t} \frac{q_t - q_{t-1}}{q_t} = \frac{3}{n + 1} \frac{v(x)}{x},
\]
with boundary condition \(v(1) = 1\). This gives \(v(x) = x^{\frac{1}{n+1}}\), or (7). Since
\[
\frac{v^n_{t+1} - v^n_t}{v^n_{t+1} - v^n_t} (v_t - p_t) = v^n_t - v^n_0,
\]
the solution (8) for \(p(x)\) follows.

References


Managing Strategic Buyers

B Supplementary Appendix: Not for Publication

B.1 Calculations, Section 2

In performing the calculations behind the example in Section 2, it is helpful to define the seller’s payoff not in terms of the prices set in each period, but the type of buyer who purchases in each period. Hence, let Π(3, 2, 1) be the payoff to a pricing scheme that induces type \( v_3 \) buyers to purchase in the first period, type \( v_2 \) buyers to purchase in the second, and type \( v_1 \) to purchase in the third. We use an “\( x \)” to denote a period in which no buyers purchase, so that Π(\( x, x, 3 \)) is the payoff of waiting until the final period and then selling to buyers of type \( v_3 \). We can assume that all buyers of type higher than that indicated in a period purchase if they have not already done so, so that Π\( (x, x, 3) \) is the payoff of waiting until the final period and then selling to buyers of type \( v_3 \). We can assume that all buyers of type higher than that indicated in a period purchase if they have not already done so, so that Π\( (x, 2, 1) \) is the payoff of selling to no buyers in the first period, to buyers \( v_2 \) and \( v_3 \) in the second, and to buyers of type \( v_1 \) in the final period. In each case, the corresponding prices are the solution to the problem of maximizing the seller’s payoff subject to the pattern of buyer purchases.

For the case of one buyer, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi_1(x, x, 3) &= (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2))v_3 \\
\Pi_1(x, x, 2) &= (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1))v_2 \\
\Pi_1(x, x, 1) &= (1 - (\rho_0))v_1.
\end{align*}
\]

There are many other strategies available to the seller, but all of them give payoffs equivalent to one of these. It will be useful to define the following, which we can then calculate:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta_{32} &= (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2))v_3 - (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1))v_2 = -0.0036 \\
\Delta_{21} &= (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1))v_2 - (1 - (\rho_0))v_1 = 0.00369.
\end{align*}
\]

With one buyer, the optimal strategy is to thus sell to buyer types \( v_2 \) and \( v_3 \) at price \( v_2 \).

Now suppose there are \( n > 1 \) buyers. In the example, we concentrate on the cases \( n = 2 \)
and \( n = 3 \). We need to consider the following possible payoffs:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi_n(x, x, 3) \\
\Pi_n(x, x, 2) \\
\Pi_n(x, x, 1) \\
\Pi_n(x, 2, 1) \\
\Pi_n(x, 3, 1) \\
\Pi_n(x, 3, 2) \\
\Pi_n(3, 2, 1) \\
\Pi_n(x, 32, 2)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) \) is the payoff from a pricing sequence that induces some \( v_3 \) buyers to purchase in the second period and some to delay purchase to the final period, at which point type \( v_2 \) and \( v_3 \) buyers purchase. Some of these strategies are obviously suboptimal. For example, \( \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) \geq \Pi_n(x, x, 1) \), as it can only improve the seller’s payoff to sell to higher buyer types (at higher prices) before offering the object for sale at price \( v_1 \). Similarly, we have \( \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) \geq \Pi_n(x, 2, 1) \) and \( \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) \geq \Pi_n(x, x, 2) \). Similar reasoning appears to give \( \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) \geq \Pi_n(x, 3, 1) \), and we will proceed as if this is the case, though it is not completely obvious and we will verify it at the end of the calculations.

Now consider \( \Pi(x, 3, 2) \). This calls for type \( v_3 \) buyers to purchase in the second period and type \( v_2 \) buyers to purchase at price \( v_2 \) in the final period. The difficulty here is that this strategy is not sequentially rational. If the object is not sold in the second period, then the buyers in the third period are known to be of types \( v_0, v_1, \) or \( v_2 \). The seller can now set price \( v_2 \) and sell to only type \( v_2 \) buyers, or set price \( v_1 \) and sell to both \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) buyers. We can calculate

\[
\left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^2\right) v_2 < \left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^2\right) v_1
\]

\[
\left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^3\right) v_2 < \left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^3\right) v_1.
\]

This ensures that when there are either two of three buyers, once it has been revealed that there are no \( v_3 \) buyers, then the static monopoly price is \( v_1 \) rather than \( v_2 \). As a result, there is no way for the seller to first sell to type \( v_3 \) buyers in the penultimate period and then sell at price \( v_2 \) to type \( v_2 \) buyers in the final period.

What the seller can do is set a price in the second period that makes type \( v_3 \) buyers indifferent between accepting and rejecting, with these buyers mixing in their accept/reject decisions in such a way as to make price \( v_2 \) in the final period just optimal for the seller. Intuitively, just enough type \( v_3 \) buyers now slip through to the final period to make \( v_2 \) the
static monopoly price. Let \( \bar{\rho}_3(n) \) the probability that a buyer is type \( v_3 \) and purchases in the second period (under this pricing strategy, and when there are \( n \) buyers), and \( \hat{\rho}_3(n) \) the probability that the buyer is type \( v_3 \) and waits until the final period to purchase. Clearly, \( \bar{\rho}_3(n) + \hat{\rho}_3(n) = \rho_3 \). The condition that the seller be just willing to set price \( v_2 \) in the final period is equivalent to

\[
\left( 1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \bar{\rho}_3(2)} \right)^2 \right) v_2 = \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \bar{\rho}_3(2)} \right)^2 \right) v_1
\]

(30)

\[
\left( 1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \bar{\rho}_3(3)} \right)^3 \right) v_2 = \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \bar{\rho}_3(2)} \right)^3 \right) v_1.
\]

(31)

Combining these arguments, we can restrict attention to payoffs \( \Pi_n(x, x, 3) \), \( \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) \), and \( \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) \). Our task is to show that given the values we have chosen, we have

\[
\Pi_3(x, 32, 2) > \Pi_2(x, x, 3) \quad \Pi_3(3, 2, 1) > \Pi_3(x, x, 3) \\
\Pi_2(x, 32, 2) > \Pi_2(3, 2, 1) \quad \Pi_3(3, 2, 1) > \Pi_3(x, 32, 2).
\]

A preliminary result is helpful. First, it will simplify subsequent notation to let

\[
\alpha^n = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2}, \\
\beta^n = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n - \rho_0^n}{\rho_1}.
\]

We will then calculate \( \Pi_n(x, 3, 2) \) ignoring the fact that commitment constraints render this strategy unattainable (or, equivalently, assuming temporarily that the seller can commit). We have

\[
\Pi_n(x, 3, 2) = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n]p + \left[ (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2} \right)^n \right) \right] v_2 \\
= [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n]p + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n] v_2,
\]

where \( p \) is a price that makes \( v_3 \) buyers indifferent between purchasing now and waiting a period to purchase, or

\[
(v_3 - p) \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)} = (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \frac{1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2} \right)^n}{1 - \left( \frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2} \right)^n} (v_3 - v_2)
\]

and hence

\[
(v_3 - p) \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)} = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2} (v_3 - v_2) \\
= \alpha^n (v_3 - v_2)
\]

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Using this for the second inequality in the following, we now calculate

\[
\Pi_n(x, x, 3) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 2) = \left[ 1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \right] (v_3 - p) - \left[ (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n \right] v_2
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \right] \left( \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n} \right) \alpha^n (v_3 - v_2)
\]

\[
- \left[ (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n \right] v_2
\]

\[
= \alpha^n \left[ (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)) v_3 - (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)) v_2 - \rho_2 v_2 \right]
\]

\[
= \alpha^n \Delta_{32}.
\]

We next calculate

\[
\Pi_n(3, 2, 1) = \left[ 1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \right] p_3 + (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \left( \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2} \right)^n p_2
\]

\[
+ (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \left( \frac{\rho_0 + \rho_1}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2} \right)^n \left( 1 - \frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_1} \right)^n v_1
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \right] p_3 + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n] p_2 + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n - \rho_0^n] v_1,
\]

where \( p_3 \) is the price at which \( v_3 \) buyers purchase in the first period and \( p_2 \) the price at which \( v_2 \) buyers purchase in the second, and hence

\[
(v_3 - p_3) \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)} = (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)} (v_3 - p_2)
\]

\[
= (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n \frac{p_2}{\rho_2} (v_3 - p_2)
\]

\[
= \alpha^n (v_3 - p_2)
\]

and

\[
(v_2 - p_2) \left( \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)} \right)^n = (\rho_0 + \rho_1) \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)} \left( \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)}{\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2} \right)^n (v_2 - v_1)
\]

or

\[
(v_2 - p_2) \alpha^n = \beta^n (v_2 - v_2).
\]

We will find it helpful to solve this for

\[
p_2 = v_2 - (v_2 - v_1) \frac{\beta^n}{\alpha^n}.
\]
Now we calculate

\[ \Pi_n(x, x, 3) - \pi_n(3, 2, 1) = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n](v_3 - p_3) - [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n]p_2 - [(\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n - \rho_0^n]v_1 \]

\[ = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n] \alpha^n \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}(v_3 - p_2) - [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n]p_2 - [(\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n - \rho_0^n]v_1 \]

\[ = \alpha^n[1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)]v_3 - \alpha^n(1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2))p_2 - \beta^n \rho_1 v_1 \]

The inequalities we need to show are thus:

\[ \Pi_3(x, x, 3) - \Pi_3(3, 2, 1) = \alpha^3 \Delta_{32} + \beta^3 \Delta_{21} < 0 \] (32)

\[ \Pi_3(x, 32, 2) - \pi_3(3, 2, 1) = \Pi_3(x, 32, 2) - \Pi_3(x, 3, 2) + \Pi_3(x, x, 3) + \Pi_3(x, x, 3) - \Pi_3(3, 2, 1) \]

\[ = \Pi_3(x, 32, 2) - \Pi_3(x, x, 3) - \alpha^3 \Delta_{32} + \beta^3 \Delta_{21} < 0 \] (33)

\[ \Pi_2(x, 32, 2) - \pi_2(3, 2, 1) = \Pi_2(x, 32, 2) - \Pi_2(x, 3, 2) + \beta^2 \Delta_{21} > 0 \] (34)

Attention thus turns to calculating \( \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 2) \). We have

\[ \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n]p + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n]v_2, \]

where the price \( p \) is now set so that

\[ (v_3 - p) \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))} = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2 + \rho_3(n)}(v_3 - v_2) \]

and hence

\[ p = v_3 - (v_3 - v_2) \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2 + \rho_3(n)} \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n}. \]
We can thus write
\[ \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n]v_3 \]
\[ - (v_3 - v_2) \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2 + \rho_3(n)} (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))) \]
\[ + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n]v_2 \]

When \( \rho_3(n) = 0 \), we have
\[ \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n]v_3 \]
\[ - (v_3 - v_2) \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2} (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)) \]
\[ + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n]v_2 \]

Our interest is now in the difference
\[ \Pi_n(x, 32, 2) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 2) \]
\[ = [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n]v_3 \]
\[ - (v_3 - v_2) \left[ \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2 + \rho_3(n)} (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))) \right] \]
\[ - \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + p + 1)^n}{\rho_2} (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)) \]
\[ + v_2[(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n] \]
\[ = (v_3 - v_2) \left[ (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n \right. \]
\[ - \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2 + \rho_3(n)} (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2 + \rho_3(n))) \]
\[ + \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0 + \rho_1)^n}{\rho_2} (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)) \right]. \]

Our calculation then proceeds as follows. First, we fix the values of \( v_1, v_2, v_3, \) and \( \rho_0, \rho_1, \rho_2 \) and \( \rho_3 \) as specified in Section 2. Next, we calculate \( \rho_3(2) \) and \( \rho_3(3) \) as the solutions to (30)–(31). These solutions must be calculated numerically, giving
\[ \rho_3(2) = .0495908 \]
\[ \rho_3(3) = .0337164. \]

We can then verify that for each of these values, the left side of the appropriate equation in (30)–(31) exceeds the right side (with the difference on the order of \( 10^{-8} \)). We then consider
the slightly smaller values

\[ \rho'_3(2) = 0.0495907 \]
\[ \rho'_3(3) = 0.03371639 \]

verifying that now the left side of the appropriate equation in (30)–(31) falls short of the right side, again with a difference on the order of \(10^{-8}\). The actual values of \(\rho_3(2)\) and \(\rho_3(3)\) thus fall within the intervals defined by these two pairs. We now verify numerically that, throughout this interval, the inequalities (32)–(35) hold.

Finally, we return to our commitment to verify the seemingly intuitive inequality that, for \(n = 2, 3\),

\[ \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 1) = \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) - \Pi_n(x, x, 3) + \Pi_n(x, x, 3) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 1) \]
\[ = - (\alpha^n \Delta_{32} + \beta^n \Delta_{21}) + \Pi_n(x, x, 3) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 1) > 0. \]

We have

\[ \Pi_3(x, 3, 1) = [1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n]p + [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0)^n]v_1 \]

where the price \(p\) now satisfies

\[ (v_3 - p) \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n} = (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^{n-1} \left( \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n} \right) (v_3 - v_1) \]

and hence

\[ v_3 - p = \frac{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2) (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - \rho_0^n}{1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n} (v_3 - v_1) \]

This allows us to obtain

\[ \Pi_n(x, x, 3) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 1) = \left[ (1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)) \frac{v_3 - v_1}{\rho_1 + \rho_2} - v_1 \right] [(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0)^n] \]
\[ = [(1 - (\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2))v_3 - (1 - \rho_0)v_1] \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0)^n}{\rho_0 + \rho_1} \]
\[ = \Delta_{31} \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0)^n}{\rho_0 + \rho_1}. \]

Putting these pieces together, we have

\[ \Pi_n(3, 2, 1) - \Pi_n(x, 3, 1) = -\alpha^n \Delta_{32} - \beta^n \Delta_{21} + \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - (\rho_0)^n}{\rho_0 + \rho_1} \Delta_{31}. \]

We again verify this numerically.
B.2 Committing to Lower Prices

This section provides an example in which the seller cannot commit to charging a low enough price in the second stage, and an example in which the seller cannot commit to charging high enough price.

B.2.1 The Model

Assume that there are two buyers and two periods. Buyers have one of three possible valuations, \( v_1, v_2, \) or \( v_3 = 1, \) with \( v_1 < v_2 < 1 \). A buyer has valuation \( v_i \) with probability \( \rho_i, \)

\[
\rho_1 = \frac{1}{8}, \quad \rho_2 = \frac{1}{4}, \quad \rho_3 = \frac{5}{8}.
\]

Conditional on all buyers being of type \( v_1 \) or \( v_2 \) in the last period, the seller’s choice is obviously between charging \( v_1 \) or \( v_2 \). She chooses the latter, higher price if and only if

\[
\Delta = \left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_1}{\rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^n\right) v_2 - v_1 > 0.
\]

There are four obvious pure strategies in the two-period game: selling to type \( v_3 \) first, and then to type \( v_2; \) selling to type \( v_3, \) and then to \( v_1; \) selling to types \( v_3 \) and \( v_2 \) first, and then to \( v_1; \) and finally, selling to no one first, and then to type \( v_3. \) The seller could also wait and sell to some larger subset of types in the second period, but it is clear that this is worse than some strategy in which type \( v_3 \) accepts in the first period. (Of course, the latter strategy may not satisfy sequential rationality). We consider these strategies in turn.

Selling to type \( v_3, \) and then to type \( v_2. \) Denote the price charged in the first period by \( p_{32} \) (the second price is \( v_2 \)), and the expected payoff by \( V_{32}. \) The price \( p_{32} \) must satisfy

\[
\frac{1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)}(v_3 - p_{32}) = (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - 1 \frac{1 - (\rho_1/(\rho_1 + \rho_2))^n}{1 - \rho_1/(\rho_1 + \rho_2)}(v_3 - v_2),
\]

and the payoff \( V_{32} \) must satisfy

\[
V_{32} = (1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n)p_{32} + (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n\left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho_1}{\rho_1 + \rho_2}\right)^n\right)v_2.
\]

Solving, we find that

\[
V_{32} = (1 - \rho_1^n)v_3 - \frac{1 - \rho_1}{\rho_2}((\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n - \rho_1^n)(v_3 - v_2).
\]
Selling to type \( v_3 \), and then to type \( v_1 \). Denote the price charged in the first period by \( p_{31} \) (the second price is \( v_1 \)), and the expected payoff by \( V_{31} \). The price \( p_{31} \) must satisfy
\[
\frac{1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n}{1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)} (v_3 - p_{31}) = (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^{n-1} (v_3 - v_1),
\]
and the payoff \( V_{31} \) must satisfy
\[
V_{31} = (1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n) p_{32} + (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n v_1.
\]
Solving, we find that
\[
V_{31} = v_3 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^{n-1} (v_3 - v_1).
\]

Selling to type \( v_2 \), and then to type \( v_1 \). Denote the price charged in the first period by \( p_{21} \) (the second price is \( v_1 \)), and the expected payoff by \( V_{21} \). The price \( p_{21} \) must satisfy
\[
\frac{1 - \rho_2^n}{1 - \rho_1} (v_2 - p_{21}) = \rho_1^{n-1} (v_2 - v_1),
\]
and
\[
V_{21} = (1 - \rho_2^n) p_{21} + \rho_2^n v_1.
\]
Solving, we find that
\[
V_{21} = v_2 - \rho_1^{n-1} (v_2 - v_1).
\]

Selling to type \( v_3 \) in the second period. Clearly, this yields a payoff of \( V_3 = (1 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)^n) v_3 \).

B.2.2 Case 1: \((v_1, v_2) = (1/8, 1/4)\). The seller cannot commit to a low price.

It is easy to check that \( \Delta = 7/72 > 0 \)—conditional on the buyers not being of type \( v_3 \), it is optimal to set the price to \( v_2 \) in the one-stage game. However, we have that
\[
\frac{43}{64} = V_{31} > \begin{cases} V_{32} = 21/32 \\ V_{21} = 15/64 \\ V_3 = 5/8 \end{cases}.
\]

That is, the optimal two-stage strategy is to sell to high types first, and then to all types.

This also dominates all schemes involving mixing (since if type \( v_2 \) or type \( v_3 \) is supposed to randomize in the first period, this lowers the probability of acceptance (relative to the same type accepting with probability one in the first period), as well as the price paid in the first period, and it does not affect the price in the second).

But since \( \Delta > 0 \), the seller cannot achieve this payoff, since in the second stage, he cannot help but charge a high price. This is therefore an example in which the seller cannot commit to charge low enough a price in the second stage.
B.2.3 Case 2: \((v_1, v_2) = (4/5, 8/9)\). The seller cannot commit to a high price.

It is easy to check that \(\Delta = -4/405 > 0\). Conditional on the buyers not being of type \(v_3\), it is optimal to set the price to \(v_1\) in the one-stage game. However, we have

\[
\frac{539}{576} = V_{32} > \begin{cases} 
V_{31} = 37/40 \\
V_{21} = 79/90 \\
V_3 = 5/8 
\end{cases}
\]

This also dominates all schemes involving mixing (for the same reasons as before).

But since \(\Delta < 0\), the seller cannot achieve this payoff, since in the second stage, he cannot help but charge a low price. This is therefore an example in which the seller cannot commit to charge high enough a price in the second stage.

B.3 Details, Proof of Lemma 5

Our purpose is to prove that, for all \(t \geq 2\) and \(n \geq 6\),

\[
(1 + nt(t + 1)/2)^{1/n} \leq x((1 + n(t - 1)t/2)^{1/n}, (1 + n(t - 2)(t - 1)/2)^{1/n}).
\]

or, equivalently, for all \(t \geq 1\) and \(n \geq 6\),

\[
(1 + n(t + 1)(t + 2)/2)^{1/n} \leq x((1 + nt(t + 1)/2)^{1/n}, (1 + n(t - 1)(t - 2)/2)^{1/n}).
\]

(At this point, letting \(x = 1/t\) and \(y = 1/n\), one can rewrite this inequality as a function on the unit square and then gain some confidence in its veracity by using a program such as Mathematica to plot it.) Upon manipulation, this is equivalent to showing that, for all \(t \geq 1\), \(n \geq 6\),

\[
4t (2 + nt (t + 1))^{1/n} + (2 + nt (t + 1))(2 + n (t - 1) t)^{1/n} - nt (t + 1)(2 + n (t + 1) (t + 2))^{1/n} \leq 0,
\]

or

\[
\left(1 + \frac{n (t + 1)}{1 + \frac{nt(t+1)}{2}}\right)^{1/n} - \left(\frac{2}{nt (t + 1)} + 1\right)\left(1 - \frac{nt}{1 + \frac{nt(t+1)}{2}}\right)^{1/n} - \frac{4}{n (t + 1)} \geq 0. \tag{36}
\]

This will be done in two steps.
B.3.1 The Case $t = 1$

In that case, we must show that

$$g_L(n) := n \left( (1 + 3n)^{1/n} - 1 \right) \geq 2 (1 + n)^{1/n} + 1 =: g_R(n).$$

Observe that, for $x > 0$,

$$\frac{d}{dx} \left( x \ln (1 + x^{-1}) \right) = \ln \left( 1 + \frac{1}{x} \right) - \frac{1}{1 + x} \geq 0,$$

where the last step follows from the standard inequality $\ln x \geq (1 + x)^{-1}$ applied to $1/x$. It follows that $g_R$ is decreasing in $n$.

Consider now the function $g_L$. Its second derivative with respect to $n$ is

$$\frac{(1 + 3n)^{\frac{1}{n} - 2}}{n^3} \lambda(n),$$

where

$$\lambda(n) = (1 + 3n) \ln (1 + 3n) ((1 + 3n) \ln (1 + 3n) - 6n) - 9 (n - 1) n^2.$$

We claim that $\lambda$ is negative $\forall n \geq 1$. To see this, observe first that

$$\frac{d^3 \lambda}{dn^3} = \frac{-54}{(3n + 1)^2} \left( 1 + 3n + 9n^2 - 2 (1 + 3n) \ln (1 + 3n) \right) < 0,$$

because

$$1 + 3n + 9n^2 \geq 2 (1 + 3n) \ln (1 + 3n),$$

which is because, from the standard inequality $\ln \left( 1 + \frac{1}{x} \right) \leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + x}}$, it follows that $\ln (1 + 3n) \leq 3n/\sqrt{1 + 3n}$. Taking squares in the resulting inequality and collecting terms yield the desired result.

Therefore

$$\frac{d^2 \lambda}{dn^2} = 18 \left( \frac{1}{1 + 3n} + \ln (1 + 3n) + \ln^2 (1 + 3n) - (1 + 3n) \right)$$

is decreasing, and it is negative for $n = 1$, so it is negative for all $n \geq 1$.

In turn, this implies that

$$\frac{d \lambda}{dn} = 3 \left( 2 (1 + 3n) \ln^2 (1 + 3n) - 9n^2 - 6n \ln (1 + 3n) \right)$$

is decreasing, and it is negative for $n = 1$, so it is negative for all $n \geq 1$. Repeating once more the argument, this establishes that $\lambda$ is decreasing, and again it is negative for $n = 1$, and therefore for all $n \geq 1$. 
We have now established that \( d^2 g_L/dn^2 \leq 0 \) for all \( n \geq 1 \). Thus, \( d g_L/dn \) is decreasing in \( n \). However, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} d g_L/dn = 0 \), and so \( d g_L/dn \geq 0 \). This proves that \( g_L \) is an increasing function.

This part of the proof is concluded by observing that \( g_L(6) > g_R(6) \). Since \( g_L \) is increasing, while \( g_R \) is decreasing, the inequality follows for all \( n \geq 6 \).

**B.3.2 The General Case, \( t > 1 \)**

**B.3.2a A Sufficient Inequality**

Recall that

\[
(1 + x)^{1/n} \leq 1 + \frac{x}{n} - \frac{n-1}{2n^2} x^2 + \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)}{6n^3} x^3 - \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)(3n-1)}{24n^4} x^4 + \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)(3n-1)(4n-1)}{120n^5} x^5 - \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)(3n-1)(4n-1)(5n-1)}{720n^6} x^6,
\]

and similarly,

\[
(1 - x)^{1/n} \leq 1 - \frac{x}{n} - \frac{n-1}{2n^2} x^2 - \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)}{6n^3} x^3 - \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)(3n-1)}{24n^4} x^4 - \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)(3n-1)(4n-1)}{120n^5} x^5 - \frac{(n-1)(2n-1)(3n-1)(4n-1)(5n-1)}{720n^6} x^6.
\]

We now apply these two bounds to the left side of (36), inserting \( x = \frac{n(t+1)}{1 + \frac{nt(t+1)}{2}} \) and \( x = nt/(1 + \frac{nt(t+1)}{2}) \) respectively. We obtain a rational function whose denominator is positive (being a square) and whose numerator is twice the following polynomial in \( n \) of degree 6:

\[
a_6n^6 + a_5n^5 + a_4n^4 + a_3n^3 + a_2n^2 + a_1n + a_0,
\]

with

\[
a_0 = -4t^6 + 24t^5 - 120t^4 + 480t^3 - 1440t^2 - 2880t - 2880,
a_1 = 48t^7 + 78t^6 + 1330t^5 + 670t^4 - 7818t^3 - 9454t^2 - 6166t,
a_2 = 12t^9 + 24t^8 + 852t^7 + 890t^6 - 9240t^5 - 23184t^4 - 21588t^3 - 13104t^2 - 1950t,
a_3 = 360t^9 + 990t^8 - 3030t^7 - 12645t^6 - 15635t^5 - 4805t^4 + 3285t^3 + 5990t^2 + 1730t,
a_4 = 60t^{11} + 240t^{10} - 930t^9 - 5370t^8 - 11580t^7 - 15376t^6
\]

\[-16824t^5 - 19620t^4 - 14730t^3 - 6960t^2 - 1410t,
a_5 = -180t^{11} - 945t^{10} - 2115t^9 - 2610t^8 - 168t^7 + 5322t^6
\]

\[+ 11830t^5 + 16105t^4 + 12093t^3 + 4904t^2 + 836t,
a_6 = 3t(1 + t)(1 + 2t)(-80 + t)(1 + t)(-272 + t)(1 + t)(-126 + t)(1 + t)(8 + 5t(1 + t)))\).

We must show that this polynomial is positive.
B.3.2b Preliminary Observations

Observe first that $a_6$ is positive for $t \geq 2$. Indeed, the last factor is a polynomial of degree 4 in $x = t (1 + t)$, namely

$$-80 - 272x - 126x^2 + 8x^3 + 5x^4.$$ 

Since the coefficients change signs only once, Descartes’ rule implies that there is at most one strictly positive root. Since this polynomial is negative when evaluated at $x = 0$, and positive when evaluated at $x = 6$ (i.e. $t = 2$), the root must be in $(0, 2)$, and so the polynomial is positive for all $t \geq 2$.

Observe that, by Descartes’ rule, $a_1$ can have at most one strictly positive root. The coefficient $a_1$ is negative for $t = 2$ and positive for $t = 3$, so that the unique root is in $(2, 3)$, and so $a_1$ is negative for $t \geq 2$. Similarly, $a_2$ can have at most one strictly positive root. The coefficient $a_2$ is negative for $t = 3$ and positive for $t = 4$, so the unique root is in $(3, 4)$, and so $a_2 > 0$ for $t \geq 4$. Similarly, $a_3$ can have at most two strictly positive roots. Further, the signs of $a_3$ at $t = 1/2$, $t = 1$ and $t = 4$ alternate, so that here again, there is no root for $t \geq 4$, and so $a_3 > 0$ for $t \geq 4$. By the same method, $a_4$ can have at most one strictly positive root, and $a_4$ is negative for $t = 4$ and positive for $t = 5$, so $a_4 > 0$ for $t \geq 5$. Finally, $a_5$ can have at most one strictly positive root, and it is positive at $t = 1$ and negative at $t = 2$, so it is strictly negative for $t \geq 2$.

We need two further facts. First, $-a_5 > -a_0$ for $t \geq 2$. To see this, let us compute the difference

$$a_5 - a_0 = -180t^{11} - 945t^{10} - 2115t^9 - 1610t^8 - 168t^7 + 5326t^6 + 11806t^5 + 16225t^4 + 11613t^3 + 6344t^2 + 3716t + 2880,$$

so, again by Descartes rule, there can be at most one positive root of the difference, and the difference is positive for $t = 1$ and negative for $t = 2$, and so this difference is negative for $t \geq 2$.

Second, we claim that $-a_5/a_6$ is increasing for $t \geq 4$. To see this, observe that the derivative of the ratio $a_5/a_6$ is equal to the ratio of the following numerator, over a denominator which is positive since it is a square,

$$-150t^{17} - 2820t^{16} - 19500t^{15} - 363160t^{14} + 129880t^{13} + 933852t^{12} + 2769050t^{11} + 53161174t^{10} + 65076966t^9 + 5494474t^8 + 3239750t^7 + 2186194t^6 + 2877454t^6 + 3504246t^5 + 2839892t^4 + 1532112t^3 + 550712t^2 + 120816t + 11904,$$

so it has at most one strictly positive root, and it is positive for $t = 3$ and negative for $t = 4$. So the ratio $-a_5/a_6$ is increasing for $t \geq 4$ and so always less than its limit, which equals

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} -\frac{a_5}{a_6} = 6.$$
B.3.2c The Result For $n > 6$

We are now ready to get our result, at least in the case $n > 6$ for now. We use the Lagrange-McLaurin theorem. Given some polynomial of degree $n$, with real coefficients $\{a_i\}$, let $m = \sup \{i | a_i < 0\}$, and $B = \sup \{-a_i | a_i < 0\}$. Then any real root $r$ of the polynomial satisfies

$$r < 1 + \left( \frac{B}{a_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{n-m}}.$$

Given our previous analysis, it follows that, applying the theorem to the polynomial in $n$ for $t \geq 5$, any real root is less than

$$1 - \frac{a_5}{a_6} < 7.$$

This establishes the inequality (*) for the case $n > 6$ and $t \geq 5$. For $n > 6$ but for each $t = 2, 3, 4$, we can compute

$$1 - \max \left\{ -\frac{a_0}{a_6}, -\frac{a_1}{a_6}, -\frac{a_2}{a_6}, -\frac{a_3}{a_6}, -\frac{a_4}{a_6}, -\frac{a_5}{a_6} \right\},$$

which of course is independent of $n$. It is still less than 7 for both $t = 3, 4$. In both cases, the maximum is achieved by $-a_5/a_6$. In the case $t = 2$, the maximum is achieved by $-a_4/a_6$, and in that case the bound on the root is only $n < 30$. However, we can directly verify that for $t = 2$ and each value $n = 7, \ldots, 30$, the polynomial is positive.

B.3.2d The result for $n = 6$

We are left with proving the result for the case $n = 6$. Plugging into the polynomial in $t$, we obtain the following polynomial in $t$,

$$155520t^{11} + 1321920t^{10} + 4324320t^9 + 8065440t^8 - 40593600t^7 - 168237440t^6 - 321927240t^5 - 358960440t^4 - 234969960t^3 - 83572680t^2 - 12520920t - 5760.$$

Once more, by Descartes’ rule, there can be at most one strictly positive root, and since this polynomial is negative for $t = 2$, and positive for $t = 3$, we are done - except for the case $n = 6$ and $t = 2$. Evaluating the original inequality for that one case concludes the proof.

B.4 Multiple Objects

This section derives the price function (9) and payoff function (9). We provide the preliminary analysis for any number of objects, and then specialize to the case of two objects.

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$^{31}$Riccardo Benedetti and Jean-Jacques Risler, *Real algebraic and semi-algebraic sets* (Hermann, Paris, 1990), Theorem 1.2.2.)
The buyer’s indifference condition. As in the single-object argument, we begin by identifying indifferent buyers. Suppose that there are \( k \) units left. Define

\[
\phi_t = k \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \left( \frac{n-1}{j+1} \right) \gamma_t^{n-j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j + \sum_{j=0}^{k-2} \left( \frac{n-1}{j+1} \right) (1 - \frac{k}{j+1}) \gamma_t^{n-j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j,
\]

where, as usual, \( \gamma_t = v_t/v_{t+1} \). By accepting now, the buyer with valuation \( v_t \) gets

\[
\phi_t (v_t - p_t).
\]

By waiting one period instead, he gets

\[
\gamma_t^{n-1} \phi_{t-1} (v_t - p_{t-1}) + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \left( \frac{n-1}{j} \right) (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} W_{k-j,t} v_t,
\]

where \( W_{k-j,t} \) is the normalized expected payoff when only \( k-j \) units are left (and the number of bidders has gone down to \( n-j \)) and \( t \) periods to go. Indifference requires the two to be equal. Observe that, defining

\[
\phi_t (v_t - p_t) = M_t v_{t+1},
\]

the buyer’s indifference condition becomes

\[
M_t v_{t+1} = \gamma_t^{n-1} \phi_{t-1} (v_t - v_{t-1}) + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \left( \frac{n-1}{j} \right) (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} W_{k-j,t} v_t + \gamma_t^{n-1} M_{t-1} v_t. \tag{37}
\]

The sellers’s maximization problem. The seller’s payoff is

\[
S_{t+1} v_{t+1} = \max \left\{ \gamma_t^n S_t v_t + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} (j p_t + Y_{k-j,t} v_t) + k \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} p_t \right\}
\]

\[
= \max \left\{ \gamma_t^n S_t v_t - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} j \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} + k \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} \right\} (v_t - p_t)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \left( \frac{n}{j} \right) (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} (Y_{k-j,t} - j) v_t - k \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} v_t \right\}.
\]

where \( Y_{k-j,t} \) is the seller’s normalized continuation payoff when only \( k-j \) units are left, with \( t \) periods to go. Observe now that

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k-1} j \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} + k \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_t^{n-j} = n (1 - \gamma_t) \phi_t,
\]

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so we may re-write the seller’s payoff as

\[
S_{t+1} = \max \left\{ \gamma_{t}^{n+1} S_t - n (1 - \gamma_t) \left[ \gamma_{t}^{n} \phi_{t-1} (1 - \gamma_{t-1}) + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \binom{n-1}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_{t}^{n-j} W_{k-j,t} + \gamma_{t}^{n} M_{t-1} \right] + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_{t}^{n+1-j} (Y_{k-j,t} - j) - k \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_{t}^{n+1-j} \right\},
\]

which is a function to be maximized over \( \gamma_t \). This can be written more compactly as

\[
S_{t+1} = \max \left\{ \gamma_{t}^{n+1} S_t + h(\gamma_t) \right\}.
\]

**The seller’s maximization.** Taking derivatives of (39) with respect to the \( \gamma_t \), the seller’s first-order conditions are

\[
S_t = -h'(\gamma_t) \big/ ((n + 1) \gamma_t^n),
\]

and therefore, using (40 in (39),

\[
h'(\gamma_{t+1}) = \gamma_{t+1}^n \left( \gamma_t h'(\gamma_t) - (n + 1) h(\gamma_t) \right).
\]

Writing \( h \) as

\[
h(\gamma_t) = g(\gamma_t) - n (1 - \gamma_t) \gamma_t^n M_{t-1}
\]

and using this expression to substitute for \( h \) in (41) gives

\[
g'(\gamma_{t+1}) - n (n - (n + 1) \gamma_t) \gamma_{t+1}^{n-1} M_t = \gamma_{t+1}^n (\gamma_t g'(\gamma_t) - (n + 1) g(\gamma_t) + n \gamma_t^n M_{t-1}).
\]

We further have, from the price recursion (38)

\[
M_t = A_t + \gamma_t^n M_{t-1},
\]

with

\[
A_t = \gamma_t^n \phi_{t-1} (1 - \gamma_{t-1}) + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \binom{n-1}{j} (1 - \gamma_t)^j \gamma_{t}^{n-j} W_{k-j,t}.
\]

Using (45) in (44) to eliminate \( M_{t-1} \), we solve for

\[
M_t = \frac{g'(\gamma_{t+1}) - \gamma_{t+1}^n (\gamma_t g'(\gamma_t) - (n + 1) g(\gamma_t) - n A_t)}{n^2 \gamma_{t+1}^{n-1} (1 - \gamma_{t+1})}.
\]

Therefore, inserting in (43),

\[
\frac{g'(\gamma_{t+1}) - \gamma_{t+1}^n (\gamma_t g'(\gamma_t) - (n + 1) g(\gamma_t) - n A_t)}{\gamma_{t+1}^{n-1} (1 - \gamma_{t+1})} - n^2 A_t = \frac{g'(\gamma_t) - \gamma_t^n (\gamma_{t-1} g'(\gamma_{t-1}) - (n + 1) g(\gamma_{t-1}) - n A_{t-1})}{(1 - \gamma_t)}.
\]
The expression $\gamma_t g'(\gamma_t) - (n + 1)g(\gamma_t) - nA_t$ can be further simplified. Indeed,

$$\gamma_t g'(\gamma_t) - (n + 1)g(\gamma_t) - nA_t = \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} j(1 - \gamma_t)^{j-1}\gamma_t^{n-j} \left(\binom{n-1}{j} n(1 - \gamma_t)W_{k-j,t} - \binom{n}{j} \gamma_t Y_{k-j,t}\right) + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \binom{n}{j} j^2(1 - \gamma_t)^{j-1}\gamma_t^{n+1-j} + k \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} j(1 - \gamma_t)^{j-1}\gamma_t^{n+1-j}.$$ 

The function $v(x)$. We now let $k = 2$ and seek the function $v(x)$, giving the identity of the indifferent buyer given that there are two units for sale and the length of time to the deadline is $x$. Given $k = 2$, we have

$$Y_{1,t} \approx \frac{n^{q-1} - (\frac{q-1}{q})^n}{n+1}, \text{ and } W_{1,t} \approx \frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{v_t}{v_{t+1}}\right)^{n-1}.$$ 

Observe that

$$\frac{1}{\gamma(x)} - 1 \approx \frac{v'(x)}{v(x)}.$$ 

If we let $t + 1 = x + \varepsilon$, $t = x$ and $t - 1 = x - \varepsilon$, we can approximate $Y_{1,t}$ by

$$\frac{1}{n} \left((n-1) \left(1 + \frac{3\varepsilon}{nx}\right)^{-1} - \left(1 + \frac{3\varepsilon}{nx}\right)^{-n}\right),$$

(recall that there is one fewer buyer) and $W_{1,t}$ by

$$\frac{1}{n-1} \left(1 + \frac{3\varepsilon}{nx}\right)^{1-(n-1)}.$$ 

Finally, we can approximate $\gamma_t$ as follows:

$$\gamma_{t+1} = \left(1 + \frac{v'(x)}{v(x)}\varepsilon + \left(\frac{v''(x)}{v(x)} - \left(\frac{v'(x)}{v(x)}\right)^2\varepsilon^2\right)^{-1}\right),$$

$$\gamma_t = \left(1 + \frac{v'(x)}{v(x)}\varepsilon\right)^{-1},$$

$$\gamma_{t-1} = \left(1 + \frac{v'(x)}{v(x)}\varepsilon - \left(\frac{v''(x)}{v(x)} - \left(\frac{v'(x)}{v(x)}\right)^2\varepsilon^2\right)^{-1}\right),$$

and do an asymptotic expansion in $\varepsilon$ around 0, obtaining

$$(n^2(n+1)w(x)^4 - 2nw'(x)^2 + w(x)^2(3 + n(3n+1)w'(x)))\varepsilon^3 + o(\varepsilon^4) = 0,$$

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where $w(x) = v'(x)/v(x)$. We also know that $v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1$. Calculating the valuations $v(x)$ is thus a matter of solving the ordinary differential equation.

$$n^2(n + 1)w(x)^4 - 2nw'(x)^2 + w(x)^2(3 + n(3n + 1)w'(x)) = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (47)

The price function $p(x)$ and payoff $\pi$. Turning now to the price $p(x)$, from $\phi_t (v_t - p_t) = M_t v_{t+1}$ (cf. (37)), it follows that

$$p_t = v_t - \frac{M_t}{\phi_t} v_{t+1} = v_{t+1} \left( \frac{\gamma_t}{\phi_t} - \frac{M_t}{\phi_t} \right).$$

We have expression (46) for $M_t$, and thus attention turns to computing

$$\gamma_t - \frac{M_t}{\phi_t}.$$  

Using our approximations $W$, $X$ and $\gamma$, it is straightforward to verify that, in the case $k = 2$,

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \gamma_t - \frac{M_t}{\phi_t} = \frac{n - 2}{n}.$$  

This in turn gives the price function

$$p(x) = \frac{n - 2}{n} v(x).$$

It is then straightforward that the seller’s payoff is given by $\frac{2^{n-2}}{n-1}$.  

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