

A Theory of Asset Prices based on Heterogeneous Information and Limits to Arbitrage

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September 20, 2011

Motivation

- ▶ This paper: asset pricing theory based on heterogeneous info and limited arbitrage
 - ▶ **Parsimonious**: all results derive from these 2 elements
 - ▶ **General**: tractability allows analysis of wide class of securities
- ▶ Central message: **systematic departure** of prices from fundamentals
 - ▶ Beliefs are heterogeneous: private signal + price
 - ▶ Price = expectation of **marginal** trader
 - ▶ Noisy info aggregation \Leftrightarrow prices \neq expected dividends (cond. on public info)
 - \Rightarrow Price over/undervaluation (depending on payoff structure)
 - \Rightarrow Price volatility can exceed realized dividend volatility
- ▶ **Variety of applications**:
 - ▶ M&M capital structure irrelevance
 - ▶ Excess volatility of stock returns
 - ▶ Price reaction to public announcements

1. Information aggregation

- ▶ Grossman and Stiglitz (AER 80); Hellwig (JET 80); Diamond and Verrecchia (JFE 81); Wang (REStud 93).

2. Heterogeneous Beliefs and Bubbles

- ▶ Harrison and Kreps (QJE 78); Scheinkman and Xiong (JPE 03); Abreu and Brunnermeier (ECT 03).

3. Finance puzzles

- ▶ M&M Capital structure irrelevance: Myers (JF 84); Myers and Majluf (JFE 84).
- ▶ Excess return volatility: Shiller (AER 81), Campbell and Shiller (RFS 88), Cochrane (RFS 92).
- ▶ Stock price under/overreaction: Barberis et al. (JFE 98); Daniel et al. (JF 98); Hong and Stein (JF 99).

Outline of Talk

1. Setup
2. Information Aggregation Wedge
3. Applications
4. Robustness

Setup

Environment

- ▶ Single risky asset in unit supply
- ▶ Pays $\pi(\theta)$;
 - ▶ Fundamental: $\theta \sim N(0, \sigma_\theta^2)$
 - ▶ Dividend function: $\pi'(\cdot) > 0$, otherwise unrestricted
- ▶ Two dates:
 - ▶ Trading in financial market ($t = 0$)
 - ▶ Payoffs realized ($t = 1$)

Financial Market: $t = 0$

- ▶ Informed traders: $i \in [0, 1]$
 - ▶ Risk-neutral
 - ▶ Limits to arbitrage: Can buy at most 1 share, and cannot short-sell
 - ▶ Observe private signal $\mathbf{x}_i \sim N(\theta, \beta^{-1})$, share price \mathbf{P}
 - ▶ Buy ($\mathbf{d}_i = 1$)/don't buy ($\mathbf{d}_i = 0$):

$$\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P}) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{1} & \text{if } \mathbb{E}[\pi(\theta) \mid \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{P}] \geq \mathbf{P} \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Aggregate informed demand: $D(\theta, \mathbf{P}) = \int d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P}) d\Phi(\sqrt{\beta}(\mathbf{x} - \theta))$
- ▶ Noisy demand: $\Phi(u)$; $u \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)$

Equilibrium Definition

A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) consists of

1. Price function $\mathbf{P}(\theta, u)$
2. Informed traders' demands $\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P})$
3. Posterior beliefs $\mathbf{H}(\theta|\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P})$ for informed traders s.t.,
 - (i) Informed traders demands are optimal (given beliefs)
 - (ii) The asset market clears
 - (iii) Posterior beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule

Trader Optimality: Threshold Strategy

- ▶ Expected dividend, and demand $\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P})$: monotone in \mathbf{x}
 - ▶ Trading strategy: **signal threshold** $\hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P})$

$$\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P}) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{1} & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_i > \hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}) \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_i < \hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}) \\ \in (0, 1) & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_i = \hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}) \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Price = dividend expectation of *marginal* trader ($x_i = \hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P})$)

$$\mathbf{P} = \mathbb{E}[\pi(\theta) | x_i = \hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}), \mathbf{P}] = \int \pi(\theta) dH(\theta | \hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}), \mathbf{P})$$

Market Clearing

▶ $D(\theta, \mathbf{P}) + \Phi(\mathbf{u}) = 1;$

$$\Phi(\sqrt{\beta}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}) - \theta)) = \Phi(\mathbf{u})$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}) = \theta + 1/\sqrt{\beta} \cdot \mathbf{u} \equiv \mathbf{z}$$

▶ **P**: aggregates private info

▶ **P** *informationally equivalent* to $\hat{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{P}) = \mathbf{z}$

▶ **z**: endogenous public signal

▶ Increasing in fundamental θ , noisy demand \mathbf{u}

▶ $\theta|\mathbf{z} \sim N(\mathbf{z}, \sigma_{\mathbf{u}}^2/\beta); \rightarrow$ precision of **z**: $\beta/\sigma_{\mathbf{u}}^2$

▶ β : private info precision; $\sigma_{\mathbf{u}}^2$: noisy demand variance

Proposition: Asset Market Equilibrium

- ▶ Unique equilibrium: price $P_\pi(\mathbf{z})$ and traders' threshold $\hat{x}(p) = \mathbf{z} = P_\pi^{-1}(p)$,

$$\begin{aligned} P_\pi(\mathbf{z}) &= \int \pi(\theta) d\Phi \left(\sqrt{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \left(\theta - \underbrace{\frac{\beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \mathbf{z}}_{\equiv \gamma_P} \right) \right) \\ &= \int \pi(\gamma_P \mathbf{z} + \sigma_\theta \sqrt{1 - \gamma_P} u) \phi(u) du \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Marginal trader pricing share conditions on private signal $\mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{z}$; public signal \mathbf{z}
- ▶ Bayesian weight γ_P on signal \mathbf{z} ; residual uncertainty = $1 - \gamma_P$
- ▶ Expected dividend, conditional on public signal \mathbf{z} only

$$\begin{aligned} V_\pi(\mathbf{z}) &= \int \pi(\theta) d\Phi \left(\sqrt{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \left(\theta - \underbrace{\frac{\beta\sigma_u^{-2}}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \mathbf{z}}_{\equiv \gamma_V} \right) \right) \\ &= \int \pi(\gamma_V \mathbf{z} + \sigma_\theta \sqrt{1 - \gamma_V} u) \phi(u) du \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Bayesian weight $\gamma_V (< \gamma_P)$ on signal \mathbf{z} ; residual uncertainty = $1 - \gamma_V$

Information Aggregation Wedge

Information Aggregation Wedge

- ▶ Information aggregation wedge: $\mathbf{W}_\pi(\mathbf{z}) \equiv \mathbf{P}_\pi(\mathbf{z}) - \mathbf{V}_\pi(\mathbf{z})$
 - ▶ Marginal trader puts higher weight on market signal \mathbf{z} than “outsider” who only observes the price ($\gamma_P > \gamma_V$)


$$P_\pi(\mathbf{z}) = \int \pi(\theta) d\Phi \left(\sqrt{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \left(\theta - \underbrace{\frac{\beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \mathbf{z}}_{\equiv \gamma_P} \right) \right)$$

$$V_\pi(\mathbf{z}) = \int \pi(\theta) d\Phi \left(\sqrt{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \left(\theta - \underbrace{\frac{\beta\sigma_u^{-2}}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \mathbf{z}}_{\equiv \gamma_V} \right) \right)$$

- ▶ But $V_\pi(\mathbf{z})$ is the **correct metric** for valuing the unconditional dividend:

$$\implies \mathbb{E}[\pi(\theta)] = \mathbb{E}[V_\pi(\mathbf{z})]$$

Information Wedge in Linear Case



Price more responsive to z than expected dividend

Intuition: Shift in Marginal Trader's Identity

- ▶ Key intuition: for each realization of \mathbf{z} , **marginal trader** is a **different agent**
 - ▶ Higher \mathbf{z} (due to θ , and/or u) has two effects on beliefs
 - ▶ Higher θ shifts up distribution of signals x 's : higher demand \rightarrow higher $\hat{x}(P)$
 - ▶ Higher u lowers net supply \rightarrow higher $\hat{x}(P)$ to deter buying by informed
 - ▶ Expectations of new marginal trader pricing shares raised through **both** effects
 - ▶ Higher expectations due to market signal (just like anyone else)
 - ▶ Higher expectations due to **shift** in identity (this is the extra kick)
- \Rightarrow "Double weighting" of market info \mathbf{z} is **rational** (Bayesian updating)

Unconditional Wedge

Lemma (unconditional wedge): The unconditional wedge is given by

$$W_{\pi}(\sigma_P) \equiv \mathbb{E}[W(z)] = \int_0^{\infty} \underbrace{(\pi'(\theta) - \pi'(-\theta))}_{\text{sign}} \underbrace{\left(\Phi\left(\frac{\theta}{\sigma_{\theta}}\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{\theta}{\sigma_P}\right) \right)}_{\text{magnitude}} d\theta,$$

- ▶ Sign: related to curvature of $\pi(\cdot)$
- ▶ Magnitude given by **informational frictions** σ_P^2
 - ▶ Marginal trader's posterior $\theta|z: \sim N(\gamma_P z, (1 - \gamma_P)\sigma_{\theta}^2)$
 - ▶ Prior: $z \sim N(0, \sigma_{\theta}^2/\gamma_V)$
 - ▶ Compounded distribution: $\theta \sim N(0, \underbrace{(1 - \gamma_P)\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \gamma_P^2\sigma_{\theta}^2/\gamma_V}_{\sigma_P^2 > \sigma_{\theta}^2})$
- ▶ Marginal trader **overweights tails** of θ distribution (overreacts to z)
 - ▶ Pricing of shares as if $\theta \sim N(0, \sigma_P^2)$, rather than $\sim N(0, \sigma_{\theta}^2)$ (fatter tails)

Results: Over/Under-Valuation


► **Definition (risk type):** a dividend function $\pi(\theta)$, $\forall \theta > 0$,

- (i) Has symmetric risks if $\pi'(\theta) = \pi'(-\theta)$,
- (ii) Has upside risks if $\pi'(\theta) \geq \pi'(-\theta)$,
- (iii) Has downside risks if $\pi'(\theta) \leq \pi'(-\theta)$,
- (iv) If $\pi'_1(\theta) - \pi'_1(-\theta) \leq \pi'_2(\theta) - \pi'_2(-\theta)$,
 $\Rightarrow \pi_1(\cdot)$ has more downside (less upside) risk than $\pi_2(\cdot)$

► **Theorem (value bias):**


- (i) If $\pi(\cdot)$ has symmetric risk, $W_\pi(\sigma_P) = 0$
- (ii) If $\pi(\cdot)$ has upside risk, $W_\pi(\sigma_P) > 0$
- (iii) If $\pi(\cdot)$ has downside risk, $W_\pi(\sigma_P) < 0$
- (iv) $\|W_\pi(\sigma_P)\|$ increasing in info frictions σ_P
- (v) If $\pi_1(\cdot)$ has more downside (less upside) risk than $\pi_2(\cdot)$,
 $\Rightarrow W_{\pi_2}(\sigma_P) - W_{\pi_1}(\sigma_P)$ increasing in σ_P

Risk Types and Information Wedges




Expected wedge = 0 (as in CARA-normal)

Risk Types and Information Wedges



Expected wedge > 0 : Overpriced security (on expectation)

Risk Types and Information Wedges



Expected wedge < 0 : Underpriced security (on expectation)

Formal Results: Volatility

Theorem (excess variability):

For any payoff function $\pi(\cdot)$ with symmetric, upside or downside risks,

$$(i) \mathbb{E}((\pi(\theta) - \pi(0))^2) > \mathbb{E}((V_\pi(z) - V_\pi(0))^2)$$

$$(ii) \mathbb{E}((P_\pi(z) - P_\pi(0))^2) > \mathbb{E}((V_\pi(z) - V_\pi(0))^2)$$

▶ Prices more volatile than expected dividends

$$(ii) \mathbb{E}((P_\pi(z) - P_\pi(0))^2) > \mathbb{E}((\pi(\theta) - \pi(0))^2), \text{ if } \sigma_u^2 \text{ and/or } \beta \text{ high enough}$$

▶ Prices more volatile than realized dividends, in the absence of a SDF

▶ Compare with West (Ect, 1988):

⇒ variability of posterior expectation < variability of realized dividends

⇒ our model: **change in identity** delivers the extra volatility

Recap: Key Results thus far

- ▶ Parsimonious model of info aggregation
 - ▶ Applies to arbitrary (monotone) payoff functions
 - ▶ Tractability arises from risk-neutral setup with limited arbitrage
- ▶ Main result: Information aggregation wedge
 - ▶ Prices overreact to market info due to *identity* effect
 - ▶ Leads to average over/undervaluation (depending on curvature of $\pi(\cdot)$)
 - ▶ Leads to excess volatility of prices

Applications

Application 1: M&M Dividend Split Irrelevance

- ▶ Suppose dividend is split in 2 and sold in separate markets

- ▶ $\pi(\cdot) = \pi_1(\cdot) + \pi_2(\cdot)$
- ▶ $\pi_1(\cdot)$ has downside risk, $\pi_2(\cdot)$ has upside risk

- ▶ Market characteristics

- ▶ Informed traders active in one market only, observe $x_{i,j} \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta, \beta_j^{-1})$
- ▶ Noisy demands:

$$\begin{pmatrix} u_1 \\ u_2 \end{pmatrix} = \mathcal{N} \left(\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_{u,1}^2 & \rho\sigma_{u,1}\sigma_{u,2} \\ \rho\sigma_{u,1}\sigma_{u,2} & \sigma_{u,2}^2 \end{pmatrix} \right)$$

- ▶ Consider informationally segmented markets

- ▶ Traders in mkt j don't observe price P_{-j}
- ▶ Results also hold in info connected markets (see paper)
- ▶ Market characterized fully by info frictions $\sigma_{P,j}$

Application 1: M&M Dividend Split Irrelevance

Proposition:

(i) Seller's revenue is independent of split iff $\sigma_{P,1} = \sigma_{P,2}$

⇒ Markets have **identical** information frictions

(ii) Total expected revenue from $\pi(\cdot)$ maximized by following split:

▶ $\pi_1^*(\theta) = \min\{\pi(\theta), \pi(0)\}$, and $\pi_2^*(\theta) = \max\{\pi(\theta) - \pi(0), 0\}$

▶ Assign π_1^* to investor pool with lower informational friction ($\sigma_{P,1}$)

▶ Intuition


▶ π_1^* has more downs. risk than any other π_1 ,

▶ π_2^* has more ups. risk than any other π_2 ,

⇒ Any alternative split $\{\pi_1, \pi_2\}$ transfers ups. risk from $\sigma_{P,2}$ to $\sigma_{P,1}$ investors

⇒ ...resulting in a net loss of revenue (lower overall wedge)

Splitting Cash Flows for Arbitrary $\pi(\theta)$



$\Rightarrow \pi_1^*$ has max. downside risk; π_2^* max. upside risk

Application 2: Dynamic Trading

- ▶ Dynamic extension:

- ▶ Dividend each period: $\pi(\theta_t)$, θ_t i.i.d.
- ▶ Traders infinitely lived, discount future at fixed rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$

- ▶ Price and expected dividend satisfy recursive expression:

$$P_\pi(z_t) = \mathbb{E}(\pi(\theta_t) + \delta P_\pi(z_{t+1}) | x = z_t, z_t)$$

$$V_\pi(z_t) = \mathbb{E}(\pi(\theta_t) + \delta V_\pi(z_{t+1}) | z_t)$$

- ▶ And so does the wedge:

$$W_\pi(z_t) = w_\pi(z_t) + \delta \mathbb{E}(W_\pi(z)) = w_\pi(z_t) + \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta} \mathbb{E}(w_\pi(z)),$$

$$\text{where } w_\pi(z_t) = \mathbb{E}(\pi(\theta_t) | x = z_t, z_t) - \mathbb{E}(\pi(\theta_t) | z_t)$$

Application 2: Dynamic Trading

Proposition (Dynamic Wedge):

Suppose that $\pi(\cdot)$ is bounded below, increasing, and convex:

- ▶ For any $\sigma_P > \sigma_\theta$, $\exists \hat{\delta} < 1$ s.t. $\forall \delta > \hat{\delta}$, $W(z_t) > 0$, for all z_t .
- ▶ Dynamic model implies:
 - ▶ Future expected wedges raise current share price (if $\pi(\cdot)$ has upside risk)
 - ▶ For high enough δ , share might **always** be overpriced

Application 3: Public Disclosures

- ▶ How does exogenous public info about θ affect wedge?

- ▶ Let $y \sim N(\theta, \alpha^{-1})$ be a public disclosure on θ

- ▶ Same eq. characterization as before, but with extra info

$$P_\pi(y, z) = \int \pi(\theta) d\Phi \left(\sqrt{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \alpha + \beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \left(\theta - \frac{\alpha y + (\beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2})z}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \alpha + \beta + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \right) \right)$$

$$V_\pi(y, z) = \int \pi(\theta) d\Phi \left(\sqrt{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \alpha + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \left(\theta - \frac{\alpha y + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}z}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \alpha + \beta\sigma_u^{-2}} \right) \right)$$

- ▶ Public info crowds out impact of z on price and expected dividend

- ▶ In the limit $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$, wedge disappears

- ▶ But for finite levels of precision α , impacts are more subtle...

Application 3: Public Disclosures

Proposition (Public Disclosures): Consider linear dividend $\pi(\cdot)$ (holds more generally)

(i) $Var(V_\pi(y, z))$ increasing in α

- ▶ Standard Blackwell

(ii) For $\sigma_u^{-2} \geq 2$, $Var(P_\pi(y, z))$ increasing in α ;

Otherwise, $Var(P_\pi(y, z))$ increasing in α iff $\alpha \geq \alpha'$

- ▶ If noisy demand too volatile, α reduces price overreaction to z
- ▶ But for large enough α , price vol increasing (more responsive to θ)

(iii) $Var(W(y, z))$ is decreasing in α iff $\alpha \geq \alpha''$ (and increasing otherwise),

- ▶ For low α , an increase reduces impact of z on $V_\pi(y, z)$ more than on $P_\pi(y, z)$
 - ⇒ Larger wedge
- ▶ But for large enough α , both $V_\pi(y, z)$ and $P_\pi(y, z)$ hardly respond to z
 - ⇒ Wedge vanishes

Robustness

Robustness

- ▶ Alternative distributional assumptions: let
 - ▶ $\theta \sim$ on arbitrary smooth prior on \mathbb{R} , $x_i \sim$ iid cdf $F(\cdot|\theta)$ satisfying MLRP,
 - ▶ Noisy demand $D \sim$ according to cdf $G(\cdot)$ on $[0, 1]$

⇒ Can always characterize wedge in this environment

- ▶ Price impact of information
 - ▶ Let noisy demand be elastic: $D(u, P) = \Phi(u + \eta(\mathbb{E}(\pi(\theta)|P) - P))$
 - ▶ Wedge is inversely related to elasticity η

⇒ Noise traders arbitrage away the wedge

- ▶ Wedge in CARA-normal setup (noisy REE)
 - ▶ Can only solve in the linear case: $\pi'(\cdot) = k > 0$
 - ▶ Wedge has two components
 - ▶ A constant reflecting discount (premium) for average shares held
 - ▶ A symmetric information aggregation wedge
 - ▶ Unconditional returns driven by the average compensation for risk

Conclusions

- ▶ Tractable noisy REE framework
 - ▶ Heterogeneous beliefs, risk neutrality and limited arbitrage
 - ▶ Useful to analyze more general payoff structures
- ▶ Key result: **information aggregation wedge**
 - ▶ Prices overreact to market information
 - ▶ Generates excess price/return volatility
 - ▶ Generates over/undervaluation on average (depending on shape of payoffs)
- ▶ Applications in finance
 - ▶ M&M capital structure irrelevance
 - ▶ Excess volatility puzzle
 - ▶ Impact of public disclosures